'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9
Abstract
This article examines the British attempt to use the momentum created after the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements of October 1925 to promote a similar settlement in Central Europe among the Little Entente countries and Hungary, and in the Balkans, where Bulgaria had to be reconciled with her neighbours, particularly with Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), with each region being dealt with in a separate settlement. The approach of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, was to induce the leaders of the countries in question to come into personal contact and tackle their mutual antagonisms, while at the same time securing that Britain, France and Italy maintained a common stance and spoke with one voice to all the concerned governments. The article outlines the main lines of diplomatic intercourse and analyses the reasons for the ultimate failure of both ‘Central European’ and ‘Balkan Locarno’. It is argued here that Chamberlain’s policy, his distorted perc...eptions, delusive premises and fallacious judgement accounted for the inevitable breakdown of his Locarno-like scheme. This failure became apparent towards the end of the period studied here and its consequences heralded difficult times in the years to come.
Keywords:
Locarno / Chamberlain / Balkan / Central EuropeanSource:
Journal of Contemporary History, 2013, 48, 24-56Publisher:
- SAGE
DOI: 10.1177/0022009412461814
ISSN: 0022-0094
WoS: 000313527200002
Scopus: 2-s2.0-84872916612
Collections
Institution/Community
Балканолошки институт САНУ / Institute for Balkan Studies SASATY - JOUR AU - Bakić, Dragan PY - 2013 UR - https://dais.sanu.ac.rs/123456789/5256 AB - This article examines the British attempt to use the momentum created after the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements of October 1925 to promote a similar settlement in Central Europe among the Little Entente countries and Hungary, and in the Balkans, where Bulgaria had to be reconciled with her neighbours, particularly with Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), with each region being dealt with in a separate settlement. The approach of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, was to induce the leaders of the countries in question to come into personal contact and tackle their mutual antagonisms, while at the same time securing that Britain, France and Italy maintained a common stance and spoke with one voice to all the concerned governments. The article outlines the main lines of diplomatic intercourse and analyses the reasons for the ultimate failure of both ‘Central European’ and ‘Balkan Locarno’. It is argued here that Chamberlain’s policy, his distorted perceptions, delusive premises and fallacious judgement accounted for the inevitable breakdown of his Locarno-like scheme. This failure became apparent towards the end of the period studied here and its consequences heralded difficult times in the years to come. PB - SAGE T2 - Journal of Contemporary History T1 - 'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9 SP - 24 EP - 56 VL - 48 DO - 10.1177/0022009412461814 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5256 ER -
@article{ author = "Bakić, Dragan", year = "2013", abstract = "This article examines the British attempt to use the momentum created after the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements of October 1925 to promote a similar settlement in Central Europe among the Little Entente countries and Hungary, and in the Balkans, where Bulgaria had to be reconciled with her neighbours, particularly with Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), with each region being dealt with in a separate settlement. The approach of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, was to induce the leaders of the countries in question to come into personal contact and tackle their mutual antagonisms, while at the same time securing that Britain, France and Italy maintained a common stance and spoke with one voice to all the concerned governments. The article outlines the main lines of diplomatic intercourse and analyses the reasons for the ultimate failure of both ‘Central European’ and ‘Balkan Locarno’. It is argued here that Chamberlain’s policy, his distorted perceptions, delusive premises and fallacious judgement accounted for the inevitable breakdown of his Locarno-like scheme. This failure became apparent towards the end of the period studied here and its consequences heralded difficult times in the years to come.", publisher = "SAGE", journal = "Journal of Contemporary History", title = "'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9", pages = "24-56", volume = "48", doi = "10.1177/0022009412461814", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5256" }
Bakić, D.. (2013). 'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9. in Journal of Contemporary History SAGE., 48, 24-56. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009412461814 https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5256
Bakić D. 'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9. in Journal of Contemporary History. 2013;48:24-56. doi:10.1177/0022009412461814 https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5256 .
Bakić, Dragan, "'Must Will Peace': The British Brokering of 'Central European' and 'Balkan Locarno', 1925-9" in Journal of Contemporary History, 48 (2013):24-56, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009412461814 ., https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5256 .