The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939
Abstract
After the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive southern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards: it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers, however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav support; but he then turned to Rome..., which was more capable of and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a number of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check.
Keywords:
Italo-Yugoslav Conflict / Albania / Italy / Yugoslavia / Italy / Albania / Tirana Pact / Ahmed ZoguSource:
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2014, 25, 4, 592-612Funding / projects:
- History of Political Ideas and Institutions in the Balkans in the 19th and 20th Centuries (RS-177011)
URI
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592296.2014.967125https://dais.sanu.ac.rs/123456789/5244
Collections
Institution/Community
Балканолошки институт САНУ / Institute for Balkan Studies SASATY - JOUR AU - Bakić, Dragan PY - 2014 UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592296.2014.967125 UR - https://dais.sanu.ac.rs/123456789/5244 AB - After the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive southern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards: it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers, however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav support; but he then turned to Rome, which was more capable of and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a number of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check. T2 - Diplomacy & Statecraft T2 - Diplomacy & Statecraft T1 - The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939 SP - 592 EP - 612 VL - 25 IS - 4 DO - 10.1080/09592296.2014.967125 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5244 ER -
@article{ author = "Bakić, Dragan", year = "2014", abstract = "After the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive southern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards: it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers, however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav support; but he then turned to Rome, which was more capable of and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a number of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check.", journal = "Diplomacy & Statecraft, Diplomacy & Statecraft", title = "The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939", pages = "592-612", volume = "25", number = "4", doi = "10.1080/09592296.2014.967125", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5244" }
Bakić, D.. (2014). The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939. in Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25(4), 592-612. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2014.967125 https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5244
Bakić D. The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939. in Diplomacy & Statecraft. 2014;25(4):592-612. doi:10.1080/09592296.2014.967125 https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5244 .
Bakić, Dragan, "The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939" in Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25, no. 4 (2014):592-612, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2014.967125 ., https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_dais_5244 .