О категоријалним изразима ШТА, ШТО и ЗАШТО у језику Петра II Петровића Његоша Mодалитети ″бића″ и ″небића″ у Његошевом идиолекту

Abstract

У раду се испитује однос између предметних категоријалних израза ШТА и ШТО, узрочног (не-предметног) ШТО и ЗАШТО, унеколико и генитивног ЧЕСА и ЧЕГА у језику Петра II Петровића Његоша. За разлику од идиолеката (и дијалеката) у којима ШТА категорише све „што јесте“ (/ било је, и биће) и све што се може узети као предмет мишљења и говора (сва ″не-људска″ физичка и сва ментална „бића“, све на шта се може упутити с „ово“, или „оно“), а ШТО - све што то није, Његошево ШТА и ШТО деле предметну сферу мишљења, те и носе тумачењу подложне (неграматикализоване) разлике. У раду се трага за тим разликама, што је приступ који подразумева трагање за модалитетима ″бића″ и ″небића″ у језичкој свести, који се као изразито колебљива разлика из најдубљег слоја свести откривају нарочитом анализом контекста у којима учествују посматрани категоријални изрази.

The words such as ko ″human being″, šta ″/non-human/ being″, gde ″a place in space″ (the so-called interrogative / interrogative relative pronouns) are analyzed as the expressions of the categories of thought in the Serbian language. The paper presents an analysis of the relationship among the objective categorial expressions šta and što, the causal (non-objective) što and zašto, and it also mentions the genitive forms česa and čega in the language of Petar II Petrović Njegoš. Unlike the idiolects (and dialects) in which šta categorizes everything “that is” (was and will be) and everything that can be a subject of thought and speech (all ″non-human″ physical and all mental “beings”, everything that can be referred to as “this”, or “that”), and što categorizes everything that is not categorized by šta, Njegoš’s šta and što share the objective sphere of thinking, and imply (non-grammaticalized) distinctions that may be subject to interpretation. The paper seeks to identify these distinctions; the approach implies the identification of the modalities of ″being″ and ″non-being″ in the Serbian linguistic consciousness. As the distinction is particularly vacillating, these modalities are discovered in the deepest layer using a specific analysis of the contexts involving the observed categorial expressions. As far as the categorization of objects is concerned, in Njegoš’s idiolect, the term šta is a reaction to “living” mental “beings” (what is “known clearly”, what is embodied in an animate idea), whereas što is a reaction to everything that is not accompanied with this impression (what is “not known clearly” or is not underlain by an animate idea). In other words, šta categorizes ″an object as a living mental “being”″, whereas što categorizes ″an object as an object″, including the mental ″non-being″. The corpus of examples presented in the paper indicate the existence of an intralingual mechanism according to which any “inanimate knowledge” (the knowledge of objects acquired either spontaneously or through learning and the knowledge of objects entirely unknown/undefined) is categorized as “ignorance”, i.e. everything that is “known” but is not “known clearly” and is not perceived as a mental “being” (is not underlain by an animate idea) is categorized as ″non--being″. Judging by Njegoš’s idiolect, where šta is at least ten times less common than što (in Njegoš’s Selected Letters there are 30 instances of šta, as opposed to 355 instances of što), it seems that the major part of our knowledge consists of objects that are “not known clearly” and are not perceived as animate mental beings. It turns out that the objective distinction šta - što and the non-objective distinc-tion što - zašto can be reduced to the defined - undefined relation. In the što - zašto relation, the što member expresses what is mentally defined (″“non- -being” as an internal cause known in an un-mediated manner″), whereas zašto expresses what is undefined in every aspect (″“non-being” as an external, entirely unknown cause″). Following the distinctions established in classical antiquity (by Plato and Aristotle), the conclusion is reached that in Njegoš’s idiolect, the distinction šta - što rests on the relationship between two modalities of “being” as a subject of thought and speech, and the distinction što - zašto rests on the relationship between two modalities of “non-being”. The evidence that in Njegoš’s idiolect, šta - što are units that belong to the same rank, where šta is “stronger” than što in terms of value and function, challenges the widespread belief that šta was introduced in the Serbian language as the original genitive form of što. Among other things, the paper draws attention to the fact that the šta - što relation, as reflected in Njegoš’s idiolect, and the čЬso ‖ česo - čЬto relation, as reflected in the Codex Marianus, open the path to the reconstruction of the linguistic logic underlying the process of the transformation of three Palaeo-Slavic expressions (*čь, *čьso and *čьto) into two Serbian terms (šta and što), whereas in most Slavic language only one expression has remained.