BRANKO BANOVIĆ

THE MONTENEGRIN
WARRIOR TRADITION

QUESTIONS AND CONTROVERSIES
OVER NATO MEMBERSHIP

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Branko Banović

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To Miloš,

who guided me through the world of contemporary anthropology

Contents

Foreword

The intricacies of national identities in Europe have been explored extensively by anthropologists since the topic emerged as an interesting field of research in the 1980s. The rapidly growing interest in nationalism at this particular time was a result of several converging tendencies. First, anthropologists had begun seriously to study their own societies, using many of the same theoretical tools as they had formerly applied to small-scale, stateless societies. Second, nationalism was simultaneously resurgent and challenged in Europe, owing to immigration from the former colonies, identity politics among minorities such as the Basques, intensified European integration through the EU, and accelerated communication creating new zones of contact and friction. Third, a handful of pathbreaking, seminal books were published almost simultaneously in the early 1980s—Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, and Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism in Europe since 1780*. Thus, by the early 1990s, a critical mass of anthropological studies of European nationalisms had been published, and ethnographically based research into the diversity of national identities in Europe would continue.

The situation in Eastern Europe was different from that in the West. There, historically oriented ethnology and folklore studies continued to hold a strong position, and instead of deconstructing, questioning, and historicizing hegemonic national identities, many academics would continue to interpret and describe national identities from a perspective compatible with classic nation-building.

On this background, this study by Branko Banović, a young Montenegrin anthropologist, is a remarkable accomplishment. While fully conversant with the canonical texts of, and perspectives on, Montenegrin nationalism, Banović studies them as discursive constructions with clear political objectives, identifying inconsistencies, ambiguities, and downright fallacies in the official record. In doing so, he draws on a broad range of theoretical perspectives, from narrative theory to social constructivism and poststructuralisms.

Yet, this rich and authoritative monograph has much higher ambitions than merely to deconstruct a hegemonic construction of national identity. Banović's book is framed by an analysis of masculinity and militarism, through which the narratives of Montenegrin history and identity are understood.

The gendered dimension of nationalism has been studied before, but rarely with the level of empirical detail and theoretical acumen witnessed here. By showing that hegemonic views of Montenegrin masculinity reflect a particular view of the nation, which in turn feeds into the recent debate over NATO membership, Banović simultaneously succeeds in revealing an important dimension of national identities everywhere—their masculine, warlike aspect—and a feature of the hegemonic Montenegrin value system that sheds light on the politics of exclusion (e.g., of homosexuals) and domestic discourses about nationhood. As the book unfolds through an examination of diverse sources of empirical material, the reader gradually comes to realize that the traditional notions of Montenegrin nationhood are now being challenged by powerful forces from within and from without, calling for its redefinition and reformation.

Branko Banović's book about discourses of nationhood and NATO membership in Montenegro convincingly showcases the potentials of anthropology at home, combining his long-term engagement and intimate familiarity with his home country with the analytical skills and professional distance of the social anthropologist. The book is a rich, detailed, and convincing study of a dramatic period in the recent history of a little-known European nation, and a very welcome addition to the anthropological literature on nationalism.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

Preface

What makes Montenegro inspiring for anthropological research is the complex entanglement of historical truth, historical narrative, and poetic narratives perpetuated with each identity question. In that sense, the debate regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO acquires numerous "specifically Montenegrin" characteristics, which I analyze through the lens of anthropological theories of identity. The basis for this book, *The Montenegrin Warrior Tradition: Questions and Controversies over NATO Membership*, is my doctoral dissertation, "Controversies over NATO in Light of Montenegrin Heroic Tradition," defended in November 2010 at the Ethnology and Anthropology Department of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Adapting to the requirements of academic publishing and the market demanded an abridgment and modification of the material from the doctoral thesis. In addition, further ethnographic research, through which I wished to acquire new information as well as verify results of the original work, resulted in significant alterations.

Scientists from various fields have dealt with NATO's expansion and the phenomena that accompany it. My aim is to show that anthropology is indispensable for a complete understanding of this geopolitical issue. By applying an innovative, theoretical-methodological bricolage, I wish to analyze the complex sociocultural phenomena that follow the expansion of NATO in a way that had not been done before. Let the reader judge how successful I have been. I encourage anyone to email me comments and suggestions at brankobanovic9@gmail.com. As an admirer of postmodern theory of ethnography, I was aware how problematic it is to aim for any objectivity in anthropological writing, but I have, nevertheless, endeavored to prevent my "native" position from burdening my writing. Better still, I have done my best to write honestly and objectively.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the teachers who most influenced my studies at various points in my intellectual development. I took my first steps in academic writing alongside my mentor for college senior thesis, Vesna Vučinić-Nešković. Only later in my career did I begin to see the benefits of our cooperation and truly begin to appreciate how far-reaching and significant her theoretical, methodological, and technical direction proved to be. I based my masters' studies on the module of anthropologies of folklore, where I took particular effort to delve deep into the secrets of structuralism and semiology. I was lucky to be guided through the mysteries of these two very exciting anthropological schools of thought by Dragana Antonijević and Ivan Kovačević. Dragana Antonijević was the mentor for my masters' thesis. I will always remember her dedication, honest praise, and even more honest criticism, all of which pushed me to be better at my work. To be honest, a dream that remains unfulfilled for me is to defend a doctoral dissertation in the field of structuralism and semiology. I only realized the value of all the work put in when Ivan Kovačević agreed wholeheartedly to be the mentor for my PhD. I was aware of the significant role Ivan Kovačević had on modernizing and advancing ethnology and anthropology in all of former Yugoslavia, and I was hence very happy and proud to cooperate with such an intellectual giant. On occasion, I would get lost in an analytic maze of my own making, struggling for days to find a way out. When things seemed hopeless, I would seek help from my mentor. In a matter of seconds, he would lead me out of the maze, leaving me to wonder whether I was dealing with innate anthropological talent, intellectual superiority, experience, or something else entirely. Whatever the case, I will forever proudly point out that my mentor was professor Ivan Kovačević. One of Ivan Kovačević's collaborators whose constructive advice significantly advanced the quality of my doctoral dissertation was Bojan Žikić. Bojan Žikić is an anthropologist who possesses an extremely refined writing style, which I have striven to emulate, knowing full well that it is of a quality quite beyond my capabilities.

Another collaborator of Ivan Kovačević changed my life forever. Beyond all doubt, Miloš Milenković is the man who made me love anthropology. Attending his lectures as a student changed my way of seeing the world: his classes were full of enthusiasm and his behavior toward us, full of warmth. Miloš taught me anthropology only for a few years, but he instilled in me a lifelong love for the science! His grasp of ethnographic theory, postmodernism, and multiculturalism still serves as a reminder of how little I know of this science and how much there is left for me to learn. Further, it was Miloš Milenković who suggested the topic of my doctoral dissertation and the appropriate theoretical-methodological framework to choose, and who followed the process of my writing throughout, steering me back when I got "lost." I could never pay Miloš back for everything he has done for me, but the least I could do is offer to dedicate this book to him.

I was not lucky to have Aleksandar Bošković as one of my teachers. During my undergraduate and graduate studies, he taught at foreign universities and was engaged in large international projects. I have heard much about his enviable international reputation, but I only met him on his return to Belgrade. By this time, I had already made a few of my own humble steps toward international affirmation. In these steps, Aleksandar Bošković's recommendation opened many a door, and his suggestions were incomparable. On the recommendation of Miloš Milenković, Aleksandar Bošković generously accepted to be my mentor in my further scientific career. I am very happy and proud that Aleksandar Bošković has lent his authority to my research efforts.

In the course of my Bachelors and graduate studies, I read everything written by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, one of the world's great living anthropologists. I dreamed of meeting him some day, but not even in my wildest dreams did I think that I would receive an invitation from him to give a lecture at such a prestigious scientific and educational institution as the Department for Social Anthropology of the Faculty of Social Sciences in Oslo. After my lecture, in which I demonstrated the significance of anthropology for understanding cultural conflicts caused by the very first "Pride Parade" in Montenegro, Thomas Hylland Eriksen encouraged me to send him the text of my new book. Upon receiving the manuscript, he wholeheartedly agreed to write an introduction for the book. The words of Thomas Eriksen in my book are the crowning achievement of my career thus far, and a strong incentive for further advancement.

When I decided to adapt my doctoral dissertation for academic publishing in English, naturally I hoped the book would be published by one of the most prestigious and influential publishers in the field of academic publishing. It was also my honest belief that the book merited this

owing to its quality. Upon seeing the manuscript, the editors of Palgrave Macmillan fulfilled my aspirations and expectations. The professionalism that I encountered at every level of the publishing process kept confirming what I already knew: that Palgrave Macmillan is one of the best-regarded and influential publishers the world over. Above all, I owe a great debt of gratitude to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out certain weaknesses in my text and offered suggestions. Based on these suggestions, I made certain amendments that significantly improved the quality of this book. I owe a special thanks to Mireille Yanow, who encouraged me and patiently guided me through the publishing process, as well as to Mara Berkoff. I am aware that I was difficult and boring on occasion, but Mireille and Mara were always kind to meet my requests. It was thanks to their professionalism that this book sees the light of day. I would also like to thank Robyn Curtis who offered professional and sincere help in the phase that came immediately after submitting my proposal—her support meant a lot to me, indeed. I owe a special thanks to my dear colleague from Sydney, Amanda Kearney, who already had experience publishing with Palgrave Macmillan. Amanda offered advice and held firm in her confidence in my book's success. In brief, I am very happy and proud that my first book in English is being published by Palgrave Macmillan.

For a number of years, I have written texts in English, but in order for this book to be published by so prestigious a publishing house, it required translation by an English native speaker. In this case the native speaker also had to have some knowledge of anthropology and the humanities. It is not easy to find such a translator, but I was lucky in this respect. Edward Djordjević studied philosophy and literary theory in New York, and now, in addition to translating, teaches English literature at a prestigious Belgrade high school, "Rudjer Bošković." We quickly developed a strong understanding, and the book is only the better for the collaboration. When I read just a few paragraphs that Edward had translated, I realized that it was not just an ordinary translation. Edward's perfection is obvious in each sentence. I truly believe that Edward Djordjević, with his masterful translation, has given the book its author's signature as well. Furthermore, I am happier to have made a good friend in the process.

Thanks to the staff at the Regional Museum, Pljevlja, I had the perfect conditions for conducting my doctoral research and writing the dissertation along with additional ethnographic material. Unfortunately, the director of the Regional Museum, Pljevlja, Radoman Risto Manojlović, whose support was crucial in the process, did not live to see the publication of this book. I did not even get the chance to thank him for everything he did for me, or tell him how much he meant to me as a person.

1

Introduction: Theory and Methodology

"*Ovu su zemlju pravili—i ratnici i pesnici*" ["This country was made by both warriors and poets"][1]

Context, Goals, and Methodology of Research

Montenegro[2] has been a much-neglected part of former Yugoslavia and probably it is the part that is least known to Western audiences. Located in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula, Montenegro has been exposed to the influence of global historical processes. In this book, I analyze identity debates that have developed among the Montenegrin public regarding the question of Montenegro's accession to NATO, as well as to explore how narratives created for that purpose, narratives that can be considered typically representative of "culture wars,"[3] have been linked with Montenegrin identity, history, tradition, and the concept of Montenegrin masculinity.

Questions regarding membership in political and military alliances are certainly of utmost importance for any state; and the acceptance of a new state into an alliance is not insignificant from the point of view of an already existing coalition. Keeping in mind that one of the problems contemporary anthropology faces is that of insufficient engagement of anthropologists in current social debates (Eriksen 2006), I think it is important to illuminate the connection between anthropology and the discussions that have developed in Montenegro regarding its possible accession to NATO, as well as to explore how society can benefit from anthropologists' involvement in a currently relevant social question. Within this context, a basic misunderstanding concerns the "encumbrance" of both anthropology and NATO with the past. Ethnology and anthropology have for a long time been considered the "sciences about

peoples," and it was thought that their object is properly found only in a rural, or native, environment. Following this fallacy, researchers considered anthropology a "historical science" and focused mostly on traditional culture. In the meantime, long "transferred" onto the urban environment, anthropologists became "occupiers" who "clear" and "capture" their own fields of interest and ensure that their work becomes "visible" (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001; Gonzales 1999; Kovačević 2001, 2008; Milenković 2007a, 2007b; Rubel and Rosman 1994). As for NATO, the "encumbrance" refers to the traditions of a Cold War institution, the main task of which was to guard borders against the Warsaw Pact. Despite its significant transformation from a military alliance to one that is military-political and, finally, political-military, NATO has remained obscure in the everyday perception of citizens. Thus, in Montenegro, there is widespread belief that in the post–Cold War era, NATO is less relevant than the European Union (EU) and that NATO's politics exclude "regular" people (Feldman 2003).[4]

Many of the arguments "for" and "against" NATO discussed in the public sphere, as well as those that circulate in informal, private discourse contain a clearly expressed narrative structure. Thus, framing narrative as an ontological condition of social life (as it is through narrative and narrativity that we constitute our social identities), I assume that the mediation between an appropriate past, the present, and an imaginary future happens through various meta-discursive practices, and through that process, narrative representations of a common past aspire to become the generally accepted meta-narrative that offers strategic support for a given narrative. By "narrative," in the technical sense, I will, in the present context, imply sequences (linear forms limited in time that can be heard, seen, and read) that, by following one another, offer an answer to the question: *what is a story*? The importance of every individual event can be understood only through its relation to the whole; that is, the analysis of a narrative also always offers the answer to the question: *why is a certain story told* (Barthes 1977; Brockmeier and Harre 2001; Carr 1986; De Peuter 1998; Jacobs 2002; McAdams et al. 2006; Raggatt 2006; Ricoeur 1991a, 1991b; Somers 1992, 1994)?

The basic premise of this research is that narratives regarding integration with NATO have a linear organization: they layer events, mostly those from the past, into a sequence of statements. In the present case, it means that the warrior tradition, whether in reality or at the level of narrative about a desired reality, has produced a Montenegrin ideal of masculinity with the characteristics of the warrior and soldier (and not, for example, the entrepreneur). With that in mind, the connection between Montenegro's warrior tradition and the debates taking place in the

Montenegrin public regarding the issue of membership in NATO become clear. Despite NATO's important evolution from a purely military alliance to a military-political alliance and then to a political-military alliance, in the minds of the citizens of Montenegro, it remains a predominantly military alliance.[5] Thus it is understandable that the opposing sides in the debate will utilize the tradition of a warrior people as a powerful weapon in their respective arguments and that an important part of the struggle will be "claiming the rights" to that portion of Montenegrin history.[6] As the past is an extremely important narrative element, and selectiveness that follows present interests is an inherent part of creating versions of the past, the warrior tradition of a people will be used, depending on one's allegiance, to a lesser or a greater degree, with certain moments brought to the foreground while others are "overlooked" (Aleida Assman 2008; Ankersmit 1994; Djerić 2006, 2007, 2009; Jan Assman 2008; Mink 1970; White 1984).

Concepts of masculinity vary between cultures, within cultures, within individuals over time, and, most importantly, in various individuals within a single group and a given temporal moment (internal variability). Therefore, I will approach cultural elaboration of gender differences (as well as considerations of cultural conceptualizations of masculinity and the social role of men) in the traditional and the contemporary cultures of Montenegro and establish characteristics assigned to "masculinity" from the classical to the modern, from traditional to contemporary, and from commonplace to representations and contents elaborated in the media (Gutmann 1997; Kimmel 2005; Mead 1963a [1935]). What is revealed in determining meanings and functions of masculinities is the social state from which they emerge, in which they are reproduced, and where they vanish, all of which emphasize the social importance of this study. I will pay particular attention to narratives that bring together the masculine patriarchal-warrior identity of the Montenegrin tradition with the socially current debates about joining NATO. Based on studies of heroism, I will analyze the traditional heroism of a patriarchal-warrior society. For a broader, theoretical framework of heroism, I will use the sociology of Orrin Klapp as well as the reinterpretation of studies of Montenegrin *humanitas heroica*[7] by Gerhard Gezeman (Gezeman 1968; Klapp 1948, 1949). Apart from Gezeman's reinterpretation of humanitas heroica, the basis for the conceptualization of a model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity will also be provided by the anthropogeographic research done by Jovan Cvijić (1991 [1922–1931], 1966 [1922–1931]), in which Cvijić wrote about characteristics of men and women in traditional Montenegro, forms of ethical behavior in accordance with traditional Montenegrin values of Marko Miljanov (1964 [1901]), as well as

Pešić's understanding of Montenegrin patriarchal morality (1996 [1986]). Furthermore, the ethnographic travel writing in nineteenth-century Montenegro will provide additional ethnographic material. Although the majority of travelers who made observations about the peoples of Montenegro did not view themselves as professional ethnographers, it is necessary to delve into their accounts to determine the characteristics of men (or "ideal men") in traditional Montenegro (Aleksandrov 1996 [1894]; Bronevski 1995 [1836]; Bulonj 2002 [1869]; Ebel 2006 [1842]; Kaper 1999 [1858–1859]; Kovaljevski 1999 [1873]; Markoti 1997 [1896], Nenadović 2005 [1878]; Rovinski 1998 [1897]).

A significant portion of the ethnographic and travel literature points out that the Montenegrins who traditionally lived in Montenegro were Serbs. Further, it is not uncommon in nineteenth- and twentieth-century sources to find a description of influential Montenegrins as adherents of Serbdom. This helped create a dual narrative basis in Montenegro for the reproduction and perpetuation of a fluid identity that can be interpreted both as Montenegrin and Serbian. The issue of Montenegro's membership in NATO has once again thrown up the question of this dual and fluid Montenegrin identity. Notably, the question of accession to NATO has been one of the first big questions of the transition period (upon achieving independence, that is, reestablishing sovereignty)[8] in Montenegrin public discourse. Usually, the big questions in a period of transition are the "trigger" for narratives about a desired future. Of course, the image of a desired future necessarily demands an image of the appropriate past—and together they lead to a significant rearticulation of social identities (which is particularly true for narratives of national identity, as they are pervasive in a given culture). Although fluid, with a propensity for transformation, often ambivalent and multiple in meaning, national and inseparable therefrom, political narratives still impose their coherent logic. In it, the past appears as an important narrative element, while narrative representation of a common past becomes one of the most important strategies of mediating between a national identity and the production of public images (Billig 1995; Naumović 2009; Nedeljković 2007; Smit 1998 [1991]). For the government leadership in Montenegro, joining NATO is offered as a primary foreign policy interest and the desired future of Montenegro. In this way, Montenegro's particular present and a desired Euro-Atlantic future will of necessity lead to the reexamination of its past, and in turn it will significantly influence the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity, particularly in the context of post-referendum, independent Montenegro. Certainly, the intertwining of the question of identity with that of NATO membership, and the inseparability of these issues from the context of quotidian

politics, will produce an array of controversies among Montenegrin citizens. If I were to place certain scientists who observe national and ethnic identities as the effect of discourse (constructivists) on one side of an imaginary axis, and others who insist on a certain realistic essence that produces those same identities (primordialists) on the other, I would locate my own approach somewhere in between these two ends of the imaginary axis, although considerably closer to the constructivists. As a "constructivist," I understand identities as a modern category—one that was conceptualized and partially envisioned by historical narratives. On the other hand, as a primordialist, I believe in a kind of continuity with my own past. By this I mean that the Montenegrin identity has been constituted through the interpretation and repeated reworking of real local, cultural, ethnic, and ethnographic material available to intellectual elites, which, in its later phases, has been shaped based on the needs of a certain, concrete, present.

Throughout the book, I will interpret the public and private debates about Montenegro joining NATO through the prism of anthropological studies of identity, in particular, those focused on a general theory of culture and the anthropology of multiculturalism. My ultimate goal for the research conceived in this way is the answer to the question: what does the analysis of the collected data say about Montenegrin identity today? The theoretical and social relevance of these problems has led my sincere desire to apply existing theories—in particular anthropological theories—of identity to the cultural context that I share, which is close to me, in which I live, and in which I am "native." My attempt therefore is to show that an anthropological theory of culture and identity is not displaced from its cultural reality and that it can contribute to contemporary and current debates regarding a number of open social questions (and especially the "big" ones, such as questions that emerge in a transition).

Theoretical and Methodological Framework of the Research

The basis for the *bricolage*[9] of the theoretical and methodological approach will be provided by the anthropology of masculinity (with special emphasis on the anthropology of the Balkan man) (Clatterbaugh 1995; Connell 1995; Fuller 2001; Gutmann 1997; Kimmel 2005; Kimmel and Kaufman 1995; Mead 1963a [1935]; Messner 1995; Pleck 1995), cognitive anthropology (with special emphasis on an analysis of narrative) (Ankersmit 1994; Carr 1986; Mink 1970; Ricoeur 1991a, 1991b; Somers 1992, 1994; White 1984), and the anthropology of multiculturalism (with special emphasis on a cultural and theoretical analysis of public policy) (Beckett and

Macey 2001; Benhabib 1999; Eriksen 1993, 2004, 2007; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Marcus and Fisher 1999; Milenković 2007c, 2008; Okin 1998; Powell 2003; Rabinow and Marcus 2006; Rapport 2003; Rorty 1995; Spinner-Halev 2001; Spiro 1986; Wright 1998; Zechenter 1997). The concept of discourse is inseparably connected with the established theoretical and methodological framework, since certain discourses are capable of limiting scope and fast-track contemporary thinking about myriad important social questions. Therefore, the concept of discourse will refer to a system of ideas that give things meaning, that is, to a concept that contributes to the production, transformation, and reproduction of objects and subjects of social life. Such a conceptualization of discourse necessarily incorporates a concept of narrative, as well as the meaning of discourse as "continuous speech" and "language in use" (Fairclough 1993; Foucault 1994 [1966], 2002 [1969]; Van Dijk 2008).

Although anthropology is normally thought to emerge from extensive field work, it did not take much theoretical grounding to notice that the type of masculinity developed in my family differed from that of my neighbors or of my friends, and among all of these there was at least minimal variation. Growing up and living in Pljevlja (in northern Montenegro), where I still reside, I had the opportunity to meet young men who considered a barroom brawl the highlight of their evening, and thought the night out to be a failure if it passed without a fight. Studying in Belgrade, I was in contact with football fans whose attendance at matches had the same "highlight." In Pljevlja, I knew "feminized" men who took no part in activities traditionally connected with men. I knew men like this in Belgrade as well. As a true libertarian, I supported the organizing of the first "Pride Parade" in Belgrade, while fully aware of a group of young men who traveled from Pljevlja to Belgrade to join in the attempt at preventing the event.

I have obtained ethnographic material for the study of contemporary conceptualizations of masculinity through a series of semi-structured interviews conducted mostly during 2009.[10] The results obtained were processed through the BMS (Brannon Masculinity Scale) and MRNS (Male Role Norms Scale) for the examination of masculinity, and were analyzed through the prism of theories of identity, theories of social construction, and from the perspective of dominant masculinity. When it comes to the debate itself about Montenegro's joining NATO, the material obtained can be divided into two parts. The first part of the material refers to the comments of "ordinary" citizens about NATO and its influence on Montenegrin identity. Apart from semi-structured questionnaires, the material is composed of any comments given by "ordinary" citizens, directed at the problem in question, collected during long-term

fieldwork in the course of daily activities (mostly during 2009, 2013, and 2014). The varied educational background (college graduates, college students, high school students), economic status (poor, middle class, well-off), religiosity and ethnicity (Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic, and Montenegrin; Serbian, Bosnian, and Albanian, respectively), show that I tried to encompass examinees from a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics. Apart from that, I tried to encompass persons from varying parts of Montenegro (continental, northern, and coastal). Proving useful to this end were Internet forums (citizens' comments in electronic media), in which citizens expressed their opinion on Montenegro joining NATO, particularly the question of the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions. The second part of the material refers to the arguments that have emerged from formal political forums, such as parliamentary sessions, political party meetings, press conferences, as well as arguments politicians and public figures use in the course of their duties. The research material is made up of interviews with politicians in the press and online media, editorials and commentary written by persons involved in the debates about Montenegro's inclusion in NATO, public debates, discussion panels about the question of membership, interviews with journalists who report on this issue, as well as interviews with politicians and representatives of various NGOs.

A particularly important source for the research was *Partner*, a monthly dedicated to the discussion of the process of integration into the EU and NATO, published by Montenegro's Ministry of Defense. The publication is intended for a broad audience, and is especially important for our research, since it regularly follows the activities of leading state officials regarding the processes of Montenegro's integration. In addition, the magazine offers important information, the analysis of which can shed crucial light on the current Montenegrin identity, and the self-perception of the military of Montenegro in particular. Further, the intertwining of identity questions with the issue of NATO membership is the crucial moment influencing the positions of Montenegrin Serbs regarding Montenegro's membership to NATO. With this in mind, I obtained ethnographic material in Pljevlja (in March 2015), a Serb-majority town on the border with Serbia, with approximately 30,000 inhabitants. As the majority of people in Pljevlja voted against Montenegrin independence and are against Montenegro's membership in NATO, the hypothesis was that the ethnographic research in Pljevlja will be particularly fruitful.

2

Narratives: The Path to Reality

Introduction to the Study of Narrative

The basic hypothesis of the research is that narratives regarding NATO integration have a linear structure. They layer events, most often from the past, into a linear sequence of statements. Therefore, due to their pervasiveness and limitlessness, it is very important for the understanding of the research topic to clearly define the concept of the narrative. Let us pause over Barthes's totalizing definition of narrative: "The narratives of the world are numberless...Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting, stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation. Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is, nor has there ever been, a people without narrative. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself." (Barthes 1977: 79). In addition to this, storytelling, in infinite variation, genre, and practical function, is common to all cultures, and is used in the narrowest of family circles as well as entire communities. Further, elements of narrative structure exist in many other discursive forms, such as scientific, legal, historical, religious, and political texts (Brockmeier and Harre 2001: 431; Stierle 2006: 73). Narratives play a key role in the shaping of our memory, knowledge, and beliefs, such that studying narratives has a significant potential, particularly regarding questions of identity (Freeman

2001). Indeed the influence of public narratives[1] can be so wide that any research done would have to include several disciplines (Brock et al. 2002). Although the study of narratives has a long tradition in psychology, linguistics, and literary theory, it has become the subject of numerous "new" studies in the past three decades (Brockmeier and Harre 2001: 39). It has also become the "battlefield" for many a discipline, as well as for scientists with various disciplinary backgrounds (philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, literary theorists, psychologists, historians, structuralists, post-structuralists, and so on). While narratives had their practical uses in nineteenth-century psychology, that is, one of its branches—psychoanalysis[2]—scientists agree that contemporary narrative theory emerges out of the work of Russian and Czech formalists in the nineteen twenties and thirties and French structuralists in the nineteen sixties and seventies. In the words of Brockmeier and Carbaugh, "contemporary narrative theory was conceived as the child of French structuralism and the grandchild of Russian and Czech formalism" (Brockmeier and Carbaugh 2001: 4).

Keeping in mind the omnipresence of narratives and the multidisciplinarity of the approach, as well as the limitlessness and myriad starting points of analysis with which the researcher is faced (i.e., that there are potentially infinitely many narratives), the question that presents itself is: what is a narrative and how can we recognize it? In the broadest sense, a narrative is a time-bound linear form that can be heard, seen, and read (Keen 2003: 16). The key element of any definition of narrative is the chronological sequence, although not just any sequence of two temporally ordered events constitutes a narrative. Therefore, the basic characteristic of a narrative is the organization of events into a whole, such that the meaning of every event can be understood only through its relation to that whole (Elliott 2005).[3] For Margaret Somers, narratives are, above all, constellations (a connection of parts) constructed in time and space and constituted by what she calls "a causal emplotment" (i.e., the translating of events into episodes and giving events meanings that follow from the story as a whole). Somers offers four common characteristics for narratives in the social and human sciences: (1) the relation of the parts, (2) giving a particular event meaning that emerges from the story as a whole, (3) selective appropriation, and (4) temporality, sequence, and place. Narrativity requires the ability to recognize the meaning of each individual event only in spatial and temporal relation to other events. Therefore, the main characteristic of narrative is that it offers meaning through connection of (however unstable) parts within a constructed configuration or social network (however incoherent or inscrutable) (Somers 1992: 601–602).

From a Representational to an Ontological Narrativity

Despite the variation in approach, the diversity of theories and presentations, and however much scientists from various fields debated whether narratives have the capacity to represent "life" ("reality"), the one thing about which there is scientific consensus is the question of relationship of narrative and the real world. David Carr has named that consensus "the standard theory," which is, namely, that life itself cannot coincide with any narrative and that real events do not have the character ascribed to them in books. That is to say, real events did not happen in the way that narratives suggest, and that any narrative will represent a distorted picture of events that have taken place (Carr 1986).[4] Since the concept of the narrative has mostly been tied to history (Somers 1994: 613), I think it is important to shed light on the debate about the status of the narrative within history as a science. Aside from understanding the representational capacity of narrative (in this case, the capacity of the narrative to represent the past), it is important to consider this debate in order to conceptualize the distinction *past/history*[5]—essential for understanding the research topic set forth in this book. The historian Ankersmit talks about two philosophies of history in the Anglo-Saxon tradition: the epistemological philosophy of history and the narrative philosophy of history. The former was always centered on the criterion of truth and validity of historical descriptions and explanations, while the narrative philosophy of history focused on the nature of linguistic instruments of historians developed for the advancement of the understanding of the past (Ankersmit 1994). Ankersmit summed up six theses of narrative philosophy of history (Ankersmit 1994: 33–44) and concluded that "whether we see historical narrative as a conjunction of statements or as a whole, in neither case can we meaningfully speak of a correspondence between historical reality and historical narrative. Constructivism, as a theory on the autonomy of narrative with regard to the past, is right in discouraging our belief in a correspondence between historical language and reality" (Ankersmit 1994: 87). For Hayden White, "historical narratives" refer to the real world (one that no longer exists but of which traces remain) and represent that world as having narrative coherence (White 1984: 30), whereas according to Mink, it is rather that narratives are displaced from art onto life: "stories are not lived but told. Life has no beginnings, middles, or ends; there are meetings, but the start of an affair belongs to the story we tell ourselves later, and there are partings, but final partings only in the story. There are hopes, plans, battles and ideas, but only in retrospective stories are hopes unfulfilled, plans

miscarried, battles decisive, and ideas seminal…We do not dream or remember in narrative, I think, but tell stories which weave together the separate images of recollection" (Mink 1970: 557–558).

Limiting the concept of the narrative to its representational form (as a method of presenting social and historical knowledge) resulted in the narrative not fitting into the epistemology of social sciences for a long time (Somers 1994: 613). However, with "*the narrative turn*," there came a new understanding of the narrative, such that different disciplines (anthropology, psychology, philosophy, political sciences, gender studies, medicine, psychoanalytic theory) begin to conceptualize the narrative in a radically new way: narratives are no longer seen as forms of representations and begin to be considered as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology. That is to say, there is a shift from a representational to an ontological narrativity (Somers 1994: 613). The essential question is whether narratives were created through an imposition of a format onto reality or whether life is inherently given shape through the narrative form. Depending on one's position, the ensuing analysis will either attempt to compare the narrative to outside reality or rather focus on the way the narrative is constructed internally (Shenhav 2006: 249).

The basic assumption of ontological narrativity is that the narrative is an ontological condition of social life. It is through narrativity that we arrive at knowledge, understanding and meaning of the social world. It is through narrativity that we construct our social identities. Margaret Somers advocated the reconfiguration of the research of identity formation through the concept of narrative (Somers 1992, 1994). Her research showed a number of things: that the story led the action, that people constructed their identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located in the repertoire of stories within which each part had a meaning dependent on the whole, that experience is constituted through narrative, that people give meaning to what has happened or is happening to them by attempting to collect or in some other way integrate these events into one or more narratives, and that people are given to behaving in certain ways and not in others based on projections, expectations, and memories emerging from the plurality and limitations of the repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narratives. Narratives are often rooted in our understanding of the world, such that they are difficult to recognize and are often accepted uncritically. Depending on the way in which the main characteristics of the narratives have been expressed, Somers isolated four types of narratives: ontological, public, conceptual, and meta-narrative (Somers 1992: 603–605).

Narrative Identity

The concept of identity has become particularly important in social and human sciences in the last few decades, because the questions concerning identity have become socially, culturally, and politically significant in the societies studied. The starting premise for the conceptualization of identity is the proposition that identity is not fixed, immutable, or primordial. Rather, it is entirely sociocultural in origin (Jenkins 2008 [1996]: 18–23). Therefore, many authors (e.g., Eriksen 2004 and Jenkins 2008 [1996]) are of the opinion that one ought to speak about identity as an open and ongoing process of identification. Following these opinions, it is very important to keep in mind that we are speaking of a multidimensional and ongoing process. It could be said that identity designates the ways in which individuals and collectives differ in their relationships to other individuals and collectives, whereas identification is an ordered establishment and the giving of meaning to similarities and differences between individuals, among collectives, and between individuals and collectives. Taken together (the only way they can be understood), similarities and differences represent dynamic principles of identification; identity represents the connection between the individual and a particular category or group of people. The latter rests on the recognition of sameness while also assuming difference from others. As an example, Bojan Žikić points out that the very experience and conception of local communities as dual ethnocultural communities (composed of two dominant ethnocultural poles) renders the overlap of ethnic ascription and description the cognitive bearer of individual identity (Žikić 2005). Identity, thus, is the reciprocal understanding of ourselves in relation to others, as well as the understanding of who those others are in relation to the rest (including ourselves) (Jenkins 2008 [1996]: 18). In addition, it is difficult to separate identification from interest. That is, the way in which I identify myself rests on how I identify my interests, and how I define my interests encourages me to define myself in certain ways (Eriksen 2004: 160–161, Jenkins 2008 [1996]: 7).

Conceiving of narrative and understanding identity are two broad fields, each with a long intellectual history. Although they have been studied through various disciplines, and from various points of view, there have not been many studies concerned with the connection of narrative and identity. Thus, we can say that research tied to identity and research tied to narrative have for a long time been "neglecting" one another. The topic of connection between narrative and identity was precisely the topic at a conference in Vienna in 1995. The gathering offered scientists from various fields (psychology, philosophy, social sciences,

literature, communication) the opportunity to express their views on the importance of the narrative as an expressive embodiment of our experience, as a form of communication, and as a form of making sense of the world and ourselves. The central topic was the question of how we construct what we call our lives and how we create ourselves in that process. What was emphasized in the conference was that this construction of the self and the world rests on a specific genre of language use: the narrative. Scientists from various fields attempted to offer solutions for overcoming the "gap" that existed between the research of narrative and identity (Brockmeier and Carbaugh 2001: 1–15).

In conceptualizing narrative identity, it is best to begin from its minimalist designation, offered by Paul Ricoeur: narrative identity *is* "the kind of identity that human beings acquire through the mediation of the narrative function" (Ricoeur 1991b: 188). Within psychology, the term narrative identity is used to signify the stories people construct and tell about themselves in order to define for themselves and others who they are. That is, the concept of narrative identity encompasses approaches and traditions that focus on personal experience expressed or communicated linguistically (Bruner 1991: 4). Thus, McAdams thinks that narrative identities (internalized and developed life stories) serve to organize and formulate a more or less coherent whole out of life, which would otherwise feel fragmentary and dispersed. Life stories therefore could be seen as connecting various aspects of a person into a unified whole with a purpose (McAdams et al. 2006: 1–14). As opposed to the approach that sees coherence as an ideal state achieved through narrative organization, the dialectic perspective sees coherence as a potential temporal consequence. To give an example, Jennifer De Peuter suggested that a model of narrative identity quite often reifies unattainable ideals of order and centripetality, and that integration, authenticity, and coherence are privileged over fragmentation, dispersion, and incoherence (De Peuter 1998: 30–49). Similarly, Peter Raggatt finds definitive telling of one's life story problematic, that is, that someone's narrative identity could be sketched out in one single, fully synthesized story. Raggatt thinks that one's life story will always be only one of any number of stories, and suggests paying attention not only to the diachronic but also to the synchronic dimension of the process of understanding narrative identity (Raggatt 2006: 15–37). Both narrative and dialectic theory are based on the textuality of meaning, with the difference that the narrative structure requires order, whereas the dialectic requires constant questioning.

When dealing with my own conceptualization of identity, my research was based on two assumptions: identity is socially constructed and it is a process. Aside from that, in the conceptualization of identity, I have

tried to overcome the radical distinction between individual identity and collective identity, understanding the two as a dialectical interplay of a process of internal and external definition.[6] In conceptualizing narrative identity, we begin from the position that narrativity is the condition of social existence, social consciousness, social action, institutions, and structures. That is to say, narrativity is not a form imposed onto social life, but rather, social and human life are in themselves "told"—narrative is the ontological condition of social life (Somers 1994: 621). Social identities are constituted through narrativity, social actions are performed through narrativity, and social processes and interactions—whether institutional or interpersonal—are narratively mediated (Somers 1992: 606, 1994: 621).

When speaking of identity (or identification) in social anthropology, we mean social identity (or social identification) (Eriksen 2004: 156–170). Thus, any research within anthropology concerning narrative identity (or identity in general) of necessity deals with memory and remembering, because identity, whether individual or collective, is identity through time, and memory and remembering are central aspects of any identity.

Cultural Memory

Although memory and remembering are individual phenomena, it is important to emphasize that understanding collective or cultural memory comes out of the operating metaphor in which the process of remembering (the cognitive process that happens in an individual's brain) is metaphorically transferred onto the level of culture (Assman Jan 2008: 111).[7] In this metaphorical sense, scientists can speak, for example, about "national memory," "religious memory," and so on. Societies neither remember nor recall in the literal sense, but much of the work done in reconstructing a common past has certain similarities with the processes of individual memory. Namely, the dynamic of individual memory comprises the constant interaction between remembering and forgetting (Erll 2008: 2–5). Similarly, as part of communication within society, some things must be forgotten to create space for new information, new challenges, and new ideas that we encounter in the present (or will encounter in the future). And the selectiveness that emerges from present needs is inherent in the creation of versions of the past. Or in the words of Gordana Djerić, "the world of social memory is inextricably tied to what it desires or what it must forget" (Djerić 2009: 63). Following her, we can say that cultural memory is a type of "established construct," which carries within itself the potential for transformation, and which, much like myriad other

constructs in social sciences, becomes real through its application—through ritual, ceremony, and anniversaries dedicated to important persons or events of the past (Djerić 2006: 80).

Thus, Aleida Assman distinguishes between two forms of forgetting and remembering: one is active, the other passive (Assman Aleida 2008: 97). Active forgetting implies a deliberate action (e.g., censorship is a powerful force in destroying material and mental cultural products), whereas passive forgetting refers to unintentional action, such as loss, hiding, and neglect (in which case, material and mental product is not destroyed but rather is not paid attention or valued, thus remaining out of use). Conversely, remembering has its active and passive side. The institutions of active memory guard "the past as a present," and the institutions of passive memory guard "the past as a past" (Assman Aleida 2008: 98).[8] One of the versions of active cultural memory is history. Namely, nation-states produce narrative versions of the past that are learned, accepted, and with which a certain relationship of collective autobiography is built. National history is also presented in the public sphere in the form of monuments and commemorative dates. To participate in national memory means knowing the key events in national history, symbols, and dates (Assman Aleida 2008: 101). Jan Assman makes a distinction between cultural and communicative memory: the two are different in that cultural memory is institutionalized (written into stable symbolic forms), whereas communicative is not (i.e., not formalized in material symbols, but rather lives in the everyday interaction and communication) (Assman Jan 2008: 111–112).

Jeffrey Olick offers the following three principles for analysis of collective memory (Olick 2008: 153–159). (a) Collective memory is not monolithic, but rather a highly complex process involving many different people, practices, materials, and topics. Therefore, one ought to be careful when researching collective memory, since any one society has more than one collective memory. (b) The concept of collective memory encourages us either to behold it as a remnant of the past or entirely as a stretched out construction of the present. "Traditionalist" models, for example, include collective memory in heritage and national character, and consider collective memory as the foundation for the continuation of identity. That is, they wonder in what way collective memory shapes contemporary activity. On the other hand, "presentist" models adapt collective memory as a means in the arsenal of power. They wonder how contemporary interests shape images of the past, and they see memory as highly variable. (c) We must keep in mind that memory is not a thing but a process, and that collective memory is something we "do," rather than "possess."

The Concept of Discourse

While conceptualizing narrative in this book, we have not sufficiently included the concept of discourse. Due to opposing and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints, discourse is difficult to define. Its meaning varies depending on the context in which it is used and the author who uses it. For example, in linguistics, "discourse" means continuous speech, and in that sense, discourse represents the most general form of linguistic production (Fairclough 1993: 39). On the other hand, there is a sharp contrast between the textually (thus linguistically) directed discursive analysis and Foucault's much more abstract approach. Because of his immense influence on social sciences and humanities, and due to his popularizing the concept of "discourse" and discursive analysis, I consider it important to take a closer look at Foucault's conceptualization of "discourse."[9]

One of the more important legacies of Foucault's thinking about discourse is its inclusion into the process of production, transformation, and reproduction of objects[10] and subjects[11] of social life. Discourse is thus actively connected to reality. Foucault's idea was that each form of thinking contains implicit rules (perhaps including rules that cannot be expressed) that delimit its scope, such that our thinking is bound and directed by these rules. Further, the analysis of levels (something beyond the individual's control) is crucial for the understanding of underlying tensions within which people think (Foucault 1994 [1966]: 365). Therefore, he is interested in systems of rules and basic structures that allow for certain sentences to appear at a given time and place (Foucault 2002 [1969]: 15–60). Simplified, Foucault was concerned with how certain conceptual frameworks for thinking and acting change through history, and for these frameworks, he used the term "discourses."

The humanities and social sciences analyze discourse in order to see how power (or its abuse) is reproduced in society, as well as finding the role of discourse in that process—since the forms of social inequality are indeed many (e.g., inequalities based on gender, class, or race), and they are integrated and legitimized through text and speech, and especially through forms of public discourse controlled by symbolic elites (politicians, journalists, scientists, writers, bureaucrats). Foucault sees power as a phenomenon of mass and homogenous domination: "power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or

there…Power functions…In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them" (Foucault 1997: 29).

Teun Van Dijk focused on the abuse of power, based on domination, and more specifically, illegitimate use of group and elite power, which leads to social inequality and injustice. The subject of Dijk's research is the discursive reproduction of abuse of power and social inequality (Van Dijk: 2008). He defines social power in relation to control, that is, control by one group over the action and behavior of another. If this control is in the interest of those who control, against the interest of the controlled, then we are dealing with abuse of power (Van Dijk 2008: 2–8). If this process also includes communicative actions, then it is one of the obvious ways in which discourse and power are connected. Therefore, while classical power was defined in categories of class and control over material means of production, today that power has been replaced with the control of mass thinking, which requires control of public discourse in all its semiotic dimensions. Seen this way, symbolic elites such as politicians, journalists, writers, teachers, and bureaucrats, all of whom have access to public discourse, along with business managers who have indirect control, or even the owners of mass media outlets, are the ones who ought to be recognized here as holding power (Van Dijk 2008: 14).

Certain past discourses, in combination with various meta-discursive practices, are able to limit the range and streamline contemporary thinking about numerous important social issues. They can influence the actions of social participants, and thus ensure considerably more power to people and groups who control given discourses. Therefore, in this book, discourse will be understood as clearly structured and limited narrative; that is, narrative will be understood as a broader framework out of which multiple discourses can emerge.

The Implications of the "Narrative Turn" on Research

What are the implications of the "narrative turn" on further research? That is to say, a past took place: people lived their lives—slept, awoke, worked, fed, traded, socialized, fell ill, loved, even went to war. However, this past has vanished without the possibility of recreation (or return).[12] All that remains of the past (today) are discourses and texts—linguistically transferred past experience, such that we cannot be certain what life was really life in Montenegro, for example, between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. We can learn about it from books or oral traditions, but then we are dealing with interpretation, something necessarily problematic. For example, what do we encounter when we enter a museum,

an institution of active preservation of the past? As Ljiljana Gavrilović points out: "the 'people,' or persons whose lives ought to be presented in the exhibition, look like they were (and still are today) beautiful, polished, in their ironed Sunday best…no trace of chamber pots, mud, cold, mortality, or any other parts of life the petit bourgeois world view would deem 'unpleasant,' 'shameful,' or simply 'ugly'…Nor is there love, sex, reproduction, happiness, fear" (Gavrilović 2007: 170–171).

Considering the characteristics of representational narrativity, let us imagine the following hypothetical situation. A group of enthusiasts ventured to collect in a single place everything ever written about the past in Montenegro (texts by historians, ethnologists, traditional songs and poems, oral traditions, and so on). Among them is an enthusiast whose task is to calculate, with "mathematical" precision, the proportion of the material that is concerned with war and moments of fighting. Although very large, we can do no more than estimate the exact percentage. We can take another example, this one even more illustrative: on one side of the scale, the mathematician places all the material that refers to fighting and wars; on the other pan of the balance, he places all else written about Montenegro's past. We can only imagine[13] the speed with which the former balance would smash against the ground. Imagine the conundrum our enthusiast faces to explain whether Montenegrins waged all those wars as Montenegrins or as Serbs! In this hypothesizing, we can take a step further and test the representational capacity of this material: is the proportion of "war period" to "peace period" indeed as it was presented by either historical or fictional narrative? Does the scientific and popular narrative of ceaseless war (Pešić 1996 [1986]), or the slightly "softened" one about rare periods of peace (Cvijić 1991 [1922–1931]: 365–366), have the capacity to represent reality as it was? We can test the representational capacity of such narratives: as a parameter it is enough to glance at the biological or economic sustainability to instantly refute the picture offered by such stories. Still, regardless of their lack of representational capacity, such narratives represent an ontological condition of social life, and social identities are constituted through narrativity—we can say that reality is one huge narrative, comprising multiple narratives into which we insert ourselves as social beings.

Let us consider an example that sheds light on the "superiority" of narrative representation. My grandmother (a retired teacher and hence an educated woman) often recounts, with reverence, that her father (my great grandfather) rushed back from Cairo in Egypt in order to *defend* Montenegro, and that he participated in operations conducted around Shkoder in Albania. In addition, my grandfather's paternal uncle was, on that same occasion, gravely wounded. Although we are a city family, one

that never paid too much credence to war narratives, it is a story often told in my family. The content of the story is indeed true: my great grandfather did indeed return from Cairo and participated in the battle for Shkoder, and my grandfather's uncle was seriously wounded in the fighting. What is problematic is in what way could they have been defending Montenegro all the way from Shkoder? Obviously, since Shkoder was never part of Montenegro, it is entirely clear from history that we are talking about a war of aggression. Still, the question remains: what is superior—the truth itself or the story through which we construct "truth" in society? Imagine my whole family sitting for a polygraph test, and all of us are asked one question: did your father/grandfather/great grandfather come from Cairo to *defend* Montenegro? The answer would be affirmative and the monitors would for each and every one of us show a normal heartbeat and regular pulse. That is it. Truth has been constructed. Aggression became defense, and occupation became liberation!

To give another example, as a boy I grew up watching the very popular TV series "Otpisani," about diversions carried out by a group of Yugoslav partisan fighters during World War II. While watching one of the episodes, I asked my father how he got a pair of scars underneath his eye. He "explained" to me that he was wounded in the war, and that a bullet entered and exited underneath his eye. I remember immediately afterward proudly telling all my friends how my father had been wounded in the war. It did not dawn on me that neither the actions nor the guerrilla group ever existed, that my father was born six years after the conclusion of World War II, nor that the scars in question were the result of a couple of warts and that he was simply playing a joke on me.

I could list many more examples. The conclusion is that we read about the past, listen about the past, talk about the past, and identify through it. However, life in the past rarely happened the way it is presented in history textbooks, films, museums, and public narratives. And yet, many such constructed representations are taken for granted, are perpetuated in contemporary discourses, and have a strong impact on what we will remember and know and what we will believe—all of which significantly influences our thinking and acting.

The Anthropologist between "Native" and Scientist: Two Ways of Researching Narrative Representations of the Past

When considering the complex relation of the past, its narrative representations and social reality, we are forced to wonder about the authority of the scientist speaking about the past. For example, when speaking

of tradition, we must distinguish the colloquial and scientific use of the concept of tradition (even if they are intertwined). In the colloquial usage, tradition can be defined in categories of finiteness, givenness, and essence, thus referring to authenticity (the untouched, emerging from a set origin, traditional) (Handler 1986: 2).[14] Such an understanding of tradition is closely tied to the false dichotomy according to which tradition and modernity are fixed, mutually exclusive states (Briggs 1996: 449). In contrast, the scientific concept refuses to accept this naturalist paradigm (supposing, as it does, restriction and essence), and claims that tradition does not assume objective property of a phenomenon and is not a given entity (composed of limited constituents from the past). Rather, tradition is a constant process of interpretation and assigning meaning in the present (Handler and Linnekin 1984). Tradition is fluid and its contents are redefined and constructed with every new generation. This also means that tradition includes elements of discontinuity (Linnekin 1983: 242). Since it is actively constructed, tradition can neither be true to the source nor indeed false—both terms are inadequate when speaking of social phenomena, which never stand outside our own interpretations of them. Tradition presents one of the strongest associations to the past. Claims made in the name of tradition carry a moral weight, especially if they are made in a group that has accepted a tradition as its own "culture." Following Hobsbawm, "'traditions' which claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented," making particularly interesting the use of old materials for the construction of a tradition to completely new ends (Hobsbawm 2000 [1983]: 1). A significant portion of this book is dedicated to the phenomenon of political instrumentalization of tradition. Hence there is relevance of familiarization with the concepts of "banal nationalism" and "symbolic voluntarism." To that end, Michael Billig insists on "expanding" the concept of nationalism and introduces the concept of "banal nationalism." This concept encompasses ideological practices that allow Western nations to be reproduced anew in quotidian practices. My book brings together the concepts of "banal nationalism" and "symbolic voluntarism." The latter concept focuses on the inconsistent relationship toward tradition in political and public life, which is particularly prominent in times of important events or election campaigns (Billig 2002 [1995]; Naumović 2009). All of this leads to the question of authority of the anthropologist writing on the tradition to which she belongs.

So, if we begin from the position that the past is constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produce texts in the present (Friedman 1992; Linnekin 1983), then one of the central questions concerns the discursive authority of the scientist working on a given

phenomena. We must distinguish between the scientist who conducts research on the phenomenon of "construction and invention of tradition" and a "native" scientist. Charles Briggs has worked on conflicts between scientists who study "invention of tradition" and many native scientists who see themselves appearing in such studies. On one hand, "native" scientists tend to legitimize themselves as "authoritative" representatives in interpreting "their own" cultures, and their authority confers significant social and political power within the culture to which they belong.[15] On the other hand, through their own studies, scientists who are interested in the phenomenon of "construction and invention of tradition" undermine the "native" scientists' discursive authority in representing culture and consequently their conferred political and social power. Therefore, Briggs concludes that conflict between these two groups of scientists is inevitable (Briggs 1996). Using Briggs's research, where shall we locate the anthropologist on this axis between the "native" and the author studying invention and construction of tradition? The answer to this question lies in Kovačević's conclusion that the cultural origin of the anthropologist is of less decisive importance than the anthropologist's training. Tied to neither nation nor state, differences among anthropologists emerge rather from the various schools and tendencies operating within the same general context of a person's birth or upbringing (Kovačević 2006a: 130).[16] Of course, in accordance with contemporary anthropological approaches, I have been mindful that in conducting this research it is not my job to judge the veracity or correctness of narrative representations of the past, but to understand the interplay of factors included in their production and reproduction.

The Hero between Poetry, History, and the Past: The "Making of" the Model of the Traditional Man

Introduction to the Research of Masculinity

The research of masculinity conceptualized in this book is based on a (strong) socio-constructivist perspective. What exactly do we mean when we say that something is "socially constructed?" Above all, "socially constructed" refers to the "avoidance of inevitability," meaning that a given "X" is not naturally determined, or inevitably the way it is. Rather, it emerges and is shaped as part of social processes. The basic use of social constructivism is "awareness raising," such that its "global" and "local" aspects can be differentiated one from another. "Global" aspects refer to the idea that the world we inhabit and the experiences we go through should by and large be considered socially constructed; "local" aspects refer to claims regarding the social construction of something specific, that is, raising awareness of something specific (Hacking 1999: 6).

The sociologist Ian Hacking offered a useful analysis of types of contemporary constructivism and categorized them in six (graded) levels: *historical, ironic, reformist, unmasking, rebellious, and revolutionary*. The *historical level of constructivism* refers to a given history "X" and claims that it was constructed as part of social processes such that "X" inheres in historical events (without necessarily claiming that "X" is good or bad). The *ironic* level of constructivism refers to the recognition that "X" is part and product of social history and social forces, but that it is also something in our present lives that we cannot avoid and simply treat as part of the world at large (the ironist is an engrossed spectator, an intellectual capable of grasping the architecture of the world to which "X"

belongs, and who uses irony to help get us to abandon "X" such as it is). The *reformist level of constructivism* starts from the position that "X" is bad. The reformist sees that "X" is not inevitable, has no idea how to live without "X," but thinks certain aspects of "X" can be modified to be made less bad. The *unmasking level of constructivism* aims not so much to refute ideas, but to undermine them, shedding light on the function they serve. This level of constructivism strives to strip a certain idea's false claim to authority. The *rebellious level of constructivism* describes constructivists who actively support claims that "X" is not necessary, that it is bad and that we would be better off without it. Finally, the *revolutionary level* calls to action beyond the world of ideas (Hacking 1999: 19–21).

The socio-constructivist doctrine is most strongly linked precisely with questions of gender, and some of the earliest constructivist premises have their roots in anthropology. For example, Margaret Mead conducted research in Samoa in the 1920s to determine whether maturing must of necessity be accompanied by crisis, the way it is in Western cultures. Nine months of research revealed to Mead that crises of puberty are not a universal phenomenon and that maturing in Samoa passes rather peacefully, without adolescent crises, so characteristic in American society of the time. Her conclusion was that the social environment shapes the behavior of adolescents (Mid1978 [1928]). Shortly thereafter (1935), having previously mapped out gender roles in contemporary American society, Mead observed three tribes (the Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli) in New Guinea and studied the gender roles and behavior of men and women of the island's tribes. Her research showed that the Arapesh ideal was a peaceful, unaggressive man, married to a woman with the same characteristics—a culture that could be seen as "female" ("motherly," "cuddly") using Western gender norms. The Mundugumor's ideal was an aggressive man married to an equally aggressive woman—which could be seen as "male" (aggressive) from the point of view of Western gender roles. Finally, among the Tchambuli, it was the woman who was the dominant partner (accordingly, the men of the tribe spent a lot of time decorating their bodies), in an apparent inversion of Western gender roles. In the end, Mead concluded that if temperament and emotional behavior traditionally considered female (passivity and a tendency to embrace children) could become a male pattern of behavior in one tribe (the Arapesh), while entirely forbidden to most men and women in another (Mundugumor), then there is no basis for these aspects of behavior to be linked to sex—the creation of these opposite types can be ascribed only to cultural influence (Mead 1963a [1935]). Gender then is not biologically, but socially, conditioned, and gender roles are not unchangeable: neither men nor women must of necessity behave in accordance with the imposed model of gender

roles (women are not predetermined to cry and be gentle, nor are men predetermined to be aggressive).

The sixties and seventies saw the concept of socially conditioned gender differences further developed. At their outset, these theories were only focused on differences between men and women, which, in addition to significant strengths, had certain drawbacks: gender was thought of primarily in dualist categories—men as dominant, women as submissive, treating both men and women as essentialized, homogenous categories.[1] This view of gender, instead of "unifying" women as the oppressed "other," led to the recognition of "new" differences among women. By reexamining personal experiences, many women saw that their life was affected by their place in various hierarchies, such as racial origin (African American, Latino, Native American), age, or sexual orientation. In other words, it turned out that women are far from determined by their gender alone.[2]

The broadening scope of women's studies in the middle and late seventies led to a critical reexamination of men and masculinity as well. The idea of social construction of gender, in particular the "feminist" claim that femininity and submission of women were socially constructed, ushered considerations of the social construction of masculinity. In turn, social construction of masculinity became the foundation on which "profeminist" men, encompassing most contemporary theorists of masculinity, would build their thinking about the issue at hand, and whose ideas have strongly influenced the conceptualization of masculinity in this book (Connell 2005; Kimmel and Kaufman 1995; Messner 1995). Still, since I belong to a discipline with a long constructivist tradition, I consider myself above all "a constructivist" or, simply put, an anthropologist.[3]

In accordance with the premises of social construction, masculinities refer to social roles, behaviors, and meanings assigned to men in a given society at a given time (Kimmel 2004b: 503). Most scientists who have done research on the topic agree that the definition of masculinity relies more on "what masculinity is not" rather than what "it is." In other words, masculinity is defined as that which is not feminine (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 2004: 151; Clatterbaugh 2004: 200; Kimmel 2004a: 182–196). The fluidity of this concept "pushes" anthropologists to define it in four ways: (a) as *male identity*—a concept of masculinity in which masculinity is by definition everything that men think or do; (b) *manhood*—according to which masculinity is everything men think or do in order to be men; (c) *manliness*—which makes some men more manly than others, and (d) *men's role*—a view that emphasizes the male–female relationship, such that man is that which woman is not (Gutmann 1997: 385–409). The sociologist Robert Connell, who analyzed basic practices and relations

that constitute patterns of masculinity in Western ordering of gender, points to the existence of *hegemonic masculinity*—a form of masculinity socially elevated above all others. It is important to keep in mind that hegemonic masculinity is not fixed, but rather it is a masculinity that possesses a hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations and represents a model few men can attain in reality (Connell 2005: 37).[4] Within gender systems there are particular relations of domination and submission between various groups of men. Where certain masculinities are hegemonic or dominant, others are marginalized. Hegemony and marginalization are necessarily interrelated and historically interchangeable relations.

Owing to the variation of definitions of masculinity in a given society at any single point in time, as well as of a single individual over time, Kimmel suggests using the term masculinity in the plural—*masculinities* (Kimmel 2004a: 182)—and offers four basic dimensions along which the meaning of masculinity can vary: (a) the meaning of masculinity can vary from culture to culture, (b) the definition of masculinity varies significantly within each culture through time, (c) the definition of masculinity changes over the course of a person's life, and (d) at a given time, the meaning of masculinity varies within a society (Kimmel 2004b). Thus, a predominantly shepherding, warrior, plunderer economy[5] in Montenegro has produced an exceptionally masculine patriarchal culture, placing great importance on men. The meaning of masculinity has varied in Montenegrin society at various points in time. My concept of masculinity before conducting this research was very different from my concept of masculinity subsequent to this research—not only that, my definition of myself as a man is significantly different from my previous view of myself as a man. Thus, masculinity is a constantly shifting collection of meanings, that is, masculinity is neither static nor outside of time, but historical. And the male experience of gender is not determined only by its sex, but by the place the man occupies within racial, ethnic, class, economic, regional, institutional, and other categories of his particular society.[6]

The Construction of Masculinity in "Warrior" Cultures

The difference between innate sexual identity and learned gender identity is probably nowhere as clear as in "warrior" cultures. Within such cultures both men and women are directed toward their particular roles: men toward engagement in battle and women toward rearing (Solomon 2007: 1518). Armed forces have at all times and across

cultures almost always been entirely male institutions.[7] In warrior cultures, boys are (often violently) socialized into tough young men who have to repress their emotions in order to be functional through the traumatic experience of fighting. Their participation in fighting is ensured through recruitment, punishing desertion, the promise of reward (anything from decoration, education, all the way to women as trophies in certain cultures), as well as stigmatizing any refusal to fight as cowardly and failing the basic test of manliness (Goldstein 2004: 815–817). Wars had a strong impact on gender relations and the shaping of masculinity, and the connection between sex and gender is particularly destabilized and intensified during wartime. Conversely, for warrior cultures, periods of peace also brought new destabilizations of gender relations: when men are no longer soldiers, "they must be convinced to change their ideas of what is right and natural (or more pleasant) to do as men."[8]

When it comes to our own time, we can point to the research done by Uta Klein. She looked at Israel as a case in which the military appears as the main mediator in shaping gender roles and constructing masculinity specifically as military masculinity. Studying Israel showed that the ideology of masculinity and the dominant position of the army in society were interrelated. The army in contemporary Israel acts as the main mediator in shaping gender roles, and each new war strengthens male/female stereotypes: men are understood as warriors, fighters, and protectors, whereas women are their emotional support (Klein 1999). Masculine dominance in contemporary Israel draws its roots in the war of 1948–1949 and has been reinforced by the six more wars fought in the 50 years since. A history of persecution formed the collective memory of the Jewish people (particularly of those living in Israel), while constant wars with neighbors provided an objective basis for everyday trepidation (Klein 1999: 50–52).

Research on contemporary masculinity in Israel provides an excellent introduction into studying traditional Montenegrin masculinity. Namely, according to both dominant national narratives, the past offered men a specific cultural context for coming of age: entering maturity in a state of war. This meant that going into battle represented an inevitable, pseudo-biological phase of male maturing and a chance for fulfillment of masculinity, the effect of which, among others, has been the emergence of an extremely dominant male culture. In the case of Montenegro, the dominant national narrative suggests a long-term, persistent siege (lasting over five centuries, covering the entire period of Ottoman rule). As we will see later, the "malleability" of this narrative allows for it to establish continuity with twentieth-century wars in the Balkans.

On the (Im)possibility of Studying Traditional Montenegrin Masculinity (Model versus Reality)

The first difficulty in researching the traditional Montenegrin man concerns his "invisibility."[9] As the narratives regarding Montenegro's past are filled with heroes, brave men, and wars, none of these stories deal with the Montenegrin man as "a man," that is, with the male experience ("being a man") and how it influenced and shaped daily lives. The best illustration of this difficulty is a study by Michael Kimmel. He asked a group of students to write down the ten most important words that describe their identity. All the women put the word "woman" among the first three. Members of the gay population referenced their sexuality. African Americans always placed "black" atop the list describing their identities. No heterosexual person put down their sexual orientation among the top ten words, and no man wrote down the word "man" as describing his identity (Kimmel 2005, Preface X).

The second difficulty concerns the representational capacity of ethnographic material used for the research. The data gathered by various national researchers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has, itself, the characteristics of a construct. It relates to the life to which it refers in a mediated way (Kovačević 2006b: 31). Ivan Kovačević points out that the most common and least conspicuous ethnographic construct is the description of ideal models of a given time. In their efforts to obtain information about how something was done, researchers were acquiring information about how something ought to be done. There was a large gap between the model and reality, and the interlocutor was providing the ethnographer with the model rather than reality. Apart from not distinguishing between model and reality, the character of the construct was influenced by (overreaching) generalizations made by amateur ethnographers, as well as various ideological constructions (Kovačević 2006b: 30–36). That problem is elaborated methodologically in Rihtman-Augustin's study on the *zadruga* (communal family), in which she showed that the everyday life of this southern Slavic patriarchal institution did unfold according to the model. The model existed only on the level of the imagined, or ideal order of things, while it was, in fact, constantly undermined. Namely, the descriptions of communal families and their life (whether by sociologists, ethnologists, or legal theorists) analyzed only an ideal image of *zadruga* culture (how it ought to be), but in her research she showed a discrepancy between the real and imagined order and concluded that life most likely went on somewhere between the two described levels (Rihtman-Augustin 1988).[10]

Gender roles contain standards, expectations, or norms the individual "ought" to fulfill. However, only a small number of men could achieve

the "norms" of gender roles prescribed by society. In the early eighties, the sociologist Joseph Pleck postulated the "gender role strain model" in order to replace the "gender role identity model" and incorporated new findings about masculinity. Pleck's "gender role strain model" includes ten different premises: (1) Gender roles are operationally defined by gender role stereotypes and norms; (2) Gender role norms are contradictory and inconsistent; (3) The proportion of individuals who violate gender role norms is high; (4) Violating gender role norms leads to social condemnation; (5) Violating gender role norms leads to negative psychological consequences; (6) Actual or imagined violation of gender role norms leads individuals to overconform to them; (7) Violating gender role norms has more severe consequences for males than females; (8) Certain characteristics prescribed by gender role norms are psychologically dysfunctional; (9) Each gender experiences gender role strain in its paid work and family roles; (10) Historical change causes gender role strain (Pleck 1995: 11–12).

Pleck's emphasis was on how "prescribed" cultural standards have a potentially negative influence on the very men who strive toward them. He delineated three broader ideas implicit in the ten aforementioned premises. (a) The first is the "gender role discrepancy" and refers to the idea that a considerable number of men face long-term inability to achieve the standards of gender roles prescribed by their culture. The resulting "fissure" leads to low self-esteem and other negative psychological consequences in individuals unable to reach socially set standards. (b) Pleck's second idea is the "trauma of gender roles," that is, even when male gender expectations are "successfully" met, the process of socialization leading to their fulfillment, much like the fulfillment "itself," is traumatic and leads to many negative psychological consequences. (c) The final idea concerns "the dysfunction of gender roles" and refers to the idea that the "accomplishment" of expected male roles can have many other negative consequences (for example, not doing "house work" or neglecting one's family) (Pleck 1995: 12–13).

In order to problematize the research (model) of the traditional Montenegrin masculinity, it is particularly important to consider the research of Gerhard Gezeman. Gezeman was not interested in what Montenegrins were like in general, nor what they were like in a given historical period or empirical case. Rather, he was interested in what the Montenegrin "was to be" in order to fulfill the rules of his community and be worthy of representing his community.[11] Gezeman underscores:

> Even the researcher who tries to deduce a categorization of an individual has to differentiate between the public and private acts of his subject. The Montenegrin man must distinguish between his empirical I, in its

reality and in its manifestations from situation to situation, and the ideal I, which every man, especially an ambitious one, sets for himself as the highest norm to which his being can aspire. Just as the individual, apart from his empirical, private character has his ideal image, thus each people that cares for itself sets its ideal of national community as the guiding star of its destiny. It is not sufficient in the case of any nation to ask about how it actually and empirically reacted in this or that case, nor how it behaves as a rule. It is also important to consider the moral criteria of self-reflection used to measure its own empirical reaction. In other words, what the nation wishes to be and what it ought to be according to the community's normative ideals. This real norm is not always what is considered "normal," but rather is the maximum demanded of the individual as a moral act of courage. How often and to what extent a nation as a whole, or its individuals achieve the normative ideal in great exceptional states of its soul, this is the particular drama, tragedy or "the miserable spectacle" of its life. What is remembered for all eternity with particular fondness in the collective memory and storytelling of a people are precisely moments like this, because they are as sublime as they are rare. (Gezeman 1968: 35)

Gezeman does not discuss the private life of Montenegrins, nor their economy or lower levels of the quotidian, but rather "the good people and why the nation considered them such."[12]

Let us pause over the seminal work *Primjeri čojstva i junaštva* (*Examples of Humanity and Bravery*) (1901) by Marko Miljanov, that most famous and highly respected Montenegrin hero offering moral guidance for behavior in accordance with traditional Montenegrin values. Along with Petar Petrović Njegoš's *Mountain Wreath* (1847), *Examples of Humanity and Bravery* is a literary work with a special (even canonical)[13] place in the cultural and educational system of Montenegro. Namely, Miljanov noted nineteenth century examples of manliness and heroism. These examples have institutionally (through mandatory school reading of special importance) and informally (through home retellings, traditional songs, and numerous other discourses) continued to shape the consciousness of patriarchal values characteristic for traditional Montenegrin society. Given our previously stated theoretical positions, let us attempt to conduct a sort of contemporary semi-ethnography of examples offered by Miljanov. Let us start with the title. What does the word "example" mean? When my elementary school teacher talked about a given student as "exemplary," this always referred to the quiet pupils, who dutifully did their homework, kept their hair neat and trim, and were, in general, of presentable appearance. They did not play with marbles during breaks, or football after school. An "exemplary student" in high school was one who did not "cut" class, and did

not consume alcohol or any other psychoactive substance. Further, we are talking about an "exemplary" young man, woman, or student.[14] In general, the standards to be "satisfied" in order for a person to acquire the label "exemplary" vary in time and place, as well as depend on the institution developing the standards. The percentage of persons able to fulfill the "prescribed" standards is minimal.

In the introduction of Miljanov's book, it says that

> Marko Miljanov did not write an "artistic" work, he did not take history simply as a backdrop against which to place his real or imaginary world…Marko delved into history, into the action, approaching the events directly and remaining with them at all times. He holds firm to the truth of his examples, does not invent nor embellish, he does not even encompass the whole action, the event in its entirety, he only selects individual moments. (Miljanov 1964 [1901]: 15)

Without doubting that Marko Miljanov truthfully wrote down what he heard, one cannot help but ask, what is it that Miljanov could have heard? For this type of reconstruction, it is useful to introduce the concept of the hero, thematized in the research of the sociologist Orrin Klapp.

Klapp considered whether there is a "universal hero" and whether there are characteristics common to all heroes in all times. He was interested in whether the collective mind of a community constructs a similar pattern of idealized persons, independently of time and place. Analyzing given data on heroes, he concluded that heroes tend to submit to a specific type, and that respected historical persons were "made into" heroes through selection and the interlacing of mythical subjects appropriate for their character as it appears in the popular imagination. Following Klapp, we can say that heroes are produced in four ways: through spontaneous recognition and behavior; formal selection; spontaneous development of legends; and poetic creation of the storyteller or author. The study of popular heroes and types of heroes in myth and legend suggests factors that influence their creation: (a) situations in which heroes are made, (b) heroic and anti-heroic roles, (c) "embellishment," (d) personal characteristics, (e) stories and rumors, (f) publicity, and (g) organizing popular reactions to heroes (Klapp 1948: 135).

Situations that create a hero (a) can be found in areas of life that are the focus of public interest. These do not necessarily have to be important historical conditions; it can be an event relating to a specific dramatic situation involving the interest of the people—a battle, a political crisis, as well as sports events. When the situation is felt to be important, its consequences unpredictable, the situation for the creation of heroes is set.

Heroic and antiheroic roles (b) refer to characteristics common to mythical and popular heroes in various cultures (Klapp 1948, 1949). Klapp points to the existence of the hero victor, the wise hero, the undervalued hero, as well as the hero defender or liberator, the hero of good deeds, and the martyred hero. The *hero victor* is the type of hero who is very strong, who always vanquishes his opponent, and who, except in certain extraordinary situations, is invincible and inviolable. His character is best described through certain typical tasks performed: "the heroic deed"—the hero is characterized by extraordinary powers proven in ordeals beyond the capability of ordinary human capacity. The accomplishment is seen as the tool with which the hero distinguishes himself from ordinary people; the "struggle" is a fighting situation found in legends about heroes in which they display their power. The victor of the struggle is declared a hero, and his rivalry can be in ability, courage, values, or strength. The manifestation of hero through battle with other people is almost universal. The "test" is the next situation common to all hero myths. In given test situations, the task or ordeal before the hero are not necessarily in direct rivalry with other persons. A successful accomplishment of a superhuman task or undertaking is proof of heroic character and status. The "search" refers to the long-term aim for a higher goal, usually including a series of tasks, struggles, and missions performed, leading up to one culminating accomplishment.

The *cunning hero* is usually smaller and weaker, but uses trickery to vanquish the stronger and more powerful, while the undervalued hero or Cinderella, is an unhappy, unknown person achieving success. In relation to the smart hero, who also wins surprisingly, the unlikely hero succeeds not through cunning but in some other way, such as luck, miraculous help, or humble hard work (Klapp 1949: 18–20).

Klapp also noted a group of roles centered around the idea of serving the group. These types of roles can be called altruistic, since the behavior of the hero benefits others and involves personal sacrifice. In that sense, we can differentiate the following roles: the *defender* or *liberator* who arrives to free a person or a group from danger. Such a hero can be found both in life and lore (whether defending from human enemies or something else). The *hero of good deeds* is ubiquitous, but particularly exemplary is the one that helps the poor. One form of the Good Samaritan is the *cultural hero* (who has lent his name to a group or a significant contribution to its well-being). Finally, the *martyred hero* is the hero who dies fighting for the group, and has a significant place and importance in special rituals. His heroic death has two common themes: willful sacrifice for a cause and defeat through betrayal. Betrayal as the condition of the hero's death is so common that it can almost be said that each hero needs a betraying villain.

Embellishment (c) is a term that can be applied to public figures aiming to separate themselves from their rivals by virtue of the things they do or due to the exceptional nature of their personal character. The type of "color" used to paint this picture refers to the stories that list or highlight these characteristics (deed done or personal qualities). Embellishment has three main functions: to gain attention, interest, imagination, and interpretation; to elevate the person as unique and singular; as well as to make it unforgettable. *Personal characteristics of heroes* (d) are relatively unimportant—the emergence of heroes is a matter of popular selection, because the creation of a general public impression is the essence of the creation of the hero (the public has little opportunity for direct contact with the hero). Therefore, we can say that roles, more than personal characteristics, create the heroes, and that roles supersede characteristics.

Regarding *stories and rumors* (e), the proverb *"even bad publicity is publicity"* seems to hold true. Building on heroic roles, anecdotes perform a lot of the work necessary to "humanize" a hero, particularly if it is a less known figure. *Publicity* (f) refers to ways of presenting a figure to the public that help produce a hero. Finally, a certain contribution to the creation of the popular hero can be made through organizing popular reactions to the hero (g).

In every culture, heroes emphasize the positive norms and socially acceptable model of behavior. The hero is the designated person, real or imaginary, who evokes appropriate thinking and behavior. In social life, the hero is more than a personality, he is an ideal image, a legend, a symbol. Heroes are respected and they are ascribed special social status: their memory lives in dreams, legends, and memories, and they are often celebrated through observation of an organized cult. Once formed, legends about heroes "develop their own life." To create a hero (out of a historical person) is to ascribe certain roles and characteristics to a person, such that the development of the hero is a collective process with innumerable popular imputations and interpretations (Klapp 1948: 135).

Heroes written about by Marko Miljanov fit into these common characteristics of mythical and legendary heroes: they perform heroic feats, fight, encounter obstacles in performing their tasks (often obstacles of an ethical nature) and successfully overcome them, they defend the group (the tribe, the fraternity) from danger, they unexpectedly vanquish the stronger and more numerous, they win using cunning, and they perform good deeds and die heroically. However, the heroes Marko Miljanov writes about are somewhat different from mythical and epic heroes. The epic genre prefers universal and heroic types, whereas Marko Miljanov's heroes are individual representatives of the heroic type, that

is, the book speaks about heroic examples from the life of the "ordinary" Montenegrin.[15]

On one hand, gender roles contain certain standards, expectations, or norms to which the individual ought to aspire, even if only a very small number of individuals could possibly reach the standards and norms set by society for their gender roles. On the other hand, the subject of research in literature that deals with traditional Montenegrin society are cultural norms regarding gender roles, and not particular individuals who may or may not fulfill the socially prescribed gender roles. This means that if we start by researching traditional Montenegrin masculinity from the standpoint of narratives about the past, the result of our research will necessarily be a *model* (and not only a model, but most often the highest representation of the model, to boot). This model will contain a very large number of imputations and interpretations, and will significantly deviate from real past life. That is, in creating a model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, for a moment we will have to forget contemporary theories of masculinity, which speak about multiple masculinities, deviations from gender roles, and the impossibility of reaching given ideals.

The Model of Traditional Montenegrin Masculinity against the Hypothetical Scientific Study of Montenegrin Men in the Past

What would be the result if we attempted to position the traditional model of Montenegrin masculinity on one of contemporary scales for masculinity testing—BMS and MRNS?

Brennon and Juni developed Brennon Masculinity Scale (BMS)[16] to measure individuals' approval of norms and values that define "American male gender." Their conceptualization focused on a four-dimensional model with a total of seven subscales. The first dimension (1) is *No Sissy Stuff* and comprises the subscales (a) *Avoiding femininity,* showing the belief that a man ought never do women's activities and (b) *Concealing Emotions*, which shows the belief that men ought never show their feelings and emotions that reveal their sensitivity. The second dimension (2) is called *The Big Wheel* with (a) the *Breadwinner* subscale, containing the belief that men ought to provide for their families through work and (b) the *Admired and Respected* subscale holding that a man ought to be admired and respected in society. The third dimension (3) is *The Sturdy Oak* containing the subscales of (a) *Toughness*, showing the belief that men ought to be physically strong and insensitive to pain and suffering, and (b) *Male Machine*, showing the belief that men ought to be efficient workers, confident, self-assured, decisive, serious, and steadfast.

The fourth dimension (4) is *Give 'em Hell* containing the *Violence* and *Adventure* subscale, showing the belief that men ought to be courageous, capable of taking risk, and conduct violence without hesitation.

Thompson and Pleck used their Male Role Norms Scale (MRNS)[17] to reduce the number of basic dimensions to three. The researcher can use this scale to assess the attitudes toward masculinity in three different areas: *status/rationality norm* (the belief that a man ought to be successful at work, provide for his family, be confident and independent), *toughness norm* (that a man ought never show emotional or physical pain, ought to carry out physical violence, and enjoy dangerous situations), and *anti-femininity norm* (in which a man ought never conduct any activity traditionally tied to women).

These scales were developed for the purposes of studying contemporary masculinity, and in any case are not easily applied to traditional Montenegrin society. Nor is this my goal. However, based on the data taken from literature dealing with traditional Montenegrin society (Cvijić 1991 [1922–1931]; Gezeman 1968; Miljanov 1964 [1901]; Pešić 1996 [1986]), and using the MRNS and BMS, we can study the characteristics of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity in order to compare it to contemporary masculinity. Let us look at how a man belonging to the "ideal type" in Montenegrin traditional society would score on the MRNS, a scale developed for studying contemporary masculinities. I will cite only certain portions encountered in the literature dealing with traditional Montenegrin society (or rather, as I have mentioned, its normative ideals).

(a) *Status/rationality norm* (the belief that a man ought to be successful at work, provide for his family, be confident and independent)—the reputation of a man depends on two conditions: historical standing of his house and his personal contribution. Only courage and action, not wealth, elicited respect and awe in traditional Montenegrin society. Merchants and craftsman, who were in any case few, were considered of lesser importance. If it happened to a Montenegrin man in good standing to be accused of cowardice, it was his responsibility to clear his name at all cost. In the warrior, shepherding lifestyle, opportunities abounded to take someone's life, defend the honor of an assaulted woman, avenge the honor of the family with every broken engagement, every rivalry over a young woman, every wonton female behavior, every word taken to be an insult. The father, as the elder, was the defender of the family (keeping in mind that this was a time before state protection). Much like tilling the land, any craftsman or merchant work was considered undignified. A good Montenegrin returns home with a captured Turk in tow. For dinner, he eats nothing but bread and bacon. He says to his brother: "go and fetch

a lamb for dinner." Since there is none in his pen, the brother, under-standing the warrior's intention, goes and steals one from the neighbor. Contemporary Montenegrins felt duty bound to defend the integrity of a woman, who was extraordinarily efficiently protected from any insult or injustice, including that coming from her relatives. A man was expected to defend the honor of his wife, sister, and sister-in-law. Once, a member of the Vasojević clan was sentenced to ten years in the dungeon. While in the Cetinje prison, at one point he said: "I can no longer bear this injustice—if I had a gun, I would kill myself." The prison warden pulled out his revolver and said: "Here, take it, if it will do you any good." The Vasojević was left with no other option than to turn the offered weapon on himself.

(b) *Toughness norm* (that a man ought never show emotional or physical pain, ought to perform physical violence, and enjoy dangerous situations)—history testifies to the virtues of Montenegrin warriors, who guarded their independence almost throughout the Ottoman reign. To kill as many Turks as possible was for the mountain men not only taking vengeance for his ancestors, but an easing of their pain, which he him-self feels. Warrior vainglory, pride, and arrogance were shown no limits. What filled the life of each tribesman, what occupied his thoughts to the exclusion of everything else, was heroism. Only courage and action, never wealth, elicited respect and awe in traditional Montenegrin society. The greatest sin of all was betrayal. Far from avoiding deadly danger in battle, these men competed in acts of heroism. The behavior of men according to the rules of manliness and heroism was self-evident. Duty consisted in being manly and warrior-like on all occasions, toward oneself and oth-ers, a requirement of battle and peacetime alike. Naturally, what these Montenegrins talk about is what interests them most: in the first place, war with the Turks, heroism, and who behaved in what way in battle. A man asleep is not ever to be killed, not even a Turk. The people feel greater sorrow for unsuccessful revenge than a death of a relative, and good revenge eases the loss of a loved one. Members of the family are constantly shown the bloody clothes of the murdered. There is no greater shame than for one's body to be discovered dead with a loaded rifle.

In a warrior society, mastering one's erotic feelings goes as far as deny-ing them completely. Even an outward expression of love toward children is considered unseemly, not to mention a manifestation of erotic love. Love as private pleasure is suppressed. The general warrior law declares that all outward emotion is to be suppressed before the outside world, especially fear, but also excessive joy or excessive sorrow, even for sons or husbands lost in battle. Every inability at mastering feeling diminishes dignity. Bourgeois whining is considered undignified sorrow-wallowing.

In a community that refers to men capable of carrying weapons as "guns," in which love and familial tenderness (except between brother and sister) is withheld, the meaning of sex is marriage, maintaining lineage and tribe. Women went into battle alongside their husbands, fathers, and brothers, all too willing to sacrifice what is most dearest to them—their sons. In this light, it is enough to cite but a few examples: (a mother speaking to her sons at their brother's funeral) "why are you crying? Did you think that all of you would return home unscathed? By my word, if another one does not die, I will wish never to have borne you;" (another mother) "this is my wish, that they be sons and die, for if they do not die, they are to be called daughters." In the chaos of a Turkish attack on a cave in the Morača region where women and children took refuge, Montenegrin mothers fought the Turks using cribs with the babies still in them. On another occasion, retreating before the advancing Turkish army, several mothers smothered their children by covering their mouths, so that the cries of the babies would not give away the group's hiding place. After a mountain village was laid to waste, the Turks raped all the captured women and girls. The fraternity decided that all women who gave birth in the ensuing period were to strangle their own babies.

(c) *Antifemininity norm* (in which men ought never conduct any traditionally female activities)—the most significant event in the family is the birth of a male child, the future tribesman. A happy family event is only the birth of a son, because only the son can celebrate the family saint's day and light candles for ancestors' souls. A single male child is considered insufficient to the point of insignificance. A barren woman is justification for her abandonment and replacement. If a man has more daughters than sons, the public will say pitifully that "he lives as if in prison." Marriage sends daughters away from the household, fraternity, and tribe. They are said to be raised for another, with much more trouble and at greater cost than sons. Daughters are therefore called "another's dinner." Should a parent not have any male children, they will be forced to fend for themselves, and feel lost and alone. If a lineage is extinguished due to a lack of male progeny, it is seen as god's punishment. "Blessed is the woman who bears sons, daughters pop up alongside." A son may cry for his mother's absence as much as he likes, the father will not approach to comfort him. Anything having to do with little children is for Montenegrin men "shameful," "unclean," even "wicked." A real man takes care that not even his clothes brush against the crib. For these patriarchs, a girl is always a source of trouble in the house, and is not taken into account when the head of household gives the number of children. If she is too unpresentable, she does not conform to demands of maintaining the lineage; if too pretty, she must be preserved not to burn away.

A sick woman was lying in bed one night and asked her husband to bring her some water from the well, as he is already going out for a drink himself. She added, "it's night, no one will see you." The man still did not bring her water (for he is not a woman to carry water). It is undignified for a man to carry any load on his back, including a baby's crib. The normal reaction of a man is narrated here: a priest, a senior guardsman of Prince Nikola, would not pick up the Prince's crying child off the ground, as he would do no such thing at home either. A man is the master who rules, a woman is a servant who serves. The erotic, love, the womanly—these are unworthy, unmanly, unheroic elements of life. Marriage, children, ancestors, and descendants—this is the meaning of life, this is serious, manly, heroic, as it serves to maintain the house, the fraternity, tribe, and people. Water fetching is not for a man, because that would mean laying down one's weapons. When a man and wife travel, the man rides the horse and the woman walks next to him, carrying a load on her back. If a woman encounters a man on the road, she stands aside, letting him pass. The man goes ahead, and if the woman accidentally overtakes him, she will stop to let him pass. Women cede their seats when a man walks in and stand if there are too few seats. At table, women and men sit apart, and women eat only after the men, whom they first serve, have finished. It would be impudent for a woman to address a man by name. A woman (or girl) is referred to as "she," "the one over here," "my woman," "that woman of mine, pardon the frivolity," and "this, by my sin, child." The Montenegrin of the old stripe considered it the end of the world when during the reign of Prince Danilo he had to kiss the hand of "his princess." Obedience is woman's greatest duty; demanding that obedience is man's greatest duty. If a woman cannot do something on her own, she will more likely ask her neighbor (another woman) than her husband. Upon birth, girls were bathed in cold water, so as not to be "hot blooded," but "pliable and docile." They ought to suppress any public outburst so as not to be reprimanded with the words "what are you doing? Are you not a girl?" It was great shame for a woman to be caught by her husband in the act of combing her hair, not to mention that when she gave birth it was far from the eyes of the man. During the act of birthing, the woman leaves the household to give birth in a hut. It was untowardly for a woman to complain about her husband or fiancée. Giving birth out of wedlock is considered a great curse not only within the family, but more broadly, because this leads to difficult interfamilial conflicts. Parents got rid of women pregnant out of wedlock in the most cruel ways. The greatest shame a woman could visit upon a man was adultery, and punishment for it was often terrible.

Many of the above-mentioned examples of what meant to be a man in traditional Montenegro were also commonplace in the ethnographic

travel writing in nineteenth-century Montenegro. Although the majority of travelers that made observations about peoples of Montenegro did not view themselves as professional ethnographers, delving into their accounts becomes a necessity in determining characteristics of men (or "ideal men") in traditional Montenegro (Aleksandrov 1996 [1894]; Bašmakov 1996 [1913]; Bronevski 1995 [1836]; Bulonj 2002 [1869]; Ebel 2006 [1842]; Grote 2006 [1913]; Jansen 2005 [1916]; Kaper 1999 [1858–1859], 1999 [1858]; Kovaljevski 1999 [1872]; Markoti 1997 [1896]; Nenadović 2005 [1878]; Rovinski 1998 [1897]). Additionally, the travelers, regardless of their national traditions, intentionally or not, usually wrote under the influence of the nineteenth-century Romanticism, so that there were a few more tropes: Montenegrins were described as living in "an island" of freedom and independence within the whole of Ottoman Empire; the best Slavs (which is particularly noticeable among Russian travelers); and contemporary Spartans (or Serbian Spartans sometimes). In all cases Montenegrin manliness, heroism, and patriotism were too emphasized, and rarely did the travelers approach Montenegro and Montenegrins critically.[18]

The basic characteristics of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity are clear.[19] How, then, should a scientific study of traditional Montenegrin masculinities look? If a study were designed in such a way to shed light on the characteristics of men in the Montenegrin past and if it took for its basis contemporary theoretical premises of masculinity, the research would necessarily result in multiple masculinities. These results would incorporate data regarding the number (or approximate proportion) of men who break the norms of gender roles, as well as the consequences breaking gender roles has on society or the individual who has fallen short of norms. The research ought to result in the appearance of a hegemonic (if not fixed) masculinity, and offer information about the deformation of gender roles caused by historical change. In later phases, the researcher could place the collected data on globally normativized scales for examining masculinity, offering the conditions for a possible comparison with contemporary men in Montenegro. However, the studies of traditional Montenegrin society have been interested in researching normative ideals imposed by society as an ideal model of behavior. Therefore, if we attempt to analyze the characteristics of traditional Montenegrin masculinities from the data collected in the literature that deals with traditional Montenegrin society, we face a whole slew of questions well nigh impossible to answer from this distance. How closely do the characteristics of the model of Montenegrin masculinity adhere to real life, that is, real men? What is the proportion of people who could not fulfill such gender roles? Where in all this can we see the average Montenegrin (or one below

average)? We are left to conjecture. Also, let us attempt to determine from the current perspective what position on the *antifemininity* scale (refusal to do any activities traditionally considered female) would be occupied by the head of Prince Nikola's guard refusing to pick up the Prince's crying child off the floor (because he would never do so in his home either), or the man who would not bring his sick wife a drink of water even in the dead of night? Or else, how high on the component of *toughness* (where a man ought never show emotional or physical pain, but ought to carry out physical violence and enjoy dangerous situations) would the custom of collecting heads severed in battle rate (Durham 1923)? How would the examples of manliness and heroism we find in Marko Miljanov rate here? But let us go a step further. Let us imagine a study of masculinity among the finalists of World Championship of Ultimate Fighting, and compare the collected results with the model of Montenegrin masculinity. There is no doubt that the contemporary Ultimate Fighting champions would be "sissies" by comparison. Of course, I offer these examples not to position traditional Montenegrin masculinity exactly on a contemporary scale. Rather, they are here to show that any kind of rational comparison of Montenegrin men on the traditional/modern axis would be illusory, and draw attention to the problematic relationship of past reality and its narrative, something we will examine further in the following chapters of this book.

Be that as it may, a significant portion of the ethnographic and travel literature points out that the Montenegrins who traditionally lived in Montenegro were Serbs. Further, it is not uncommon in nineteenth and twentieth century sources to find a description of influential Montenegrins as adherents of Serbdom. The patriotism of old Montenegrins is characterized as striving for freedom, but not infrequently also as striving for the defense of Serbdom. The pain of the Ottoman Empire occupying Kosovo in 1389, and the desire for Kosovo to be liberated and returned to Serbia, is a common motif in traditional Montenegrin epic poems. This motif was also developed in the poetry of Montenegrin rulers of the Petrović dynasty (Petar II Petrović Njegoš and Prince/King Nikola). Further, a significant portion of ethnographic and travel literature also points out the strong emotional ties of old Montenegrins to Russia. The depth and significance, but also its irrationality, are best illustrated by an interesting detail from Montenegrin history. In 1776, a man of unknown origin appeared in Montenegro (it was assumed that he came from Bosnia or Dalmatia), and a rumor spread throughout Montenegro that, for some reason, it was the Russian Emperor, seeking refuge in Montenegro. Presenting himself as the Emperor of Russia, Peter III of Russia, this controversial historical figure successfully ruled Montenegro styled as Šćepan Mali from 1767

to 1773 (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 325–373). To comprehend the cult of Russia in Montenegro, it could also be useful to know that Gezeman says that old Montenegrins held the belief that the Russian Emperor is familiar with prominent Montenegrin heroes, knows the precise location of their mountain homes, and asks after their health (Gezeman 1968: 199).

The Traditional Component of the Model of Traditional Montenegrin Masculinity (Economic, Social, and Historical Contexts)

The model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity is inseparable from social formations that have influenced its creation. This requires a description of the broader social and historical context. It is particularly important to differentiate between two components of the model, most often interlaced and so difficult to separate. The first refers to gender roles of a shepherding, warrior, and plunderer economy awarded to men and women. The second refers to the concept of gender roles, shaped through fictional, ethnological, and historical narratives.

We can find the roots of the traditional Montenegrin masculinity model in the framework of tribal society. However, it is important to keep in mind that the process of creation of tribes in the Balkans is not confined to a single epoch. Thus, for example, Erdeljanović thinks that this region of the Balkan Peninsula had tribal formations even at the time of the Illyrians (whose social structure was shattered with the arrival of the Romans). This author points out two phases in the formation of tribes in the region—the older and the more recent. The older phase encompasses the first centuries of Slavic migration to the area, whereas the more recent refers to the period after the arrival of the Ottomans (Erdeljanović 1978 [1926]: 575). Cvijić holds that the tribal structures of South Slavs date back to when they were dwelling in the Carpathian region, but that they were weakened or completely dissolved through the influence of the Byzantine Empire and the South Slavic medieval states (Cvijić 1966 [1922–1931]: 84–88). These claims support the thesis that in the region of the Dinaric Alps tribes are indeed very old social formations, and that the dissolution of old tribal systems and recreation of new ones is a continuous process. The ever ready return and strengthening of tribal organizations, which almost went extinct during the period of South Slavic medieval states, Cvijić called "ethnographic reverse aging" (Cvijić 1966 [1922–1931]: 17), reawakening with it the old social formations and customs. According to Cvijić's terminology, the "ethnographically freshest tribes" inhabited the area of Montenegro, the Montenegrin Highlands, and the neighboring regions of Herzegovina and northern

Albania (Cvijić 1966 [1922–1931]: 84–88). Similar to ethnographic refreshment, in Western anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss noted a discrepancy between humble agricultural technology and abundance of agricultural rituals in the Bororo tribe of Indians. This led him to hypothesize that these tribes went through a process of cultural regression and he called that process "the archaic illusion or pseudo-archaism" (a false archaism in the sense of a secondary archaism) (Lévi-Strauss 1974 [1958]: 111–117; Pavković 2009).

The katun, at once designating a shepherd's hut and an organizational form, had an important role in the genesis of tribes in the Montenegro region. The katun is a structure of summer grazing fields, a form of organization of seminomadic shepherding originating in pre-Slavic times (Gezeman 1968: 48). The system is present throughout the Balkan Peninsula with local variations (Filipović 1963; Djurdjev 1963: 166; Erdeljanović 1978 [1926]: 95). Above all, the katun designated a group of people from several families or households gathered around a senior member under whose orders they conducted their economic duties for the masters they served. Aside from that, the katun marks a dwelling cite where any such group of people lives. One of the main activities of Vlachs in medieval katuns was the "carry" (transferring goods on horses, offering coaches for hire). Most katuns varied in size, but it is thought that they usually counted no more than 50 households (making it easier to rule, move around, find grazing fields for sheep or cattle). In the Middle Ages, the katun was an organized group of people that differentiated itself not so much through their economic activity as much as through its services (carriers of goods, professional shepherds, soldiers) and their legal status. Desanka Kovačević studied the katun in the hills surrounding Dubrovnik and concluded that a katun was not a state, but a constantly changing process (Kovačević 1963).

Tribes started to form through a fusion of mountain katuns and village parishes in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Apart from the influence on the genesis of tribes (as an economic basis for a tribe), the existence of medieval katuns is important for this research in yet another way, which concerns the "peacefulness" of the people living in medieval katuns. Namely, the population of one area in the feudal period were cattle and sheep herders and carried goods for hire—and were in fact quite peaceful. Before the arrival of the Ottomans in the Dinaric Alp region of the Balkan Peninsula, several medieval princedoms and feudal states emerged. In the region of today's Montenegro, first there was Duklja, later the state of Zeta. While the feudal system was in place, the shepherds had their designated summer and winter grazing areas, and peasants working the land had their winter grazing areas. Each group

achieved its right to graze by paying a "grass tax" to the agrarian master ("grass tax" was feudal shepherding rent). The feudal system "operated" until the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, when a crisis in the Zeta feudal state coincided with the arrival of the Ottomans, causing the break up not only of the organization of the state but also of feudal social property. As Erdeljanović notes:

> As soon as strong state government disappeared from these mountains—where the full force of state control could never be fully exerted—the region was plunged into disorder, worsened by almost incessant war and power grabs, leading to the revival of the tribes. It was a response to conditions and a way to protect interests. (Erdeljanović 1978 [1926]: 470)

With the dissolution of feudal states and the arrival of the Ottomans, the population that worked the land and dwelt in parishes converted into shepherds, mixing the two layers and further combining with the Vlach shepherds, creating tribes.

According to Nikola Pavković, the secondary archaism in South Slavs can be seen in the totality of culture, and most clearly in the reduction of agriculture and the dominance of extensive shepherding (Pavković 2009: 12). The paucity of fertile land in the region of the Dinaric Alps[20] was conducive to making shepherding the economic staple (predominantly sheep and goats). Shepherds had to use summer and winter grazing fields to survive, that is, there is an oscillation of shepherds' dwellings depending on the season. With the dissolution of the South Slavic medieval states, a slew of older social forms were renewed in society as a whole. Above all, this meant a tribal organization with appropriate institutions: custom law, blood vengeance, collective criminal responsibility and communal property (on the level of family, fraternity, village, or tribe), people's court, fraternal and tribal assembly, and tribal ethos and solidarity. Apart from that, the destruction of medieval states and higher social classes arrested the development of written literature, which was supplanted with an oral tradition (Pavković 2009: 12).

The organization of Montenegrin tribes can be followed in the time after the Ottoman conquest, that is, in the more recent phase of its creation, otherwise called the period of "ethnographic reverse aging." The Montenegrin area featured two types of tribes. The Montenegrin tribes, that is, the tribes of Old Montenegro, bordered by the valley of the Zeta river, lake Shkoder, and the Bay of Kotor. The tribes of Old Montenegro inhabited the four subdistricts of Katunska, Riječka, Lješanska, and Crmnička *nahijas* (the Arabic word for the smallest administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire). The other group of tribes covered the green

zone area, between the Zeta and Lim rivers. These were further split into the Herzegovina tribes and the tribes of the Seven Highland Hills. Still, when speaking about the creation of "newer" tribes (in the more recent phase), we must be aware that the process of creation and development of Montenegrin tribes was not uniform, nor were all tribes formed at the same time or had a collective dynamic of creation and development.[21] Social structure also varied from tribe to tribe, and from period to period (Erdeljanović 1978 [1926]: 328–344, 459–484, 556–585, 498–750).

When speaking, then, about "tribal society," we must keep in mind that we are not dealing with a coherent universe. Rather, the characteristics offered in idealized descriptions of tribal society ought to be thought of as referring to the real life of some of the tribes only conditionally. Although tribal lore has it that all members of a tribe descend from a common ancestor, the tribes formed more often through agglomeration than by relation (to use Cvijić's terminology), by a confluence, rather than dispersal of blood (in Gezeman's terminology). The operating assumption is that each tribe had a few old lineages that made up the core of the tribe. The core drew together smaller groups who would expand the initial fraternities by adopting the lore about the origin of the tribe as their own (Cvijić 1991 [1922–1931]: 360–370).

In forming the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, it is important to emphasize that one of the basic (although not necessary)[22] conditions for the formation of a tribe was the possession of a summer and winter grazing area. Thus, Erdeljanović points to a few factors when discussing the population of a region as it is beginning to take shape into a tribal community. Before all else, he places the existence of a mini commune or collective land, used and defended by all members of the tribe. In Montenegro, a mini community meant a community of grazing and using a given forested area belonging to a tribe, a fraternity, or a village collectively.[23] Sreten Vukosavljević is also of the opinion that the highest mini communities and common economic interest drew unrelated people into a given collective (Vukosavljević 1953).

It is precisely in the context of a seminomadic economy and collective property of a tribe that we should seek the roots of the formation of traditional Montenegrin masculinity. Namely, an extensive shepherding economy gave collective property an immensely important role, and collective property of a fraternity or a tribe can only be property if it is *defended* from others. Therefore, each piece of tribal territory requires defense. Tribes led real mini wars for hills and valleys, and much blood was spilled over grazing territory, water, and forests. The seminomadic shepherding economy had an important characteristic: when they were not themselves engaged in theft, shepherds sought, almost single-mindedly, to prevent

the theft of their flocks by neighboring tribes. The hillside grazing field was the ground that had to be constantly defended with weapons, and collective life with the flock meant battle readiness at all times (Cvijić 1991 [1922–1931]: 366). This gave rise to frequent battles among tribes, as well as among members of various fraternities within a tribe.[24] Since the economic basis of a tribe was the katun, it was enough to deprive a tribe of winter grazing grounds to threaten all its members with biological extinction. For example, parishes which in the wintertime hosted flocks of the Katun *nahija* had to seek grazing grounds outside the borders of their tribe (along the coast and the plains around lake Shkoder). Such an arrangement was sustainable only on the condition of not entering into conflict with the Venetians, Ottomans, or any of their vassals. However, after the Morean War (1684–1699), when the Venetians denied these tribes the use of their winter grazing grounds, the Katun members began enmities with both the Ottomans and the Venetians. The tribe faced a dilemma: either die of starvation (since it would be unable to sustain its flock through the winter) or pick up arms and find vital resources outside their own country, resulting in a truly merciless shepherd war. Similarly, the Venetian government forbade their vassals to accept flocks for winter grazing, but despite all prohibitions, Montenegrins brought their sheep on Venetian vassals' grounds. The occasional attempts on both the Venetian and Ottoman sides to close borders "forced" Montenegrin tribes to take up arms to break the economic blockade and seek sources of sustenance outside their own territories. These raids were known as *četovanje*, a kind of guerrilla warfare on a tribal or fraternal basis, and they are as old as the history of the tribes themselves. Due to tribal anarchy on the territory of Montenegro, as well as the weakening of Ottoman power in Herzegovina and Venetian power in the Bay of Kotor at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the raids became larger and more frequent.[25] There were more incursions into insufficiently defended territories, including the greater Dubrovnik area. Our best preserved records of the tribes' raids are of incursions into the Dubrovnik and Bay of Kotor areas, and contemporary Dubrovnik and Venetian sources are littered with instances of Montenegrin guerrilla warfare.[26]

If we consider the given information through the prism of contemporary theories of masculinity, keeping in mind that masculinities are produced through quotidian activities, we can easily conclude that the economic logic of traditional Montenegrin society necessarily privileged men. The extensive shepherding economy and collective property of the tribe demanded defense, and the lack of basic living resources meant they had to be sought elsewhere. Ensuring the basic means of existence— either through their defense on the tribe's territory or through raids onto

neighboring land—meant frequent armed conflicts, and, as we have mentioned, armed forces were at all times and in nearly all cultures almost always entirely male institutions (Solomon 2007; Goldstein 2004). Thus the ensuring of basic life means in traditional Montenegrin society was specifically male work, and the dominance of the shepherding, warrior, plunderer economy precipitated an extremely masculine, patriarchal culture.[27] When it comes to the cult of male children, a particularly interesting phenomenon are "sworn virgins." These transgender beings were nineteenth- and twentieth-century women whose gender identity did not match their assigned sex and lived in the patriarchal area of the Western Balkans, mainly Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro. A "sworn virgin" would take a vow of chastity, swear to never get married, wear male clothing, adopt a male gender identity, and continue to live as a man. Owing to the fact that families in Montenegrin patriarchal area were patrilineal and patrilocal, a woman would mainly become a "sworn virgin" if the family was left without male children (Barjaktarović 1948, 1966).

The Conflicts with Ottomans as a Component of the Model of Traditional Montenegrin Masculinity

The analysis of the traditional component of the model of Montenegrin masculinity has shown that its roots should be sought in the tribal structure of society. A particularly significant role in the creation of the model was played by the seminomadic shepherding economy and collective property of the tribes. The extensive shepherding economy awarded collective property an important role, and communal life with the flock meant constant battle readiness, as well as frequent clashes over control of economic resources. This, in turn, drove the culture toward an extreme patriarchy, greatly privileging the male gender.

Over time, this traditional model of masculinity acquired another component. Namely, the geopolitical position of Montenegrin tribes caused them to enter into frequent clashes with the Ottomans. These clashes left a lasting impression in the national oral tradition and contain a whole host of traditionalist elements. In Montenegrin epic poems, there is a constant ethical and life struggle between good and evil, a struggle for freedom and against slavery, for justice and equality, against injustice. The main characteristic of heroism in traditional poems is that it is directed at moral goals. In Montenegrin epic poems, heroism is sung about as the striving of the Montenegrin people for freedom, and the heroic spirit permeates the warrior morality. Traditional literature, particularly Petar Petrović Njegoš, stigmatize traitors, "Turkish" sycophants,

and unheroic behavior (Pešić 1996 [1986]: 120–121). Traditional epic poetry even sings about heroic feats in the course of plundering sheep. However, these poems, in contrast to the archival material in Dubrovnik and Kotor, mention no guerrilla warfare on the territory of Dubrovnik or Venice (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 314–323). Only booty plundered from the Ottomans was considered a feat worthy of traditional epic poems. In general, traditional poetry constantly got transformed and described events differently from the way they occurred. They tell us nothing about the events they describe, but offer information about society in the period in which they lived.[28]

In order to fully understand the influence of conflicts with the Ottomans in producing the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, we need to analyze the complex interrelation of historical truth and its narrative representations. Notably, there is a particularly glaring incongruence between the popular narrative, even the popular science narrative, and historical facts when it comes to the relation with the Ottoman Empire. Historically, with the conquering of Shkoder (1479), Ottoman rule finally took control of the Zeta valley and the Highlands, and thus over the main road from Shkoder to Herzegovina. When looking at the relation of Montenegrin, Highland, or Herzegovan tribes toward the Ottomans, it is especially important to differentiate the popular narrative from historical facts. A digest form of typical, idealized description of a popular narrative and popular science narrative would go something like this:

> At the time of the occupying campaign against Europe, the Ottomans used their military power to crush Zeta, but they could never subjugate it to their governance. A several-century bloody war between the Ottoman Empire and the Montenegrin people took place, beginning in the 16th century, and lasted, with increasing intensity, until the 20th century. Montenegrins fought to the death because their national survival was in question. This struggle had great social consequences for the development of Montenegro. The Montenegrin people subjected all other goals and aims to the defense against this danger…(Pešić 1996 [1986]: 145). The history of Montenegro in the last five centuries is the history of the greatest heroism imaginable…(Cvijić 1991 [1922–1931]: 168). The Montenegrins had battle and war imposed on them by the Ottomans. They accepted it because they had to. It was a question of life and death…Before their very hearths, they were forced to choose: us or them. (Pešić 1995 [1986]: 158–159)

This narrative has very little overlap with historical fact. Montenegrin tribes were "jammed" in between the Venetians and the Ottoman Empire, and were "torn" between administrative and economic commitment, since

they were subject to Ottoman sovereign rule, but economically tied to the Venetian markets in the Bay of Kotor. Their geopolitical position dragged them into incidents and wars of the Ottomans against the Venetians and other states (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 44). Thus during the Cretan War (1645–1669) and the Morean War (1684–1699), known as the sixth and seventh Ottoman–Venetian Wars, there was noticeable hesitation (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 135–145)[29] and ambivalence on the part of the tribes (Istorija Crne Gore: 224, 458–459).[30] There were frequent vacillations on the part of the tribes (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 160–161)[31] and alternating periods of conflict and peace, but a real war, there was none. At no point during the Cretan War did the Montenegrin, Highland, and Herzegovan tribes sever their ties to the Ottomans (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 116). In the first days of the Morean War, there was much trumped-up outwitting and maneuvering, rather than frankness. There was an incongruence between words and deeds, between wishes and the actual state of affairs. Everybody was declaring allegiance to Venice, but no one did anything about it. The cautious posturing of the tribes was a general character-istic of the situation. In the first years of the Morean War, not a single Montenegrin, Highland, or Herzegovan tribe moved into open hostilities against the Ottomans (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 173). Although it was in the interest of the Venetians to win over the Montenegrin, Herzegovan, and Highland tribes, they had a hard time unifying and connecting the disparate tribes. All three sets of tribes did offer resistance to the Ottomans, but the scope of that resistance was rather broad and never crossed into uncompromising fighting (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 226).[32] Historical facts tell us that for the duration of the sixteenth and seven-teenth centuries, we cannot speak of a significant or organized resistance of Montenegrins, and until the eighteenth century, only the Katun nahija advocated a fight to the death.

Right up until the beginning of the eighteenth century, until the arrival of the first Russian emissaries, the interest in foreign affairs of Montenegrin tribes went no farther than Venice and Constantinople. Only when Russia entered the war against the Ottoman Empire in 1710 did the Russian Emperor, Peter I, seek out the Christians of the Balkans—in Montenegro, but also in Serbia, Slovonia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina—and called for rising against the Ottomans (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 251–253). The rebellion did fail, but from the very beginning, the Porte took it very seriously, so much so that the Sultan issued a firman that the Montenegrins and Highlanders be severely punished, the mon-astery on Cetinje be destroyed, the leaders of the rebellion, Prince Danilo (1697–1735) and Miloradović, be caught, and those resisting be taught a lesson (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 256). In 1712 and 1714, the Porte sent

retaliation squads: initially some 20,000 soldiers led by Ahmet-pasha, and then some 30,000, by Numan-Pasha Ćuprilić. That there were two retaliation squads is particularly significant for two reasons: it was the first time the Montenegrins fought directly against the much stronger Ottoman power, and these two events will later on strongly influence the formation of traditional narrative (with numerous imputations and interpretations).

The Ottoman army led by Ahmet-pasha reached as far as Cetinje (the Montenegrin capital), forcing the organizers of the rebellion to hide in Herzegovina. Still, this gave rise to a popular legend: that the Montenegrins fought back at Carev Laz, annihilating some 60,000 people, that the Ottomans did not conquer Cetinje, and that for this reason the Sultan sent another attack on Montenegro. Historical documents show that, to the contrary, the Katunjani resisted the Ottoman army, inflicting some losses in the course of their struggle and retreat. Prince Vasilije Petrović (1750–1766) recorded information retold to him by ordinary people (about the absolute victory of Montenegrins over 60,000 Ottoman soldiers in the first, and 100,000 in the second attack) into the "History of Montenegro," printed in Moscow in 1754, giving rise to the legend of "Carev Laz" (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 258–263).[33] It is this very source that first put forward the hypothesis about the centuries-long freedom and independence of Montenegro (although the author himself never hid that even in his time Montenegro recognized Ottoman power as sovereign).[34] "History of Montenegro" by Prince Vasilije Petrović did not have a great impact on Montenegrin traditional narrative until the end of the 18th century. Once the official royal historiography was constructed, at the time of Prince Petar I and subsequent rulers of the Petrović dynasty, the text became the main "historical" source (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 96).

The legend of untouched independence and the events at Carev Laz significantly influenced the creation of the tradition of constant struggle against the Ottomans. A key text in that regard is *Mountain Wreath*, the magnum opus of ruler and greatest Montenegrin poet Petar II Petrović Njegoš (ruled during 1830–1851). The central portion of the work concerns the inquest against Turkish converts, that is, the dramatic action focused on exterminating tribal converts to Islam, supposed to have taken place at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. According to legend, the inquest was held throughout the land one Christmas Eve, initiated by Danilo Šćepčević, later called Petrović of Njeguš (1697–1735). Njegoš's text claims this event as the epic moment of the beginning of Montenegrin liberation. There are no written documents about the event in question prior to the nineteenth century, and the Dubrovnik and Venetian archives contain not a single reference to it

(Pavlović 2001: 7). Nor is the event mentioned in Prince Vasilije Petrović's "History of Montenegro" (just as there is no word about Montenegrin Islamic converts). The first mention of the event is in a poem by Petar I Petrović. This episode was then used by Sima Milutinović Sarajlija, teacher and mentor to Petar II Petrović Njegoš, in his own "History of Montenegro" (published in Belgrade in 1835), because he thought it was necessary to give greater significance to the historical role of the Petrović dynasty. The artistically represented event appears to the reader, even a scientist, as reality (Nikčević 1985). Njegoš accepted the theme and began to develop it in his early works. Finally, following the ideology of his time, Njegoš reshaped and raised the event from an incident in collective memory to the level of struggle for liberation, heritage, orthodoxy, and Serbdom (Aleksov 2006: 29–30; Ilieva 2005; Nikčević 1985, 2001; Pavlović 2001: 7–8).

Socio-constructivist theoretical premises dominant in the studying of masculinity claim that *men are not born but made*. In addition to the economic context, a significant role in the "making" of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity was played by the overall geopolitical position of Montenegro in history. Namely, the historical, ethnologic, and fictional narrative about Montenegro's past suggest a constant state of siege throughout the period of Ottoman rule over Montenegro. Since wars necessarily have great influence on the structure of gender relations and the creation of masculinity, given that the popular and popular science narrative about Montenegro's past is one of permanent war against the Ottoman Empire, we can say that the given narrative had a great impact on the structure of traditional Montenegrin gender roles and particularly on the production of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, in part responsible for the creation of an extremely masculine, patriarchal culture.

Ideology of Masculinity and the Creation of the State

It would perhaps be in vain to attempt to clearly distinguish between traditional and traditionalist components of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity. In our research, however, we are less interested in representational than ontological narrativity, with its basic premise that we know and give meaning to the world through narrativity. Given this point of view, it is of vital importance for the rest of the book to consider the connection between the ideology of masculinity, historical and fictional narrative, the activities of the Petrović dynasty, and the creation of modern Montenegro. Tribal Montenegro was full of tribal

conflict, constant killing for myriad reasons, and had widespread blood vengeance (the scientifically widespread explanation that at the root of all this is "sustenance and survival" was an insult to Montenegrins even at the time). In order to suppress these (and other) destructive activities, the princes of the Petrović dynasty favored assembling the autonomous tribes and introducing statehood and rule of law. The most significant step in this direction was made by Petar II Petrović Njegoš (ruled during 1830–1851), who continued the process of centralization and achieved great progress in overcoming the power of autonomous tribes and creating a picture of a unified confederation.

If we now look at traditional Montenegrin masculinity in the context of the statehood of Montenegro, we can see that the two have an ambivalent relationship. Namely, the introduction of law, formation of institutions, and imposition of tax necessarily limited the autonomy of the tribes and the individual's monopoly on force. Each new step in creating a state shrunk the space for fulfillment of traditional masculinity and represented a new step in "pacifying" the Montenegrin man. Legal norms were often in collision with moral norms characteristic for tribal society of Montenegro, such that the heroism of patriarchal warrior society was a significant obstacle in the creation of the modern state and presented as a "remainder" that had to be removed. This historical task was successfully executed by the Petrović dynasty.[35] In the removal of these norms, Petar II Petrović Njegoš, in particular, reversed the suppression by previous rulers of certain traditional elements, claiming them as the very essence of Montenegro and using them as a tool in the building of a modern nation. In other words, as a ruler, he suppressed the heroism of the patriarchal warrior society; as a poet and philosopher, however, he preserved it brilliantly in his writing. In his masterpiece, *Mountain Wreath*,[36] the father of modern Montenegro, Petar II Petrović Njegoš, celebrated the most significant events from both real and invented Montenegrin past, suggesting a conflict of three civilizations: the heroic-patriarchal (Montenegrin), oriental (Ottoman or "Turkish"), and Western (Venetian). *Mountain Wreath* is the first great powerful narrative about a desired collective past, which became "canonized" history and was "imposed" on disparate tribes. The narrative from *Mountain Wreath* "integrated" members of various Montenegrin tribes, such that they "got" a collective heroic "history" and awareness of community—in a word, a "collective autobiography" (which found its consensus in making "Turks" the common enemy)—and had decisive influence on the creation of modern Montenegrin identity.[37] Njegoš dedicated *Mountain Wreath* to the leader of the First Serbian Uprising of 1804, Karadjordje Petrović. A significant aspect of this all-important philosophical epic poem, the narrative of which holds the very

essence of Modern Montenegrin identity, is the lamenting over the fate of Serbdom.

In this chapter, I have used three examples (Montenegrin legends of untouched independence, legends regarding Carev Laz, and the inquest of Islamic converts) to demonstrate the extent to which historical truth, historical and ethnologic narratives, and fictional narratives are interlaced and inseparable. In general, this is the problem faced by contemporary Montenegrin historiography. It is a particularly conspicuous problem in any scientific attempt at interpreting the ethnic origin of the Montenegrin people—a subject most ungrateful for research, due to the paucity and unreliability of sources.[38] Following contemporary anthropological takes, according to which the past is only a perspective of the present, in researching the ethnogenesis of the Montenegrin people, the anthropologist Saša Nedeljković set as the subject of his study not the past itself, but rather the stories of the past, that is, historiographic narratives. Most ethnogenetic studies consider the appearance of the Montenegrin nation as an interrelating of various Slavic, Serbian, Croatian, and pre-Slavic Balkan peoples. Nedeljković, on the other hand, divided all theories about the ethnic origin of Montenegrins into the Serbian, the Croatian, and internal theories. His conclusion is that, due to the Croatian and Serbian peoples/nations becoming early advocates of Western and Eastern Christianity, respectively, power structures within "smaller" groups of people/nations of the Balkans formed into three strands, producing three traditions and three ideologies: two external (opposed to one another) and one internal (autonomous).[39] A similar situation can be seen at the micro level on questions concerning the origins of individual tribes.[40]

The entwined and inseparable nature of historical truth, historical and ethnological narratives, and fictional narratives is yet another reason for my personal position somewhere between the constructivists and primordialists, closer to the constructivists. All previously mentioned narratives (battle at Carev Laz, legend of untouched independence, inquest against Islamic converts) have emerged from real ethnographic and historiographic material and were given shape only later (depending on the needs of the "particular present"). Thus, there are historical documents about the battle at Carev Laz during the Morean War. Although there is no particular locality mentioned for the battles of 1712, the nation's tradition describes Carev Laz as the place of destruction of the Ottoman army at the hands of the Montenegrins. The legend thus enters history, and later official historiography. Similarly, the frequent clashes among Montenegrin, Highland, and Herzegovan tribes caused by attempts to collect taxes transform into the legend of Montenegro's centuries-long struggle for independence. It is the same in the case of the inquest against

Islamic converts, which appears in the description of Bishop Danilo I Petrović (1697–1735), the inquest acquired completely new significance in the poetry of Petar II Petrović Njegoš.

Although these narratives have no capacity, or minimal capacity, to present the reality of past life, in moving from representative to ontological narrativity, they have great capacity to influence the shaping of identity because they are "imposed" as the only reality. Everything that has been written or sung orally *has become the "one and only reality" available to people* (Ankersmit 1994; Carr 1986; Mink 1970; Ricoeur 1991a, 1991b; Somers 1992, 1994; White 1984). In a particular historical moment, Njegoš took events preserved by the people's oral tradition, reshaped them, and raised them to the level of struggle for freedom, heritage, orthodoxy, and Serbdom, which in turn influenced the creation of modern Montenegro and had decisive influence in shaping Montenegrin identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[41] However, all that has been written or sung/told contain an abundance of material, representing a rich and dual narrative basis for the reproduction and perpetuation of a fluid identity. Depending on one's interests, it can, as needed, be interpreted as Montenegrin or as Serbian. The question of Montenegrin membership to NATO reignited the dual and fluid nature of Montenegrin identity.

4

Traditional Gender Roles and Contemporary Multicultural Politics of Identity: Men between Reality and Multiculturalism

Physical Violence as a Component of Contemporary Masculinity: Youth Research

The data that shed light on contemporary conceptualizations of masculinity have been obtained in a series of semi-structured interviews conducted mostly in 2009. As it was my attempt to study the extent to which physical violence and exposure to danger determine contemporary masculine identity (insofar as significant elements of the model of traditional masculinity), I have focused my research on young men. I thought that as parameters of masculine identity, physical violence and exposure to danger would be much more prominent in a younger population. Some 50 young men, aged between 17 and 25, were part of this portion of my research. I strove to encompass young men of various education levels (high school, junior college, and college), economic status (high, middle, and low income bracket), nationality (Montenegrin, Serbian, Albanian, Bosniac, and Muslim), and religion (Orthodox and Muslim). The bases for studying various types of masculinity were the Male Role Norms Scale (MRNS) and Brannon Masculinity Scale (BMS). The data was collected in various places: on the street, at gyms, at coffee shops, and so on. In the case of most interviewees, I conducted the interview purposely: for example, with young men who I knew were inclined to be involved in incidents, with those who spend a lot of their time in gyms, as well as men who were engaged in activities not normally associated with men. Data obtained this way really quite

varied. This refers to the inconsistency in the positions of a single person, most often concerning incongruence between the "ideal" and "empirical," and was the norm more than the exception. As an illustration it would be interesting to quote a few of the conversations with my interviewees. For example, on his own, the interviewee says: "I am a traditional man, we all know how a man should behave and how a woman, and I demand from a girl to comport herself in accordance with that." This is followed by a series of my questions: Would you change a baby's diaper tomorrow? have you ever made lunch? would you go to the store on your wife's request? does your girlfriend go on vacation with her girlfriends? does she ask for your approval for that? and so on. As you can imagine, the interviewee answered all but the last question affirmatively. In the end, I asked, what, then, makes you a traditional man? and, of course, got no answer.

Another example refers to violence as a characteristic of masculinity. The interviewee says: "a man ought to be a man, put his foot down when needed. He should not hesitate to use violence." I adjusted to the situation immediately and asked, "would you ever fight anyone?" To which the unhesitating answer was, "of course." "If someone insulted you, you would immediately strike?" "Yes." "Do you now fight when someone insults you?" The answer was, "fighting is today completely out of place." After which I was unable to get an answer from this interviewee what exactly constituted violent conduct in his behavior. As I have mentioned, such conversations were the rule, rather than the exception.

When I focused on readiness to physical violence, exposure to danger, and the aesthetic ideal of the male body, my research revealed different groups of young men.[1] The first group consisted of young men who considered readiness to violence and exposure to danger an important characteristic of masculinity. For this group, an important aspect was the conspicuous effort put into sculpting the body as a form of symbolic capital, with physical strength (combined with an oversized body ideal) coupled with emotional restraint. Their positions are reflected in the following statements:

- We challenged them to a fair fight, and they did not want to come.
- I went out last night. There was no trouble anywhere, it was really boring.
- Look at those sick junkies. We ought to get together and bust them up.
- If my girlfriend cheated on me, I'd slap her around, and I'd beat the hell out of the guy.
- What kind of a man doesn't even have a couple of hundred pounds. Or alternately, who can't "strip" a bottle of brandy.

- My goal right now in life is to be strong and physically prepared.
- All the guys in my building go to the gym.

The second group comprised men who considered that one ought to avoid physical violence and exposure to danger whenever possible, but they rejected neither completely. The positions of this group are reflected in the following statements:

- Those guys make me not want to go out, they're always causing trouble.
- They're fighting too much. I cannot understand how someone could fight in this day and age.
- I would fight if there were no other way.
- They drive their cars too fast. I don't care about them, but they'll kill an innocent person.
- What would I do if she cheated on me? Nothing. She can go if she thinks that is better.

The aesthetic ideals were considerably different:

- He used to be fit; then he started taking steroids and turned into a freak.
- You should be athletic, trim, but that is it.
- Yeah, exercise, but also study, work, socialize.

The third group rejected physical violence and exposure to danger entirely, and considered sensitivity an important characteristic of men. The positions of this group are reflected in the following statements:

- Of course I'm gentle with my girlfriend. I am gentle towards my mother and sister, too.
- I have never hit anyone, nor would I.
- I hang out mostly with girls, since we have more topics of conversation in common.
- I have never been into sports.
- You should care about yourself, but by spending more time with the mind than the body.

The research analysis of the small sample of older men (aged 50 to 70) showed differences too large to be classified with a single main cause.

The starting premise was that the contrast between different types of contemporary masculinity would be the most conspicuous on the subscale claiming exposure to danger and violence as the essence of masculinity. The data obtained by this research showed that young men of various or even the same socio-demographic characteristics, who live in the same neighborhood, even within a single family, scored differently on the given subscale (sometimes even diametrically opposite). The only pattern I could draw from the research sample was that young men who resorted to violence more often were also less educated, mostly from working-class families. In this case, the drawing of any definite conclusions about social status, education, and types of masculinity was pure conjecture, unworthy of scientific writing. In any case, this is not the subject of this book. Certainly, the assembled data were more than sufficient to show that in reality there is more than one masculinity, even when taking as a parameter only one such aspect as physical violence. As I have mentioned, the parameter of readiness for physical violence and exposure to danger was an important component of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, and the assumption was that the diversity of contemporary masculinity will be most obvious precisely in relation to this component.

Contemporary Men: Toward the Man of the Future

I have attempted to determine the characteristics of the Montenegrin man of the future by focusing my research on young, highly educated persons engaged in politics and the NGO sector. Conceiving the research in this way greatly constrains the possibility of generalizing obtained results. However, it has also clearly oriented us toward types of Montenegrin masculinity that will appear in the future (perhaps even become dominant). My premise was that young, highly educated youth of political parties would in the near future represent the political elite of Montenegro, and therefore promote the desired form of masculinity top-down.

This portion of the interviews was held at the Regional Euro-Atlantic Camp (REACT 2009), held during September 1–5, 2009, as well as in Podgorica in September of 2009. During that time, I conducted interviews with exactly 42 persons from Montenegro (29 men and 13 women). The diversity of religious and ethnic affiliation (Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic, and Montenegrin, Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, respectively) shows that I strove to encompass interviewees from different socio-demographics. Aside from that, in my research, I tried to encompass persons from different parts of Montenegro (continental, northern, and coastal regions).

Above all, we ought to keep in mind that all the interviewees from this group were in agreement with the statement that men with characteristics of the traditional man (as suggested by historical, ethnologic, and fictional narratives) do not exist in contemporary Montenegro. This group of men valued professional success, education, economic prosperity, and considered that a man ought to be the protector and provider of the family. Characteristic statements are listed here:

- We men are more oriented toward the public sphere, and it is very important to be accomplished socially, but we mustn't neglect the family.
- My task is to offer my children all the comfort I was myself given by my parents.

Child care, cooking, hygiene were still female tasks, but the men believed that they ought to take part in them and thus help the women. Their statements indicated this attitude:

- Of course I would change the diapers of my children.
- I will sometimes make lunch.
- It would not be my first time doing laundry and ironing.

As we can see, housework is still perceived as female work. A Montenegrin feminist claimed that if men were able to achieve economic prosperity on their own, they would still prefer to lock the woman at home. This was confirmed in part by a series of later interviews. As characterized by these statements:

- I allow my girlfriend to go out with her girlfriends and go on vacation on her own. Some day I will allow my wife to go out with her friends. I would allow any public engagement, although I think that a woman ought to dedicate herself more to the family.
- I support the emancipation of women, but I think that we are neglecting that which is most sacred—the family. Child care ought to be shared, but the mother takes the lead there.
- We live in different times today, it is difficult for someone to provide for a family on his own.

Research within this group has shown that physical violence and exposure to danger have completely vanished from masculinity. Characteristic statements include,

- Oh come on, that is a stupid question.
- What? I should fight someone to prove that I am a man? I didn't even do that as a kid.
- That does not exist anymore.

This is true of violence toward women. Thus it is interesting to quote an exchange between a feminist and some ten young men from the group. The feminist pointed out that contemporary Montenegro has many cases of violence against women within the family, to which one of the participants in the exchange retorted (to rapturous applause of the others): "Don't you understand that this has nothing to do with either men or Montenegro. We are dealing with criminals who should be in prison and the mentally ill who ought to seek help."

According to the men interviewed in this portion of the research, work is the main dimension of masculine identity. It is defined as a male space, and it is through work that men accumulate social capital that represents their basic contribution to their families.

As mentioned, the research was initially directed at men only. Spontaneously and by accident, one of the interviews included a woman who offered her idea of men in Montenegro today. Later, I held similar conversations with multiple interviewees.[2] The possibility of generalizing these results is quite limited because the interviewees were exclusively young women, highly educated, and actively engaged in the public sector. They all agreed that men today are much "softer" and "effeminate" than they used to be, but that they were far from the "Western type" of man. The basic change boils down to much more personal care, their own appearance, and status symbols. According to the women, men have changed externally, but views overall have remained traditional. Their statements about men reveal these aspects:

- Career, work, income are all in the service of status symbols.
- A good car, watch, designer shoes and suit—this is what men hold up today as the ideal.
- They have simply "slapped on" some new "make up," but everything has remained the same.
- Well, tell me, will you, do you know a man who has a positive outlook on homosexuality?

I am showing the field research of contemporary Montenegrin masculinities as part of the theoretical methodological framework of an overall study, and its purpose is to show that reality necessarily holds multiple types of masculinity (which is important for understanding the relation

of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity and real men in the past). The focus on narratives that link the male, patriarchal-warrior identity of the Montenegrin tradition to currently socially relevant debates regarding the accession to NATO has driven this research, and did not require deeper analysis of each given factor. In any case, the problems in defining contemporary masculinity detected in this research could be a signpost for some future theoretical and methodological specifying, preferably interdisciplinary studies of the Montenegrin man. I think that future studies of masculinity ought to pay attention to the influence certain social variables have in defining masculinity in different social groups. It is necessary to consider the differences and similarities of vantage points in urban and rural environments. Since anthropology is usually thought of as long-term fieldwork in small communities, it would be interesting to examine the connections that exist among concepts of masculinity present in these communities. Is there competition between masculinities? Is there a dominant masculinity? What is the connection between various views of masculinities and their relationships toward women? What is the connection between various masculinities, socio-economic status, and the aesthetic ideal (of the male and female body)? What are the common characteristics present within different views of masculinity?

Such research is particularly important in the context of a worryingly high level of homophobia, noticed by the head of the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro.[3] In my opinion, the question of status of the LGBT population in Montenegro will cause a fierce and long lasting "cultural war," in which any consensus of "traditional" and "new" ideals regarding the conceptualization of gender roles will be impossible. Unfortunately, many traditional and traditionalist gender ideals, long cherished and carefully "preserved" in the popular imagination, will continue to shape the ideas of "normal/not normal" gender roles in Montenegrin society, which can have numerous negative consequences.

Multicultural Identity Politics

As we have seen, the researchers who have studied traditional Montenegrin society most often had as their research subject the normative ideals imposed by that society—the ideal model of behavior. Thus, based on narratives about the past, we can discern the characteristics of models of traditional gender relations, but not of all the gender relations as they actually took place. Still, this in no way lessens the functional potential of the given model in determining contemporary social relations.

To that end, Saša Nedeljković has endeavored to discover whether these "traditional" conceptions were still active. He wanted to know whether and to what extent they still determined social relations, and how they influence the construction of the ethnic identity of rural Montenegrins in Serbia. The starting premise was that this masculine pattern of behavior was crucial for understanding Montenegrin culture in Lovćenac (a village in Serbia). The author thus wanted to examine the way and extent to which this pattern can be discerned in everyday life, what role it played in interethnic communication, and whether and how it is instrumentalized in ethnic relations. Nedeljković's analysis showed that the concept of masculinity is a very useful analytical tool in studying Montenegrin ethnic identity in Lovćenac, and that masculinity is manifested through specific and adapted forms of aggression, heterosexuality, authoritarianness, laziness, and so on. In signalizing or stigmatizing one's ethnicity, masculinity was ascribed to one's community, while masculine success and the extent of fulfillment of the ideal model of masculinity is shown as useful in identifying with a tight ethnic (tribal) and regional groups, that is, in internal classification (Nedeljković, 2010).[4]

By focusing on multiculturalism as a political, cultural, and educational strategy, my intention in this portion of the book is to show the functional potential and possible abuses of the model of traditional Montenegrin gender relations within contemporary identity politics. The anthropology of multiculturalism will serve as the theoretical and methodological framework, with special attention paid to cultural theoretical analysis of public policy (Beckett and Macey 2001; Benhabib 1999; Eriksen 1993, 2004, 2007; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Marcus and Fisher 1999 [1986]; Milenković 2007c, 2008, 2014; Okin 1998; Powell 2003; Rabinow and Marcus 2006; Rapport 2003; Rorty 1995; Spinner-Halev 2001; Spiro 1986; Wright 1998; Zechenter 1997). Culture is fast becoming an omnipresent synonym for identity and identity marker around which various social and political groups are formed, and they lobby for special recognition from the state (all in the name of cultural specificity, that is, in the name of "this" or "that" aspect of cultural identity). Therefore, in this portion of the book I raise the question of the instrumentalization of the model of traditional Montenegrin gender relations in contemporary identity politics, and pay special attention to the lack of consensus between the concept of culture in the public sphere and the concept within contemporary anthropology. This inconsistency has been conceptualized by Miloš Milenković as "the paradox of post-cultural anthropology" (Milenković, 2007c).

Multiculturalism represents a specific form of identity politics in which various groups in contemporary society fight for recognition by

the state. Their struggle is based on claims that differences in language, gender, culture, ethnicity, or religion (this list is constantly enlarged) are so essential that states and their institutions ought to consider these differences as sufficient grounds for the recognition of identity. Within political theory, multiculturalism is most often used in two contexts: (a) in the context of education, where the problem regards the exclusion of various groups from the concept of culture as it is taught (women, gay, lesbian populations, non-white populations, ethnic and religious minorities, aboriginal populations). It includes the history, literature, and philosophy of these groups and is often called the "politics of identity" or "politics of representations." For this exclusion to be rectified in the educational context, so claim the multiculturalists, the curriculum ought to include works and books of authors from the excluded groups, as well as considering their "points of view" in the interpretation of texts (whose authors are predominantly white males). The second (b) is the broader social, economic, political context, within which it is claimed that groups culturally different from the majority culture are insufficiently protected in their individual rights. Therefore they seek special group rights to protect their different cultures and "their own" way of life. Some forms of these group rights are ones that guarantee political representation, right to state subsidies (for cultural activities or education), as well as the right of exemption from certain general laws. In the broader social, economic, and political context of multiculturalism, language, history, or religion (or a combination of those, often used to determine ethnicity) become a marker of difference in culture (Okin 1998: 662–663).

Because the term multiculturalism itself is used by all kinds of institutions (schools, pupils, journalists, NGOs, politicians, governments, churches), and because all these entities have completely different ideological agendas, Timothy Powell thinks that any attempt at finding consensus in defining the concept is an exercise in futility (Powell 2003: 153). Still, despite all the significant differences, multiculturalists emphasize the importance and validity of diversity of cultural traditions,[5] criticizing the ethnocentric focus on "Western," "European," or "Euro-American" history, culture, or society. In this field, anthropologists can consider themselves intellectual pioneers.[6] When considering the question of anthropology's relation to multiculturalism, as well as the possible contributions of anthropology to multiculturalism, the question that immediately comes up refers to cultural relativism as the central contribution made by twentieth-century anthropology to liberal thinking (Marcus and Fischer 1999 [1986]: 166–167).

Philosophically, relativism assumes that there are no objective standards for either truth or judgment outside the individual's assumptions

(Metcalf 2005: 55). However, anthropologists need not take up such an extreme position. Spiro points to the existence of "various" cultural relativisms available to anthropologists: (a) descriptive relativism, resting on "cultural determinism of anthropologists," whereby anthropologists have claimed ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century that culture alone regulates the ways in which people see the world. Accordingly, descriptive realism claims that a cultural change will produce diverse social and psychological understanding among different people. (b) Normative relativism, which goes a step further in claiming that there is no universal standard for judging between cultures. All cultures judge one another following their own internal standards. Finally, (c) epistemological relativism, which combines the extreme cultural-deterministic position with the viewpoint that cultural diversity is virtually infinite. Epistemological relativists embrace a "particular cultural determinism," one which, in opposition to "general cultural determinism," holds that there is no universal cultural pattern. They claim that human nature and the human mind are culturally compliant, thus making generalizations regarding culture, including general cultural theory, wrong (Spiro 1986: 259–286).

Using the example of Germany and Great Britain, Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham considered the impact of immigration waves and presence of various ethnic minorities on liberal nation states and traditional models of citizenship.[7] Nation states, as the most pervasive units of social organization, are weakened from without, through globalization and the dislocation of power from national to supranational and transnational levels. Conversely, legitimacy, authority, and integrative capacities of the nation state are also weakened from within, through increased plurality of modern societies. Apart from that, liberal universal values that support the nation state are called into question through claims to special group rights (or exemption of duty), through which collective actors express their cultural difference from society at large (Koopmans and Statham 1999). Expanding on Brubaker's analysis,[8] Koopmans and Statham differentiated between three types of civil regimes, characteristic of European states: (a) ethno-culturally exclusionary citizenship—most studied in Germany—in which full citizenship rights are rather difficult to achieve, despite birth on the given territory. Germany has hundreds of thousands ancestors of immigrants who are still officially "foreigners" (*Auslander*) without full political rights; whereas, an ethnic German immigrant (*Aussiedler*) just arrived from Russia has full social and political rights based on inherited ties to the nation. (b) Civil assimilationist citizenship, represented in Europe by Britain, Sweden, and Holland. Within a multicultural pluralist model of citizenship, the state not only offers an easy access to full social and political rights, but actually guarantees ethnic

diversity recognizing immigrant groups as "ethnic minorities" with their own cultural rights and privileges. For example, such groups in Holland have a right to their own schools and they get assistance from the state (Koopmans and Statham 1999: 661).

Struggles for cultural "identity," which first appeared as a response to contradictions within liberalism, have themselves produced many contradictions. Multiculturalism, we learn from Ulrich Beck, is caught in the trap of national epistemology with its either-or categories (among which the national/transnational is crucial) and the tendency for national epistemologies to essentialize identity. The strategy of multiculturalism assumes collective categories of otherness and orients itself toward homogenous groups it considers similar or different to itself—either way, distinct from itself. For the multiculturalists, individuals are secondary and are viewed as members of territorial, ethnic, and political communities (Beck 2004: 446–447).[9]

Multiculturalism has become the dominant ideology not only in the struggle against racism, but also in the struggle for women's and gay rights. It permeates the entire territory of debate, the political course and action, and results in contradiction. For example, feminists accuse multicultural theorists of ignoring the rights of women in their arguments for preserving group rights, since rights of groups often mean the subjugation of women. When the leaders of a group are men with traditional worldviews, then group rights become a way to oppress women (Spinner-Halev 2001: 84). Thus, Susan Okin studied the conflict between multiculturalism and feminism, pointing out that group rights often obscure the differences within a group, as well as ignoring private life (Okin 1998: 661–684). Claire Beckett and Mary Macey have looked at the influence of multiculturalism on the struggle for gender, race, ethnic, and sexual equality, and have concluded that multiculturalism in these areas has a negative impact (Beckett and Macey, 2001: 309–319). Multiculturalism, according to them, intensifies and legitimizes oppression of those already oppressed, and represents a threat to liberal democracy and individual human rights. The authors illustrate their claim through documenting domestic violence, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, as well as violence directed against the gay and lesbian population. Of course, multiculturalism on its own does not cause any violence; it does, however, enable its propagation through respect of "cultural difference," various cultural practices, as well as through noninvolvement in the "life styles" of minorities.[10]

Multiculturalism and relativism have "shaken" the universalist ideals even where they seemed "strongest"—in the area of human rights, where, due to the possible consequences, their application is particularly disturbing. The modern system of human rights is based on the concept

of universalism, in which there is a uniqueness that connects all people (regardless of cultural and regional provenance), and the bare minimum of this uniqueness are represented in those human rights. The influence of cultural relativism, multiculturalism, and postmodernism has slowly eaten away at those ideals. Many now agree that universal human rights are simply not suited to the incredible diversity of cultural and religious practices throughout the world, and that they have to be reconstituted to better conform to local cultural and religious norms (Zechenter 1997). Universalism is at the root of modern human rights, and for human rights relativists, it is impossible to defend universal human rights in a world so richly varied.[11] Zechenter emphasizes that numerous groups have called into question the ideal of universal human rights. (a) There are some Asian and Islamic governments that, despite having ratified all international instruments of human rights, completely reject their universalism. (b) Numerous regimes of the Third World wish to avoid international scrutiny of domestic treatment of their citizens. (c) Representatives of newly organized aboriginal groups seek legitimacy for themselves and their cultures. (d) Many social scientists and philosophers are involved in seeking reliable theoretical justification of universalism and its principles. (e) Persons who respect human difference mostly see human rights as an extension of the influence of the West. (f) There are also those who fear that human rights universalism will encourage undesired mixing with other cultures. Most of these groups and individuals claim that the expansion of universal human rights simply would not suit the extreme difference in cultural and religious practices throughout the world, and that universal human rights ought only to supplement local cultural and religious norms (Zechenter 1997: 323).

Zechenter cites the case of 18-year-old Roop Kanwar, a member of the Rajput community in India, who was immolated alive upon her husband's passing, because she acquiesced to the cultural practice of "sati." The author concludes: instead of using culture as an explanation and justification for all behavior, it is more fruitful to analyze (a) whose interests are served by performing "traditional" customs, (b) why are some customs abandoned, while others are preserved and reintroduced, and by whom, (c) who gains in the change of cultural practice, and who in maintaining the status quo, (d) who influences the direction and internal dynamics of cultural change, and whether such cultural changes would lead to true equality and improvement in the situation of marginalized subgroups and individuals, or else their further subjugation, (e) what is the best way for the universal ideals of human rights to be used to affect change in the nature and dynamic of native relations of power, to cause more just results.[12]

Given everything that has been said, the impression is that there is no easy solution to these dilemmas. Democracy demands a respect for minorities, multiculturalism demands respect for (some or all) cultural traditions, and respect for certain cultural traditions of a given group often leads to the subjugation of another group (to the point of physical integrity of members of such a group) (Beckett and Macey 2001: 316). Anthropology, thus, finds itself in a particularly unenviable position. So much so, that Nigel Rapport wonders, "do we applaud the 'romantic autochthonisation,' or do we insist that essentialising arguments concerning culture (and ethnicity, race, tribe, nation, cosmos) threaten plural, liberal, democratic society" (Rapport 2003: 380)? How do we "approach" collective nouns and identity terminology that turn "subjects of experience" into "objects of knowledge?"[13] Inexorably, this leads anthropology into its post-cultural paradox.

The Paradox of Post-Cultural Anthropology

The multiculturalization of higher education, of the public sphere and of overall political map of society has come to presume multiculturalism as a political, cultural and educational strategy, but this strategy has to be founded on some sort of image of a multicultural society. If we, the anthropologists, fail to offer one, we will remain irrelevant. But if we do, we will contradict ourselves…In the second half of the 20th century, anthropology developed in opposition to the traditional anthropological concept of culture as a relatively stable and homogenous system of values, acts and beliefs, which characterize a group or a community. However, this concept is still widely employed in political theory, multicultural policies and public discourses, and this implicit theory of culture will probably survive despite the valid reasons anthropology has offered in favor of abandoning it as an essentialist construct that is epistemologically naive and politically fatal. If it strives to intervene in those policies, anthropology would have to renounce its postcultural status, and sacrifice its image as a theoretical discipline, in order to endure the game of intervention of social and political theory in the ongoing processes of multuralization of education, political systems, and public sphere. On the other hand, by sacrificing the image of a highly sophisticated theoretical discipline, anthropology might lose the authority on the basis of which it gets the opportunity to intervene on the process of negotiation and decision-making concerning contemporary life. (Milenković 2007c: 122)

In the premodern period, cultural products and processes were often part of the justification of an understanding of the dominant political structure. Although the cultural sphere still performs the role of political

justification, there are new claims emerging in the name of "this" or "that" aspect of cultural identity that struggle within a nation's resources for redistribution or recognition. Thus, culture becomes an ever present synonym for identity, and social and political groups are formed around such identity markers, advocating for special recognition from the state. Of course, this is all done in the name of cultural specificity (Benhabib 1999: 401–403). Culture becomes an arena for power struggles—a source of collective rights for self-determination, as well as an important tool in the identity struggle within pluralist societies.

On the other hand, current anthropology has raised the question of the future of the concept of culture. There are various approaches (Eriksen 2004: 28–31),[14] which can be summed up by the following: all agree that the time of cultural groups is more or less over (the very concept of culture instrumentalized in contemporary politics of identity) and that the concept should be abandoned. However, what cannot be abandoned is the cultural as the constitutive aspect of human life.[15] From its very beginning, the subject of social and cultural anthropology has included the study of social and cultural dimensions of human life, such that the concept of culture was central to all anthropological study. Today, when speaking about culture within anthropology, we can distinguish between two groups of ideas. (a) The older group of ideas regards culture as a homogenous, relatively stable unit of beliefs and practices, within which people can be further subdivided and categorized according to characteristics. (b) The new meaning of culture is not as a thing, but as a political process of struggle over power to define key concepts, including culture itself (Wright 1998: 7–10). Anthropologists who work on comprehending and representing the ensemble of cultural processes consider the old group of ideas (based on geographic referents, totalities, and holism) overly simplistic (Eriksen 1993). People have always been on the move, cultures are ever changing, and identities are much less fixed and static than classical anthropological approaches would suggest (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Thus the view of culture as a relatively settled and integrated system of values and meanings cannot be accepted.[16] Against this, anthropologists are interested in how values appear, shape our behavior, and are continuously reshaped through our social interactions (Stolcke 1995: 12). Anthropologists of all theoretical frameworks accept the fact that cultures are malleable entities and that in their behavior or acceptable cultural behavior, people change their cultural concepts, sometimes even radically so. Also, anthropologists see that in an alternate political context, people can consciously shape or change a cultural tradition, using various cultural components, including reintroducing elements from much earlier traditions (Rubel and Rosman 1994: 335–343).

Together with the "disappearance" of the traditional concept of culture, Gerc's interpretative turn (seeing culture as a system of values and reading culture as text) (Gerc 1998 [1973]), Said's critique of Orientalism (according to which Orientalists had authoritative representations of Middle Eastern "others" as less significant and distant from themselves) (Said 2003 [1977]), the calling into question of objectivity of ethnography (crisis of ethnographic representation, crisis of ethnographic realism, and crisis of authority of anthropologist in representing culture) (Clifford 1986; Marcus and Fisher 1999 [1986]), together have forced anthropologists to openly admit that anthropology can no longer satisfy its traditional attempts to secure holistic, objective representations of the life of members of particular cultures (as represented by WCTE—Writing Culture Theory of Ethnography) (Milenković 2003, 2007a, 2007b).

The incongruity between the contemporary anthropological concept of culture (with its connected impossibility of objective representations) and the concept of culture in the public sphere has led anthropology into a process Miloš Milenković calls the paradox of post-cultural anthropology. To wit, contemporary ethnographic theory (WCTE) implies that "cultures"—for which multicultural politics are created—are "written," meaning that on the formal level they resist being treated as ontological givens. On the other hand, the public sphere has witnessed the exact opposite—cultures that "do not exist" have become subjects of decisions in liberal democracies amended by the multicultural. In other words, not only is it not characteristic for the public sphere to transfer ontology into epistemology, but rather, the opposite is true: epistemology becomes ontology. This "pushes" anthropology into a schizoid position because the public sphere, the political map of society, and higher education are made to be more multicultural. If we fail to offer multiculturalism, we become irrelevant. If we do offer it, we deny ourselves (Milenković 2007c).

The Paradox of the Models of Traditional Montenegrin Relations

Let us remain with Milenković's line of reasoning and attempt to situate the model of traditional male–female relations in contemporary identity politics. We will be using this last phrase as an essentialization of cultural, that is, identity differences to political ends. Let us imagine a hypothetical situation: an anthropologist is a member of an ethnic Montenegrin minority within a liberal democracy modified by multiculturalism, such as (the cradle of multiculturalism) Canada. (And let us keep in mind that our anthropologist's formative years were more influenced by brilliant games of Wayne Gretzky than by many of the historical narratives into

which he was being placed.) Since Canada recognizes immigrant groups as "ethnic minorities" with their cultural rights and privileges, and offers them subsidies as such, the anthropologist is requested to show what exactly is the "*differentia specifica*" of gender relations of his ethnic community. The anthropologist is thus placed before a dilemma: if he uncritically regurgitates what historical, ethnological, and fictional sources have to say regarding a model of gender relations, he will completely debase all his knowledge acquired through education. Even if he were to attempt to conceive of some field research, it will imply the existence of a closed, internally coherent collection of ideas, beliefs, and practices. He would take a long time to resolve the given problem, in which time, the members of his ethnic group would begin to complain openly: how come others get state subsidies, whereas we do not? Finally, when they got tired of waiting, they take matters into their own hands, "dig" into historical textbooks, histories and ethnographies, as well as traditional songs and poems in order to see what characterizes traditional Montenegrin men and women. In an attempt to present their findings as fully as possible, they inquire with their older relatives what gender relations were "really" like. They put all of this to paper and chose a representative. The new representative, in turn, quickly understands that the essentialization of Montenegrin gender identity is proportional to the increase of his personal and his group's bank account, and starts taking his job ever more seriously. He initiates the founding of a school for the ethnic group, obtains help for organizing various workshops and symposia, as well as the development of numerous cultural activities, opening various homeland clubs, and goes dutifully to pay his respects in families of newborn baby boys. Those workshops gather steam and the symposia swell in numbers. One of the parents boasts about his son beating up the neighborhood kids at the local playground, and the others congratulate him. Another buys a round for all the men upon the birth of a son. A third furtively tells an expectant community that it will be a third daughter in a row, and the rest comfort him that it is the woman's fault.

The representative fully grasps the power at hand, and endeavor with all his might to convince government officials to allow him to carry weapons, as it is a natural characteristic of men in his culture. However, the growth in stature (and bank account) of the representative begins to raise eyebrows in the community. Soon, there are several opposing candidates, one of whom will seriously challenge for the representative position, because he hails from a more prominent fraternity with still greater heroes in his lineage. There would be elections to confirm the foregone conclusion of the demise of the old representative. While the new candidate boasts about the number of great heroes in his family's past, the all

but defeated adversary presents the "ace from his sleeve," and publicly inquires: "how can you be our representative when your son is a homosexual, and you yourself know that homosexuality is not naturally found in Montenegrins?" The new candidate is stunned into silence. He, of course, wins not a single vote, and the old representative keeps his mandate. The anthropologist, all the while, is still trying to resolve the paradox of post-cultural anthropology.

This is only a hypothetical example of the paradox of post-cultural anthropology that forces us into thinking about how anthropology ought to approach extrapolating (and potential abuse of) a model of traditional gender relations in identity politics. All of which raises a host of questions: what is more relevant (not speaking on a scientific or theoretical level), ethnographies written as theses only, which have scientific value only if they can be refuted (Milenković 2006: 177); or else the presentation of the "traditional (amateur) memorialist," who will defend his positions with the same fervor with which we wish to refute our own positions? Can criticism and deconstruction of tradition ever be superior and more socially relevant than tradition itself? Can the average or below average (however quantitatively dominant) be superior to the "example" (an allusion to *Examples of* Humanitas Heroica by Miljanov (1964 [1901]))? Let us return to Nedeljković's analysis: it showed that one of the main determinants of social relations of the rural Montenegrins in Lovćenac were precisely these "traditional" representations. In a theoretical context, it is entirely justified to place traditional representations in quotation marks. However, if traditional representations determine contemporary social relations and if they become a significant factor for recognition within multicultural identity politics, then they are no longer presupposed, but rather entirely real, and as such have significant practical implications.

Whether used in the context of education or in a broader social, economic, and political context, multiculturalism as a particular form of identity politics in contemporary society necessarily demands the essentialization of certain "cultural" differences. In the demand and recognition of group rights, "traditional" gender relations could have a significant role and could be recognized as "*differentia specifica*" of a given community. The particularity of traditional Montenegrin gender relations is precisely in the fact that we can only know the characteristics of models of traditional gender relations, but not the characteristics of actual gender relations as they unfolded in the past. Therefore, if he wished to intervene in social reality, the anthropologist would have to move within clearly determined coordinates: we can know about "traditional" Montenegrin gender relations only on the basis of "written" sources. Further, identity politics can only recognize these "written"

representations, and traditional representations significantly contribute to current social relations. In the name of traditional representations, one can live quite well (men with traditional outlooks on life), others can suffer (women and men who do not fit neatly into culturally imposed norms of gender roles), and some can even have their physical well-being threatened (homosexuals). In multicultural identity politics, the response of society can be simple—"such is their culture/tradition." The maneuvering in such limited space of social reality requires the harmonizing of post-cultural theoretical heritage of contemporary anthropology with the essentialization of cultural differences[17] (the resistance to which is the very foundation of contemporary anthropology)—certainly a significant challenge facing current scholarship.

The Question of Instrumentalization of the Montenegrin Heroic Tradition

The act of accepting "as is" popular science narratives about traditional Montenegrin men and continuous warfare (even tempered with rare moments of peace) has the effect of bringing the modified and embellished "story" of the past into the present and giving it the capacity for extension into the future. We can say that such narratives are perpetuated and safeguarded for future generations as a kind of "black box."[18] Of course, the task of social-humanist scholars is precisely to "unpack" such "black boxes." For example, in various current discourses (e.g., the debate about accession to NATO or in particular the question of the status of the LGBT population), portions of the Montenegrin heroic tradition circulate as closed objects, accepted as unquestionable and as narratives that do not require cultural consensus. In these narratives, traditional Montenegrin men are represented exclusively as heroes and manly men, ready to defend, but never assault, who fought by the rules of heroism and manliness, and always for the highest ideals, and were never defeated. What would happen if we allowed other voices in this debate, voices that would "shatter" the inner homogeneity of these discourses? In other words, what would happen if we showed that narratives packed in such a way perhaps do not entirely suit reality, and have certain mythical characteristics? We ought to keep in mind that even political myths and historical writing contribute to current identities (both of which contribute to the shaping of the social imagination). In particular, it is important to emphasize that not all narratives are necessarily political myths, nor are all political myths historical narratives (Bottici 2007: 201). Historical narratives are a part of social imagination and are constituted through myriad social practices.

It is often difficult to differentiate between historical and mythical discourse in these practices, given that they are often deeply embedded in daily life, since they do not only live in libraries, archives, and museums (Bottici 2007: 219). The function of study of myth is precisely to execute its deconstruction in order to learn about the society in which we live. According to Kovačević, the study of myth is really sociology, since it tells us what kind of society we live in, what social groups it comprises, and what social, political, economic interests hold sway in a given society (Kovačević 2006b: 59).

Taking Foucault's concept of genealogy,[19] the strategies I have chosen in deconstructing popular scientific narratives about men in Montenegro's past is based on combining the concept of masculinity and the basic assumption of contemporary approaches in studying masculinity—that masculinity cannot be spoken of in the singular, but rather in the plural, as masculinities, that aside from variations among cultures, the meaning of masculinity varies widely over time within any given culture, throughout a given culture at any particular moment, and over the course of one's life. The second strategy relates to the incongruity between culturally set standards of masculinity and the actual state of affairs. Gender roles carry with them standards, expectations, or norms that the individual ought to fulfill, even if very few men could attain the gender norms as they are handed down by society. The third strategy concerns the representational capacity of the material regarding traditional Montenegrin gender roles, which always carries over the model with numerous small imputations and interpretations, but never the actual state of affairs. The fourth strategy refers to the "peace-loving" nature of the inhabitants' medieval katuns (which is particularly important as the katun represented the basis for the formation of tribes). At the time when the medieval feudal system was functioning, the population of a katun was primarily engaged in shepherding and transport of goods, and dutifully paid its tithes to the feudal lord.[20] Finally, the fifth strategy concerns the incongruity between the dominant popular scientific narrative of Montenegrin history and historical fact, in particular in relation to the Ottoman Empire. In other words, men of whom the popular science narrative speaks could have hardly existed in reality.

Still, the "tenuousness" of ethnological and historical narratives does not lessen their contemporary functional potential, just as was the case with functional narratives in Njegoš's time. Thus, regardless of the fact that a man spoken of in popular scientific and fictional narratives could actually have hardly existed, this presented no obstacle for Njegoš to use consciousness of traditional heroism for the creation of the modern Montenegrin state. As part of its social ontology, at one point this

consciousness became (mostly thanks to his *Mountain Wreath*) the only "reality" accessible to people, that is, it became past reality they incorporated and integrated into themselves. Contemporary and future extension of numerous narratives regarding the heroic tradition will certainly induce many a "headache" to the social-humanist scholar. An obvious example would be the way in which many traditional and traditionalist narratives, preserved a long time and carefully "cherished" in the popular imagination, will still maintain a high level of homophobia on a societal level. In addition, much time and effort will be expended in "explaining" the meaning of Njegoš's verse "*ne složi se Bajram sa Božićem*" [the Eid and Christmas fall on different days], the reading of which in an ethnically, nationally, and confessionally mixed Montenegro could be especially "inflammatory." It is my impression that in interpreting that verse and the like, many "natives" and "puritans," regardless of their ethnic, national, or religious tradition, will always take the most prominent role in public—and contemporary multicultural trends will abet them.

Keeping in mind that the long-standing and carefully maintained narratives about the warrior tradition of Montenegro have permeated its entire culture, one would assume that NATO membership (perceived mostly as a military alliance) will only reassert "stories" from the past, and that participants in the debates would invoke the tradition of a warrior people, independently from their relation toward the alliance. Narratives created for that purpose are capable of imposing a continuity on otherwise disparate events, establishing strong connections between the past, present, and future. As such, they acquire a functional potential in discussions about Montenegro's membership in NATO and have a significant influence on the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity—as we will see in the coming chapters.

The Social, Historical, and Political Context of the Relations between NATO and Montenegro

From an Institution of Collective Defense to an Institution of Collective Security: The Relations between NATO and Montenegro

In the past several years, the Montenegrin elites as well as the public at large have been preoccupied with the question of Montenegrin statehood, with the populace of the country deeply divided on the question of the country's independence. For years, there had been debates about this on political forums and among everybody involved in the political life of Montenegro (politicians, institutions, NGOs, individuals, and so on). The "culture war," featuring both experts and ordinary citizens, "raged" even in places that traditionally have no connection with politics. Put simply, the question had an all-consuming nature of a "total social fact." Finally, at the referendum held on May 21, 2006, the question, "do you wish for Montenegro to become an independent, internationally recognized state?" was answered by a majority of citizens in the affirmative, fulfilling the condition for Montenegro to formally declare its independence and seek international recognition. In June 2006, Montenegro declared independence and was accepted into the United Nations. Thus the Montenegrin public was released from deliberating on a topic it had been engrossed in for years. With resolving the question of Montenegrin statehood, the stage was set for the beginning of new debates regarding other important questions of statehood. One of the first big questions before Montenegro was the question of its membership in NATO.

The anthropological study of cultural and civilizational potentials of international integration has thus far been focused on the European Union

(EU) (Gačanović 2009)—giving the impression that the "Atlantic" part of such "Euro-Atlantic" potentials has been neglected by anthropology. On the other hand, experiences from recent enlargements of EU and NATO have clearly shown that a state's membership in NATO has preceded its membership in the EU by a few years.[1] Conceptualizing the transformation of NATO as a never-finished process and a never-achieved state, I think it is imperative to first debate the complex historical circumstances that created the conditions for Montenegro's membership in NATO.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is an intergovernmental military alliance that at present comprises 28 members dedicated to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington.[2] In accordance with the treaty, the main role of NATO is the protection of freedom and security of all its members through political or military means. The alliance came into being as a result of the determination of its founding member states to protect "freedom, common heritage and the civilization of its peoples, based on democratic principles, individual freedom and the rule of law" while still retaining each state's full sovereignty (NATO Handbook 2005: 18; Gligorijević and Petrović 2007: 7). The North Atlantic Treaty recognizes the individual rights of signatory states, as well as their international obligations, in accordance with the UN charter. Each member state agrees to share the risks and obligations, as well as avail its rights, of collective security. They also give assurance that they will not accept other interstate obligations that are in conflict with this treaty. The key portion of the North Atlantic Treaty is article five, which establishes that in the case of an armed attack on one or more of the signatory states, all other members will support the state or the states under attack, asserting the right to individual and collective defense. This support would involve any emergency action considered necessary, including the use of armed force. Other articles of the treaty establish the obligations of signatory states to maintain and develop individual and collective defense capabilities. The treaty also allows for the signatories to "unanimously invite to the Alliance, any European state capable of advancing the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security in the region of the Atlantic as a whole" (Gligorijević and Petrović: 2007, 13).

NATO is also a forum in which member states debate security problems of collective interest and undertake collective action in facing them.[3] A flexible organizational structure (established by article nine) has allowed the alliance to develop and adapt to new conditions, such that throughout its history, NATO has undergone a series of reforms and restructurings (NATO Handbook 2005: 9). During the Cold War, NATO was conceived in such a way to give its members very specific advantages regarding military strategy directed at a potentially terrifying war against the USSR. With the

dissolution of the USSR, NATO lost its primary purpose, as the end of the Cold War[4] and the disappearance of the USSR created a completely new situation in Europe. To many, it seemed that these new historic changes would mean an end to the East–West confrontations and thus the end of Cold War institutions such as NATO. Seeing how NATO was formed to be a collective defense organization dedicated to maintaining the balance of power, analysts invoked the "balance-of-power theory" and predicted that the fundamental restructuring of that balance will remove the need for this alliance (Duffield 1994–95: 764). In other words, the social context for the formation of NATO disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Following the "balance-of-power theory," it was realistic to expect that NATO would be dissolved (since neither the USSR nor the Warsaw Pact were adversaries any longer, the end of NATO seemed possible) (Waltz 1993: 75).

As a result of the changes discussed, NATO faced several options. (a) It could have disbanded along with the dissolution of its perceived enemy—as many predicted, and some (above all Russia) even hoped. (b) It could remain as a mere collective defensive organization of Western Europe, the kind it always was meant to be, not changing with the new situation. (c) It could continue to exist, but with a reduced structure, responsibility, and possibilities (Antis 2006: 7–9). Obviously NATO did not go the way of dissolution, but rather began to immediately transform itself. From this point of view, NATO represents a unique institution in the history of security organizations and alliances (Antis 2006: 3). The contemporary Strategic Concept[5] of NATO encompasses the following political elements: a broader approach to security, which includes political, economic, social, and environmental factors, as well as the defensive dimension of the alliance; a strong obligation toward transatlantic relations; maintenance of military capability of the alliance so as to ensure the effectiveness of military operations; development of European capabilities within the alliance; maintenance of structures and procedures for adequate prevention of conflicts and direction of crisis situations; an effective partnership with non-NATO states on the basis of cooperation and dialogue; and enlargement of the alliance and an open-door policy toward potential new member states (NATO Handbook 2005: 18–19).

Robert Antis has stated that the degree to which NATO accepts change in its structure and procedures, leading to greater operation efficiency, also determines the degree to which the alliance will be capable of collectively defending itself and executing crisis missions (Antis 2006: 16). According to Antis, the transformation is neither necessarily good nor bad, but *simply is*. NATO has transformed itself since the end of the Cold War and is no longer the same alliance that protected borders from the Warsaw Pact—it contains more member states and maintains close

relations with many others. In some cases these are not even states particularly close to NATO, as called for in the treaty. At the same time, NATO has an increased cooperation with states in the region and engages in open scientific, economic, and similar dialogues with other states (Antis 2006: 251). Currently, NATO has a much greater responsibility in a wider global context instead of the previous well-defined area of responsibility, which is simply because NATO has transformed into a new type of security institution—it has passed from being an institution of collective defense to an institution of collective security.

To consider the relation of Montenegro to NATO (and the West), we ought to keep in mind the social context in the last decade of the twentieth century. With the collapse of communism, the old norms that ruled Yugoslavia (of which Montenegro was part) lost legitimacy. Newly formed states replaced the old, communist designations of national identities were replaced with new ones, giving ethnic and national identities a primary role. Although the war did not take place on the territory of Montenegro, soldiers from Montenegro actively participated in the hostilities in the closing decade of the twentieth century, which of course took its toll on Montenegro. A decisive moment took place in 1997 when a portion of the Democratic Party of Socialists, led by Milo Djukanović, came to power and began the process of reconstructing the political stage and rearticulating foreign relations with the world. The West stopped being seen as the enemy, and the state elites tended to identify more with the Western community, recognizing it as the main locus of establishment of new identities.[6] Certainly the most visible benefit of this turn in foreign policy was that Montenegro was not seen as the primary target in the military action NATO undertook against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 (even though Montenegro was, along with Serbia, its integral member), thus avoiding serious destruction. Unfortunately, the bombing of the small town of Murino did result in six civilian casualties (which included two girls and a boy) and serious injury to four other persons. However, apart from that, the bombing of positions and installations of the Yugoslav Army only caused minor material damage to Montenegro.

On declaration of independence and reestablishment of statehood in 2006, membership in NATO was designated as a foreign policy priority for Montenegro. In a short period, Montenegro became a member of the Partnership for Peace, initiated the first phase of the Planning Act Review Process (PARP)—NATO's primary mechanism for encouraging reforms of defense systems in partnership states—began the development of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), received invitation to begin Intensified dialogue with NATO, and submitted its request for membership (MAP), the last step prior to obtaining membership. Current

Montenegrin government elites see Montenegro as integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures,[7] present the alliance as an institution that protects the values of freedom, democracy, and rule of law, and describe the West as possessing superior attributes of freedom, stability, and progress.[8]

The Question of NATO Membership: Arguments for and against

The Montenegrin public has never reached a consensus regarding the country's membership in NATO, leaving some people on the political stage to advocate in favor and others against such an entry.[9] Most of the arguments in favor of joining NATO overlap with one another, but they can be generally divided into security, political, and economic reasons (Radoman 2007).

At the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs it is thought that with the accession into a system of collective security, Montenegro would gain solid guarantees of defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity—"the strategy and commitment of Montenegro is to transition from total defense to a system of collective security."[10] Aside from the argument of improved security, the Ministry of Defense thinks that

> with entry into NATO, Montenegro would have significant political and economic benefits. There would be conditions for a more complete affirmation of democratic standards, exemplified by the most developed countries, the very members of the alliance. Montenegro will have direct benefits from membership, since a country with stable safety and security also has a favorable economic atmosphere, which is the biggest draw for foreign investments.[11]

Thus, NATO would not only be a guarantor of security but also one of free market, and recent member countries have noted an increase in direct foreign investment upon joining the alliance. Further, the biggest investors, meaning the richest countries, most of whom are also members of NATO, invest primarily in countries with a high level of economic and political stability.[12] Safety and democratization are extremely important for development of the economy, which are the real benefits Montenegro would acquire by adopting the concept of collective security within NATO.[13]

The political arguments encompass the overall political position and democratic capacities of the country, which would be, according to its advocates, strengthened with the accession to NATO:

> With the accession to NATO, Montenegro enters into a partnership with states synonymous with democracy and economic development…It is

superfluous to speak about which states are in that "Atlantic coalition" and how useful and politically advantageous for Montenegro it is to be in such an environment…Parallel with the strengthening of security and political cooperation, we build a better base for establishing economic stability and intensifying the flow of direct investment into the country…Certainly, other countries in the region are in a similar position as us, although Montenegro, particularly in comparison to some, is ahead in many respects.[14]

The argument from the security angle is strengthened by the regional argument, which states that it is in the interest of Montenegro to become part of the system of collective security along with the other countries in the region:

NATO's very function is, by bringing the countries of the region under its wing, to deepen their mutual cooperation and in the long run to, through its numerous programs, eradicate the causes of instability that have existed until recently.[15] Montenegro has a new neighbor—NATO…Apart from its naval border with Italy, Croatia and Albania have become members of NATO, thus NATO is on Montenegro's land border.[16]

As noted, the question of Montenegro's membership in NATO has its opponents. Their arguments too are intertwined and overlapping, which can be mostly classified as political, security, economic, ideological, and emotional.

The political arguments claim that NATO is an undemocratic institution and primarily an aggressive military organization:

We oppose Montenegro's membership to this aggressive military alliance. Further, we would like a referendum to decide the question, because any decision that would exclude the majority will of the people could hardly be called democratic.[17]

Regarding the economic argument of the opponents to membership, they refer to potential costs Montenegro would incur with accession to NATO: "the cost of membership to NATO would be enormous for the destroyed economic potential of Montenegro…Aside from membership dues, we would have to pay the costs of buying weapons and equipment in order to attain NATO standards, the costs of participation of soldiers in military interventions, costs of adapting communication systems, and others."[18]

Much as in the case of the advocates of membership, the opponents too offer security arguments, but against membership: "Collective security today does not exist in practice. Global safety cannot be achieved

through lumbering military organizations and stockpiling of weapons."[19] Safety arguments also refer to possible dangers from terrorism, since Montenegro would potentially become a target of terrorists once it enters NATO, which would reflect negatively on the country as a tourist destination. Often the argument offered is that NATO formed as an alliance for the Cold War and as such has lost its relevance.[20] The opponents of membership buttress their security arguments with regional ones (if Montenegro is surrounded by members of NATO, then Montenegro is in no danger), as well as by opposing sending Montenegrin soldiers to NATO operations and missions.

The ideological arguments take recourse to pacifist ideals, according to which an acceptable option would be neutrality and demilitarization of Montenegro. The Liberal Party advocated demilitarization (although they later gave up on the concept) because in that way Montenegro would distance itself from the warrior tradition, which is a precondition for the democratization of society.[21] Finally, not the least in importance, there are arguments of an emotional nature, the main one being NATO's intervention against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999:

> *New Serbian Democracy* would like to remind that on this day, eleven years ago, NATO preformed an act of aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…[22] In defiance of historical fact, in defiance of law and justice, the Montenegrin regime would like to enlist Montenegro into NATO, forget hundreds of killed and thousands of wounded citizens of FRY, destroyed factories, bridges, poisoned land and water. The *People's Coalition*[23] is fighting for Montenegro to stay out of this aggressive military alliance…[24] The first intervention was in 1995 in Republika Srpska, with Serbia and Montenegro being bombed in 1999. The consequences are still at hand.[25]

Montenegro's relations with Russia also carry significant emotional weight. Thus the leader of New Serbian Democracy, Andrija Mandić has stated:

> Among the emotional reasons for which our party opposes membership of Montenegro to NATO, I would include the negative relation this alliance has towards Russia, upon which we, Serbs in Montenegro, look as a fraternal friendly state…I think that the ruling coalition of Montenegro has made a series of blunders in their relations with Russia, and that it is necessary to hear the other side, that is, for Russia to be acquainted with what the parliamentary opposition stands for regarding certain strategic questions, such as NATO or the economy. I am convinced that *New Serbian Democracy* and the *Democratic Front* will soon assume power in

Montenegro after which relations with Russia will be set right—fraternal and friendly, building trust and partnership in many relations, to the benefit of both countries.[26]

What can we glean from the main political, security, economic, ideological, and emotional arguments seen through the prism of the ideal popular narrative about Montenegro's warrior tradition? I think that for such a conceptualization it is best to shift the polemic about NATO into that "past" suggested to us by popular and popular science narratives, and imagine what the ideal type of Montenegrin hero would say about all the arguments. In that light, the function of the arguments of the advocates of membership in NATO would be to explain to the hero how NATO brings with it a better life (argument from economics), how the membership can prevent wars and bloodshed (argument from security), how wonderful it would be to "sit at the same table with the greatest and most powerful" (argument from politics), and how, by remaining outside of the membership one would "stand out" in the region (regional argument). On the other hand, the arguments of the opponents tell the hero that membership would mean participation in an aggressive military alliance (argument from politics), would be increasingly costly (argument from economics), would mean the emergence of terrorist activity (as a form of dangerous guerrilla units) in Montenegro (argument from security), would mean the betrayal of fraternal and friendly Russia (political-emotional argument), that a new age has dawned in which one must lay down one's weapons (argument from ideology), and finally, how NATO, only a little over a decade earlier, conducted a war against their Serbian brothers that also included Montenegrin victims (argument from emotion).

Let us now imagine how the ideal warrior would react to these arguments. (a) Concerning the economic ones, he would "pass over them as if nonexistent." (b) When it comes to political arguments, on the one hand, he would have "companionship with the great," while, on the other, there would be "participation in attacking others (far from Montenegro)" and the betrayal of fraternal and friendly Russia. (c) The security argument would tell him that membership carries safety from death, but also new deaths. (d) The ideological arguments about setting aside weapons would probably be "laughable."[27] *Summa summarum*: there is no chance of laying down weapons, and the hero has no qualms about facing serious danger (rendering security arguments moot). While he "weighed" the political arguments above all, the emotional arguments swooped in to create great confusion. Therefore it was decided that the decision of membership in NATO be taken at a general meeting of the tribes, for which preparations are taking place. Of course, the attempt at a humorous look

through the "warrior prism" serves only to anticipate the type of analysis to come, since the narratives regarding Montenegro's warrior past are instrumentalized in formal and informal political forums, in both arguments in favor and against NATO membership.

Even if we accept the claim that the plans and dynamics of Montenegro's transition are determined by internal forces, with external actors (international institutions) representing only mitigating variables,[28] there is little doubt that Montenegro's membership in NATO is a question that will determine the future of the state and to a great degree influence how its citizens' identity will be redefined. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the debate regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO, even years after it began, has remained vehement and complex, elicits strong emotions, and results in a "culture war" that evokes typically male narratives about war—narratives preserved in poems, songs, stories, history books, and museums. The question of membership in NATO is one of the first great transition questions that appeared in the Montenegrin public after achieving independence, or reestablishing statehood, in 2006. A part of the debates and arguments from the previous, that is, referendum, campaign has "spilled over" into the new debate about membership in NATO. Thus the integration of Montenegro into NATO and the EU, by a strange dint of fate, has connected the existence of a nineteenth-century Montenegro with its reiteration of independence at the beginning of the twenty-first century, which we will discuss in the following chapter.

The Reproduction of Contemporary Montenegrin Identity in the Context of NATO and EU Membership: Is NATO Solidifying or Fracturing the Montenegrin Identity?

The Theoretical Context of Analysis

As we have seen, joining the EU and NATO is offered as a primary foreign policy interest and the desired future of Montenegro. Any desired future also requires an image of a desired past—leading to rearticulation of social identity. One of the most powerful practices in creating, shaping, transferring, and reconstructing national identity are the narrative representations of a communal past (Anderson 1983; Gellner 2006 [1983]). Thus the central theoretical and methodological framework in this portion of our research is conceptualized in accordance with the "narrative turn" in social and humanist sciences. The basis for the *bricolage* of this theoretical and methodological approach is an analysis of the narrative and the concept of cultural remembering/memory. The founding premise of the latter is that the selectivity that creates versions of the past is inherently the result of present desires (Assman Aleida 2008; Assman Jan 2008; Brockmeier and Harre 2001; Carr 1986; Djerić 2006, 2007, 2009; Erll 2008; Jacobs 2002; McAdams Josselson and Lieblich 2006; Ricoeur 1991a, 1991b; Somers 1992, 1994). Conceptualizing narrative as an ontological condition of social life (since it is through narrative and narrativity that we constitute our social identities), the premise here is that meta-discursive practices act as a mediation between an appropriate past, the present,

and an imagined future. In that process, narrative representations of a communal past seek to become the generally accepted meta-narrative that offers strategic support for a given narrative. In order to understand the extent to which activities of the country's leadership expand the maneuvering space for the instrumentalization of any number of historical narratives, it is necessary to introduce the concept of "banal nationalism." Michael Billig points out frequent lapses in conceptualizing nationalism. They refer to how routine and quotidian forms of nationalism of Western countries have been overlooked.[1] In order to overcome this absence, Billig insists on "expanding" the concept of nationalism and introduces the concept of "banal nationalism." The goal of the concept is to encompass ideological habits that enable Western nations to be ever reproduced in daily life (Billig 2002 [1995]). Furthermore, Slobodan Naumović showed that the causes of change in relationship toward tradition in the political and public life of Serbia at the turn of the twenty-first century should be sought in practices of instrumentalization of tradition for national and political goals. In this context, Naumović focuses on the concept of "symbolic voluntarism," the crucial characteristic of which is a certain inconsistent relation to tradition and traditional symbols. Symbolic voluntarism becomes particularly prominent in times of important events or election campaigns (Naumović 2009: 299–303).

The main source for analysis of this issue is *Partner*, a monthly magazine dedicated to the question of Euro-Atlantic integration, defense, and the military. The publication is aimed at a broad audience, and is of particular importance for our research because it dedicates considerable space in each issue to narrative representations of the past, submitting information about important events and dates from Montenegrin history. *Partner* is published by the Ministry of Defense, so that the choice of important dates and events, as well as their interpretation, can be taken as "official." The other source for our analysis will be the meta-discursive practices in the inauguration speeches of the President of Montenegro and President of the Parliament of Montenegro, as well as their interpretations of the past in addresses to the public on occasions of Statehood Day and Independence Day.

The Structure of the National Narrative of Montenegro

A national narrative must have its own cultural basis, which, in turn, is based on the existence or rediscovery of national history. Equally important in that process is what is remembered, what is forgotten, and what is deliberately overlooked. Let us look at a selection of important historical

events and their interpretation in *Partner*, published by the Ministry of Defense of Montenegro.

Battle of Martinići

July 11, 1796, the date of the battle of Martinići, is one of the most significant and most sacred dates in Montenegro's rich history. It was in the aftermath of this battle, and on the eve of the battle of Krusi, that the *Stega* was adopted. An oath to the unity of Montenegro, it declared that "with the help of Christ the Sustainer, friend to friend, tribe to tribe, parish to parish, a solemn vow is made, and honest word given, upon one's honor, that Montenegro would not be betrayed or let down." The *Stega* was essentially a founding act in the state building of Montenegro. In the main clash of the battle, which took place on 11 July, the Montenegrin army, led by Petar I Petrović, succeeded in delivering a heavy blow to the Ottoman army led by Kara Mahmud Bushati. The Ottoman army counted some 17,000 soldiers, while the Montenegrins counted some 3,400 warriors. The significant numeric disadvantage of the Montenegrin army makes the victory all the more remarkable. In order to redeem himself for the heavy blow at Martinići, Kara Mahmud Bushati struck again against Montenegro in the early fall of the same year. Once again, this time at Krusi, the Montenegrins defeated the Ottoman army and Kara Mahmud Bushati was killed in that battle.[2]

Battle of Grahovac

In the glorious constellation of Montenegrin national and liberation battles, one star shines with particular historical luminosity. It is the battle of Grahovac, which took place in the first half of May of 1858. The decisive clash between the Montenegrins and the Ottomans took place on May 13, on the high plain of Grahovac, near Grahovo. The Turks suffered a furious defeat, with their casualties, according to relevant data, between 2,500 and 5,000, with some sources citing 7,000 killed. The Montenegrins lost 200 men, and a further 300 were wounded. On the Turkish side, 7,000 people took the field, with some sources saying 13,000, whereas the Montenegrins counted 7,500. Six thousand Montenegrins came from Cetinje. The armies were led by Hussein-pasha for the Turks and Mirko Petrović, the brother of Prince Danilo, for the Montenegrins. The battle of Grahovo was preceded by months-long political action of Montenegrins in Herzegovina, preparing the Orthodox population for a rebellion against the Ottomans, in order to endanger the interests of

Turkey and Austria-Hungary in that region, and ultimately to the territorial expansion of Montenegro. The battle of Grahovac was part of a larger strategic political plan of Prince Danilo (who ascended to the throne in 1851) to strengthen the statehood of Montenegro and its recognition by Europe. In conversations with the French Emperor, Napoleon III, Prince Danilo openly stated the political demand of Montenegro for diplomatic recognition of its independence, expansion of its borders and emergence onto the Mediterranean.

Europe accepted Montenegro's request for a new border arrangement with the Ottomans. An international conference, called for the first time by Montenegro. It was held in Constantinople and ended with the fulfillment of Montenegrin demands. A new border with Turkey was established. Montenegro gained some 1,500 square kilometers of new territory and was *de facto* recognized as an independent state. It can be said that the battle of Grahovac paved the way to formal recognition of independence of Montenegro, 20 years later, at the Congress of Berlin.[3]

Congress of Berlin

The decisions at the Congress of Berlin were preceded by a slew of victorious battles of Montenegrins against the Ottoman Empire, to which Europe could no longer remain indifferent. The Congress of Berlin was held at the request of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, since these two countries were dissatisfied with the Treaty of San Stefano (signed in March 1878), in which Russia, after emerging victorious over the Turks, set the conditions of peace. This treaty gave Montenegro a large territory spreading far beyond current state borders. It was this very fact, in a sense, that prompted the summit in Berlin—to annul the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Montenegrin question was one of the main topics of the Congress of Berlin. In the agreement reached at the summit, on July 13, 1878, Montenegro secured international recognition. Of the 64 articles of the Berlin Treaty, eight referred to Montenegro.[4]

Podgorica Assembly

By a decision made at the so-called Great People's Assembly in Podgorica, in November 1918, Montenegro was joined with Serbia, and, losing its name, entered the newly formed State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. At the time, the dominant feeling favored the creation of a South Slavic state. Still, there were two streams of thought about the unification in Montenegro. One was in favor of unconditional unification, whereas the

other advocated for Montenegro to join the new union through the decisions and acquiescence of its legal authorities, as a state and equal partner. The advocates of an unconditional unification printed their political positions on white billboards, acquiring the nickname "the Whites," with the detractors to such unification using green colored paper, thus named "the Greens." The White-Green split, essentially, has remained until our present day, and has in certain situations had elements of civil war.[5]

Christmas Uprising

According to history, the first civil war resulting from the White-Green split happened in late 1918, right after the so-called Podgorica Assembly, starting with the political protests against the assembly's decisions. At first these were public protests, but would later become organized resistance against the abolishment of the independent state of Montenegro. The first armed action, in that sense, took place at the beginning of November in Nikšić, when a group of citizens expressed its loyalty to King Nikola, confiscated weapons from guards, and occupied the state building. Armed conflicts became intensified toward the end of December (old style calendar), giving the events their name. Resistance continued into early 1919, and lasted until 1924. The main skirmish with the Serbian army and police took place near Cetinje. At one point, the resistance fighters surrounded Cetinje, Virpazar and Rijeka Crnojević. There were attempts at internationally mediated negotiations with the leaders of the rebellion, one of whom was Captain Krsto Popović. The goal of the rebellion was, first of all, to pressure the participants of the Paris Peace Conference, so that the Montenegrin question would be settled in a democratic way. The Christmas Uprising was nevertheless crushed, according to historians due to the resistance fighters' poor organization.[6]

Uprising in Montenegro (July 13, 1941)

In contrast to Berlin of 1878, where world powers decided the fate of Montenegro without the presence of its representatives at the Congress itself, in 1941, Montenegrins, asking no one, took their own destiny into their hands. The rebellion was prepared, organized and led by communists, but overall it was popular resistance against the occupier. The size of the rebellion, its strength, and the determination of Montenegrins to liberate their country were best described by the Italian occupying commander, Army General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli. In a message of August 2, 1941 to his high command in Rome, Biroli did not hide his helplessness

in crushing the rebellion. He wrote to Rome from Cetinje that "attempting to keep the Montenegrins subdued is like taking a plow to the sea." From a military strategic point, according to historians, the uprising in Montenegro in 1941 was a unique example in Europe. However, political decisions following the rebellion somewhat caused its breakdown in the fall of the same year. The question that arose with the liberation of Montenegro from the occupying forces, in which a decisive role was played by communists, concerned the relation of the people toward the old regime. This would prove to be the seed of future ideological/political confusion, resulting in the split of the native population into Partisans and Chetniks. The motive and sincerity of the rebellion itself, however, cannot be questioned; its greatness can withstand all scrutiny. The uprising in Montenegro will forever remain an example of popular enthusiasm, sacrifice, and endeavor to fight for one's own freedom and that of other people. In 1941 Montenegrins effectively stood up, with no international agreements or formal allies, to defend Europe, even though it was Europe that had, in 1918, actively participated in the dissolution of Montenegro as a state.[7]

Analysis of the National Narrative and Meta-Discursive Practices of the Government Leadership[8]

In order to establish what is being put forth by a narrative structure, it is important to point out the principle by which the dates of Montenegrin national history and various meta-discursive practices of recalling them are connected into a logical and coherent form. The situation only becomes clearer if we see Montenegro's national history linked to its creation, and if we imagine some important historical dates in succession, concluding with the tentative initial steps of European and NATO integration:

- Battle of Martinići—representing the precondition for the passing of the Stega, one of the founding acts of Montenegrin statehood;
- Battle of Grahovac—fits into the larger strategic and political plan of Prince Danilo for strengthening the state subjectivity of Montenegro and its recognition in Europe. The Battle of Grahovac clears the path for formal recognition of independence 20 years later, at the Congress of Berlin;
- Congress of Berlin—the formal recognition of Montenegro. Although it lost part of the territory gained by the Treaty of San Stefano, the Congress fully recognized Montenegro, and the date of the Congress of Berlin is celebrated as the Statehood Day in Montenegro;

- The Podgorica Assembly—the decisions by which Montenegro was joined to Serbia, and without say entered the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The assembly had two camps: one advocated unconditional unification with Serbia (the Whites), while the other advocated for Montenegro to enter this new union through the decisions and acquiescence of its legal authorities, as a state and equal partner (the Greens);
- Christmas Uprising—the culmination of the conflict between the Whites and the Greens, in the aftermath of the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly. Armed conflict was most intense in the run-up to Christmas, early January 1919. The maneuvers of the rebels continued until 1924. Historical sources cite the participation of some 4,000 armed rebels, who fought under the slogan "For Montenegrin Right, Honor and Freedom." The rebellion was quashed due to insufficient organization on the part of the rebels;
- Uprising in Montenegro (July 13, 1941)—one of the first and most populous antifascist uprisings in Europe. In World War II, Montenegro began the antifascist fight back, which resulted in the return of certain elements of statehood as part of Socialist Yugoslavia;
- Independence Day—On May 21, 2006, the citizens take to the polls for a democratic referendum to decide the question of Montenegrin independence. Independence is declared on June 3, 2006, receiving United Nation recognition on June 28 of the same year;
- Membership in the EU and NATO—With two great and eternal values of love for freedom and antifascism, and harmony among the peoples and faiths, since the peoples have their roots in faiths, we join the European and North Atlantic integrations, with the aim of confirming our modern civic state;[9]
- NATO is the guarantor of peace, security, stability, as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity of Montenegro—with the accession into a system of collective security, Montenegro would gain solid guarantees of defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10]

Let us now connect the elements from the national narrative and their interpretation in the monthly, *Partner*, with the meta-discursive practices of the government leadership. In doing so, we should pay special attention to portions of the inaugural speeches of the President of Montenegro and the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, which were part of their public addresses on the occasions of Statehood Day and Independence Day.

In part of his speech on the occasion of his assuming office of the President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović said:

I assume the highest office—that of the President of Montenegro—with particular attention to its current importance—that of the choice of the first president of the revived, independent Montenegro. In its previous incarnation, Montenegro was a monarchy, with its international recognition achieved at the Congress of Berlin, a full one hundred and thirty years ago. Being at the crossroads of the East and West, Montenegro was an irresistible lure to the powers of other countries. Equally naturally, the history of Montenegro is the history of struggle for freedom and establishment or renewal of our own state…Our current, definitive renewal of independence, Montenegro owes to its long history, but also to the anti-fascist uprising of July 13th and the referendum decision of its citizens. If the revival of Montenegrin statehood, lost unjustly at the Podgorica Assembly, began with the anti-fascist struggle, it was finally completed by the expressed will of its citizens at the referendum. This is why Montenegro's revival carries within itself two great and eternal values of our country—anti-fascism and multinational and multiconfessional harmony. Aware that they were fighting against the greatest evil the world had seen, in its idea and its achievements, Montenegrin anti-fascists knew that for the struggle against fascism they of necessity had to use the return of the self-relevance of our state. Therefore, Montenegro owes eternal gratitude to its own and South Slavic anti-fascism, which recognized that it could not achieve its full potential if it ignored the injustice of the loss of statehood of Montenegro. The will of the people that completed this revival of independent statehood by way of referendum showed and declared that it belongs to all, regardless of national or religious difference. It belongs equally to all, regardless of political position about the need of revival of state independence…Finally, after the referendum, precisely because we are all citizens of Montenegro, and because it is the home of all of us, let us be together, because only in this way can we build a common European future. We are bound to this unity precisely by the need for further affirmation of Montenegro as a civil state of multinational and multiconfessional harmony, and the need for European and Euro-Atlantic integration…Because of the quality and importance of the security integration, a strategic need of Montenegro is in membership to NATO. Of course, respectful of security reasons, but also valuing the economic and political benefits brought by joining.[11]

In his speech on the occasion of assuming the office of the President of Parliament of Montenegro, Ranko Krivokapić said:

The two previous sessions of the Parliament of Montenegro, over which I had the honor of presiding, were favored by history. The Twenty-Second

session passed the Decision Regarding the Referendum and declared the renewal of the independence of our state. The Twenty-Third session adopted the Constitution of Montenegro and by signing the first contractual relation with the European Union, brought us into the Union's proximity. All of which was but a grain of sand in the millennium long statehood of Montenegro, in three different manifestations—Duklja, Zeta, and Montenegro…As we enter this illustrious home with democratic legitimacy, we must be conscious that we will reach the heights of previous manifestations with great difficulty, nor will we be worthy of those who dreamt of Montenegro's freedom and gave their life for it. Our deeds must be guided by the consciousness of St. Peter, that behind us stands no greater force than words and language…Montenegro has managed to create so much good history, that it is difficult to find a date that does not have a universal message…Luckily, nothing unifies Montenegro as its dedication to the idea of the European Union. It resolves the externally imposed historical division. Let us ignore all the election numbers and rally around the number 29! A chair with that number waits in both the EU and NATO, and it is incumbent upon us to attempt to reach it! Unfortunately, the externally imposed division remains with regards to full membership in NATO. This assembly must cease with the untenable slogan "for the European Union, against the Atlantic Alliance." Collective security is a guarantor that we never again engage in war with our brothers or on our doorstep. Lest we forget, freedom in Montenegro was always considered priceless! … Long live Montenegro.[12]

On the occasion of the main celebration of Statehood Day of Montenegro, President Vujanović laid a wreath on the monument in Gravovo, offering the words:

It is no accident that we again find ourselves in Grahovo, with the need to express our fascination with Montenegro's July 13th. On that date in 1878 Montenegro secured its international recognition at the Congress of Berlin as the crowning achievement of a centuries long struggle for freedom and homeland. In that struggle the Battle of Grahovo stands as an incredible expression of bravery and intrepidness for the cause of freedom as an eternal good…I bow to all the fighters and victims of fascism in Montenegro, and send them expressions of infinite piety and awe. Expressing my amazement, I would like to say that Montenegro is also proud that it never doubted the values of the anti-fascist struggle. Nor will they. Montenegro is permanently directed against fascism, with a determination to always preserve this value. It will be preserved, in the name of its anti-fascist past, and in the name of civic Montenegro…This year has special significance in celebrating the anti-fascist movement. We mark the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory over fascism, the central celebration of which was naturally held in Moscow on the great Red Square, where

Russia's magnificent military parade showed an equally glorious respect for its anti-fascist past. This parade also expressed an important message of partnership of Russia with NATO, appropriately, precisely on this day of celebration of the victory over fascism.[13]

Speaking on the occasion of Statehood Day, the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, Ranko Krivokapić, emphasized:

Among the numerous important dates in Montenegro's long and turbulent past, the day that shines the brightest is July 13th, Montenegrin Statehood Day. This date is written into our history with gold letters, starting in 1878, when at the Congress of Berlin, Montenegro officially became the 27th internationally recognized independent country in the world. 70 years ago, on July 13th, 1941, on the day of the antifascist uprising, our glorious ancestors made us duty bound to consider sacred that which they fought and gave their lives for. And they fought for the freedom of not only Montenegro, but the whole free world. On that day, Montenegro was Europe, standing up for the defense of the highest European ideals: freedom, justice, equality. July 13th is a beacon of light that even today shines on the European way that we follow. Recent history has been a warning: when it was not faithful to its ideals, such as in the early nineties, Montenegro nearly lost itself. Montenegro must never again be unworthy of its past, red like the Montenegrin flag, red like the five sided red star, red like Aurora. Let this July 13th be the herald of Montenegrin European future. Citizens of Montenegro, I congratulate you, in the name of the Parliament of Montenegro and my own, on this Statehood Day—July 13th.[14]

At the official reception for Statehood Day, the President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović, spoke thus:

Once again, in our capital, Cetinje, of course, we mark the day of our statehood. In the year in which Montenegro celebrates 131 years of gaining state independence and three years of that statehood's revival by way of referendum. At the same time, it has been 68 years since the great anti-fascist uprising. All in the year that precedes the centenary of the Kingdom of Montenegro. A kingdom that is in its manifestation the crowning achievement of the royal dynasty Petrović Njegoš. In the 222 years of rule—longer than any other royal house among South Slavs—and seven heads of house, this dynasty dedicated itself to freedom and the state of Montenegro. Warriors and spiritualists, statesmen and poets, visionaries and philosophers were essentially, and above all, Montenegrin freedom fighters. As the rulers and monarchs for over two centuries, they led their people into battles for freedom, propelled poor, small Montenegro among the illustrious and stable countries. In this grandiose Montenegrin state path,

Petar I and Petar II Petrović Njegoš set the foundations of a state, Prince Danilo made a decisive turn, and Prince and King Nikola finished their shining vision—on July 13th, 1878, when, at the Congress of Berlin, Montenegro was declared an internationally recognized state. The independent state, the end result of a centuries long and priceless struggle for freedom, had as its goal to spare Montenegro from the indignity of chains or worse—acceptance of slavery … On its second glorious July 13th, in 1941, Montenegro stood up to fascism in a popular uprising filled with a feeling of freedom and non-acceptance of occupation and slavery. Following the greatness of the freedom struggle of the Petrovićes, Montenegro rebelled against the greatest danger in the world, and sent the message that fascism is neither eternal nor unbeatable. This uprising was also the beginning of the revival of the unjustly terminated Montenegrin state. The values of freedom and state independence connected fatefully—why should we not believe this—the two greatest Montenegrin dates, unifying them into a single date: July 13th. The third historically priceless date, May 21st, when Montenegrin independence was re-established through a referendum, is the democratic crowning of the founding of the state begun in the anti-fascist July 13th uprising. With these two great and eternal values—freedom loving and anti-fascism—and harmony between peoples and faiths, since peoples have their roots in faiths, we join European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, aiming to confirm our civil state. We join these organizations to share their values, but also to thereby selflessly and permanently promote our exceptional riches.[15]

The following were the words of President Vujanović at the official reception on the occasion of Independence Day:

One year ago, at the gate of King Nikola's castle in our capital, Cetinje, we advanced in order to return to Cetinje, but this time as an independent, internationally recognized Montenegro. So we have done. We are once again on Cetinje, the capital of just that independent, internationally recognized Montenegro. The state mission is complete. We have revived the state reality of our knightly ancestors, and embodied a nearly millennium long dream of their indefatigable offspring. On the territory that currently houses our country, the independent state has been re-established for the fifth time, the third time under the name of Montenegro … We have once again placed Montenegro among the names of states, and have returned the country to its rightful address … The struggle for the renewal of an independent Montenegrin state has lasted nearly a whole century. Although history is not always just, as we know from how it treated Montenegro in 1918, never renounces its fundamental values. In the Second World War, in the face of Nazi and fascist invasion, the Montenegrin heroes of July 13th stood up to the last, side by side with their Yugoslav brethren, in defense of European freedom and culture. Led by the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia, Montenegrin anti-fascists also defended the nullified state honor of Montenegro, the honor of Grahovo, of Vučji Dol, the honor of the ancient Montenegrin quest for freedom for the Montenegrins state. And so they did. In the given historical relations and conditions, they accomplished what could be done—a Montenegrin republic within a common Yugoslav state. They also, however, ensured the previously denied national right of the Montenegrin people. Without their antifascist heroism and sacrifice, there could have been no Montenegro. And certainly not in this place where we stand today... Only a permanently stable Montenegro can respond to the ultimate, strategic Montenegrin goal: long term European and Euro-Atlantic integration process. On this question, the Montenegrin position could not be clearer: full fledged membership to NATO as soon as possible, full fledged membership in the European Union as soon as possible. Here too, we have received accolades—we are approaching both communities. On this colossal ascent, most prestigious in Montenegrin history, worthy of the unbroken annals of Montenegrin freedom, we still expect the support of Balkan and European allies and friends. In particular, we are confident of this most decisive pillar of support, present ever since the groundbreaking anticipation of President Wilson, a confirmed friend of the Montenegrin people and their independent state in two world wars, from the allied United States of America.[16]

As a part of marking Montenegrin Independence Day, Prime Minister Milo Djukanović unveiled a monument in Bajice, near Cetinje, with state and military honors, celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of the Christmas Uprising against the unification of Montenegro with Serbia in the aftermath of the 1918 Podgorica Assembly decisions: "On this ground our ancestors defended the dignity and right to self-determination of the Montenegrin people. Yet another battle for Montenegro began here, one that was a guerrilla, emigrant, and later antifascist and emancipatory, above all, civic and democratic, and which was brought to an end on May 21st, 2006."[17] On the same occasion, the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, Ranko Krivokapić, laid a wreath in the mausoleum of Petar II Petrović Njegoš, stating that "Lovćen [ancestral home and cite of mausoleum of Njegoš] is a symbol of the eternal Montenegro," and adding that "now that it has grasped its freedom, it is moving firmly toward the EU and NATO."[18]

In summarized form, the Montenegrin "official" national narrative would go as follows: victorious Montenegrin battles were the precondition for Montenegro to gain international recognition at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. With the Podgorica Assembly (1918), Montenegro disappears, and the attempt to regain its statehood immediately (Christmas Uprising) fails. In World War II, Montenegro began the antifascist fight

back, which resulted in the return of certain elements of statehood as part of Socialist Yugoslavia. Finally, on May 21, 2006, Montenegro regained its statehood, and NATO is now the guarantor of peace, security, stability, as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity of Montenegro.

In the end, we come to the final (and simple) formula of the narrative: Montenegro created its state with difficulty, lost it, and finally regained it. Following the principles of logical coherence on which the narrative rests, we are faced with the conclusion that independent and internationally recognized Montenegro was part of a long-standing plan, and the membership in EU and NATO are presented as progress along the same path.

National and Masculine Identities of the Army of Montenegro

In Montenegro's history and tradition, the army was an institution of exceptional social importance. The military profession enjoyed respect and a good reputation. Service in the military was considered passage into adulthood for men, and was consequently marked with various ceremonies. With independence, Montenegro embarked on professionalizing its military, discontinuing the previous practice of compulsory service. When the transition took place, the President of Montenegro said that "young Montenegrin men will no longer serve in the military, but rather be employed in it." Some considered this decision inconsistent with the traditional role of the military in Montenegro:

> On September 5th, the descendants of famous fighters and heroes from the bosom of Rade Tomov, have laid down their weapons for good, placing them aside the displayed swords and rifles of their ancestors…With this decision, Vujanović has "corrected" a decision of 2 October, 1831, 175 years ago, made by St. Peter of Cetinje, who established the Guard, the police and military formation of the Prince's Bodyguards. From that time until Vujanović's decision, Montenegrins dreamed of being soldiers, officers, generals, etc. In many a war, they raised military honor and courage to the highest pedestal of the fatherland…Those times are now long ago. Today, the Montenegrin government has prepared a new military doctrine according to which, the song traditionally sung in the Fall when young men used to enter the military, "Gora žuti, gora žuti, odoše regruti" [Yellow are again the leaves, the next generation for the army leaves] will be hummed by a lone young man here and there, determined to become a soldier—professionally employed in the Army of Montenegro. A significant number of citizens of Montenegro, one might even say the majority, is not only stunned by the abolishment of military service, but disapproves of the move, convinced that it runs contrary to tradition and masculinity of Montenegrin men.[19]

Keeping in mind that contemporary national identity has a role in socializing soldiers as members of a nation, historical narratives that suggest close cultural proximity and relatedness appear particularly significant in new conditions. Looking at the army of Montenegro through the nationally dominant historical continuum suggested by the national narrative, the situation could not be clearer: Montenegro created its state thanks to military activity. After 1918, Montenegro lost its state and its military, and as part of larger state entities, its young men served their military duty under banners that were not Montenegro's flag. Finally, in 2006, after nearly a hundred years, Montenegro had the conditions to begin building its own military. Since a nation must be capable of referring to its glorious distant past (to more effectively tug at the heart of members of the nation), for the purpose of strengthening the national identity of the army of Montenegro, the national narrative was "enriched" with several new elements. Particularly important among them is the date of October 7—the assumed date of the Battle of Tudjemil, near Bar, taking place in the distant year 1042 (836 years prior to the first international recognition of Montenegro), chosen to be the day of the army of Montenegro. The national narrative suggests that this was a great victory of Duklja over the Byzantine army, making the medieval states Zeta and Duklja the precursors of the Montenegrin states. The victorious Battle of Tudjemil is represented as the beginning (and original source) of the Montenegrin military:

> Montenegrin history, steeped in the struggle for freedom, is so rich with battles and wars, that it is no easy task picking a date to be the Day of the Army of Montenegro. There are many days that could be considered. The Ministry of Defense, aided by experts, in particular historians, has for this day chosen a battle from the distant past: the Battle of Tudjemil, near Bar, in 1042. This battle near Bar is where the army of Prince Stefan Vojislav defeated the Byzantine army that came to this region to quell the local population's uprising against Greek rule. The Byzantine Emperor, Constantine IX Monomachos enlisted the help of Duklja-Zeta's neighbors, and designated the ruler of the region Cursilius as the head commander. The two armies met at Tudjemil. Although significantly weaker, the Duklja-Zeta army roundly beat the Byzantines and their allies, keeping Duklja-Zeta safe from Byzantium for a long time.[20]

When it comes to the army of Montenegro, the strengthening of national identity is inseparable from the process of strengthening masculine identity. Montenegrin soldiers require a dose and type of masculine identity that will enable them to join NATO's multinational forces—all in the name of distant national interests. An element that has proven

important in this processes are narratives that recall the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in earlier missions. In this way, a "narrative of cooperation" is produced. The centerpiece of this narrative is the participation of the Montenegrin army in resolving the Crete crisis in 1897. Equally important are its participation in the Sinai mission by SFRY, the participation of individual Montenegrin soldiers in other countries' militaries, as well as the cooperation of Montenegrin Partisans with British troops in evacuating wounded allied soldiers across the air bridge Donja Brezna—Bari, during World War II. Put in sequence, these events constitute a story with a seemingly deep past, and makes the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in current NATO missions its logical continuation.

Still, professional advancement and financial considerations, both important elements of contemporary masculine identity, were put forward as the description of the motivation of soldiers to join international missions. The Ministry of Defense and the high command of the army of Montenegro enable participants in international missions to acquire various benefits: career or rank advancement, housing assistance, and a much higher salary. The soldiers' motives mostly operate within the realm of these benefits, for which a daily payment of about a hundred Euros (100€) was stressed as the main incentive for signing up.[21] The possibility of professional advancement and financial prosperity (as the primary motives for joining international missions) substantiate the studies of contemporary Montenegrin masculinity: work is the main component of masculinity. It is through work and professional advancement that men accumulate social capital, which ensures the well-being of their families. However, when we consider Montenegro's past as it appears in the national narratives and stories of cooperation, we get a different image of the "ideal soldier" of the army of Montenegro—one willing to participate in bringing peace. The core of the image of the perfect soldier can be found in the words of the commander of the first unit of Montenegrin soldiers to go to Afghanistan, Enes Murić: "Money to me is not important. It means little whether the mission pays a hundred or sixty euros a day. This is my contribution to the advancement of the state."

It would be interesting to make a short detour and mention an event I witnessed as a participant of REACT in 2009. I was listening in on a conversation that three members of the first contingent of the army of Montenegro that was about to deploy to Afghanistan were having with representatives of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs of countries in the region that had already sent soldiers on missions in Afghanistan (mainly Croatia and Hungary). The aim of the conversation was to supplement information acquired from the Ministry of Defense of Montenegro. In other words, the soldiers wanted to know firsthand about the situation

and conditions that awaited them. The questions asked were entirely practical and pertained to specific tasks of their role in Afghanistan. According to their interlocutors, the questions were no different from the ones asked by their colleagues from Croatia or Macedonia. They wanted to know about their personal safety, their safety in the region where they would be stationed, what is happening on the ground, what their specific duties would be, and so on. They were interested about post-traumatic stress disorder and what causes stress, and about women and sexual contact. As the questions were practical and specific, they received practical and specific answers: that the situation in the city where they were going was stable, but a town nearby saw Taliban activity, which reflected on the atmosphere in their town; that at first they only secure the base, and go out on missions only later in their stay, which is more dangerous; that iron discipline rules the base (punishing even driving above the speed limit); that mixing with women is strictly prohibited and punished severely; that post-traumatic stress appears after the second or third mission and is not caused by stay on base; that those leading the units must have perfect command of English and various procedures; and that they will learn analysis of situations in the field (frequency and duration of attacks, time intervals between attacks, etc.).

The Influence of NATO and EU on Contemporary/Future Montenegrin Identity

Before the final analysis of the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity in the process of joining the NATO and the EU, let us, once again, consider the influence of the present on the production of narrative interpretations of the past. To begin with, let us look at a real situation. On October 7, 2013, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia was a guest at the sanctification of the Great Orthodox Cathedral in Montenegro's capital, Podgorica. On the occasion, he was received by Prime Minister Djukanović, who, in the course of the conversation, "gave special emphasis to Russia's importance throughout Montenegrin history." Patriarch Kirill, himself "spoke in particular of the historical aspect of Montenegrin-Russian friendship, which, as he said, lives on in permanent memory of the Montenegrin and Russian peoples."[22] As we can see, the Russian Patriarch's visit "demanded" a very different past than the one "demanded" by NATO integration, which is why official Montenegro "gave special emphasis" to that part of Montenegrin past "ignored" in the myriad discussions about NATO. Even though joining NATO was quite often connected to Montenegro's past through various

meta-discursive practices, the advocates of membership chose to be silent on those occasions regarding the historical ties of Montenegro to Russia (which in Montenegro has a cult status).[23] Additionally, the advocates of membership roundly "ignored" the not so rare historical and ethnographic data that shows Montenegrins calling themselves Serbs, as well as narratives that speak about the spirit of Serbdom that permeated victorious Montenegrin struggles for freedom.[24] Let us consider yet another hypothetical situation: on the referendum for the statehood status of Montenegro held in 2006, suppose a majority of people vote for Montenegro to remain in a state of union with Serbia. Imagine also that the government leadership that advanced the cause of unity with Serbia becomes the ruling group in Montenegro and has the possibility, from their centers of political power, to reign over symbolic activities. Let us, in such a changed scenario, attempt to imagine what Montenegro's national narrative and meta-discursive practices would be in the different inaugural public addresses of the president and the president of the Parliament on Statehood Day (since Independence Day would not be celebrated in the changed situation). What would be the official reminiscences of the Podgorica Assembly? Would the Christmas Uprising (as an uprising against unconditional unification with Serbia) be part of the national narrative (would it be "ignored"), or would it be replaced by the Battle of Mojkovac (as an example of the sacrifice of Montenegrin soldiers for Serbia in World War I)? Let us go a step further and imagine that one of the primary strategic goals of that country is *not* joining NATO. In that case, would the listed historical dates be tied to events favoring Montenegro joining NATO? Would "forgotten" events be brought back into limelight from the dustbin of history to witness the cooperation of Montenegrin and British soldiers during World War II, or would the numerous historical ties of Montenegro with Russia take over? Following this line of reasoning, would Russia, as happened many times in the past, be the main object of Montenegrin affection?

Of course, I have cited the example of the visit of Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia to Montenegro, along with the hypotheticals to further shed light on the dynamic of social remembering and forgetting, and once again it shows the selectivity inherent in creating versions of the past.

The world is, above all, divided into nation-states—countries that claim to be nations through their national narrative. Therefore, national identity is perhaps the most important and broadest of all collective identities. If we conceptualize reality as a large narrative in which we "incorporate" ourselves as social beings, while keeping in mind the concept of "banal nationalism" and "symbolic voluntarism," and if we

consider social activities and identities as mediated through narrative, then we begin to see the true capacity of narratives in creating, shaping, transferring, and reconstructing contemporary social identities, as well as the reproduction of the nation on the level of the quotidian (Billig 2002 [1995]; Naumović 2009; Smit 1998: 220–225). Montenegro's imagined Euro-Atlantic future demands certain narrative interpretations of the past. In later phases, these interpretations (various meta-discursive practices) strive to become the all-pervasive meta-narrative. Narrative interpretations of the past remind members of a nation of their common ancestry and have a very important function in shaping and strengthening the desired national identity as well as the reproduction of the nation in quotidian life. In the case of Montenegro, this is proving to be very important, in particular if we keep in mind the social and historical context of its status as a state. Even though Montenegro was an independent and internationally recognized state at the end of the nineteenth century, it spent the twentieth century as a part of larger state entities. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Montenegro renewed its statehood. As an independent and internationally recognized state, it set forth on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration, a primary foreign policy goal and the country's desired future. Such a desired Euro-Atlantic future requires an appropriate past, and the coherence of the national narrative allows for a connection between the two. The binding together of important historical events with Montenegro's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community is conducted through a variety of meta-discursive practices, most often at ceremonies dedicated to remembering important events. This is what makes celebrations of Statehood Day and Independence Day so important—they are the dominant means of reiterating the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, the Podgorica Assembly, the antifascist struggle of World War II, and Montenegro's independence vote in 2006. The clearly designated central points, together with the logical coherence that the narrative requires and follows, give the whole story a "malleability," allowing it to adopt new elements. The established narrative continuity of past, present, and a Euro-Atlantic future appears as an "official" mediator in the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.

To best understand the given narrative, it is necessary to conceptualize it in both the synchronic and diachronic perspective. To that end, we can show two graphs, which we can term the "graph of sovereignty" and the "graph of identity," respective to their context. Integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions are not only represented as one of many points on a diachronic plane (the horizontal axis) but as its ultimate point. We can say that it is, diachronically, the ultimate outcome of a path charted

long ago. On the other hand, if we consider Montenegrin sovereignty as a synchronous parameter (vertical axis) and keep in mind that the EU and NATO are organizations of sovereign states, then we can see that in the interplay between synchrony and diachrony, the integration of the state into EU and NATO marks the "end" of a great narrative. With the accession into a system of collective security, Montenegro would gain solid guarantees of defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Simply put: in the context of sovereignty, the "end" of the great narrative (achieving sovereignty), is the precondition for the "beginning" of integrations into EU and NATO (given that they are organizations of sovereign states and NATO is the guarantor of Montenegrin security, stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity)[25]—all of which can be clearly seen on the "sovereign graph" shown in figure 6.1.

If we tend toward complete determination (as in the "sovereign graph") and take the sovereignty of Montenegro as the synchronic parameter (i.e., as movement from lack of sovereignty to acquiring sovereignty), then the "game" of synchrony and diachrony becomes completely clear (i.e., the main points are clearly defined): 1878, Montenegro gains sovereignty; 1918, Montenegro loses sovereignty; 2006, Montenegro regains sovereignty.[26] In that case, the line of national narrative has clear high points and low points on the sovereignty axis. Of course, in order to join Euro-Atlantic organizations it is necessary to reach the highest point. Once Montenegro reaches the highest point, NATO becomes the guarantor of its stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

However, if Montenegro were to become a member of EU and NATO, in order to understand potential reproductions of future Montenegrin identity, it would be much more efficient if we were less determinate.

Figure 6.1   The sovereign graph.

Thus, the synchronous axis is conceptualized not as sovereignty (simply and clearly), but as movement from less self-reliant to more self-reliant.[27] Keep in mind that we have the socializing potential of international integrations as part of complex forces of globalization. In the particular case, the assumption that the complex practices of socialization and enculturation are embodied in the actions of international organizations (EU and NATO),[28] which (as socializers) aim and sometimes effect changes in the definition of identities of the socialized—with the given influences unfolding in the context of forces of globalization (here globalization is a phenomenon that refers to the intensification of global interconnectedness, an aspect of which makes borders and limits ever more porous, and global processes constantly intersect national borders). The reproduction of a potential future Montenegrin identity will unfold within the given (Euro-Atlantic) narrative space, and necessarily under its influence. Therefore, integration into Euro-Atlantic integrations can be conceptualized as a kind of dialectical equilibrium of self-reliance and non self-reliance.

If we were to attempt to explain the (often excessive) insistence on national narrative by reference to the desire to strengthen national identity of the "new/old" state, we will be only partially correct. Montenegrin independence, gained via referendum in 2006, is often placed among the most important historical moments and represents the point that allowed for the possibility of integration into EU and NATO. There is little doubt that independence, or renewal of Montenegrin statehood, is the result of the political activity of the presently ruling coalition of DPS-SDP. Therefore, it is entirely clear that the state and government leadership in Montenegro, by frequent recourse to and utilization of national narratives are, among else, legitimizing themselves to both the Montenegrin public and the international community as the bearers of EU and NATO integrations. The intertwining of the question of identity with that of NATO membership, and the inseparability of these issues from the context of quotidian politics produces an array of controversies among Montenegrin citizens. It is my intention in the following three chapters to wade through these matters.

Controversies Surrounding Membership in NATO in Private Discourses: The Citizens' Viewpoint

NATO as Guarantor of Montenegro's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

The question of Montenegro's membership in NATO has produced numerous controversies regarding identity. In fact, it was an extension of already present issues. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the essence of the terms "Montenegrin" and "Serbian" were already hotly debated in various spheres of social life. Whether the disagreements refer to questions of language (do Montenegrins speak Montenegrin or Serbian), religion (do they fall under the auspices of the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Montenegrin Orthodox Church), status of statehood (in favor or against an independent Montenegro), or other issues, we can say that at the root of this "cultural war" on identity lies a single question: are Montenegrins a subgroup of the Serbian people or a discrete ethnic/national group?[1] As I have mentioned, Montenegro has a dual narrative basis[2] that allows for the reproduction and perpetuation of a fluid identity that can be understood as either Montenegrin or Serbian. As we will see, this question of identity has burdened and deeply influenced private discourses of Montenegrin membership in NATO.

The ethnographic material on which the following analysis is based was collected over a long period in the course of my daily activities. Making the work easier was the fact that I was allowed to participate in a lot of the activity of the NGO "Alfa Center" as they illuminated and promoted the work of NATO in Montenegro. Particularly important were several day-long camps held annually, and "REACT," which held lectures and panel

discussions on the advantages and shortcomings of Montenegrin membership in NATO. As a participant and sometimes as a seminar lecturer at Alfa Center's camps, I had the opportunity to privately discuss issues with a number of people from a plethora of fields (undergraduate and graduate students, journalists, experts in various fields, university professors, soldiers, NGO activists, politicians, etc.). Let us see what we can take away from the analysis of my private discourses.

The discourse about NATO as the guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Montenegro has a good deal of traction among citizens who voted for Montenegrin independence at the referendum and supported membership in NATO. According to their viewpoint, Montenegro is a small Balkan state in an unstable area, and NATO could bring it stability. In particular, it is thought that Serbia, Albania, Croatia, or some newly created Islamic state in the Balkans could eventually threaten the territorial integrity of Montenegro, and NATO will be a guarantor against such an occurrence. One interlocutor, Rajko, a high school teacher, notes:

> The fact is that certain politicians in Serbia and Albania still advocate political and ideological ideas of "Great Serbia" and "Great Albania." The fact is that the idea of "Great Serbia" includes all of Montenegro, and "Great Albania" encompasses portions of our territory inhabited by Albanians. It is also a fact that Muslims still dream of the independence of Sandžak [the border area between the now independent states of Serbia and Montenegro with a majority Muslim population], and that Croats call the Bay of Kotor the "bay of Croatian saints." By entering Montenegro, all these ambitions evaporate forever.

According to these discourses, there is danger from Albania regarding specific portions of Montenegrin territory encompassed by the concept of "Great Albania," cities inhabited by Albanians (Ulcinj, as well as parts of the municipalities of Podgorica, Bar, Plav, Rožaje, and Gusinje). The potential danger from a new Islamic creation in the Balkans refers to portions of northern Montenegro, included in the concept of South Sandžak, populated by Muslims (Andrijevica, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Pljevlja, Plav, and Rožaje). Croatia is mentioned less often as a threat to Montenegrin territorial integrity, and its aspirations cover the Bay of Kotor. Still, looking at discourses of threats to Montenegro, the greatest potential threat is placed on Serbia. In this case, the threat does not include portions of Montenegro, but rather its entirety. Serbia could easily destabilize Montenegro, and NATO is the guarantor of this not happening.

The events that preceded the Podgorica Assembly (1918), during the assembly itself, and its subsequent fall out are all part of the traditional

arguments offered as justification for considering Serbia as a threat. Mentioned in particular is the Karadjordjević dynasty's occupation of Montenegro, this Serbian royal family's introduction of military rule, unconditional unification with Serbia, and violent suppression of the Montenegrin rebellion against these acts (the so-called Christmas Uprising). In the following years, the Serbian government took revenge on family members of the participants in the revolt. The decisions of the Podgorica Assembly attempted to stifle Montenegrin identity. My interlocutor, Petar, whose great grandfather was killed along with a few other members of his extended family during the Christmas Uprising, testifies:

> My family remembers well the crimes of the Serbian military against us, our cousins and friends. Most painfully, nobody was allowed to talk about this. Although we all knew it, we were forced to listen to stories of the democratic character of the Podgorica Assembly. My great grandfather had nothing against Serbia, but he could not stand Montenegro entering this new state without its name, as if it had never existed. Now that Montenegro is independent, it is important that the new generations learn about these events, and not sweep them under the rug, like we have done until now.

A more recent element used to justify the threat from Serbia is that in 1999 the Montenegrin army was under the command of Slobodan Milošević, and there was grave danger of it being used against Montenegrin security forces, the Montenegrin government, and its citizens. Montenegro was at the time a federal state in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the army was under command of the President of Yugoslavia, Milošević, which led to Montenegro being needlessly targeted for NATO bombing. Thanks to the wise policies of the President of Montenegro, Djukanović, Montenegro was able to avoid greater casualties. My interlocutor, Emil, a highly educated Muslim, points out:

> Milošević allowed Yugoslavia to be bombed for the sake of remaining in power. This was the height of his madness. Should Montenegro be allowed to be the victim of Serbia's mindless politics? Of course not. Although a large number of citizens in Montenegro supported Milošević, Djukanović stood up to him and thus inscribed his name in history books. I am sure that when Montenegro becomes a member of NATO, it will never again be victim to such obtuse politics.

In the course of conducting my research, I had the opportunity to speak to a great number of highly educated people, well versed in Montenegrin history and culture, who advocated the thesis of a Serbian threat to Montenegro. They focused on the long-term "quiet occupation" (a term

by one of my interlocutors) Serbia conducted in various ways, primarily through the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro and official history textbooks. According to them, for centuries, the Serbian Orthodox Church not only spread Orthodoxy in Montenegro but also Serbdom (by way of propagating the cult of the ruling Serbian medieval dynasty, the Nemanjićes). History textbooks written before and during the socialist period (predominantly written in Belgrade) emphasized the history and culture of Serbia, while Montenegrin culture and history were ignored and studied selectively.[3] All this informs their fear that such a "quiet occupation" could, under the right circumstances, grow into overt military occupation, and parallels are drawn to 1918 and the events surrounding the Podgorica Assembly. Membership in NATO is seen as a guarantor that an occupation like this will never again occur.

According to some, the discourse of NATO as a guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Montenegro has a great potential for political instrumentalization on the level of local as well as foreign policies. This point of view is particularly common among people who support Montenegro's membership in NATO and are against the ruling coalition. Following their thinking, the ruling coalition represents itself as the sole guarantor of Montenegro's membership in NATO, and thus the only guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The thinking is that these political elites thus gain maneuvering space to label their political enemies as vacillating on stability, independence, and Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic future. An interlocutor, who supports NATO membership but is not politically active, says:

> DPS and SDP first say that NATO is the guarantor of sovereignty and Montenegro's secure future. Then they say that they are the only guarantor that Montenegro will enter NATO. From that it follows that anyone who is against DPS and SDP is also against NATO, against Montenegro and its safety. In this way they continuously produce state enemies and create divisions in our society. It is on these divisions that this government relies to stay in power.

Another interlocutor adds a thought about the President of Parliament, Ranko Krivokapić, who has a reputation as a Montenegrin patriot, deftly combining motifs and important dates from Montenegrin history in his inspired speeches, usually finishing them with a line from the Montenegrin anthem, "Montenegro the Eternal":

> Whenever he can, Ranko Krivokapić exclaims "Montenegro the Eternal." He also says that he and his party are the guarantors of Montenegrin

sovereignty, which means that Montenegro is eternal only if he is eternally in power.

Based on all this, we can say that the ruling elite presents themselves to the international community (primarily to the United States and EU) as the only guarantor of Montenegro successfully undergoing its integration into NATO. At the same time, when speaking to international officials, other political options are presented as forces that would impede Montenegro entering NATO. Therefore, it is thought that the ruling coalition uses these strategies to ensure the constant support of the United States and EU to remain in power.

Why Do Serbs Oppose NATO Membership and the New Montenegrin Identity

Since Montenegrin Serbs are clearly the largest opponents of Montenegrin membership in NATO,[4] my intention in this chapter is to analyze the extent to which this question of membership is intertwined in their discourses with questions of identity. In addition to the ethnographic material gathered as part of the overall study, the data for this analysis is from newly gathered information in Pljevlja in March of 2015. Pljevlja is a city near the border with Serbia where they are in majority. The inhabitants voted overwhelmingly against Montenegrin independence and are largely opposed to NATO membership. The assumption was, therefore, that the question of Montenegrin membership in NATO would be strongly linked to identity questions.

The intertwining of identity questions with the issue of NATO membership is the crucial point influencing the positions of Montenegrin Serbs regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO, as will be evident in the following analysis. Indeed, an analysis of meta-discursive practices of the top echelons of government regarding Euro-Atlantic integration has shown that the 2006 referendum that gave Montenegro its independence is included among the country's most significant historical events. Since the referendum result is represented as a precondition for the beginning of the process of integration of Montenegro into the EU and NATO, we can say that the referendum is in some ways fatefully connected to the question of Montenegro joining the EU and NATO. While the date of referendum is placed among the most significant dates in Montenegrin history by top government officials, in the discourses of Montenegrin Serbs it is seen as one of the most controversial dates in the more recent Montenegrin history. When Montenegrin Serbs discuss the referendum,

they first emphasize the accompanying machinations on behalf of the power elites and the fact that it was Albanians, Muslims/Bosnians, and Croats of Montenegro who were decisive in Montenegro achieving its independence. Speaking to me, Nenad says:

> The entire diaspora was allowed to vote, except for Montenegrins living in Serbia. Muslims and Albanians throughout the world were paid to return [to vote]. One of the big Albanian drug lords, Naser Kelmendi, who was named by Barack Obama in an official report as a security threat to the US, admitted in a TV interview that he organized and financed the participation of 8,000 Albanians! What else needs to be said?! All those employed in the civil service were under pressure to vote for independence, the whole government apparatus was put in the service of achieving independence, and whoever voted for independence was given a job, a position, money or some other privilege. And even with all these scheming efforts, their victory was only achieved with some 1,200 votes difference.

Another point emphasized is that only the Montenegrins in Cetinje, in so-called Old Montenegro, the former voters of the Liberal Alliance, along with a small portion of city elites honestly supported Montenegrin independence. All other persons of the Orthodox Christian faith voted in favor of independence either out of personal interest or fear. Following these discourses, Muslims/Bosniaks, Albanians, and Croats played a key role in the referendum result, with special emphasis placed on the notion that they voted for independence out of their own national interests, and not out of Montenegro's interest. Another person I spoke to, Ivan, comments:

> Albanians and Muslims were the decisive factor in Montenegro becoming independent. They supported independence in order to more easily achieve their national goals and because they hate Serbs and Serbia. Now the government has to dance to their tune. But this is only the beginning. We will yet see the Muslims and Albanians play their cards. Only then will Montenegro see how costly their support was.

The question we are faced with is why does the referendum significantly influence the position of membership in NATO. This is because Montenegrin Serbs believe that, since independence, the ruling elites have been imposing a new Montenegrin identity, and that NATO membership is an important step in that direction. What follows from these discourses is that NATO is an organization under the influence of Catholicism that will certainly distance or even separate Montenegro from Orthodoxy, that membership in NATO will definitely break Montenegro from Serbia,

and, finally, that NATO wholeheartedly supports the denial of the Serbian character of Montenegrin history and tradition, as abetted by the ruling classes in Montenegro, all of which further leads to the suppression of the Serbian identity in Montenegro.

The argument that NATO is an organization under the influence of Catholicism that could tear Montenegro's ties to Orthodoxy[5] follows from identity controversies that occur in Montenegro's quotidian routine. Montenegrin Serbs think that the ruling elites are deliberately suffocating the Serbian Orthodox Church to the advantage of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which they consider to be an artificial creation under Catholic influence. It can be heard often that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been historically, spiritually, and culturally based in Montenegro, that it has an eight-century-long tradition; whereas the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was founded in 2000, that too as a nongovernmental organization. Therefore, in the discourses of Montenegrin Serbs there is a belief that NATO, along with the ruling elites, will suppress the Serbian Orthodox Church and impose the Montenegrin one, believed to be under Catholic influence. Along these lines, in the same way they are imposing the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, the ruling elites are imposing the Montenegrin language.[6] Such policies will further lead to break of ties with Serbia, and NATO membership will be the definitive break, since Montenegro and Serbia will be member states of two opposing blocs (the assumption of these discourses being that Serbia will certainly not be a NATO member). Goran tells me:

> They are constantly imposing the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, even though the Serbian church has a much larger following. What hurts them most is all the research shows that the SOC is the institution with the greatest trust among the population. They are also imposing the Montenegrin language although the majority of people say they speak Serbian. They are deliberately breaking all ties with Serbia and Serbdom. Mark my words, when Montenegro enters NATO, Jabuka (the border crossing to Serbia) will no longer have a border, but a "Berlin Wall." Even though everyone in Montenegro has relatives in Serbia, this is the ultimate end of ties of Montenegro and Serbia.

When it comes to the belief that the Serbian character of Montenegrin history is being denied, what these persons claim is that the ruling elites and historians faithful to the government are deliberately reshaping history, avoiding all mention of anything to do with Serbia and attempting to label Serbia as Montenegro's main enemy. It is thought that NATO wholly supports these actions on the part of those in power. Further, it is

thought that due to the key role played by Muslims in obtaining independence, the ruling elites have an awkward task of interpreting the verses of the father of modern Montenegro, Njegoš, given that the central motif of *Mountain Wreath* is the extermination of those Montenegrins who have converted to Islam. One of my interlocutors points out:

> What pains me the most is that they are falsifying history and declaring Serbs the main enemy. The way they are going, it seems that schools will start teaching that it was the Serbs and not the Turks who occupied Montenegro for five centuries. Last year was the bicentenary of the birth of Njegoš. They could not even celebrate the year properly so as not to run afoul of Muslims who think that Njegoš has quite a few "problematic" verses against Islam. And besides, there are quite a few "problematic" verses that go in support of Serbdom.

In my second round of gathering data in Pljevlja, in 2015, I had conversations with a large number of local Serbs. I had a particular strategy for a portion of this research. Initially I would show my interlocutors the results of my analysis of the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity regarding Euro-Atlantic integrations. Then I would await their comments. Perhaps the most interesting comments were generated by the issues of the "Podgorica Assembly" (1918) and "Christmas Uprising" (1918). When speaking of the "Podgorica Assembly," Montenegrin Serbs mostly felt that it had a democratic character and that it represented the will of the Montenegrin people to live in a common state with Serbia. They add that the ruling elites unjustly emphasize that Serbia occupied Montenegro. Further, they consider the "Christmas Uprising" the action of a small number of Montenegrins in a small part of the country known as "Old Montenegro." Following their discourses, the constant emphasis on the "Podgorica Assembly" and "Christmas Uprising" is considered as a deliberate attempt on behalf of the ruling elites to paint Serbia as the occupier and enemy of Montenegro.

Of course, there are always discourses that do not fit the aforementioned pattern. To illustrate, let me offer a few details from a conversation with a young historian politically engaged in a pro-Serbian party:

> "As a historian I can tell you immediately that in 1918 Serbia did Montenegro a lot of wrong. Despite Montenegro's serious sacrifices for the Serbian cause in the First Balkan War and World War I, Serbia paid her back in the most violent way possible. Montenegro became a victim of the depraved ambitions of the Karadjordjević dynasty, in every possible way inferior to the Montenegrin Petrović dynasty. Montenegrin people desired to live in a common state with Serbia, but the Podgorica Assembly

was neither legal nor legitimate." Noticing my surprise, since I was not expecting this view of the Podgorica Assembly and Christmas Uprising, my interlocutor continued: "I am a Serb. I am aware of my identity. But I have no problem critically thinking about these questions…Montenegrin historians trying to show that Montenegrins are ethnogenetically different to Serbs are going to encounter big problems. In order to do that, they will have to break principles of history as a science."

All of this results in Montenegrin Serbs feeling treated as second-rate citizens. Boban tells me:

> This is how things stand in Montenegro: Serbs make up 30 percent of the population, but only 7.3 percent work in the government sector; Montenegrins make up 45 percent of the population, and 82 percent of those is [are] employed in the government sector! This is terrible discrimination. Further, the Albanians, when they support Albania (in football), this is not a problem. The Croats support Croatia, no problem. The Muslims, when they support Bosnia or Turkey, this too is not a problem. But when Serbs support Serbia, they are nationalists. When we support Novak Djoković, they instantly label us as nationalist.

Allow me to make a small digression regarding the discourses of Montenegrin Serbs in which they express the belief that the ruling elites negate the Serbian character of Montenegrin history and tradition. In the opening portion of the book and in the chapters dealing with Montenegrin history, I have noted the phenomenon of a dual narrative base, allowing for a reproduction of a fluid identity that can be interpreted as either Montenegrin or Serbian. This dual narrative base refers to quite common ethnographic, historiographic, and folklore sources that show Montenegrins who lived in traditional Montenegro as being Serbian and that influential Montenegrins often considered themselves champions of Serbdom. However, if we analyze texts in the publication *Partner* that refer to significant historical events and victorious Montenegrin battles, we will notice that there is no mention of anything that could indicate the Serbian character of Montenegrin history and tradition. We can see the same character if we analyze the inauguration speeches of the President of Montenegro and the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, as well as their public addresses on Statehood Day and Independence Day. In other words, if the aforementioned rich dual narrative base allows for the reproduction of a fluid identity that can be interpreted as both Montenegrin and Serbian, the ruling elites have only chosen those parts of this narrative that allow for the reproduction of Montenegrin identity. In contrast, the aspects of the narrative base that would allow for the reproduction of a Serbian identity are roundly ignored.

Montenegro's relationship with Russia is another important element in many Serbs' position regarding membership in NATO. Their discourses tell us that NATO and Russia are seen as two opposing forces, and in accordance with its history and tradition, Montenegro ought to always be on the side of Russia. In these discourses Russia is considered a Slavic, Orthodox center, a protecting force of Montenegro throughout its history (the expressions "brotherly Russia" or "mother Russia" are commonly heard). Orthodoxy and its Slavic nature are the two strongest links with Russia, and membership in NATO could jeopardize these centuries-long spiritual and cultural ties.

Permit me another small digression. The cult of Russia in Montenegro is complex, multilayered, and anthropologically very interesting. It developed early, most likely in the early eighteenth century, when the Russian Tzar, Peter I, called upon Balkan Christians to rise up against the Ottomans. This call was brought by several Russian emissaries and met with approval in the tribal society of eighteenth-century Montenegro. Thus the cult of Russia was born. At its essence lies the image of Russian Orthodoxy as the only bastion of Eastern Christian civilization and a guarantor of liberation of the Balkan peoples from forced Islamization that came with Ottoman occupation. In the ensuing period, Montenegrin rulers regularly sought the support and protection of Russia, whether economic, political, or military. Most often, it was granted. Among Montenegrins, this has created the strongly held belief that Russia is a powerful protectress of Montenegro and a center that gives form to Montenegrin wishes and expectations.[7] Such beliefs are at the root of the cult, but the cult has over time acquired new elements, such that today the cult of Russia also inextricably includes elements of Russia as the center of Orthodoxy, of all Slavic peoples, center of Socialism, and antifascism. These elements are further supported by public images of influential Russian leaders. The cult of Russia in Montenegro grows in strength in periods when Russia has strong leaders (or "alpha male leaders"),[8] meaning that in my research I noticed that certain elements of the cult of Russia in Montenegro are present in proportion to the public image of the current president of Russia, Vladimir Putin.[9] Initially, I intended to write a portion of the book on the cult of Russia in Montenegro and look at the controversies surrounding Montenegrin membership to NATO precisely in this light. However, I quickly realized that the complexity of this topic requires a book by itself.[10]

As things stand, the relationship toward Russia strongly influences the positions of Montenegrin Serbs regarding the membership of Montenegro in NATO, and the depth and complexity of the ties with Russia represents the central aspect of these discourses. Where Russians are seen as our

Orthodox brethren, and Russia the center of Orthodoxy ("mother Russia"), NATO is mostly associated with Catholicism. What follows therefrom is the fear that membership in NATO could break Montenegro's ties with Orthodoxy. Russia's antifascist tradition is also often cited, along with the country's role in the demise of Hitler's Germany in World War II. An interlocutor, Dražen, says:

> "The clash between Russia and NATO is unavoidable. It will come to that sooner or later. Throughout history we have been Russia's allies and we are bound to them by many commonalities, but mostly Orthodoxy. It would be unnatural for Montenegro to side with NATO in a future conflict. I can say confidently that only Muslims and Albanians from Montenegro are on the side of NATO, but no Orthodox person, unless they've been bribed. Ask any Orthodox person who supports NATO, regardless whether they are Serbian or Montenegrin, if they like Russia or NATO more. They will all say they love Russia more. Love for Russia is in our blood." To which Dražen's acquaintance adds: "America likes to present itself today as the main pillar of antifascism, even though Russians were the biggest victims of World War II. The battle of Stalingrad was one of the bloodiest in the history of mankind. Had the Russians not defeated Hitler, fascism would rule the world. Today the role of Russia in the struggle against fascism is played down."

It is worth noting that I have occasionally encountered discourses critical of Russia, where the accent was placed on the idea that Russia has treated Montenegro exactly in accordance with its foreign policy interests. Someone I spoke to, a person knowledgeable in history, said:

> I am against NATO, but people being against NATO because they love Russia, this is stupidity of the highest order. Russia has supported Montenegro and Serbia only when it was in its interest. At times it has also brutally manipulated with Serbia and Montenegro. I am against NATO, but I would love to see them finally remove Russian influence from this region.

Advocates of joining NATO are also aware of the power of the cult of Russia in Montenegro, but they see the future of Montenegrin relations with Russia in one of two ways. Some of my interlocutors think that the strategic, economic, and political interest of Montenegro must turn entirely toward the West, and that Montenegro should act in accordance with its interests, not its emotions. They justify their opinion by pointing out that Russia helped Montenegro historically only when it was in Russia's interest. By contrast, the other group thinks that NATO membership is in

Montenegro's strategic interest, but that a cooling of relations with Russia would be economically detrimental, particularly when we consider that the development of Montenegrin tourism is predominantly based on tourists from Russia. Therefore, they fear that membership in NATO could disrupt relations with Russia, but they hope this will not happen.

The 1999 NATO bombing of FRY is a very important element of nearly all anti-NATO discourses among Montenegrin Serbs. Discourses on the NATO bombing hold a few key elements: NATO was the aggressor against the Serbian people; the bombing was conducted without the approval of the UN; NATO was an ally of the Albanian people; and Djukanović's cooperation with NATO in 1999 represents an act of treason. Only rarely do discourses not fit the pattern of these elements. I spoke to a person named Miroslav, and he says:

> The NATO bombing is a precedent for everything. At the very end of the twentieth century, they are bombing a state in the very heart of Europe. They claim that the aim of the bombing is "putting an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo." Could anyone explain what the bombing of targets in Montenegro or bridges in Novi Sad has to do with the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo? None, of course.

What is emphasized in the discourses on the bombing is that in 1999 NATO was an ally to the Albanians, helping them separate Kosovo from Serbia in order to create a Greater Albania. The alliance of the Albanians and NATO is explained in two ways. The first is that the Albanian lobby in the United States is so powerful and influential that they are able to use the United States and NATO, through diplomacy, for their national interests. The second is that Serbia and the Serbian people are collateral victims of America's anti-Islamic policy. As per these discourses, America has been conducting wars the world over against Islamic states (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria), but they always support Muslim countries in the Balkans (Bosnia and Albania). In that way they create a semblance of balance so as to be able to plausibly deny they are waging a war against Islam in general and claim they are at war with specific states and their leaders. Often, in discourses on the bombing, there are stories told of military skill of the Serbian military, which, in addition to withstanding NATO air strikes, defied attacks by Albanian terrorists on land. It thus prevented NATO ground troops from entering Kosovo. Another interlocutor, Dejan, comments:

> All you have to do is take a look at the image of the Serbian military withdrawing from Kosovo. For 78 days, NATO systematically destroyed all the

positions of the Serbian military but was capable of destroying very little of its armament. During that time, the attacks of Albanian terrorists served as the forefront of a territorial intervention by NATO. This never took place because they were afraid that the Serbian military would destroy them in the same way it destroyed the Albanian terrorists.

In the discourses on the NATO bombing, Djukanović is represented as a politician who, in collaborating with NATO, committed an act of treason unprecedented in Montenegrin history. By being servile toward NATO during the bombing, so goes this discourse, Djukanović has forever ensured NATO support for his politics and himself personally. He will have this support as long as he continues to fulfill their demands. In fact, he will have this support even if he does not fulfill their demands, because his actions from 1999 have indebted NATO to him so much that the organization will always help him remain in power. An acquaintance, Srdjan, comments:

> Djukanović was a NATO ally in the fight against Milošević. He had a significant role in that struggle. He has shown his loyalty to NATO countless times, with the visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels while NATO was bombing Montenegro being only the best example. He is one of the most loyal and significant NATO people in the Balkans, and he will always have the support of NATO.

The discourses of Montenegrin Serbs show us that the relationship of Djukanović toward NATO is a very important segment of his public image. In general, the foreign policy turn toward NATO that Djukanović performed is seen as one of the key moments in his career. Therefore, myriad controversies regarding the issue of Montenegrin membership in NATO have crystalized in the public image of Milo Djukanović, which we will see in the following chapter.

When the Whole Debate Revolves around One Person: Private Discourses about the Relationship of Milo Djukanović toward NATO

Symbols have a multivocal and dynamic character, and identity controversies the world over often crystalize around a single "thing" that comes to carry heavy and contested symbolic weight (Bennett 1994; Turner 1975). Analyzing private discourses, we can say that the controversies regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO (along with all the identity controversies that go with that) crystalized around one single person, or at least one person's public image. Without doubt, Prime Minister Milo

Djukanović[11] is the symbol of Montenegro's integration into NATO and the epicenter of all private discourses on the issue. Rarely have so many opposing viewpoints coalesced into the public image of a single person, and it is perhaps a unique case that controversies regarding a country's membership in NATO crystalize in such a way. Although seemingly out of date, Klapp's sociological analysis of the concept of popular hero proves to be the ideal basis to analyze the public image of Milo Djukanović as part of the debate on Montenegrin NATO membership.

In the mid-twentieth century, Orrin Klapp analyzed the process of development of popular heroes, concluding that they appear most often in periods of instability and rapid change. They emerge in those areas of life in which the public is most focused (Klapp 1948). A hero in public life becomes much more than a person. He is an ideal image, a legend, and a symbol. Once formed, the legend of a hero "lives a life of its own." The development and further life of such a person is a collective process based on a whole series of popular imputations and interpretations. Along the way, the person of the hero becomes inseparable from stories and rumors about him or her. In certain cases, such a publicly formed image is reinforced with publicity and orchestrating popular reactions to the hero (Klapp 1948: 35). Given that Djukanović has held high political functions for the past quarter century and has been Montenegro's undisputed leader the past 18 years, his public image has developed in widely varying circumstances. These include the last few years of the socialist period during which SFRY was dissolved, there were hostilities in Montenegro's surroundings, NATO bombed FRY, crisis developed in Serbian–Montenegrin relations, a referendum was held to gain independence, and finally, the period post-referendum was marked by attempts to integrate into NATO and the EU while also seeing heavy investment from Russia. Bearing witness to all these historical circumstances, Djukanović's public image is eminently present in private discourses regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO. However, this image brings together numerous controversies that follow the question of NATO membership.

Rumors and stories that circulate about a person are very important in constructing a public image, and for the public image of Milo Djukanović, they are particularly important. In every possible respect, Djukanović is distanced from "ordinary" citizens. He is surrounded by a tight circle of advisors, and in events that demand his public appearance, he is followed by heavy security. There is scant information regarding his private life. In the media he is presented exclusively as a politician, always impeccably dressed. Therefore, stories and rumors are most often the only form of "contact" with him.[12] His charisma and popularity among the membership and supporters of DPS are best illustrated by the following

narrative. As I am putting the finishing touches on this book, the DPS is busy organizing its congress, to take place on June 20, 2015. The congress is set to elect the leadership of the party, including the president and vice presidents of DPS (the number of vice presidents is not set in advance, and there have been four thus far). At meetings that have taken place in local city and village DPS committees[13] throughout Montenegro, thousands of party activists have, as part of their duties, nominated their candidates for president and vice presidents of the party. According to the information I have been able to obtain, the number of candidates nominated for vice presidents runs in the hundreds. In contrast, for the position of president, all the DPS activists in every city and regional local committee, nearly without exception, suggested a single name: Milo Djukanović. For example, at a meeting of one of these local city committees of DPS in Pljevlja, the president of the committee asked her activists: "who shall we suggest as the president of the party?" To which one activist, Rada, answered without the slightest hesitation: "Milo Djukanović. One and only. The greatest. The Best. As long as Milo is there, I will vote for DPS." The local committee then nominated him formally as well, much to the applause of the activists.

The foreign relations turn that Djukanović made toward NATO, thus sparing Montenegro from serious damage during the NATO bombing of FRY in 1999, is cited as a crucial event in his career and a moment when he became a serious statesman. Some of my interlocutors think that with the role he played in Montenegro obtaining independence (2006) and in the decision to make a foreign policy turn toward NATO and EU (1997), Djukanović has entered his name in the history books of Montenegro. Both decisions are linked with his decisiveness, courage, strength, and personal charisma. Speaking to me, Marko says:

> In the early nineties, The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro advocated an independent Montenegro. Even then there were people who advocated for Montenegro's entrance into NATO. However, only Djukanović had the strength to execute these projects. I am certain that had it not been for Djukanović, Montenegro would today not be independent, nor would there be any talk at all of NATO in Montenegro.

Another interlocutor, who was a member of the state security agency in the nineties and early period, affirms:

> Today everybody is talking about NATO, attacking Djukanović for all and sundry. They are not aware how much he risked by developing good relations with NATO. At the time, in 1999, a great number of people in

> Montenegro supported Milošević. There are protests against Djukanović and he is called a traitor. At that moment, Montenegro is home to Yugoslavia's Seventh Army battalion, under Milošević's command, who, we knew, was going to attack us. We had information that Djukanović's life was threatened. This was a fateful year for Montenegro. The turn to NATO required a lot of courage. Today it is easy to talk about NATO. Who knows what might have been with Montenegro, had it not been for Djukanović at its helm.

Those who advocate Montenegrin membership in NATO and also support Djukanović speak of him as a leader who began the process of rapprochement of Montenegro with NATO in difficult and unstable circumstances using the strength of his authority, and he is the only guarantor that Montenegro will become a NATO member. In the words of one of my informants: "Montenegro's membership in NATO is Djukanović's project. He knows everything he's been through. He started it, and he will complete it."

Djukanović's relationship to NATO draws various controversies, which is particularly evident in discourses by Djukanović's opponents who support Montenegro's membership in NATO.[14] They see him as a politician who instrumentalizes the issue of Montenegrin membership in NATO and identity questions in order to remain in power. The fact that he has been in power for a quarter of a century is a central aspect of these discourses. Special attention is paid to his inconsistent relationship to the statehood of Montenegro in light of his pro-Serbian pronouncements from the early nineties. His detractors in this respect most often cite his statement that he has come to detest chess because of the Croatian "checkerboard."[15] In the same vein, they mention Djukanović's statements of concern for the fate of Serbs in Croatia, as well as his statements about Kosovo (e.g., "Kosovo is the bedrock of the Serbian and Montenegrin people, and must not fall as long as we and our descendants live"). Still, a particular place is reserved for Djukanović's statements in which he discussed the relationship of Serbia and Montenegro, attacked those who wished to separate the two, and opposed Montenegrin independence ("A heightened concern for Montenegro is a smokescreen behind which we can see a hatred towards the perpetual 'potential occupier'—the Serbian people," or else "We are proud of our Serbian ancestry and Montenegrin statehood, the great history of the Serbian people. Which is why I believe in a common future and prosperity"). Citing and paraphrasing Djukanović's statements from the early nineties, his opponents buttress their thesis that Djukanović is a "ruthless pragmatist" who instrumentalizes identity questions in order to remain in power. They add that he was a member of Communist Youth

League and one of the leaders of Socialist Montenegro, that he is the only leader of one of the former Yugoslav republics from the nineties still in power, as well as one of the richest European politicians. One of my interlocutors notes:

> When Milošević was popular, he supported Milošević. When the West promised him support, he turned against Milošević. He has gone from a fiery advocate of a joint state of Serbia and Montenegro, to the person most responsible for Montenegrin independence. First he ruled thanks to Serbian votes, today it is the Albanians, Croats and Muslims who are his main allies. In all this time, Montenegro has become a deeply divided society, but he has remained in power throughout. Membership in NATO will allow him to rule for a long time yet.

Among those who support integration with NATO but are opposed to the ruling coalition, we can also find views stating that Djukanović and the power structures use the scope of integration of Montenegro in NATO to "hide (sweep under the rug)" the real problems of this society. They cite Djukanović's responsibility, along with that of the ruling coalition, for the poor state of the Montenegrin economy and the negative phenomena present in Montenegrin society resulting from a lack of rule of law. Djukanović's detractors emphasize his dishonesty (bait and switch) regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO. They substantiate their views by mentioning the large capital Russian citizens have invested in a suspicious manner in Montenegro over the past few years. My interlocutor, Maja, a masters' student at the Faculty of Political Science in Podgorica, tells me:

> "Djukanović and DPS are always talking about NATO and European values. But at the same time, they have sold Montenegro's biggest factory to the Russians, a number of hotels on the Montenegrin coast are tied to Russian capital, and Russians own large tracts of land both on the coast and inland. According to some data, Russian citizens own nearly a quarter of Montenegrin territory. Montenegrin tourism is entirely based on tourists from Russia. While talking about NATO, they are collaborating closely with dubious Russians and KGB agents from former Soviet countries." Her friend Goran adds: "In the time they've been speaking about Euro-Atlantic integration, they have sold anything that they could get their hands on. First the factories, then the coast. There's nothing left to sell. NATO is the main priority for Djukanović's government. They are mortgaging the state at a rate of two million a day, there is an enormous level of corruption, the police, judiciary and prosecution are not doing their jobs, and citizens are poorer by the day… All the while, Djukanović has become one

of the richest politicians in Europe. If this is mentioned, it is considered an attack on the state and its European future. When the SDP wishes to hide its responsibility for all these negative phenomena, they can always use the excuse that they are only with Djukanović because of NATO. NATO is justification for everything. These political moves are transparent even to little kids."

It is interesting that a large number of my interlocutors reckon that Montenegro entering NATO will significantly increase Djukanović's chances of remaining in power. However, it is also not that rare to find discourses according to which membership in NATO will signal the end of his rule. Some of Djukanović's detractors claim that he stays in power by using characteristic "election engineering," by which they mean manipulation of the electoral will of the citizenry through a system known as "ensuring the vote."[16] It is therefore thought that the rule of law upon which NATO insists would prevent the mechanisms Djukanović uses to manipulate the electoral will of the people, resulting in his political end. It follows, in these discourses, that Djukanović could deliberately obstruct Montenegro's path to NATO. The core of the controversies mentioned here can be seen in a dialogue that took place between my acquaintances Ivan, a DPS sympathizer, and Nikola, an SNP sympathizer.

Ivan lets Nikola know clearly: "when Djukanović oriented Montenegro towards Europe in 1997, you were against it. Today, you support EU membership. When he initiated the project of independent Montenegro, you were against it. Today you more or less accept an independent Montenegro. Now that DPS is taking Montenegro into NATO, you are once again, against it. In the meantime we have beaten you at every election since and we will beat you again. Thanks to us, Montenegro will become a NATO member and you will sooner or later support that." To which Nikola responded: "You are well aware of all the abuse used to 'beat' us. When NATO officials repeatedly insist that the lack of rule of law is the main obstacle to Montenegro's membership, it means that you must abandon all these abuses if you would like to enter NATO. This also means that Djukanović's love toward NATO will have to be expressed through the arrest of his close allies, knee-deep in criminal activity and corruption, the so-called 'big fry.' Slowly, all of this will lead to the political end of your party and your idol, Milo Djukanović."

As we can see, the public image of Milo Djukanović is the focal point of various controversies that arise in discussions of Montenegro's membership in NATO. Djukanović is at once seen in many roles: the first modern pro-Western leader, but also the last communist leader in Europe; a leader

whose charisma and strength have turned Montenegro toward NATO, but also a leader who could halt Montenegro's advance into NATO for personal interests; the only guarantor who will ensure Montenegro will continue its favorable foreign policy toward the West, but also a leader who is under strong Russian influence; a sincere Montenegrin patriot, but also a politician who instrumentalizes the issue of Montenegrin membership in NATO and identity questions in order to remain in power; a leader who sincerely advocates entering NATO, but also uses that declared intention as a ploy to remain in power, and also taking care not to enter NATO as that would mean the end of his rule. In any case, DPS expects that by the end of the year Montenegro will receive a formal invitation for NATO membership, which could be significant for the 2016 parliamentary elections. It remains to be seen how the relationship between Montenegro and NATO will develop in the years ahead.

The Montenegrin Warrior Tradition in the Arguments for and against NATO: Private Discourses and Formal Political Forums

Montenegrin Warrior Tradition and NATO Membership (Does NATO Prevent or Prolong War?)

The analysis of the instrumentalization of Montenegro's warrior tradition in the debates regarding NATO membership is based on material that can be broadly divided into two categories. The first refers to comments of "regular" citizens about NATO given in informal political forums. This material was built from semi-structured questionnaires, comments made by "regular" citizens directed at the problem at hand, collected through long-term field research, and gathered in the course of daily activities. To this end, the Internet forum proved particularly useful (along with comments in electronic media made by readers), where the topic discussed was Montenegro's membership in the alliance, and citizens at large expressed their opinion about Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions. The second refers to the arguments drawn from formal political forums, such as the Parliament, party meetings, press conferences, as well as arguments put forth by politicians and public officials as part of their work in office.

The debate in the Montenegrin public about the country joining NATO has been (and continues to be) spirited and complex. We can clearly see two main discourses that direct the polemic and concern the perceived character of NATO. In the first discourse, NATO is seen as an organization of collective security, and that discourse features arguments in favor of Montenegro joining the alliance. Alternatively, the discourse

in which NATO is seen as an aggressive military alliance features the arguments against Montenegro joining the alliance. Aside from that, the question of the participation of soldiers of the army of Montenegro in NATO missions has elicited particularly great interest (a veritable "eruption" of arguments based on Montenegro's warrior tradition), such that within this sub-polemic there are two discourses depending on whether one condones or condemns the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions, which I have termed the discourse of peace operations and warrior discourse.

Of course, I am aware that analysis of discourse is a "double-edged sword"—it has many good sides, but is susceptible to the charge regarding the sample that legitimizes the analysis of the discourse. The main reason I wished to conduct a discourse analysis is because of the "language game."[1] Namely, as "an expert," I often imputed to informants the popular and popular science narrative about Montenegrin warrior tradition[2] and posed the question: do you think that membership in NATO and participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO operations are in accordance with the warrior tradition of Montenegro? Thereby the informant was placed squarely in the military context. His space for maneuvering became considerably narrowed, and certain portions of the narrative about the past began to be spontaneously connected with Montenegro's membership in NATO and the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in its missions—thus clearly sketching the borders of the two discourses. This was particularly visible in negotiations concerning the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions.

Depending on whether one sees NATO as an organization of collective security or as an aggressive military alliance, Montenegrin membership in NATO is perceived as something that can prolong or put an end to centuries of suffering. This will be clearly illustrated by portions of conversations I held with a group of 15 participants in the Regional Euro-Atlantic Camp (REACT 2009). The group consisted of both advocates and detractors of Montenegro's membership in NATO and mostly composed talented humanities students and graduates. Upon explaining what I am writing about in my dissertation, I got a great number of comments that clearly mapped out these two discourses. Thus, one of the advocates for membership in NATO commented on the relationship between the warrior tradition of Montenegro and the question of NATO membership:

> "We have all studied our history and we know that Montenegro was more or less constantly at war. We were occupied by the Turks for five centuries and we had constant hostilities against them. In the twentieth century, we saw the First and Second Balkan War, the First and Second World

War, and towards the century's end, the Yugoslav civil war and the NATO bombing. Enough is enough. Our generation needs safety. Once we enter NATO, there will be no more wars. Had Yugoslavia been a NATO member in the nineties, it would not have seen such bloodshed on its territory. We all have fresh memories of the nineties. With NATO, there will be no more wars." This provoked a whole slew of comments in support: "Exactly so. My brother had to hide so as not to be forcibly mobilized in the nineties. Nobody asked those boys whether they wanted to go to war or not. The military police shows up, they arrest you, they give you a rifle and send you to Bosnia or Croatia. I want assurance that in the future nobody will forcibly mobilize my child. That is why we need NATO." Or else, "In this region, every few decades, some fools come to power and want to go to war. Montenegrin soldiers were attacking Dubrovnik twenty years ago. Why? Even they do not know. Not even the politicians who send them know. We have all had enough of this. NATO has its flaws, but by entering it, at least we will no longer wage war, nor will we be forcibly mobilized." And further, "If you ask people in Bosnia why they were at war, nobody would be able to give you an exact answer. A friend of my father's refused to leave Bosnia until the last minute. He kept saying, it is tense, but there can be no war. Finally, the war surprised him. In the Balkans, war simply explodes suddenly."

In opposition to the advocates, the detractors to NATO membership see the Montenegrin warrior tradition in a completely different light:

"I agree that Montenegro took part in wars, that it suffered in those wars, that every generation was affected by wars. For that very reason, I am against NATO. Why would Montenegrin soldiers go fight in Afghanistan? If Montenegro becomes a member of NATO, wherever NATO wages war it will call for Montenegrin soldiers." This comment too was followed by numerous statements of approval: "What kind of thinking is this? NATO wages wars the world over, yet we want to join NATO in order not to fight. We fought whenever we were attacked, whether by Turks or fascists in World War II. If we join NATO we will be the ones attacking." Or else, "We were witness to NATO attacking us. Montenegro much less than Serbia, but attacked nevertheless. We all recall how afraid we were when hearing the air sirens warning us of NATO strikes. That is how people in Afghanistan will react when attacked by our soldiers."

These comments describe the essence of the relationship of Montenegro's warrior tradition and the questions of NATO membership, which was born out in subsequent research. When talking about Montenegro's warrior tradition and the question of NATO membership, advocates think that joining the alliance will mean the end of war

suffering in Montenegro; in contrast, the detractors of NATO think that membership will prolong Montenegrin war suffering. Therefore, the Montenegrin warrior tradition becomes an important element in security arguments of these two opposing discourses.

Traditional Discourses as Part of Arguments from Security

The fact that the debate is directed by two principal discourses concerning the character of NATO becomes especially evident in formal political forums. Among persons who were in favor of NATO membership, whose arguments moved within the discourse of seeing NATO as an organization of collective security, the warrior tradition of Montenegro is predominantly used as part of the arguments from security. According to that understanding, membership in NATO is a guarantee that the tragic events from Montenegro's (and the region's) recent or more distant past will not be repeated. For our analysis to be as concise as possible, and not to "duplicate" similar material, I will only point out the most representative statements. Further, for the analysis to be as authoritative as possible, we will focus on the statements of the heads of the most important political parties in Montenegro, whether in favor or opposed to Montenegro's membership in NATO.

At the closing session of the *Democratic Party of Socialists*, prior to the local elections in Kotor, the president of the party, Milo Djukanović, said:

> I am thinking of our commitment to the idea of a civil society, our dedication to constant advancement of rights and freedoms, minorities, as well as our complete commitment to integrate Montenegro, in the full sense of the word, into European and North Atlantic structures…Since the experience and traumas of war are still fresh, I believe that we are the very generation called upon not to leave even the slightest chance for our offspring to have to fight the way we did and our ancestors did. And what is the guarantee that Montenegro and the region will never be at war again, given that we do not have sufficiently developed self-regulating mechanisms for a permanent maintaining of peace and democracy? The only guarantor is, without doubt, joining NATO and the EU. The *Democratic Party* knows why it advocates for this idea and stands firmly behind it. Not because we are insensitive to the events of 1999, when FRY was bombed by NATO, since we do feel the wounds from Murino, from Golubovac, from Bjelopavlić, and from Belgrade and Pristina too. We are also aware of belonging to generations that still remember the Cold War period, but as rational people, we have to try to rid ourselves of outdated outlooks in the interest of what we believe will be the guarantor of a peaceful and safe future for our offspring.[3]

On the occasion of his election to presidency of the Parliament of Montenegro, the president of the *Social Democratic Party*, Ranko Krivokapić, stated:

> Fortunately, nothing unites Montenegro as much as its commitment to the idea of the European Union. The idea resolves the externally imposed historic division. Let us abandon all election numbers and rally around the number 29! A chair with that number awaits in both the EU and NATO, and it is our task to reach it first! Unfortunately, the externally imposed division remains when it comes to full membership to NATO. This convocation should end the untenable message "for the European Union, but against the North Atlantic Alliance." Collective security is a guarantor that we never again be at war with our brothers, or on our borders. Lest we forget, no price could ever be put on Montenegro's freedom![4]

In an official visit to the United States, from January 19 to 22, 2015, Prime Minister Milo Djukanović met with the highest government officials, among whom were Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. During his visit, Mr. Djukanović gave a lecture at Johns Hopkins University on the topic of "Montenegro's Path toward Euro-Atlantic Structures." Answering a question regarding the implementation of the government's communication strategy regarding joining NATO, with which he wished to express to the public the importance of Euro-Atlantic integrations, the prime minister said:

> I would say that perhaps the strongest argument I have when speaking to people in Montenegro about this issue is as follows: unfortunately, we have far too many convincing examples in recent history of how fragile our stability is and how unreliable our mechanisms of stability are. To rely on what I would call an already defeated supposition that we have learned something from our latest mistake, seems to me to be a fatal repetition of mistakes. The generation of my grandfathers went to war. When the war was over, they probably thought that the lesson was learned. The generation of my father went to war. They too probably thought that the lesson was learned. My generation went to war. The crucial question I ask people to whom I am speaking is do we wish to leave such a fate to our children. I think that this is no longer a question of politics, but one of basic human and parental responsibility. If we are responsible people then we ought to emerge from a state of unreliable stability in our region, a stability that is evidently no longer able to sustain our national, religious and cultural difference, since conflicts occur most often on those grounds. Thus I think there is no question that all the countries of the region ought to find themselves within the NATO framework and that this will be a reliable guarantor of regional stability, without which there can be no economic or democratic development.[5]

On the other hand, the opponents of Montenegro's joining NATO, whose arguments move within the discourse of NATO as an aggressive military alliance, use the same arguments for their purposes. The arguments can be distilled down to a statement given by Goran Danilović, vice president of *New Serbian Democracy* and one of the chief people in the Montenegrin opposition: "We have had enough wars on this territory."[6] From these arguments, it follows that membership in NATO will continue the stream of wars and bloodshed. Thus, in one of the press releases from *New Serbian Democracy*, we find the following:

> "*New Serbian Democracy* cannot see any benefit whatsoever of Montenegro's membership in NATO, and thinks that this issue should be retired. In the sixty years of its existence, NATO and its leading members have participated in numerous armed actions against other states, including Montenegro, often in blatant disregard of international law and minimizing the role of the United Nations."[7] The spokesperson of *New Serbian Democracy* underscored: "Montenegro ought to abandon the application process into NATO immediately, because there is no good reason to be part of this aggressive military alliance that spreads fear throughout the globe and commits crimes against peoples and countries the world over."[8]

During a visit to the town of Murino, which was devastated during the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the *People's Party* reminded the local people about the victims of NATO bombing by stating:

> Against historical fact and against right and justice, the Montenegrin regime wishes to make Montenegro a member of NATO, and forget the hundreds of killed and thousands of injured citizens of the former FRY, the destroyed factories, bridges, poisoned land and water. The *People's Coalition* is fighting for Montenegro to stay out of this aggressive military alliance, which has, since former Yugoslavia, devastated the children of Iraq and Afghanistan, all while demanding of us to be part of their bloody work by having our soldiers join theirs in spreading death and bringing it upon themselves.[9]

In an interview given to the Russian news agency IA REX, the leader of *New Serbian Democracy*, Andrija Mandić, reflected on the question of Montenegro's relationship to NATO:

> "The ruling coalition is actively pursuing a politics of joining NATO, even though two thirds of our citizens are opposed to it. *New Serbian Democracy*

is the strongest political organization opposed to Montenegro's joining the North Atlantic military alliance. We think that this issue can only be decided in a referendum, since any other decision would be entirely problematic and would represent a danger for the stability of Montenegro. Our reasons for opposing Montenegro's membership to NATO are both emotional and practical. Recall that this aggressive alliance committed a criminal assault in the Spring of 1999 against Montenegro and Serbia, in which over two thousand people died, that the targets of this military alliance were mostly civilian objects, hospitals, residential buildings, civilian infrastructure, media buildings, and the damage is estimated to be upwards of 100 billion dollars. During their attack, NATO used illegal weapons, in yet another case of breaking all international norms…" stated the leader of NSD, Andrija Mandić.[10]

The *Liberal Party* has used the arguments about the prevention of wars to justify its position of not joining NATO and demilitarization (for which it used to stand). In the program of the *Liberal Party*, one article refers to the question of heritage:

After centuries of dictatorships, wars and everything that goes along with those, we must do everything for our society to face its past, such as it was, because this is the only way to develop an objective picture of everything behind us…We must be conscious that our history is actually a history of a series of discontinuities. Historical experience clearly confirms that people do not have eternal and unchanging fates, but rather that they pass through various phases. One such phase is before us. We have to define our state's status and complete a comprehensive transformation of society in accordance with the current standards of the developed world. We have to recover economically and develop. We have to create better conditions and possibilities for human life, and we have to do all of that while not endangering the living conditions of future generations.[11]

In the context of instrumentalization of old warrior ideals, it would be interesting to first pay a little attention to one of the releases from the Ministry of Defense regarding Montenegro's demilitarization and neutrality. In a press release, the Ministry of Defense states "that Montenegro does not have a tradition of demilitarization and neutrality, nor a political or security basis for such a position." Responding to this, the LP said that "by the logic of the Ministry of Defense and the language of exclusivity, we will enter Europe carrying a dagger, a yataghan and swords. This too is part of our tradition, but not the civilized sensibility of liberals who see Montenegro in a completely different way."[12]

Montenegrin Soldiers from Crete (1897) to Afghanistan (2009) and the Traditionalist Narrative of Montenegro's Exclusively Defensive Wars

In October of 2008, the Parliament of Montenegro adopted the Law of Use of Units of the Army of Montenegro as part of international forces, peace-keeping missions, and other foreign exercises. Finally, on July 28, 2009, on the suggestion of the Council for Defense and Security, the Parliament approved a plan for sending members of the Montenegrin army to UN peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Liberia and the peacekeep-ing mission of the European Union in Somalia. Regarding the mission to Afghanistan, the plan called for the participation of 40 soldiers, with the possibility of rotation. The plan also called for two soldiers from the army of Montenegro to participate in Liberia, and a further three soldiers to the EU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Preliminary training of 85 soldiers began in Danilovgrad in August, 2008.

When it comes to the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in peace-keeping mission outside of Montenegro, the Afghanistan mission was the most intriguing to the public. As we have mentioned, the sending of Montenegrin soldiers is problematized in two discourses: the discourse of a peacekeeping operation and a fighting discourse. Montenegrin offi-cial representatives operate within the former discourse, as advocates of the idea of joining NATO, and they see the participation of Montenegrin soldiers as a peacekeeping operation that brings stability and security to the world and an opportunity to bolster Montenegro's international rep-utation.[13] On the other hand, the arguments of representatives of parties opposed to joining NATO operate within the fighting discourse, where the participation of Montenegrin soldiers is seen as an act of occupa-tion (not peacekeeping), and a highly risky one at that. Thus the *Socialist People's Party* does not support sending army of Montenegro soldiers to Afghanistan, while it supports their participation in the missions to Liberia and Somalia, explaining that the last two missions are for obser-vation purposes ("these are observer missions, calling for, respectively, two and three army of Montenegro soldiers who will not be exposed to fighting"), whereas the mission to Afghanistan is a fighting mission ("although it is considered a secure region [North], we cannot forget that Afghanistan sees daily armed incidents, that is, attacks on mission par-ticipants [ISAF], meaning that there is a real danger for our soldiers").[14] *New Serbian Democracy* does not support the decision of sending Montenegrin soldiers to these missions ("we cannot take responsibil-ity for their lives, especially those who go to Afghanistan,"[15] "everyone who votes for this will be responsible for the forty people who go to

Afghanistan"[16]) because, although it is a UN mission, the dominant role is taken by NATO.

The question of sending Montenegrin soldiers to Afghanistan has helped bring to the public all the arguments the elites have at hand. Several elements from Montenegro's history, both recent and distant, have been utilized in arguments in favor of sending Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions. The most important of these historical moments is the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the peacekeeping mission on the Greek island of Crete, in 1897.[17] Montenegrin soldiers' participation in this mission to Crete is one of the arguments exclusively in favor of the advocates of Montenegro's membership in the alliance. Since their arguments move within a discourse in which NATO is seen as an organization of collective security, the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in Crete is connected through various meta-discursive practices with the mission to Afghanistan.

Thus the President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović, on the occasion of Montenegrin Statehood Day, held an official ceremony at the president's residence on Cetinje, attended by political, cultural, scientific, economic, public, and sports figures, as well as national heroes and former high state functionaries. Speaking of the participation of the members of the army of Montenegro in the peacekeeping mission on Crete in 1897, President Vujanović emphasized the present readiness to help, based exclusively on altruistic principles.[18]

A NATO representative of the Force Planning Directorate, Rok Kosirnik, stated: "security is not free and is not gifted. Thanks to its turbulent history, Montenegro knows this very well. Security cannot last forever without investment, nor does it last without being defended with other countries and often far away from home. No one can know what King Nikolas was thinking when he decided to send 80 Montenegrin soldiers to Crete in 1897 to participate in the first modern peacekeeping mission. It seems, though, that the justification was not different to that given by governments today when they send people to defend freedom throughout the world." Kosirnik reiterated the same argument at the panel discussion.[19]

The ceremony organized on the occasion of the departure of the first regiment of the army of Montenegro to the ISAF mission to Afghanistan was attended by the President of the Parliament, Ranko Krivokapić, the Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, Boro Vučinić and Ivan Brajović, as well as members of the diplomatic corps. The President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović stated on the occasion that Montenegrin soldiers first participated in a peacekeeping mission as far back as 1897, when one such unit joined the peace strengthening mission on Crete.[20]

If we look up the social ladder of this line of reasoning, we reach the very top of the government. In their public appearances, the argument has been offered by the President of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović, and NATO's representative of the Force Planning Directorate, Rok Kosirnik. But perhaps it was best put by the Minister of Defense, Vučinić. Minister Vučinić closed the press conference for the adoption of the plan of sending Montenegrin troops to peace operations with the following words: "Finally, I would like to remind everyone that over a century ago, 70 Montenegrin soldiers successfully conducted the first international peacekeeping mission, and our coming efforts in this area are nothing but the continuation of that tradition. I am certain that our soldiers in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Liberia will execute their tasks with distinction, thus conferring honor on their country."[21]

As we have mentioned, the decision to send Montenegrin soldiers to Afghanistan had the greatest impact on the public, and the traditionalist narrative of Montenegro's exclusively defensive wars was particularly appropriate for arguments of those opposed to the decision. In the estimation of the member of parliament from the *New Serbian Democracy*, Strahinja Bulajić, by adopting the decision to send the army of Montenegro to the mission in Afghanistan, the twenty-fourth Parliamentary session will remain in memory as passing an act that will for the first time in history make the Montenegrin military an occupying force: "This day will go down in the history of Montenegro as special, and the Parliamentary session as the first to make our army an occupying force…We cannot vote for our soldiers to die for the interests of others in foreign wars."[22] The president of the *New Serbian Democracy*, Andrija Mandić, remarked that there is no need to send the soldiers beyond state borders: "We will not raise our hands to send Montenegrin soldiers beyond our borders. Anyone who raises his hand, let him be aware that should, God forbid, one of our soldiers die, it was his fault."

The arguments against sending Montenegrin troops beyond the country's borders utilize the traditionalist belief that *Montenegro never led an aggressive war*. Thus the *New Serbian Democracy* has declared that this parliamentary session will enter history as the first convocation in history to decree that the Montenegrin army become an occupier.[23]

If we pause for a moment over the claim of the member of Parliament of *New Serbian Democracy*, Strahinja Bulajić, that the Montenegrin army was never an "occupying" force, and if we look at the retort in the daily *Partner*[24] following the statement, we can see that the polemic was held exclusively with regard to the question of whether the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the mission in Afghanistan meant an "occupation" of a country or not. Neither side in the polemic called into question

the nonparticipation of Montenegrin troops in previous aggressive wars. Although the arguments move within two conflicted discourses, the defensive past of Montenegro remains unblemished and "passes over" an indubitable historical fact: Montenegro has already fought aggressive wars. In the first Balkan War, Montenegrin troops occupied a portion of Metohija (while the Serbian army took Kosovo) in an armed conflict with regular Ottoman troops and portions of the majority population, followed by the expulsion of this population from the area (see more in Report of the International Commission 1914: 150–151, 318; Vojna enciklopedija 1972: 656). Further, neither side even considers the siege of Shkoder (in Albania) and the heavy Montenegrin casualties on the occasion. The Montenegrin siege of Shkoder began in October of 1912, and the city capitulated in April of 1913. However, under pressure from big international powers, it had to withdraw. Aside from that, Montenegro emerged from the First Balkan War with a territory expanded by 5,000 km² and integrated cities that had never before been part of its territory: Mojkovac, Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Berane, Plav, Gusinje, Rožaje, Tuzi, and part of the lake Shkodra, as well as Peć and Djakovica, which are today no longer part of Montenegro.

Allow me to digress slightly and once again point to the complex relationship of past reality and its narrative representations, historical truth and dominant narratives about historical truth. What, after all, is historical truth in the given examples from the First Balkan War? Are they examples of attack or defense, occupation or liberation, freedom struggle or aggression? In order to get "truthful" answers to these questions, we would have to take a polygraph (see chapter 2). The polygraph does not lie. Its only fault is that in establishing the truth about past and contemporary international and interethnic conflicts in the Balkans, it is quite useless. Nor is it of any help in solving numerous identity questions. Unfortunately, as soon as intellectual and cultural elites begin to vocally and frequently reference the results of the polygraph—new/old Balkan problems appear on the horizon.

Montenegro's Freedom-Loving Tradition and NATO

Narratives about Montenegro's freedom-loving struggles acquire significant potential as part of the debate regarding NATO membership, in particular when we consider the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the alliance's missions. In the chapter where I analyzed the construction of traditional Montenegrin masculinity, I pointed out that in Montenegrin epic poems, there is a constant ethical and life struggle between good

and evil, a struggle for freedom and against slavery, for justice and equality, against injustice. The main characteristic of heroism in traditional poems is that it is directed at moral goals. Heroism sung about in these epic poems is the striving of the Montenegrin people for freedom, and a spirit of heroism permeates the warrior morality (chapter 3). As in the narratives about the struggle of Montenegrins against the Ottomans, the striving for freedom is a central portion of the narrative of Montenegro's antifascist struggle in World War II. The fight for freedom is on occasion referred to not only as the freedom of Montenegro but also as the freedom of other peoples (Balkan Christians during Ottoman times or Balkan peoples under Nazi occupation). In my research over the course of several years, I have spoken to a great number of people from various parts of Montenegro and have concluded that the invocation of Montenegro's freedom-loving tradition gives particular weight to anti-NATO discourses. They emphasize that the desire for freedom permeated Montenegro's entire history and that Montenegro's struggles were exclusively defensive. Violating this tradition, by joining NATO, Montenegrin soldiers will participate in struggles that do not have as their goal the liberation of Montenegro. The idea of NATO as an aggressive military alliance is combined with the traditionalist narrative of exclusively defensive wars fought by Montenegro. Therefore, membership in NATO is seen as a radical break with Montenegro's freedom-loving tradition. Discourses about the incongruence of Montenegro's freedom-loving tradition and NATO are particularly common among Serbs in the northern part of Montenegro (where Serbs are the majority in several districts: Berane, Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Plužine, and Šavnik).

While participating in the Regional Euro-Atlantic Camp (REACT 2010), held in a village near Šavnik, I took the opportunity to discuss this question with some local inhabitants. A middle-aged interlocutor told me:

> "We fought for five centuries and liberated ourselves on our own from the Turks. Nobody liberated us but ourselves. We only fought when others attacked. Our country is sacred to us. Now they want to force us into this NATO and take our soldiers to fight in Afghanistan. They are even talking about NATO building a base for military exercises here. They will do as they please in Montenegro." His friend addressed me, adding: "You, young man, and your generation hold nothing sacred. You are paid to support NATO and you support it. To you, our history means nothing. You would sell your own father to the Americans if they asked it of you, not to mention Montenegro."

To better understand the principles that connect the freedom-loving tradition of Montenegro to the question of NATO membership, it is

interesting to point out a few comments citizens of Bijelo Polje (Milan, Marko, Ivan, and Petar) gave for the Montenegrin weekly *Revija D*:[25]

- As the freedom-loving people that we are in Montenegro, we ought never accept NATO, since it is not in our national being. Our ancestors always said that "Westerners are cunning tricksters," meaning that they should not be trusted. The very fact that they bombed us in cold blood makes them criminals.
- Their goals are obvious even to a child. It is sad that we are even considering such silliness in our freedom-loving Montenegro, in which a soldier, sworn to the defense of fatherland, was the pride of family and fraternity. I cannot comprehend the current rulers who are pushing their people into the arms of its ancient enemy.
- The bombing of FRY is a clear example of occupation and land grabbing from a sovereign state. The example of Kosovo and Metohija is a lesson to future generations how this alliance breaks all international conventions, even the United Nations Charter. It would be madness to send the youth of Montenegro to be sacrificed for the interests of others. The freedom-loving people of Montenegro would thus become just another protectorate in the Balkans.
- We witnessed great tragedies in our recent past, and NATO was the main cause of tragedies that took place, because it destroyed our great Yugoslavia, a respectable military power, although it was not a member of any military alliance, which did not suit global world politics. By entering NATO, Montenegro gains nothing, but rather looses a part of its sovereignty. Joining NATO follows the personal interests of certain individuals. Such a decision ought to be made by the citizens of Montenegro at a referendum.
- They have dissolved their own army and are supposedly creating a new one, following NATO's orders…We have brought shame to our traditions and the graves of our ancestors. It would be a curse to rid ourselves of Marko Miljanov, Miljan Vukov, Jole Piletić, general Janko Vukotić, Njegoš, St. Peter of Cetinje, and all those for whom the fatherland was dearer than their own life. Montenegro is an ecologic state, so what does it need NATO?! Why should its youth's graves be on foreign soil?

As we can see from the previous examples, the "story" about the past, in modified form and with new elements, is perpetuated into the present while acquiring the capacity for further development in the future. For example, the struggles of Montenegrin tribes from several hundred years ago have nothing to do with World War I. World War I has no direct

connection with World War II, nor does any of this have anything to do with the casualties in the wars conducted in the nineties, and certainly nothing with the NATO intervention against FRY in 1999. And yet, on the level of storytelling, it can all be shaped into a single, coherent narrative, and lends itself well to instrumentalization in debates about membership in NATO. With a narrative thus conceived, membership in NATO can be perceived as a betrayal of tradition and of ancestors' graves, and the shameful disavowal of Marko Miljanov, Njegoš, and Montenegro's entire freedom-loving past.

My ethnographic research was followed by a continuing perusal of polemics held in print and online media. When the decision was made to send Montenegrin soldiers on NATO missions, a large portion of anti-NATO comments on Internet forums in the country and the region expressed positions with the basic premise that Montenegrin soldiers ought not to wage war outside Montenegro. [26] Here is a selection of the most interesting:

- For a handful of dollars you have the opportunity to leave your bones and never be found. No instructor can train you to defend yourself from people who consider you the enemy. Put yourselves in the shoes of the people who live where you are going. They do not even know where Montenegro is, no less could they believe that you are there to defend them from I know not what…If you like adventure, join the Foreign Legion, at least they have a tradition.
- This is pure catastrophe. They are sending our soldiers beyond Montenegro, to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban. Catastrophe. They are sent to the most dangerous northern part controlled by German forces. How many will return?
- I condemn this mission, just as I condemn the war in Afghanistan. It is entirely unnecessary. Afghanistan is unbreakable and the Taliban, as religious fanatics, are very popular. I had the opportunity to speak to a Russian officer who was in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation. People there live in incredible poverty. Only 6 percent of homes have electricity. Most people live rogue existences in remote and inaccessibly high mountains, where humans have a hard time going on foot, no less in vehicles. Their whole life and their quotidian is war, and all they talk about is war and heroism…It is impossible to win a war there.
- They should all quit and let the advocates of this NATO integration train and send their own children. These young men joined the war because they have no other income, is that not sad? But this is of no

concern to those sending them, to whom it is important to fulfill quotas demanded by world powers. For shame.

- I advise the Army Minister not to bring shame on the Piper tribe and Montenegro. He should first take stock of the actual state of affairs, and only then deliberate.
- It is crazy to send one's youth to be sacrificed for foreign interests.
- What good are her young men's graves on foreign soil?

There are very few arguments that justify sending Montenegrin soldiers to Afghanistan based on the warrior tradition. It is interesting to look at what few there are based on this idea:

- Montenegrins very well should go and fight where there is war. We used to be warriors, that tradition should be kept up.

You are huge moron. Go fight yourself, you f***ing idiot.

Why are you cursing? I would not send anyone who does not want to go, only volunteers. And if we are true Montenegrins, there will be plenty of volunteers.

There were also plenty of humorous comments regarding the sending of Montenegrin soldiers to Afghanistan. Using irony, these most often mix overemphasis of the vainglorious warrior tradition with attempts of contemporary Montenegro to bolster its international reputation by including a small number of soldiers in large international missions:

- These people are trying to suck up to the Americans, so they're sending nearly one-fifth of their "great" army into Afghan wasteland.
- One platoon and there goes their whole army.
- And Milo Djukanović the commander, clad in fatigues and a Montenegrin hat pays a "surprise" visit to his glorious army…my friends, this is a farce, really and truly for a TV comedy, where is that Božović actor, he could make a good show of this!
- I hear the army is seriously preparing for a mobilization…they have sat down to watch Rambo III.
- It will be an honor for future generations to say—my granddad participated in the fight for our sacred land: Afghanistan!
- Oh man, when those four Montenegrin soldiers show up in full gear and begin reciting the Petrovićes and other nonsense about *humanitas heroica*, the Taliban are going to be bored s**tless, lay their weapons down, and beg for forgiveness.
- Can they send the navy up those crags?

- The Mujahideen are quaking in their boots, they will not even dream of jihad now.
- The decision of the government of Montenegro has seriously destabilized the Middle East.
- According to informal sources, the decision of the government of Montenegro was made jointly with the State Department, in order for Montenegrin heroes to be the advance strike force in the American attack on Iran. Obama is denying it, but Ahmedinejad is mobilizing.
- Had it not suffered so many casualties when fighting with the Russians against Japan, Montenegro would today have at least ten million people!
- Is NATO going to be stronger with Montenegro as part of it? Is it ever! You have no idea, when this military power joins in, with a whole 169 soldiers and a fire brigade, NATO is going to go blow Russia away.
- The Taliban are now afraid, here comes the Montenegrin raid.

Analysis of the Instrumentalization of Traditional Discourses in the Debates about Montenegrin Membership in NATO

There is no consensus in the public sphere regarding Montenegro joining the NATO. Further, the political scene can be clearly divided among political parties that advocate in favor of Montenegro's membership in the alliance and those against. Dominant in both groups are arguments from the point of safety, politics, and economics, with the addition that the detractors of Montenegro joining NATO use ideological and emotional arguments.

The warrior tradition is most often instrumentalized as part of defense arguments of the opposing sides. The main argument for both is the break with war casualties of the (recent and distant) past, whether this past be on the level of historical truth or the dominant scientific narrative of historical truth. Narratives created for that occasion are capable of imposing a "continuity" of Montenegrin wars from the very distant past, through World Wars I and II, right up to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the NATO campaign against FRY at the very end of the twentieth century. Such narratives have significant instrumental capacity, because political elites on both sides of the debate think that the time has finally come to break with the tradition of war and casualty in Montenegro. (Often the space where they demand the break with the bloodshed are not geographically specific to any nation-state, but are designated with the

less exact phrase "in this region," which we can take to be the "Western Balkans"). A break with wars and bloodshed (and the warrior past) is the main security argument used by all participants in the debate—advocates, detractors, as well as those who for a while demanded demilitarization of Montenegro. However, depending on whether NATO is seen as an organization of collective security (advocates) or as an aggressive military alliance (detractors), the same argument assumes different functions. The arguments of advocates of Montenegrin membership in NATO move within the discourse in which NATO is seen as an organization of collective security, making NATO a guarantor against the repetition of bloodshed from Montenegro's past. Conversely, the arguments of the detractors of Montenegrin membership in NATO operate within a discourse in which NATO is seen as an aggressive military alliance, so that joining the alliance would mean participation of Montenegrin soldiers in current and future wars, and thus a continuation of the tradition of bloodshed and Montenegrin casualties in wars.

Narratives about Montenegro's freedom-loving struggles acquire significant potential as part of the debate regarding NATO membership, in particular when we consider the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the alliance's missions. Namely, some security arguments refer to the defensive character of recent wars in which Montenegro was involved, suggesting a traditionalist narrative of a desirable past reality. Even though historical facts disprove this (the occupation of Metohija, and the siege of Shkoder in the First Balkan War), the traditionalist model claims that Montenegro has never undertaken an aggressive war, and that the history of Montenegro, as it is told in popular and scientific narratives, is the history of constant struggle for national survival. The fight for freedom is on occasion referred to not only as the freedom of Montenegro, but also the freedom of other peoples (Balkan Christians during Ottoman times or Balkan peoples under Nazi occupation). This portion of Montenegrin history is used abundantly by the detractors of Montenegro's membership in NATO, for whom this institution is an aggressive military alliance. When NATO is conceived as an aggressive military alliance, it is not difficult to spot the incongruity between Montenegro's "defensive" tradition and the "aggressive" concept of NATO. Thus Montenegro's membership in NATO is presented as a break with the tradition of Montenegro, and the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO operations is a blatant violation of the country's entirely defensive tradition.

In formal political forums, we can say that both sides refer to Montenegro's warrior tradition equally. The security arguments, that NATO can prevent or continue bloodshed described in narratives of Montenegro's past, are equally suited for instrumentalization by either

side. Albeit, due to the "monopoly" on instrumentalization of the traditionalist narrative about Montenegro's entirely defensive past, the detractors of Montenegro's membership in NATO have a slight advantage in instrumentalizing traditional ideas. However, such a relation of power lasts only until one reaches the question of participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions. Then the warrior tradition of Montenegro begins to be utilized much more by the detractors of joining NATO, and this relationship is particularly noticeable in informal political forums. In other words, as the debate moves from formal to informal political forums, and from general questions about NATO membership toward the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in its missions, the use of Montenegro's warrior tradition remains more or less the same, whereas it is drastically increased among the detractors.

The disproportionate use of Montenegro's warrior tradition on one side of the debate about sending Montenegrin soldiers on NATO missions, specifically, the lack of the tradition's instrumentalization on the advocates' side of the debate, can be said to be a strategic omission. Indeed, NATO operations are conceptualized as peacekeeping operations, and when one considers the characteristics of the dominant popular scientific narrative of Montenegro's warrior tradition, it can be said that the advocates of sending Montenegrin soldiers on NATO missions have very little room to maneuver in instrumentalizing traditional conceptions. For example, if they were to "continue" the narrative in which Montenegrins are warriors and heroes, then they could justly be accused of "carrying yataghans and swords into Europe." I think there is no need to explain how narratives developed in that direction would contrast with ideals of freedom, democracy, rule of human rights, all of which are ideals associated with the West and NATO as an essentially Western institution. Further, a narrative continued in this direction would render meaningless all the security and most of the political and economic arguments.

Still, certain traditionalist elements are suitable to fulfill the resulting "vacuum." That is, in the activities of the Ministry of Defense, we can see a spontaneous "surfacing" of narratives that speak about the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in earlier international missions and the army's cooperation with militaries of prominent NATO states—which I have termed the narrative of cooperation. The participation of the Montenegrin army in the Crete crisis is a central element of such a narrative. A reminder of the participation of the army of SFRY in Sinai during the Israel-Arab war exhausts the elements from Montenegro's past when its soldiers participated in peacekeeping missions, and this lacuna is overcome with individual examples of participation of Montenegrin soldiers in foreign militaries.[27] An important aspect of this narrative is

Montenegro's World War II antifascist struggle and its joint antifascist operations. In choosing events to be celebrated, there is a "recollection" of "forgotten" historical events. One such activity is the unveiling of a monument on the sixtieth anniversary of the evacuation of the wounded from Donja Brezna. An event that took place in late August of 1944,[28] it was a joint action of British and Allied pilots of the Balkan Air Force (BAF) and Yugoslav Partisans. The action saw the creation of an air bridge, connecting a grassy runway in Donja Brezna, Montenegro, with Bari, Italy, safely transferring some one thousand fighters and Allied crew members.[29]

Let us see in what way does the "cooperation narrative" impose its coherence. The participation of the Montenegrin army in resolving the Crete crisis does not say much on its own; the participation of individual Montenegrins in missions of international importance tells us even less. The same goes for the participation of SFRY in the Sinai mission, as well as the air bridge Donja Brezna–Bari. However, put in sequence, these events constitute a long backstory of a seemingly natural heir, Montenegro's entry to NATO and its soldiers' participation in this alliance's missions. Thus we are left with the impression that both the idea of NATO as a central defensive and security institution in the Euro-Atlantic space and the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in its missions are completely consistent with Montenegrin tradition. Sometimes even missionary work is considered a typically Montenegrin characteristic.[30]

Debates about Montenegro's Membership in NATO in the Context of Globalization, or "There Is No Getting Around It"

Let us now look at the North Atlantic integration debate in Montenegro in the context of the phenomenon of globalization (Eriksen 2003: 1–18, 2007). Globalization, above all, refers to the intensification of global interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement and mixing, contacts and connections, as well as cultural interaction and exchange (Appadurai 2002: 46). Globalization refers to a world in which borders and limits become ever more porous, allowing people to be exposed more than ever to intense and direct contact with one another. It is a world in which the plurality of processes that operate on a global scale continuously cuts through national borders, integrating and connecting cultures and communities into new space-time combinations, creating, in reality and in experience, an ever more connected world. This is a world in which the rapid flow of capital, people, goods, representations, and ideologies compress our sense of space and time, making it feel smaller and

closer—in short, a global world is a world in motion (Inda and Rosaldo 2002: 2–5).

Since the late eighties, globalization has become a major academic topic, such that the phenomenon of globalization is central to a number of entirely different disciplines. Anthropology is building its own perspective to study the phenomenon of globalization. On one hand, the tendency of most literature on globalization is to focus on large-scale economic, political, and cultural processes. On the other hand, anthropology deals with the articulation of the global and the local, that is, how globalized processes are expressed in the context of the reality of particular societies with their cumulative (or historical) cultures and ways of life. It is not only preoccupied with mapping the ways in which the globe is crisscrossed, but also with the experience of people who live in specific localities. What anthropology offers (often lacking in other disciplines) are the concrete activities of human interaction—that is, how subjects respond to these processes in culturally specific ways (Eriksen 2003: 1–17; Inda and Rosaldo 2002: 5). Indeed, anthropologists are critics of the theory of global homogenization and strongly resist the urge to imitate other experts' understandings of globalization, even if they are informed by it. No anthropologist claims that a global future will be culturally homogenous; rather, they imagine the global era as one characterized by "local" cultural differences (Tsing 2002: 464).

One of the problems that anthropologists face concerns the distinctions of center/periphery and global forces/local places. We must keep in mind that the world's cultural centers are not identical to its political and economic centers,[31] that in cultural flows there is much more diversity, and that cultural influence does not only move from the center to the periphery but in the opposite direction as well.[32] When it comes to long-term influences of transnational cultural trends, one possible scenario predicts an ever greater accumulation of local cultures and ever more connected meanings and forms, becoming gradually inseparable. Another scenario claims that imported elements will be adapted to a local cultural contexts (Hannerz 2002: 43). Linked to the distinction of center/periphery is the distinction of global power/local place, which, according to Anna Tsing, ought to be overcome, because both power and place are both local and global (Tsing 2002: 477–479).

Considering all this, anthropologists are often in a dilemma best described by the position on which Paul Rabinow and George Marcus agree: "We don't want this Korean-American student to tell us that capitalism is exactly the same everywhere and we don't want this Korean-American student to say that global finance has a uniquely Korean form which is the key to understanding how, say, the Internet and other global

things work in Korea" (Rabinow and Marcus 2006: 109). What can we draw from the debates in Montenegro if we see them as "wedged" in between these two extremes.[33] We can neither say that the debates about membership in NATO held in Montenegro have been entirely the same as anywhere else, nor that they were completely "Montenegrin."[34] Still, certain specificities can clearly be noted. One of them is that the debate on NATO directly followed the referendum, which resulted in it being burdened with numerous identity controversies characteristic of post-referendum Montenegro. Further, as the debate moved from formal to informal political forums, and from general questions regarding NATO membership toward the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in peace-keeping missions, the debate about Montenegro's membership in the alliance had an ever more specifically Montenegrin tone. A typically Montenegrin tone was most prominent in informal political forums—particularly in the detractors' arguments against sending Montenegrin soldiers to peacekeeping missions. This tone could best be noted in the response a famous Montenegrin journalist gave me when I described what I was doing in my research. After thinking about it briefly, he said: "well put. It seems that there is no getting around it" ("it" being the warrior tradition of Montenegro). This can be said to be a typical Montenegrin contribution to global retraditionalization.

9

Concluding Remarks

The research aim of *The Montenegrin Warrior Tradition: Questions and Controversies over NATO Membership* was to scrutinize the identity debates in Montenegrin public opinion over the question of membership in NATO and to explore how narratives created for that purpose have been linked with Montenegrin identity, history, tradition, and the concept of Montenegrin masculinity. The focus of the book were the narratives that connect the masculine, patriarchal-warrior identity of the Montenegrin tradition with current social debates about Montenegro's possible membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The strategies I have chosen in deconstructing popular science ideas of men from Montenegro's past are based on the concept of masculinity and the basic assumptions used in contemporary approaches for studying masculinity—above all that we cannot speak about masculinity in the singular, but rather in the plural. My first strategy is that the notion of masculinity varies from culture to culture, and its meaning varies significantly over time within any given culture, among different parts of a given culture, and in the course of one's life. The second strategy refers to the incongruence between the culturally set standards of masculinity and the actual state of affairs—that is, gender roles contain standards, expectations, or norms that an individual ought to fulfill, but only a fraction of men can achieve the norms that society sets regarding gender roles. The third strategy concerns the representational capacity of the material about traditional Montenegrin gender roles, which always displays models with a great number of imputations and interpretations, never the actual state of affairs. The fourth refers to the "peace loving" nature of the population of Montenegro in feudal times and orderly payment of taxes to a feudal lord. Finally, the fifth strategy concerns the incongruity between the dominant popular science narrative of Montenegro's past and historical facts, particularly in relation to the Ottoman Empire.

In short, men about whom the popular science narrative discusses could have hardly actually existed.

Social and historical contextualization of the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity demands the differentiation of its inter-laced components. The first refers to the way of making a living and the predominance of a shepherding, warrior, plunderer economy in the Dinaric Alps region of the Balkan Peninsula. If we look at traditional Montenegrin society through the prism of contemporary theories of masculinity and keep in mind that masculinities are produced through daily activity, we can see that the logic of everyday survival perforce gave men the advantage. Their form of economy demanded defense of the flock and communal property, and the scarcity of resources necessary for survival meant they had to be sought beyond the borders of one's tribe. Providing basic means of existence—whether by protecting one's own resources or seeking them through incursions into foreign territory—meant frequent armed conflicts. Because armed troops were almost always, and throughout most cultures, entirely male, this meant that providing basic means of existence in traditional Montenegrin society was specifically male work. This produced an extremely masculine patriarchal culture in which only men could acquire profit—giving advantage to male children, relegating women to a purely biological and early rearing function.[1] The second component is tied to the constant clashes with the Ottoman Empire. Whether operating on the level of historic truth or based on narratives with a desired outcome of events, it is through poetry, but also through historical and ethnographic writings, that the model of traditional Montenegrin masculinity acquired its traditionalist component, as well as its capacity for further and broader instrumentalization.

The obvious "tenuousness" of the popular science ideas about traditional Montenegrin men diminished their functional potential not one jot. Given this, it is interesting to consider the influence of the ideas of heroism of Montenegro's patriarchal warrior society on the creation of modern Montenegro. Although each step in the creation of a modern state stifled individual heroism and narrowed maneuvering space for the fulfillment of traditional masculinity, consciousness about traditional Montenegrin heroism (predominantly preserved thanks to Montenegro's ruler, poet, and philosopher, Petar II Petrović Njegoš) had a significant influence in the creation of modern Montenegro and the formation of its identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Further, the obviously "tenuous" ideas about traditional Montenegrin gender relations suggested by popular science narratives have numerous contemporary implications. In particular, it is interesting to determine their place in

the paradox of post-cultural anthropology. Indeed, multiculturalism as a specific form of identity politics in contemporary society necessarily demands the essentialization of certain "cultural" differences; and in the recognition and demand for group rights, "traditional" gender relations can have a significant role and can be recognized as "*differentia specifica*" of a given community. In order for anthropology to intervene in social reality, it has to move within clearly delineated borders: we can only know "traditional" Montenegrin gender relations based on ideas "written down" because only "written down" ideas can have any merit for identity politics. Those traditional notions have considerable impact on contemporary social relations. In the name of traditional notions, some can live quite well (men with traditional views of the world), some can suffer (women, and men who do not fit culturally imposed gender norms), and some can even have their physical existence threatened (homosexuals). In multicultural identity politics, society's answer cannot simply be, "that is their culture/tradition." To maneuver in this space of social reality, it is necessary to harmonize post-cultural theoretical heritage of contemporary anthropology with the essentialization of cultural differences (to which contemporary anthropology is the answer). This is a formidable challenge for contemporary anthropology.

Determining the national identity of the older Montenegrins and their contemporary heirs is a perpetual conundrum in the public sphere. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the meanings of the terms "Montenegrin" and "Serbian" were already hotly debated in various spheres of social life. Whether the disagreements refer to questions of language (do Montenegrins speak Montenegrin or Serbian), religion (do they fall under the auspices of the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Montenegrin Orthodox Church), status of statehood (in favor or against an independent Montenegro), or other issues, we can say that at the root of this identity "cultural war" lies a single question: are Montenegrins a subgroup of the Serbian people or a discrete ethnic/national group? The search for the answer to this question is complicated by the existence of an intricate dual narrative. This narrative includes ethnographic and historical records, as well as traditional folklore material. It could be simplified to include everything that has been written or sung orally. A significant portion of the ethnographic and travel literature points out that the Montenegrins who traditionally lived in Montenegro were Serbs. Further, it is not uncommon in nineteenth- and twentieth-century sources to find a description of influential Montenegrins as adherents of Serbdom. This helped create a dual narrative basis in Montenegro for the reproduction and perpetuation of a fluid identity that can be interpreted both as Montenegrin and Serbian. The issue of Montenegro's membership

in NATO has once again thrown up the question of this dual and fluid Montenegrin identity.

One of the starting premises of this research refers to the understanding of culture and history in contemporary identity politics. In the era of globalization, multicultural assumptions have once again rekindled interest in history, and mostly in national history. Supposed authenticity and continuity with the past have become a significant means of political legitimation. This requires the establishment of the "strongest" possible bond with the past, which is done by recourse to interpretation and revision of historical fact—all of which is, of course, selective. The hypothesis in this text is that the warrior tradition, whether on the level of reality or at level of narrative about a desired reality, has produced a Montenegrin ideal of masculinity brimming with characteristics of the warrior and soldier. That same idealized warrior tradition of masculinity was instrumentalized in current social debates of whether Montenegro should join NATO. It was not difficult to draw a parallel between NATO's warrior tradition and that of Montenegro. Despite its significant evolution from a military alliance, through a somewhat political grouping, to a predominantly political alliance, in the perception of the Montenegrin public NATO remains primarily a military alliance. It is only to be expected that the opposing sides in the debate about whether or not Montenegro should join NATO would utilize Montenegro's tradition as a warrior people in their argumentation, and that a significant portion of their fight would be over "the rights" to this part of Montenegrin history.

The public has not yet reached a political consensus about whether Montenegro ought to join NATO. The political landscape has parties in favor of membership in NATO and those against it. Both groups, however, offer security, political, and economic arguments for their positions, with the detractors also resorting to additional arguments of an ideological and emotional nature. Research has clearly shown that the debate is directed by two principal discourses concerning the character of NATO. In the first, NATO is seen as an organization of collective security. The arguments offered by those in favor of joining NATO operate within this discourse. Conversely, in the other discourse, where NATO is seen as an aggressive military alliance, we find the arguments of the detractors to the alliance. The specific question of participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO operations was particularly contentious. Even within this, so to speak, sub-polemic, the arguments offered on both sides fit neatly into the two previously described discourses. Thus, the participation of Montenegrin soldiers with NATO was debated in either the discourse of peace operations or that of occupation, depending on whether the

participants in the debate approve or disapprove of sending Montenegrin soldiers with NATO contingents.

Montenegro's warrior tradition is most often instrumentalized for the purposes of articulating security arguments from both sides of the NATO divide, and the stakeholders claim that their main goal is a break with the war suffering of the country's distant or recent past—whether or not this suffering actually happened as a historic truth or as the dominant popular science narrative about historical truth. Narratives created for this purpose are capable of imposing a "continuity" of Montenegrin struggles, starting from the "distant" past, through the World Wars, and concluding with the wars of former Yugoslavia and NATO intervention against FRY at the very end of the twentieth century. Such narratives have a significant capacity for instrumentalization, because political elites, on both sides of the debate, think that the time has finally come to break with Montenegro's tradition of war and casualty. (Often the call to end war suffering refers to a space not geographically limited to any specific nation state, but to a rather more vague geographic area—"in this part of the world"—which can be synonymous with the Western Balkans.) The cessation of war and suffering (a break with the warrior past) is the main security argument used by all participants in the debate—advocates, detractors, as well as those who once favored demilitarization of Montenegro. However, depending on whether NATO is seen as an organization of collective security (as the advocates do) or an aggressive military alliance (as detractors think), the same arguments take on entirely different interpretations. The arguments of the advocates for membership in NATO function within a discourse that sees NATO as an organization of collective security. For them NATO represents a guarantor that the past war suffering of Montenegro will not recur. On the other hand, the arguments of the opponents of membership operate within a discourse where NATO is seen as an aggressive military alliance. For them, Montenegro's accession to the alliance would mean embroiling Montenegrin soldiers in current and future wars. This would imply continuation of the tradition of Montenegrin war suffering.

An aspect of the arguments from security is based in the notion that all wars fought heretofore by Montenegro have been defensive in character. This suggests a traditionalist narrative about a desired past reality. Even if historic facts run counter to this narrative (i.e., the occupation of Metohija and the siege of Shkoder in the First Balkan War), the traditionalist model claims that Montenegro never led an offensive war, and that the history of Montenegro, as told in popular and popular science narratives, is the history of constant struggle for national survival. Narratives about Montenegro's freedom-loving struggles acquire significant potential as

part of the debate regarding NATO membership, in particular when we consider the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the alliance's missions. This portion of Montenegrin history is used prominently by detractors of the idea of membership in NATO, because of NATO's status as an aggressive military alliance. If one accepts the latter premise, it is not difficult to see the inconsistency of Montenegro's "defensive" tradition and NATO's "offensive" essence. Thus Montenegro's membership in NATO represents a break with Montenegrin tradition, and the question of participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO operations is seen as a serious breach of the tradition of defensive struggle.

When it comes to formal political forums, we can say that both proponents and opponents of membership draw equally on Montenegro's warrior tradition. In other words, the security arguments claiming that NATO can prevent future war suffering of the type given in narratives of Montenegro's past are equally suited for instrumentalization by either side of the debate (even if the detractors have a slight advantage given their "monopoly" on the instrumentalization of the traditionalist narrative of only defensive wars). This balance is disrupted by the question of participation of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions. On this point, the warrior tradition is utilized much more in the arguments of the detractors, which is particularly evidenced in informal political forums. That is to say, as the debate moves from formal to informal political forums, and from general questions related to NATO membership to the participation of Montenegrin soldiers in the alliance's missions, arguments about the use of Montenegro's warrior tradition remains more or less stable among the advocates of membership; however, it increases significantly among the idea's detractors. The discrepancy in its use in the debate on sending Montenegrin soldiers on NATO missions, or rather, the absence of the tradition's instrumentalization among the advocates for membership, can, in truth, be characterized as *strategic silence.* Even though NATO operations are conceptualized as peace keeping missions, given the characteristics of the dominant popular science narrative about the warrior tradition of Montenegro, it leaves the advocates of membership very little maneuvering room to instrumentalize traditional representations. Thus, if they attempt to "advance" the argument in which Montenegrins are both warriors and heroes, then they could justifiably be accused of entering the North Atlantic Alliance carrying "yataghans and swords." It would be superfluous to elaborate how far narratives along those lines would stray from the ideals of freedom, democracy, and rule of human rights, so associated with the West and NATO as an essentially Western institution. Further, a narrative taking this path would render meaningless all the security arguments and most political and economic

arguments. Still, there are certain elements from the tradition that are suitable for filling the resulting "vacuum." The actions of the Ministry of Defense do show a spontaneous "emergence" of narratives that incorporate Montenegrin soldiers' involvement in previous international peace keeping missions and their cooperation with other NATO states' armies—I have chosen to call such details of the cooperation as narratives. The participation of Montenegro's military in resolving the Crete crisis (1897) is a central element of the narrative of cooperation, to which are added their participation in SFRY's military's mission in Sinai (1985), participation of individual Montenegrin soldiers in other armies, as well as Montenegrin partisans' collaboration with British soldiers in World War II. These events signify a deep past, giving the potential involvement of Montenegrin soldiers in NATO missions the semblance of a logical continuity with past occurrences.

Operating from a position of high state power broadens one's maneuvering space, and the advocates of Montenegro's membership in NATO are the parties currently in power. They are, therefore, accorded considerably more space for the instrumentalization of numerous historical narratives. To truly grasp this phenomenon, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with the category of "banal nationalism" and "symbolic voluntarism." Namely, Michael Billig introduces the term "banal nationalism" in order to include ideological habits that enable Western nations to be reproduced ever anew in their quotidian roles. Further, Naumović introduced the concept of symbolic voluntarism to emphasize the inconsistent relationship toward tradition and traditional symbols in political and public life. When we look through the prism of banal nationalism and symbolic voluntarism, we can see that the popular science narrative about Montenegro's warrior tradition and contemporary national narrative appear to be inextricable. Thanks to their position in the highest echelons of the power, government representatives are able to choose, organize, and manage symbolic activities to their advantage. The most significant dates in Montenegrin history are linked to Montenegro joining NATO and the EU. In that sense, dates that become particularly important are Statehood Day and Independence Day, which remind people of the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, the Podgorica Assembly, the antifascist struggle in World War II, and Montenegro's independence by referendum in 2006. These clearly marked points of reference in the narrative, along with the logical coherence on which narrative necessarily rests, ensure its "malleability" and potential incorporation of new elements (such as any victorious battles that came before Montenegro's independence in 1878). Narrative interpretations of the past have a significant function in the reproduction of the nation, as well as shaping and

consolidating of the desired national identity. The established narrative continuity of Montenegro's past, present, and imagined Euro-Atlantic future appears as the "official" mediator in the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity, as the country goes through the process of integration into these larger entities. This allows linking events from the distant past with the present and an imagined Euro-Atlantic future of Montenegro. Lest we forget, numerous examples show how the selectivity that emerges from current political needs is inherent in the shaping of a nation's past. A particularly interesting example is the visit of the Russian Patriarch to Montenegro, and the selective expression of the past during the visit, because his visit "demanded" a very different past from the one "demanded" for the state's integration into NATO. Therefore, official Montenegro took the opportunity to "*especially note*" Russia's importance in Montenegrin history. In other words, Montenegro "especially noted" the very part of the past it widely "ignored" in numerous discussions about NATO. At the meeting with the Russian Patriarch, we see how the same element in the same political climate can either be readily pointed out or overlooked, depending on the context. Further, the advocates of membership roundly "ignored" the not so rare historical and ethnographic narratives that speak about the spirit of Serbdom that permeated victorious Montenegrin struggles for freedom. Namely, in the chapters dealing with Montenegrin history, I have noted the phenomenon of a dual narrative basis, allowing for a reproduction of a fluid identity that can be interpreted as either Montenegrin or Serbian. However, in my analysis of the reproduction of contemporary Montenegrin identity in the context of NATO and EU membership, I showed that the ruling elites have only chosen those parts of this narrative that allow for the reproduction of Montenegrin identity. In contrast, those aspects of the narrative basis that would allow for the reproduction of a Serbian identity are ignored.

Structured sequentially, the Montenegrin national narrative would go as follows: victorious battles were fought to establish the conditions for Montenegrin independence and recognition at the Congress of Berlin (1878); Montenegro vanishes with the Podgorica Assembly (1918), and immediate attempts to regain statehood (the Christmas Uprising) is defeated; Montenegro initiates the antifascist struggle in World War II, which resulted in the return of certain elements of statehood as part of Socialist Yugoslavia; finally, on May 21, 2006, Montenegro regains its statehood. In the end, we arrive at the ultimate (simplified) formula of a narrative: Montenegro was at great pains to create its state, which was then lost before being regained. Following the principles of logical coherence on which the narrative rests, the conclusion that follows is that Montenegro has been on the path toward independence and international

recognition for a long time, and membership in NATO and the EU are given as the continuation of that path.

Why has the debate about NATO membership initiated such strong need on the part of Montenegro for a national narrative? The question of Montenegrin membership in NATO is the first big question that arose after the referendum of statehood and legal status of Montenegro. Part of the debates and arguments from the previous referendum campaign "spilled over" into the new debate about membership. Further, we have to keep in mind that social identity is most important when it is endangered. Montenegro was indeed an independent state (1878–1918), but it became a part of larger state entities during the twentieth century. The 88-year discontinuity in statehood is a gap too wide to be easily bridged. Therefore, taking into consideration the social and historical context of its statehood status, it is clear that this "young/old" state is using every possible opportunity to project a distant and heroic past. In that sense, common narrative interpretations of the past recall a common ancestry and have a very significant function in shaping and consolidating the desired national identity, and they reproduce the nation on an everyday level. The process of consolidating the country's national identity is particularly visible in the Military of Montenegro. In this institution, the construction of national identity is inseparable from the construction of masculine identity, since soldiers have to be inculcated to uphold the good name of their national identity while participating in peace keeping missions far away from home. This is achieved through the interweaving of a national narrative and a narrative of collaboration (and the two appear inextricable), with professional and material benefits, which the Ministry of Defense and the Headquarters of the Military of Montenegro have portrayed as very important for participation in international missions. The motivation of professional advancement and achieving a level of material wealth confirms the research into contemporary Montenegrin masculinities, which shows that work, professional advancement, and the achievement of a certain level of material wealth have become key elements in contemporary Montenegrin masculinity.

The private discourses regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO is to a great extent influenced by the identity controversies characteristic of a post-referendum period. The intertwining of the question of identity with that of NATO membership and the inseparability of these issues from the context of quotidian politics produce an array of controversies among Montenegrin citizens. Thus the discourse of NATO as the guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Montenegro has a good deal of traction among citizens who support NATO and who voted for independence at the referendum. In this viewpoint, Montenegro is a

small Balkan state in a still unstable area, to which NATO could bring stability. In particular, it is thought that Serbia, Albania, Croatia, or some new Islamic creation in the Balkans could in the future threaten the territorial integrity of Montenegro, and that NATO is a guarantor of this not taking place. According to these discourses, there is danger from Albania regarding specific portions of Montenegrin territory encompassed by the concept of Great Albania, cities inhabited by Albanians (Ulcinj, Podgorica, as well as parts of Plav and Rožaje counties). The potential danger from a new Islamic creation in the Balkans refers to portions of northern Montenegro, included in the concept of South Sandžak, populated by Muslims (Andrijevica, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Pljevlja, Plav i Rožaje).[2] Croatia is mentioned less often as a threat to Montenegrin territorial integrity, and its aspirations cover the Bay of Kotor. Still, looking at discourses of threats to Montenegro, the greatest potential threat is placed on Serbia. In this case, the threat does not include portions of Montenegro, but rather its entirety. The events that preceded the Podgorica Assembly (1918), the assembly itself, and the fall out all are part of the traditional arguments offered as justification of Serbian threat. A more recent element used to justify the threat from Serbia is that in 1999 the Montenegrin army was under the command of the President of Yugoslavia, Milošević, which led to Montenegro being needlessly targeted for NATO bombing. Some interlocutors focused on the long-term "quiet occupation"[3] Serbia conducted in various ways, primarily through the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro and official history textbooks. All this informs their fear that such a "quiet occupation" could, under the right circumstances, grow into overt military occupation, and parallels are drawn to 1918 and the events surrounding the Podgorica Assembly. Membership in NATO is seen as a guarantor that an occupation like this could never again occur.

According to certain people, the discourse of NATO as guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Montenegro has a great potential for political instrumentalization on the level of local as well as foreign policies. This point of view is particularly common among people who support Montenegro's membership in NATO but are against the ruling coalition. Following their thinking, the ruling coalition represents itself as the only certain guarantor of Montenegro's membership in NATO, and thus the only guarantor of stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The thinking is that the political elites thus gain maneuvering space to label their political enemies as being weak on stability, independence, and Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic future. Based on all this, we can say that the ruling elite presents themselves to the international community (primarily to the United States and EU) as the only guarantor of Montenegro

successfully undergoing its integration into NATO. When speaking to international officials, they also present other political options as forces that would impede Montenegro entering NATO. Therefore, it is thought that the ruling coalition uses these strategies to ensure constant support of the United States and EU in order to remain in power.

Montenegrin Serbs are clearly the largest opponents to Montenegrin membership in NATO. The intertwining of identity questions with the issue of NATO membership is the crucial factor influencing the positions of Montenegrin Serbs regarding membership in NATO. They believe that, since independence, the ruling elites have been imposing a new Montenegrin identity, and that NATO membership is an important step in that direction. What follows from these discourses is that NATO is an organization under the influence of Catholicism, which will certainly distance or even separate Montenegro from Orthodoxy, that membership in NATO will definitely break Montenegro from Serbia, and finally, that NATO wholeheartedly supports the denial of the Serbian character of Montenegrin history and tradition, currently propagated by the ruling classes in Montenegro, all of which further leads to the suppression of Serbian identity in Montenegro. Montenegro's relationship to Russia is another important element influencing many Serbs' position regarding membership in NATO. Russia is considered a protecting force of Montenegro throughout its history, and the depth and complexity of its ties with Russia represent the central aspect of these discourses. Orthodoxy and its Slavic nature are the two strongest links with Russia, and membership in NATO could jeopardize these centuries-long spiritual and cultural ties. The 1999 NATO bombing of FRY is a very important element of nearly all anti-NATO discourses among Montenegrin Serbs. Discourses on the NATO bombing hold a few key elements: NATO was the aggressor against the Serbian people; the bombing was conducted without the approval of the UN; NATO was an ally of the Albanian people; Djukanović's cooperation with NATO in 1999 represents an act of treason. By being servile toward NATO during the bombing, so goes this discourse, Djukanović has forever ensured NATO support for his politics and himself personally.

The discourses of Montenegrin Serbs show that the relationship of Djukanović toward NATO is a very important segment of his public image. In general, the foreign policy turn toward NATO that Djukanović performed is seen as a masterstroke in his career. Therefore, myriad controversies regarding the issue of Montenegrin membership in NATO have become interlaced with the public image of Milo Djukanović. Without doubt, the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanović, is the symbol of Montenegro's integration into NATO and the epicenter of all

private discourses on the issue. Djukanović is at once seen as the first modern pro-Western leader but also the last communist leader in Europe; as a leader whose charisma and strength have turned Montenegro toward NATO but also as a leader who could halt Montenegro's advance into NATO. He is the only guarantor that Montenegro will continue its favorable foreign policy toward the West, but he is also, at the same time, under strong Russian influence. Though a sincere Montenegrin patriot, he also instrumentalizes the issue of Montenegrin membership to NATO and identity questions in order to remain in power. He is a leader who sincerely advocates entering NATO and uses the prospect of entering NATO in order to remain in power; however, he also takes care not to enter NATO as that would mean the end of his rule. Rarely have so many opposing viewpoints coalesced into the public image of a single person, and this is perhaps a unique case where controversies regarding a country's membership in NATO crystalize in such a way.

Now that I have reached the closing lines, I would like to add some of my personal thoughts. When I ran the marathon for the first time, I contemplated the 42 kilometers 195 meters I had just left behind. I thought of the achievement as the apex of my personal experience and was rather proud of myself. I was also quite young. I ran each subsequent marathon more as a matter of course, realizing as I aged that there are more extensive and more arduous trails. Guided by this experience, I have endeavored to reach the conclusion of this book keeping in mind the greater scientific and intellectual challenges that lay before me. I honestly believe that anthropologists can greatly improve society! Finally, without wishing to offer this as an excuse for mistakes made, I would like to say that as I was writing this book, my greatest ally was my youth; it was also, perhaps, my Achilles heel.

Notes

1   Introduction: Theory and Methodology

1. This is part of the hit song "Ovo je Balkan" ("This is the Balkans") played by Bajaga and the Instructors, a highly popular Serbian and former Yugoslav rock band (Bajaga and the Instructors 1993).

2. Montenegro is a small ethnically, nationally, and religiously mixed country in Southeast Europe with an approximate population of 672,000. It was recognized as an independent state for the first time at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. A 40-year period of independence ended in 1918 when it was unified with Serbia, before incorporation into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (which became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). After World War II, Montenegro was a republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As the state collapsed in the early 1990s, Montenegro remained a part of a larger union, known first as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then simply as Serbia and Montenegro (a state union inclined toward a confederation). In May 2006, the majority of its citizens voted for independence, making Montenegro once again an independent state. For more, see *Montenegro in Transition* (2003), edited by Florian Bieber (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft); and Morrison (2009), *Montenegro (a Modern History)* (London: I. B. Tauris).

3. The term "culture wars" refers to the disagreements troubling contemporary intellectual life, with regard to conflict of opposing concepts of values within which culture becomes the ever-present synonym for identity, and an identity marker around which various social and political groups coalesce (mobilizing its "primordial" identities along the way). In "culture wars" the possibility of general consensus over anything fundamental is very remote.

4. Gregory Feldman points out that the EU is more focused on "ordinary" people through immigration policy, mobility of workforce, and myriad scientific research possibilities, while the impression of NATO is removed from everyday life (Feldman, Gregory [2003], "Breaking our Silence on NATO," *Anthropology Today* 19 [3]: 1–2).

5. For example, the research done by Strategik Marketing in December 2009, conducted for the Government of Montenegro, shows that the most common answers to the open question (with no offered answers) about the advantages of joining NATO were security, safety, peace, protection from aggression, the

strengthening of the military, and better conditions for the military. A relatively small proportion of citizens tie the accession to NATO with economic development, job creation, and a quicker entry into the EU (TV Montenegro 2009).

6. The matter of Montenegro's membership in NATO is one of the questions of the transition period from which various identity disputes follow and around which there are real culture wars. Indeed, it is in periods of transition that opposing sides "instrumentalize" all available elements, so that "native culture" and "old" identity categories, although theoretically untenable, still appear as powerful weapons available to opposing sides.

7. During the Ottoman period, a large proportion of Montenegrin mountains remained untouched by Ottoman culture, so that the old patriarchal "humanitas heroica" (*čojstvo i junaštvo*) and the customary law prevailed. The Montenegrin "*čojstvo*," humaneness of a hero (or as Gerhard Gesemann has defined it "*Humanitas heroica*"), means that in order to be heroic in the true sense of this concept, a hero needs more than mere hardihood or bravery: he must place restraint upon them and thus become a human being, or as Marko Miljanov writes, "bravery is to defend yourself from another, and the humanity is to defend the other from yourself." In this system of morality, where humaneness and heroism must be in a state of equilibrium, tolerance is always directed toward all others, but never toward oneself. For more, see Arbatsky (1962) "Traits of Humanitas Heroica in the Extreme North of the USSR," *Slavic and East-European Studies* 7 (1/2).

8. Today, Montenegrins can be divided into "Montenegrin Montenegrins" (44.98 percent of the overall population) and "Montenegrin Serbs" (28.73 percent of the population). While the majority of Montenegrins and Bosniak/Muslim, Albanian, and Croatian national minorities all voted for independence, the majority of Montenegrin Serbs voted against it.

9. *Bricolage* is a French term proposed by Claude Lévi-Strauss for an analysis of mixed forms. The *bricoleur,* one who assembles, separates the forms from their rootedness in history and reconstitutes them to his own purposes. Levi-Strauss applied this term to a seemingly arbitrary combination of myth motifs (mythemes) comprising families of mythic narratives. In the contemporary study of the humanities, *Bricolage* is understood as a critical, multi-perspectival, multi-theoretical, and multi-methodological research. For more on *bricolage*, see Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1966 [1962]), *The Savage Mind* (London: Weidefeld and Nicolson): 24–33); and Rogers, Matt 2012. "Contextualizng Theories and Practices of Bricolage Research," *The Qualitative Report* 17 (7): 1–17.

10. For a methodology of anthropological field study, see Žikić (2007a), "Qualitative Field Research in Anthropology. An Overview of Basic Research Methodology," *Etnoantropološki problemi* 2 (2): 123–135; and (2007b), "Antropološko proučavanje marginalnih društvenih grupa—metodologija terenskog rada," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja* 71: 39–52.

2   Narratives: The Path to Reality

1. Public narratives are stories we encounter daily in the media, as well as those we consume in books, films, and so on, and they exert powerful sway over what we remember, know, or believe. In a world ever more connected through television, film, and Internet, it is not difficult to imagine a future where the influence of public narratives grows ever stronger.

2. Psychoanalysis had close ties with narratives, and the complex procedure of psychoanalysis was connected to the narration of the domain of the psyche (Straub, Jurgen (2008), "Psychology, Narrative and Cultural Memory: Past and Present," in *Media and Cultural Memory/Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, 215–229 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter): 215).

3. Jane Elliott emphasizes three key characteristics of narrative in the context of social research: (1) it has a time and chronological dimension, in so far as it ensures the presenting of a series of events or experiences above a description of a state of affairs; (2) it communicates the meaning of the event or experience through the use of evaluating statements and through a temporal configuration of events; and (3) there is a significant social dimension of the narrative—they are omnipresent in society and are the popular form of communication. Narratives are usually spoken in a specific context for specific purposes (Elliott, Jane (2005) *Using Narrative in Social Research* (London: Sage Publications): 15).

4. Regarding the capacity of narratives to represent reality, Brockmeier and Harre have pointed out two fallacies. The first concerns the fallacy of meta-linguistic reality, which they have called the ontological fallacy, consisting of the belief that there is a real story "out there" (before the process of narration and its analytical reconstruction) "waiting" to be discovered. The second fallacy concerns the assumption of a unified and independent human reality, represented by a (more or less) true narrative description. This second fallacy, Brockmeier and Harre call the representational fallacy (Brockmeier and Harre (2001) "Narrative, Problems and Promises of an Alternative Paradigm," in *Narrative and Identity*, ed. Jens Brockmeier and Donald Carbaugh, 39–59 (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing): 48–49).

5. For more, see Thompson (2000) *What Happened to History* (London: Pluto Press): 5–6.

6. Or, as Eriksen says, "Without the other, I cannot be myself; without the others, we cannot be us." See Eriksen (2004) *What is Anthropology* (London: Pluto Press): 159.

7. On an internal level, memory or remembering are a part of a neurological system, while on the social level, they comprise communication and social interaction.

8. Assman thinks that the tension between the "past as past" and "past as present" is particularly visible in different rooms in museums: the main items on display vs. the basements and storage where all that is of peripheral value

are kept. Further, she distinguishes between types of places that hold "past present" and "past past." "Past past" is held in archives, whereas "past present" is in canons, where to canonize means separate texts, persons, objects, and monuments and "imbibe" them with the highest values and meanings. See more in Assman Aleida (2008) "Canon and Archive," in *Media and Cultural Memory/Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, 97–109 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter): 97–109.

9. Eriksen classifies work inspired by Foucault into two categories: (a) ethnographic studies of discursive power, and (b) criticisms of anthropological research (Eriksen 2004: 140).

10. An object, for Foucault, is an "object" of knowledge, an entity recognized by specific sciences and disciplines as that which they study. For example, the object of psychopathological discourse was modified through time, such that the unity of discourse on madness was not based on the existence of the object of "madness" (formulated once and for all), but rather, it was constituted through what was uttered in all the sentences that designated, shared, described, and explained it. A unified discourse of madness would be the interplay of rules that make it possible for an object to appear in a given time period, as well as their transformation. See Foucault (1994 [1966]) *The Order of Things* (New York: Random House, Vintage books Edition): 25, 30–38.

11. Following Foucault, the social subject that produces a sentence is not an entity that exists outside and independently of discourse, as the source of the sentence (its "author"), but rather is a function of the sentence itself (Foucault 1994 [1966]: 38–43).

12. As Keith Jenkins says: "The past is gone, and history is what historians make of it when they go to work." See Jenkins (1991) *Re-thinking History* (London: Routledge): 8.

13. Taking into account what material we have heretofore gone through and what is particularly important, material about the past that has been processed in elementary and high school education.

14. When speaking of authenticity, Richard Handler begins from the basic assumption that authenticity is a Western cultural construct and more of a function of Western ontology, rather than anything within the cultures to which it refers.

15. Following Thomas, the assumption is that persons who have a reified culture have a positive opinion of it, since such constructions affirm local identity (i.e., people whose culture is reified have a positive attitude toward reification, because up to that point their culture was "invisible"). See Thomas (1992) "The Inversion of Tradition," *American Ethnologist* 19 (2).

16. Kovačević reached this conclusion through comparative analysis of two ethnographic studies of two Serbian villages of similar cultural context. One study is "external," American (*A Serbian Village* (*Srpsko sel*), by J. Halpern 2006 [1956] (Beograd: Srpski genealoški centar)), whereas the other is "native" (*Jarmenovci*, by S. Knežević and M. Jovanović (Beograd: Naučno delo)). Both were written and published at about the same time (1956 and 1958).

Kovačević did not find significant differences between the two ethnographies. The comparative analysis allowed him to draw a parallel between contemporary Serbian and American ethnographies and reach the conclusion that there were no significant differences between the two milieus (Kovačević 2006a: 97–145). Writing this book, I consistently felt the desire for it to be on the level of books written by my colleagues from prestigious universities the world over.

3   The Hero between Poetry, History, and the Past: The "Making of" the Model of the Traditional Man

1. Queer theorists seeking to deconstruct gender and heterosexual binaries criticize feminist theories for setting up opposition between "male and female," thus affirming institutionalized heterosexuality, as well as gay and lesbian movements for reifying the homosexual/heterosexual binary (Nagel (2000) "Ethnicity and Sexuality," *Annual Review of Sociology*: 107–133).
2. For more, see Zinn et al. (2005) "Introduction," in *Gender Through the Prism of Difference*, ed. Maxine Baca Zinn, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, and Michael A. Messner, 1–10 (New York: Oxford University Press).
3. Margaret Mead developed the theses on the social construction of gender in the late twenties and early thirties. It would take another 30 years for the development of feminist movements that would, based on constructivist premises, precipitate the examination of masculinity.
4. Following Kimmel, in mainstream US culture, masculinity that has become standard is that of the white, heterosexual, early middle aged man. The Hegemonic definition of masculinity is the powerful man, and manliness is equated with strong, successful, capable, and reliable (Kimmel (2004a) "Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity," in *Feminism & Masculinities, Oxford Readings in Feminism*, ed. Peter F. Murphy, 182–196 (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 184).
5. Official history often tries to neglect the warrior-plunderer economy of the Dinaric Alps, speaking instead only about the cattle rearing economy (Kovačević 2006b: 63).
6. For more, see Fuller (2001) "The Social Constitution of Gender Identity among Peruvian Men," *Men and Masculinities* 3 (3): 316–331.
7. Men have had the role of warrior across cultures and time, even though many scientists agree that there is no evidence of men being biologically predisposed for war. It has been shown that hormones, even size and strength, have a minimal role in successful fighting. Instead the warrior process is learned (just like gender). This can be easily seen from the great number of patently successful female and unsuccessful male fighters (Solomon (2007) "War," in *Encyclopedia of Sex and Gender (4)*, ed. Fedwa Malti-Douglas, 1518–1522 (Detroit: The Gale Group)). Despite the variations in participation of men

and women in various armies throughout the world, the point here stands that armed forces are male institutions, and masculine and male dominance is a characteristic of all national militaries (Woodward and Winter (2007) *Sexing the Soldier: The Politics of Gender and the Contemporary British Army Transformations* (London: Routledge): 20). War roles are assigned primarily and often exclusively to men. Women certainly participated in many wars, at times as openly as men. For example, during World War II, the Red Army contained some 8 percent women fighters in various fighting roles. The Partisans in Yugoslavia and guerrilla forces in general had an even greater number of women in their ranks (Goldstein (2004) "War," in *Men and Masculinities, A Social, Cultural and Historical Encyclopedia*, ed. Michael Kimmell and Arny Aronson, 815–817 (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio)). From at least the fourteenth until the nineteenth century, women were an integral part of European armies. As armies became much more professional and bureaucratic, they became an exclusively male domain (Klein and Bradford 2004: 546–548).

8. Cynthia Enloe studied the impact that the end of the Cold War had on gender (re)defining. She points out that every postwar period is filled with a series of questions: What does change? What does not? Will the reduction of militarism transform concepts of masculinity? Is it reasonable to expect the appearance of new attitudes in men and women toward gender roles? See Enloe (1993) *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 25.

9. In Kimmel's words: "American men have no history. Sure, we have stacks of biographies of the heroic and famous, and historical accounts of events in which men took part, like wars, strikes, or political campaigns. And we have group portraits of athletes, soldiers, and the men who run unions and political parties. There are probably thousands of histories of institutions that were organized, staffed, and run by men…But these books feel strangely empty at their centers, where the discussion of men should be. Books about men are not about men as men. These books do not explore how the experience of being a man structured the men's lives, or the organizations and institutions they created, the events in which they participated. American men have no history as gendered selves; no work describes historical events in terms of what these events meant to the men who participated in them as men" (Kimmel (2005) *The History of Men* (New York: State University of New York Press): 3).

10. This discrepancy between imagined order and real order, the ideal culture and real culture, of the *zadruga* (communal family) was particularly noticeable regarding characteristics of property, work, life, authority, and mutual relations in the southern Slavic patriarchal institution. For instance, life of communal families have some common characteristics: (a) they possess indivisible, family-owned joint property, personal property being uncustomary; (b) labor is separated into male-specific and female-specific jobs, and also some joint jobs; though men have the jobs with higher status, all

work for the benefit of the zadruga; (c) the extended family lives in harmony, with the focal value being on harmony; however, men have a higher status and women are subordinated; (d) functioning of the head of the community is limited by male consensus, but the head must be strict and just; (e) the village family is independent from the mainstream of society. However, in her research, Rihtman-Augustin found that the everyday life of the *zadruga* did unfold according to a previously established model, and it showed a discrepancy between the real order and the imagined order as ascribed to communal families: (a) there is possession of individual property along with common property, and at times complementary to it; theft of joint property also occurs; (b) there is equal work load for both sexes, and female personal work is essentially an economic function; there are also contradictions in the performance of specialized work in the community; (c) conflicts between families and individuals do exist; there also exists a subordinate female sub-culture; (d) defiance is shown to strict masters, and there is a female influence in opposing the master's unjust decisions; (e) many types of contacts and communication exist between the zadruga, the feudal lords, gentry, and the market.

11. Gezeman encountered (at the beginning of the twentieth century) many Montenegrin men who no longer fit the picture depicted of their fathers and grandfathers (Gezeman (1968) *Čojstvo i junaštvo starih Crnogoraca* (Cetinje: Obod): 34).

12. "The less than good or even mediocre Montenegrins can be discussed by whoever so wishes, I am interested only in the good ones" (Gezeman 1968: 37–38).

13. To canonize means select texts, persons, objects, and monuments and "imbue" them with the highest values and meanings. For more, see Aleida Assman (2008) "Canon and Archive," in *Media and Cultural Memory/Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, 97–109 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).

14. Somehow, by some "curse," it was often precisely the "exemplary young woman" who became pregnant, the "exemplary young man" who was arrested, and so on. In other words, persons who were "exemplary" in the eyes of society most often deviated from this ideal.

15. Djeka Savićev and Mikonja Šaranović from Bjelopavlića did not want to kill a Turk in his bedroom (lest they wake the kids in the process), so they left a sword by his pillow (38); Rade Vukašinov would not allow the Turks to cut up the dead Šćepan Jankov, who had carried his father's head to the vizier of Skadar (38); Mirko Šutanov was sought and had his brother killed by the Turks. One Turk was caught and left for Mirko to kill when he returns. Upon his return, Mirko, rather than kill him, released him (39); Božina Stojanov forgave Lazo Novakov for an attempted murder, because the former was a hero (55); Veko Ilinčić did not want to kill Peruta Drljević in revenge for the death of his nephew killed by the Drljevićes. Rather, he killed a different Drljević (in order to make the Turks lament) (67); Even when they had no one

to avenge, both individuals and tribes sought battle in order to show that their heroism is no smaller than that of others (70); Two warriors, Milisav Mišnić and Veko Ilinčić, wanted to fight because neither would admit that the other was the better warrior, saying: "I can neither pass by you, nor live knowing you are better than me." They agreed to settle the issue by capturing and presenting a live Turk to the Morača tribe. Veko caught a Turk, but Milisav did not. Thereupon, Milisav always deferred to Veko, although Veko would not hear of it (97); Niko was young and had not seen battle, and his sister, Janica, doubted his heroism. Mother and sister prayed for their son and brother, and told him not to be frightful, lest people mock him. Upon hearing that he was injured, the sister cried out in joy "I now have a hero brother." Seeing their mother in tears, Janica reproved her: "why are you crying when you know he went to strike and be struck?" (73); A mother went into battle with her sons. When one of the sons died, his three brothers cried at the funeral, to which the mother responded: "Why are you crying? Did you think that all of you would return unscathed home? By my word, if another one does not die, I will wish never to have borne you." "This is what I want, that they be sons and die, for if they do not die, they are to be called daughters." (75); The mother of Veko Ilinčić would not allow the execution of her son's murderer, Radovan Kukorog. "If I cannot see Veko living, I would not see you dead either" (75). Many other examples abound (Miljanov (1964 [1901]) *Primjeri čojstva i junaštva* (Beograd: Branko Djonović): 38, 39, 55, 67, 70, 73, 75, 97).

16. BMS scale taken from King (2000) "Men's Definitions of Masculinity and Male Power," in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado): 9–10.

17. MRNS scale taken from King (2000: 10–11).

18. Boulogne, a French doctor who visited Montenegro in 1869, noticed that lacuna: "The authors tended to present Montenegrins as exceptional in Europe regarding their heroism and fearlessness, which made Montenegrins create a distorted image of themselves…It is wrong, completely wrong…They are brave and nobody even thinks to deny that, they provided strong evidence of their bravery, but far from being a true exception, a living model of fearlessness and patriotism to which other people should bow down" (Bulonj 2002: 68).

19. Saša Nedeljković conducted research among Montenegrins in the village of Lovćenac (in Serbia). It showed that "traditional" views of Montenegrin masculinity are still operative, that they still determine social relations and influence the construction of an ethnic identity of rural Montenegrins in Serbia (Nedeljković (2010) "Maskulinitet kao alternativni parametar etničkog identiteta: Crnogorci u Lovćencu," *Etnoantropološki problemi* 5 (1)).

20. The land of Montenegrin tribes is almost entirely limestone. The land is barren, craggy, with patches of grass only in the cracks and fissures, and meadows only in sinkholes and valleys. In Montenegrin tribal regions there is no other arable land except in these sinkholes and valleys, and the land there

can be tilled by hand only, with potatoes and corn practically the only edible vegetables able to grow (Cvijić (1991 [1922–1931]) *Balkansko poluostrvo* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva): 367).

21. The number of tribes varied, with some disappearing (e.g., Ridjan and Nikšić tribes) (Filipović (1991) *Čovek medju ljudima* (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga): 104).

22. For example, the geographic conditions of the Katun *nahija* offer no possibility of winter grazing. Still, tribes got formed in this area. In any case, a tribe could be formed without possession of summer and winter areas, but not without using them (Istorija Crne Gore (1975) *Istorija Crne Gore. Knjiga treća* (Titograd: Redakcija za istoriju Crne Gore): 470).

23. For more, see Ćirić-Bogetić (1966) *Komunice u Crnoj Gori u XIX i početkom XX veka* (Cetinje: Obod).

24. Due to population growth, tribes and groups had to expand their grazing territory, causing clashes between tribes, but also among members of fraternities within a single tribe. This was one of the main reasons for emigration, much more than Turkish violence (Cvijić (1966 [1922–1931]) *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje, osnovi antropogeografije.* (Beograd: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika Socijalističke republike Srbije): 106–110).

25. The government of Dubrovnik complained in 1676 that the Montenegrins are constantly robbing them (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 163).

26. Thus, toward the end of November 1717, Vuk Tomanović and the rest of Kruševljani plundered from the village Dub in the Konavski region 216 sheep and goats. In early March 1733, Montenegrins stole from the people of the Konavski region 350 sheep. Powerless to protect itself from the Montenegrins, the government of Dubrovnik appealed on several occasions to the Ottoman Porte, demanding that the Montenegrins be punished. Aside from the attacks on Ottoman and Dubrovnik territory, the Montenegrins often raided merchant convoys. As early as the middle of 1736, Dubrovnik villages near the border with Herzegovina kept permanent sentry to alert of Montenegrin guerrillas. Citizens of Dubrovnik were in a state of panic for their property, and it was enough for the Montenegrins to do no more than assemble for the Dubrovnik government to ring the alarm. All attempts of the city of Dubrovnik to engage the Ottomans toward their defense were in vain, as they themselves had a hard time defending from Montenegrin raids. There were even cases of women being kidnapped and ransomed to the Ottomans (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 314–317, 235–237).

27. As Gezeman humorously observes "the stealing of animals was effaced from God's commandments" (Gezeman 1968: 77).

28. Traditional epic poems tell us about the society and epoch in which they appear, but little about the events to which they refer. Still, although these narratives do not represent reality as it happened, they had to engage at least a portion of the extant ethnographic material that referred to the subject at hand. For more, see Kovačević (2006b: 63–64).

29. For example, in mid-March 1655, the Ottomans attacked Grbalj and places in the Bay of Kotor. Assisting in the attack were most of the Highland tribes (not only Kuči and Vasojevići). Further, the territory of Montenegrin tribes served as the base for the Ottoman attack on Kotor in 1657, and some Montenegrin tribes also participated in the attack, for which they were barred from entering the Bay of Kotor for a period of time (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 135–145).

30. In the vacillation between the Ottomans and the Venetians one can see the contours of the separation between the Katun and the other *nahijas*. Because of their geographic position, Crmnička, Lješanska, and Riječka *nahijas* communicated more with Ottoman cities and were economically tied to them. On the other hand, the Katun *nahija* relied on the Bay of Kotor and was the most resistant core in the struggle against the Ottomans (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 212, 458–459).

31. Although initially allied with the Venetians, by the end of the Cretan War the Montenegrins were attacking Kotor.

32. Individual and great successes, particularly by the Highland tribes, ended in an agreement made on the seat cushions of the Shkoder Pasha. The Highland tribes were in the most difficult position: in close proximity of two large Ottoman military bases, Shkoder and Podgorica, far from their allies, the Venetians, and economically blocked. These tribes had a difficult time getting past these obstacles, and were more at the mercy of an Ottoman economic blockade than their military might (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 226).

33. Differences in interpretation are rather large. Scientists' arguments range from whether this was a conflict with the entire Ottoman army, with its advanced part, or even whether there was a battle at all. In Montenegrin historiography, Jovan Tomić was the first to disrupt the legend about the great Montenegrin victory at Carev Laz in 1712, claiming that its first mention is found in the essays of Prince Vasilije and his "History of Montenegro." Tomić accused the Prince of deliberate embellishment and invention. Based on recognized sources from the eighteenth century, the people kept up the legend of the tragedy of Montenegro from 1712. At the same time, there was a legend about the battle at Carev Laz as a historical event from the Morean War. A century later, Prince Petar I Petrović Njegoš would write a poem about Carev Laz (based on the data from "History of Montenegro" of Vasilije Petrović), transferring details from one event at Carev Laz (during the Morean War) onto the events of 1712, thus creating the legend of Carev Laz (Istorija Crne Gore 1975: 258–263).

34. Following Montenegrin legend, Montenegrins were never subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and Montenegro was the "cradle of freedom." This is true to an extent, since the tribes had a certain degree of autonomy even during the period of Ottoman administration. Taxes were levied, but not always successfully.

35. This is particularly true of the following rulers of the Petrović dynasty: Metropolitan Bishop Petar I Petrović Njegoš (1784–1830), Metropolitan

Bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1830–1851), Bishop and Prince Danilo Petrović (1852–1860), and Prince Nikola Petrović (1860–1918).

36. For more, see Petrović, Petar II Njegoš (2012 [1847]) *The Mountain Wreath* (Chicago: Aristeus Books).

37. Delving any further into the text would mean leaving the domain of my own research. For more on the role of *Mountain Wreath* in the formation of the Montenegrin nation, it is useful to see the doctoral dissertation of Angelina Emilova Ilieva (Ilieva 2005). Also, see Gezeman (1968: 207).

38. All theories regarding the ethnic origin of the people of Montenegro are based on only a handful of sources. Aside from their incompleteness, the problem is rendered more complex by historians' unwillingness to mention certain portions of their source material in their interpretation, so as not to call into question their theories (e.g., Croatian historians avoid the claim made by Constantine VII that the Zahumlje and Travunje regions were populated by Serbs; Serbian historians, for their part, often avoid mentioning the term "Red Croatia") (Nedeljković (2007) *Čast, krv i suze* (Beograd: Zlatni zmaj): 92).

39. Historiographic traditions of each interested party have faithfully followed the programs and interests of their own nations, such that historiography has largely turned into a form of struggle for national interests (Nedeljković 2007: 92).

40. As an example, it is assumed that the Bjelopavlići tribe got its name from its originator, and not the territory it inhabited. The historical material shows that Bijeli Pavle, an unknown historical figure whose origin is difficult to establish, could be a descendant of old Serbian princes of the Nemanjić family, of Leka Dukadjin or of a Roman woman, a nobleman, a servant, or the originator of the ruling Zeta dynasty, or indeed the progenitor of a tribe.

41. I hope that the introductory words to this book, taken from the pop song "Balkan" of the popular rock band *Bajaga i instruktori*, now have their full meaning: "This country was made by both warriors and poets" ["This is the land of both warriors and poets"].

4 Traditional Gender Roles and Contemporary Multicultural Politics of Identity: Men between Reality and Multiculturalism

1. Data obtained from conversations with young men aged 19–30.
2. Young women aged between 23 and 35.
3. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro has stated that the level of homophobia in Montenegro is worryingly high. (DAN 2014) *Zabrinjava kršenje ljudskih prava* [online] January 21, 2006.
4. "There is almost not a shred of empathy for homosexuality and there is a simplistic condemnation of homosexual orientations. Even the more tolerant inhabitants of Lovćenac have a hard time understanding this "disease" and think that the participants in the gay pride parade deserve to be beaten.

It has been mentioned to me along the way that there are no homosexuals in Lovćenac, and this made me realize that it is best not to pursue the topic. Masculinity reflected directly onto this gender/sexual structure of the examined sample: they were all men. Indirectly I was told that in that community, no one is allowed to approach someone else's wife or girlfriend, that is, that women are completely protected. Better put, women were, in a way, the property of the men. This was underscored by the complete lack of women in public life: they are not functionaries in public institutions or organizations, they do not frequent places of daily gathering, such as coffee shops or pubs." (Nedeljković (2010) "Maskulinitet kao alternativni parametar etničkog identiteta: Crnogorci u Lovćencu," *Etnoantropološki problemi* 5 (1): 51–67, 64.

5. Joshua Parens thinks that the only thing the multiculturalists have in common is the opposition to traditional universalism, reflected in the term the "melting pot." For more, see Parens (1994) "Multiculturalism and Problem of Particularism," *The American Political Science Review* 88 (1): 169–181.

6. Franz Boas' book, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), deserves a central place in multicultural bibliographies for its elaboration of cultural relativism and its robust discussion of racial and intercultural topics in the United States (Roseberry 1992: 843).

7. Kymlicka and Norman defined citizenship as the set of rights, duties, roles, and identities that tie citizens with the nation state. However, citizenship is not only a given status defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also one's identity and expression of one's membership in a political community. It is clear that many groups (blacks, women, Aborigines, ethnic and racial minorities, gays, lesbians) still feel excluded from "common culture" despite holding common rights of citizenship. Members of these groups feel excluded not only because of their socioeconomic status, but also due to their socio-cultural identity—their "difference" (Kymlicka and Norman (1994) "Return of the Citizen, A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," *Ethics* 104 (2): 352–381, 370).

8. In dealing with different models of citizenship, Rogers Brubaker points out difference between national states and compares the "jus sanguinis" legal tradition, where citizenship is achieved through ethnic origin (Germany), with "jus soli," where citizenship is achieved by birth on the territory (France, where "jus soli" is dominant) (Brubaker (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)).

9. Beck remarks humorously that "someone has said that multiculturalism is a highly refined variant on the idea that cats, mice, and dogs eat from the same bowl: it postulates, in other words, essentialist identities and a rivalry among them" (Beck (2004) "The Truth Of Others, A Cosmopolitan Approach," *Common Knowledge* 10 (3): 446–447).

10. Claire Beckett and Mary Macey emphasize that multiculturalism encourages a "conspiracy of silence" in various groups: minority ethnic men, male academics, professionals, and the state. Even though there is clear evidence that family violence is used in order to prevent lesbian relationships, and the

black gay population is exposed to violence within the family and the community, the statistics obscure these facts (Beckett and Macey (2001) "Race, Gender and Sexuality: The Oppression of Multiculturalism," *Women's Studies International Forum* 24 (3/4): 309–319, 312).

11. It is much easier to derive group rights if one starts with communitarian, rather than liberal, premises. Within the liberal–communitarian debate, the liberals assume that the individual has a given identity prior to and independently of society, and that individual rights, on which liberalism is founded, should not be derived from one's cultural, social, religious, or linguistic background. On the other hand, the communitarians claim that individuals are constituted through the community in which they live, and that values that influence the individual's behavior, along with the symbolism through which life is given meaning, come from the community. In addition, the public good or interest of the community is more important than the individual's interests and values (Abu-Laban (2002) "Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Essentialism," *Citizenship Studies* 6 (4): 459–482; Hickman (1990) "The Idea of Individuality: Origins; Meaning, and Political Significance," *The Journal of Politics* 52 (3): 759–781; Lehrer (2001) "Individualism, Communitarianism and Consensus," *The Journal of Ethics* 5 (2): 105–120; Morrice (2000) "The Liberal Communitarian Debate in Contemporary Political Philosophy and Its Significance for International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 26 (2): 233–251; Taylor (1989) "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in *Liberalism and Moral Life*, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); Theobald and Dinkelman (1995) "The Parameters of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate," *Peabody Journal of Education* 70 (4): 5–18).

12. Many women's groups organized a protest march against this practice, while many Rajput people, both men and women, defended this practice by way of cultural relativism. The latter claimed "sati" as an ancient Rajput tradition and as part of their culture. Roop Kanwar became a cultural symbol for such groups of Rajput fanatics. The case threw up a slew of hypothetical questions: is it at all important that Roop Kanwar agreed voluntarily to submit to "sati?" Does her acquiescence justify the cultural practice? Is it legitimate for a woman to agree to her own immolation? Does she have a right to reject the cultural practices of her culture or ethnic subgroup? Does it matter that were she to refuse to die, she would be banished from her village and family and have nowhere to go? Would "sati" be justified if it were supported by the majority of the group? Does the justification of "sati" have the same legitimacy if the majority of its supporters are men, when all its victims are women? What if the supporters of "sati" are political opportunists who use the practice to gain political support and divide a culture along ethnic practices? Is the age of the victim important? What if it is a child? What if it is an older woman who is an economic burden to her relatives? Is reference to ancient customs enough to legitimize this practice? What if the woman is entirely under the control of her family? Is it important whether the woman

is pregnant? If the woman has lived her entire life in one village and has never seen a different model of behavior, can she legitimately acquiesce? Is it wrong for Indian feminists and activists of human rights to refer to universal ideals of human rights in their struggle against "sati" and other forms of violence and torture? Do Indian feminists betray their heritage and are they, along with human rights activists, victims of Western imperialism? (Zechenter (1997) "In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 53 (3): 319–347).

13. To quote Rorty: "Multiculturalism began to go sour soon after it was invented. It started out as one more attempt to get white middle-class males to behave better toward the people they enjoy shoving around—black and brown people, women, poor people, recent immigrants, homosexuals. It hoped to encourage these groups to take pride in themselves rather than accept the derogatory descriptions that the white males had invented for them . . . The movement began in colleges and universities as an attempt to make room for courses and programs in African American studies, Hispanic studies, and the like. This attempt succeeded, and the results have been fruitful. On the campuses, particularly those where such programs exist, there is less humiliation of blacks and browns, less condescension to women, and more safety for homosexuals than anywhere else in society. And these programs are often staffed by some of the liveliest, most interesting, and most devoted teachers. A debilitating mistake was made, however, when academics began to campaign for compulsory undergraduate courses that would "sensitize students to cultural differences." . . . It is the difference between gently suggesting, as universities always have, that attitudes acquired at home may need supplementation or correction and telling undergraduates that they are sick and need treatment . . . Starting from the thought that white children too should know about heroic African Americans, it ends up with the self-fulfilling prediction that they will remain separated from their black contemporaries not just by money and life chances but by a 'difference of culture'" (Rorty (1995) "The Demonization of Multiculturalism," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 7: 74–75).

14. Thomas Hylland Eriksen points out that arguments critical of the concept of culture could be divided into four: the first concerns the pluralism of words. (Culture can be conceptualized as the opposite of nature, where culture is everything that is learned. Following this position, culture unites people. On the other hand, culture can be that which divides people. This shifts the focus from what is unique to humans to what differentiates them.) The second argument concerns the concept of tracing. (Within any group of people, there are significant variations, and in some cases these variations can be greater than between different cultures.) The third argument refers to the political use of the concept of culture and points out the reduction of the complexity of culture to only a few simplistic categories. The fourth argument concerns the "roughness/awkwardness" of the concept of culture, as it is used in daily life and the media to "explain" any number of conflicts

and problems (when people beat their children, the response could be a simple shrug of the shoulders and reference to "their culture") (Eriksen [2004] *What is Anthropology* [London: Pluto Press]: 28–31). In writing against the concept of culture, Lila Abu-Lughod has offered as her main argument the attempt to think about how to write an ethnography of the Bedouin community (on which she has worked for many years) that would do justice to the complexity, vacillation, and contradiction of everyday life. Ultimately, her conclusion is that the concept of culture, with its inevitable generalizations and typifications, has become the main component of distancing, against which she wishes to struggle. See the reply of Lila Abu-Lughod to Cristoph Brumann, in Brumann (1999) "Writing for Culture: Why a Successful Concept Should Not be Discarded (and Comments and Reply)," *Current Anthropology* 40: 13–15).

15. To quote Marcus: "we as anthropologists feel we can't, yet, do without culture, but how to make it appear in our analyses, how to make it resonate is a very large problem" (Rabinow and Marcus [2006] *Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary* [Durham and London: Duke University Press]: 106–110). In Eriksen's view, it is necessary to be aware of difference, the problem of borders, political abuse, change, flow, and conceptual incorrectness; however, for anthropology it would be equally intellectually suicidal to reject the concept according to which people have different backgrounds, have grown up in different milieus, live (to a greater or lesser degree) in different life-worlds, and see the world in different ways. Therefore, it appears necessary to keep the concept of culture. In an ideal world, however, it should be securely locked in the armoire and brought out only when needed. In most uses of the concept of culture today (in and out of anthropology) there would be no warrant to open the armoire (Eriksen 2004: 31). For similar issues, see Gonzales (1999) "What Will We Do When Culture Does Not Exist Any More," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 30 (4): 431–435.

16. To quote Paul Rabinow: "the term certainly gave us a lot of interesting work and taught us a lot about the world, but it seems tied to too many conditions that don't exist any more" (Rabinow and Marcus 2006: 108).

17. And become insensitive to the "conspiracy of silence" encouraged by multiculturalism—written about by Claire Beckett and Mary Macey (Beckett and Macey 2001).

18. Following Jenkins, in studying identity, we ought always keep in mind that we are speaking about complex processes of identification and guard against occasional reification. It is these processes that have to be "unpacked" before being treated as a "black box" (Jenkins [2008 (1996)] *Social Identity* [London: Routledge]: 15).

19. The genealogy of myth is concerned with the conditions in which the meaning of the myth takes shape, as well as the values that have influenced its creation. Therefore, genealogy of myth cannot be seen as history of myth, nor does it focus on continuity, but just the opposite (Bottici [2007] *A Philosophy of Political Myth* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]: 16–20). In

Foucault's sense, genealogy presupposes the identification of the, so-called, minute of deviation, error, wrong assessment, incorrect calculation at the moment of "birth" of a thing that continues to exist and later acquires significance for us (Foucault [1988] *Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984* [London: Routledge]: 262). Following Foucault, genealogy represents a new form of rebellion: "They (genealogies) are about the insurrection of knowledges. Not so much against the contests, methods, or concepts of a science; this is, above all, primarily, an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in society as ours…Genealogy has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific" (Foucault [1997] *Society Must Be Defended, Lectures at the College de France 1975–76* [New York: Picador]: 9). The basic questions of genealogy are: what types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science? what speaking subject, what discursive subject, what subject of experience and knowledge are you trying to minimize when you begin to say: I speak this discourse, I am speaking a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist? (Foucault 1997: 10).

20. Prior to the arrival of the Ottomans to the Dinaric Alps region of the Balkan Peninsula, there had been several medieval princedoms and feudal states. In the region that would later see the formation of Montenegrin tribes, this was first Duklja, and later Zeta.

5   The Social, Historical, and Political Context of the Relations between NATO and Montenegro

1. Czech, Hungary, and Poland became members of NATO in 1999, but EU members only in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004, and joined the EU three years later, in 2007. Among Montenegro's immediate neighbors, Croatia joined NATO along with Albania in 2009; the former joined the EU only in 2013, whereas the latter has not yet become an EU member. Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) became members of both NATO and the EU in the same year, 2004.

2. Member states of NATO initially were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, Czech, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. In the last round of enlargement in 2009, NATO accepted Croatia and Albania.

3. Decisions within NATO are made exclusively based on *consensus*, that is, general agreement. Although some states have a greater political, economic, and military influence, there is no coercion in making decisions. The principle

of consensus is applied at all levels of the organizational structure of the alliance (NATO Handbook [2005] Public Diplomacy Division, NATO, 1110 Brussels, Belgium: 33). *NATO has no standing army in the classic sense.* All member states that participate in military activities of the alliance place at its disposal troops and equipment, giving an integrated structure to NATO. The military is under control of the member states, and is placed at the disposal of the alliance when it needs to conduct specific missions (Gligorijević and Petrović [2007] *Vodič kroz Partnerstvo za mir* [Beograd: International and Security Affairs Centre]: 15).

4. During the Cold War, relations between the two blocks could not be considered either peaceful or openly hostile. This unnerving peace lasted for decades, with seemingly no end in sight.

5. The Strategic Concept is a document that describes the purpose and tasks of NATO and gives guidelines for the transformation of powers and capabilities of the alliance. The Strategic concept was first published in 1991 and revised in 1999. It describes the specific task of the alliance: to ensure the necessary basis for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment based on development of democratic institutions and a peaceful resolution to conflicts, in which no state would be able to scare or intimidate another state through threat of use of force. Further, as article four of the treaty states, to serve as an essential forum for consultations of allies on any question that affects their vital interests, as well as prevent and defend any threat directed at any member state of NATO, as per articles five and six of the treaty (NATO Handbook 2005: 18–19).

6. For more, see Caspersen (2003) "Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict," *Southeast European Politics* 4 (2–3): 104–121.

7. (a) The Strategy of National Security of Montenegro is a strategic document that defines the development and functioning of the system of national security of Montenegro. It is the expression of the country's commitment to be part of regional and international (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) systems of security…The strategy confirms the commitment of the state of Montenegro to undertake all necessary activities in order to fulfill the conditions for its integration into European, Euro-Atlantic, and other international security structure. Given this, a strategic goal of Montenegro is to become a full member of NATO and the EU in the shortest time. See *Strategija Nacionalne Bezbjednosti Crne Gore* [Strategy of National Security of Montenegro] (2008).(b) The Strategy of Defense of Montenegro is a document that gives answers to the most important questions regarding the functioning and development of a defense system. This document issues from the Constitution of Montenegro and Strategy of National Security, the presentational document of Montenegro for Partnership for Peace, and its strategic commitment to European and Euro-Atlantic integration…With the goal of realizing a strategic defense goal, Montenegro is directed toward the realization of the following defensive aims: (1) the construction of credible defense capabilities, (2) development of interoperational capabilities of Montenegro

for participation in peacekeeping activities in the world, (3) contribution to the construction of a secure and stable region, (4) development of partnerships and cooperation with other democratic states, (5) development of other necessary capabilities for entry into NATO and the EU. See *Strategija Odbrane Crne Gore* [Strategy of Defense of Montenegro] (2008).

8. (a) Montenegro shares the values of the alliance—respect and preservation of democratic societies, respect of principles of international law, fulfillment of the responsibilities of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, as well as international agreements about disarmament and control of armament, refraining from threats or use of force against other states, and respect of existing borders and resolution of disputes through peaceful means. For all these reasons, Montenegro wishes to be part of NATO. Montenegro is aware of the necessity of comprehensive reforms in order to fulfill this goal. See *Prezentacioni Dokument Republike Crne Gore* [Presentational Document of the Republic of Montenegro] (2007).(b) Expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the region of Western Balkans will strengthen and further develop the domain of common values that NATO members share (democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights). This will further stabilize and unite a region that shares common goals and integrative processes. See *Strategija Nacionalne Bezbjednosti Crne Gore* [Strategy of National Security of Montenegro] (2008).

9. After parliamentary elections held in 2012, the coalition *European Montenegro* (comprising long-term partners *Democratic Party of Socialists* (DPS) and *Social Democratic Party* (SDP), and joined by the *Liberal Party* (LP)) had parliamentary majority (together with the *Bosniak Party* (BP), *Croatian Civil Initiative* (HGI), and the Albanian parties *Forca* and *Albanian Coalition*). Membership to NATO is set as a foreign policy priority in the programs of all the parties in the ruling coalition (the *Liberal Party* went from being a party advocating military neutrality to a party advocating membership in NATO). The recently established *Montenegrin Democratic Union* and Citizens' Movement *United for Reform Action (URA)* are also in favor of joining NATO. The opposition parties in the latest parliament are the coalition *Democratic Front* (made up of *New Serbian Democracy*, *Movement for Change*, a portion of *Socialist People's Party*, portion of NGO activists, and unaffiliated individuals), the *Socialist National Party* (SNP), and the new party on Montenegro's political scene, *Positive Montenegro*. Of the opposition parties, *Positive Montenegro* is strongly in favor of membership in NATO. The *Democratic Front* is a colorful coalition (NSD is against membership to NATO, but PZP is for membership, part of SNP within the *Democratic Front* is against), and the relationship of the *Socialist National Party* toward NATO is also undefined. When it comes to the voters' relation to NATO, an interesting study was done by the agency Ipsos Public Affairs. The results of their study showed that almost three-quarters of voters of the coalition of *European Montenegro* are in favor of membership in NATO (with 18 percent against), two-thirds of *Bosniak Party* voters are for NATO

(with 23 percent against), 55 percent of the voters of *Positive Montenegro* supports membership to NATO (35 percent is opposed), and every fifth voter of the *Socialist National Party* supports membership (with 69 percent against), every twelfth voter of *Democratic Front* supports Montenegrin membership to NATO (three-quarters being against). Ipsos Public Affairs states that there is an obvious long-term increase in support of Montenegrin citizenry for NATO (in 2009 it was 31 percent, in 2013, 40 percent), while the proportion of those against has remained almost identical (2009, 38 percent, and 2013, 39 percent). The increase in support to NATO comes from the previously undecided citizens or those who said that they would not vote in a potential referendum regarding Montenegro's membership in NATO. If the referendum for NATO had been held in July 2013, the voter response would have been 60 percent, of which 48 percent would have been in favor, 47 percent against, and 5 percent would have been undecided. (Ipsos Public Affairs, 2013). For more, see Radoman (2007) Debata u Crnoj Gori o pristupanju NATO/ *Western Balkans Security Observer* 5: 14–21.

10. Interview with Vučinić, B., Minister of Defense. In *Partner* (2008a) "Interview with B. Vučinić, Minister of Defense," in *Aktivan partner u programu Partnerstvo za Mir*, *Partner* 2008 (3): 5.
11. Ibid. In *Partner* (2008b) "Interview with B. Vučinić, Minister of Defense," in *Bezbjednost preduslov ekonomskog prosperiteta*, *Partner* 2008 (2): 11.
12. Interview with Tahirović, M., Deputy Minister of Defense. In *Partner* (2008c) "Interview with Tahirović, M., Deputy Minister of Defense," in *Partnerstvo za mir—suština i značaj*, *Partner* 2008 (1): 11.
13. Interview with Lukšić, I., Vice President of the Government of Montenegro. In Latković (2009).
14. Interview with Krivokapić, R., President of the Parliament of Montenegro. In Latković (2008).
15. Ibid.
16. Despotović, I. (2009a) *NATO u komšiluku*, *Partner* 2009 (14): 7.
17. Vučurović, J. Spokesperson for *New Serbian Democracy*. In NOVA (2009a).
18. Radović, M., vice president of the *People's Party*. In NS (2008a); Guberinić, S., High functionary of the *People's Party*. In NS (2008b).
19. Radović, M., vice president of the *People's Party*. In NS (2008a).
20. Arguments are multiple, and one of the more basic ones hit at the essence of this organization, since it was created as a reaction to the formation of the Warsaw pact and a balance to the socialist way of government. Instead of ceasing with operations after the dissolution of that model of government and the Warsaw pact, NATO has given itself new goals and tasks. Radović, M., vice president of the *People's Party*. In NS (2008a).
21. Harović, E. Spokesperson for *Liberal Party* in LP (2007); Our project is not entry into NATO, with all due respect to the greatest military alliance. We think that after the horrors through which we have gone in the last century, particularly in the most recent, terrible war in which Montenegro brought shame on itself, the country ought to demilitarize. We are a small country of

440,000 people and do not require an army, nor big expenditure for a military. Instead of entry to military alliances, we ought to declare neutrality. Živković, M. president of the *Liberal Party*. In Vukčević (2007).

22. Vučurović, J. Spokesperson for *New Serbian Democracy*. In NOVA (2009b).
23. The *People's Party* was the first to begin a serious campaign against NATO. In the elections held in 2012, they were not able to garner enough votes for entry into parliament.
24. IN4S (2009a).
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with Mandić. A., president of the New Serbian Democracy and vice president of the Democratic front. In NOVA (2013).
27. In practice, the *Liberal Party* quickly abandoned its initial position on demilitarization.
28. Theories of international relations offer several mechanisms through which international actors, such as international organizations, can influence the behavior of a state. In that sense, two mechanisms in particular are of greater relevance (and most often connected): the conditionality of membership, and the methods encompassing a broad set of processes of socialization (Kelley [2004] "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions," *International Organization* 58 [3]: 425–457, 446–449). While some authors claim that socialization in its true sense (internalization of new group norms through encouragement and/ or communicative action) can be found in international institutions, others are skeptical with regard to these claims and suggest that adaptation to institutional norms is, above all, strategic behavior (Johnston [2005] "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and beyond Europe," *International Organization* 59 [4]: 1013–1044). About these issues, see more in Gheciu (2005) "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe,'" *International Organization* 59 (4): 973–1012; Kydd (2001) "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," *International Organization* 55 (4): 801–828; Pevehose (2002) "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization," *International Organization* 56 (3): 515–549; and Waterman et al. (2001–2002) "NATO and Democracy," *International Security* 26 (3): 221–235.

6   The Reproduction of Contemporary Montenegrin Identity in the Context of NATO and EU Membership: Is NATO Solidifying or Fracturing the Montenegrin Identity?

1. Nationalism is almost always designated as something that is "theirs," on "the periphery," and "far from us." "The separatists, the fascists and the guerrillas are the problem of nationalism. The ideological habits, by which 'our' nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and, thereby, not noted" (Billig [2002 (1995)] *Banal Nationalism* [London: SAGE Publications]: 6).

2. Dajević, S. and Radoman, I. (2008) *Proslava Martinićke bitke*, *Partner* 2008 (6): 3.

3. Despotović, I. (2008a) *Stogodišnjica bitke na Grahovcu*, *Partner* 2008 (4): 26.

4. Despotović, I. (2008b) *13. Jul—Dan Državnosti*, *Partner* 2008 (6): 26.

5. Despotović, I. (2009b) *Politički pacifizam*, *Partner* 2009 (18): 7–8.

6. Ibid.

7. Despotović, I. (2008b).

8. As examples of meta-discursive practices of the Montenegrin state elite, we have taken the inaugural speeches of the President of Montenegro and the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, as well as their official addresses to the public on the occasions of Statehood Day and Independence Day.

9. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2009).

10. Vučinić, B. Minister of Defense (2008a).

11. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2008).

12. The Parliament of Montenegro (2009).

13. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2010b).

14. SDP (2011).

15. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2009).

16. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2007).

17. Radoman, I. (2009b) *Sjećanje na borce za nezavisnost*, *Partner* 2009 (15): 3.

18. Crnogorski glasnik 63 (2010) *Krivokapić položio vijenac na Lovćenu* [online] May/june 2010. Available from: http://issuu.com/vijececg/docs/glasnik-br.63/14.

19. Djurić, N. (2006) *Ispravljanje Svetog Petra Cetinjskog* [online] September 3, 2006. Available from: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/t5602.lt.html.

20. Adžić, N. (2008) *Dan vojske Crne Gore, Tudjemilska bitka*, *Partner* (1): 26.

21. For staff sergeant first class, Branko Drobnjak, participation in a peacekeeping mission is a necessary item in the biography of any professional soldier: "in the career path of any professional soldier, one necessary item for advancement is participation in a peace keeping mission. It is a kind of specialization in military affairs. The professional soldier has to prove that he is ready to face the challenges of the contemporary world and protect his country from all contemporary risks." Dr. Burić of Montenegro's medical team pointed out the material reasons as significant in making the decision to participate in peace keeping missions: "I do not own my own home. With military benefits given to participants in these missions, the possibility of career advancement and acquiring higher rank, the advantages in possible home acquisition, not to mention the pay raise, are all motives for most of the soldiers to travel." In Jovićević (2009) *Mirovne misije su dio vojne profesije*, [online] August 12, 2009. Available from: http://www.paluba.info/smf/index.php?topic=5781.0.

22. The Cabinet of the President of Government of Montenegro (2013).

23. For more on the creation of the cult of Russia in Montenegro, see *Istorija Crne Gore. Knjiga treća* (1975) (Titograd: Redakcija za istoriju Crne Gore): 325–373.

24. For example, in a speech in June 1796, on the eve of the battle of Martinići, Petar I Petrović Njegoš says: "to show (the enemy) that in us our Serbian

hearts continue to beat, and Serbian blood surges." Three months later, in the speech on the eve of the battle of Krusi, he calls the Montenegrins Serbian knights.

25. If one wished to be poetic about it, we can be pathetic and speak about the "death" of the great narrative, as a precondition for the "birth" of integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations. In a sense, NATO would be the guarantor of immortality and eternity of Montenegro.

26. For the purposes of this text, I have given special attention to the narrative representations of the battles of Martinići and Grahovac, because they were selected over other events from Montenegrin history by the monthly *Partner*. However, a narrative conceived like this—with clearly defined central points (centering around years 1878, 1918, and 2006)—is quite "flexible" and appropriate for absorbing other elements. This is particularly true of Montenegrin victorious battles that took place before 1878, such that this narrative, depending on the situation, can be complemented by certain new elements. For example, the narrative of the army of Montenegro, which took as its day October 7th, includes the day of the Battle of Tudjemil, which took place in 1042 (836 years before the Congress of Berlin).

27. This is of course not in the formal sense in which self-reliance could be equated with sovereignty, but in the sense of leaving semantic space within which the ideas of being self-reliant and not being so could be imbued with various meanings.

28. See note 28 in chapter 5.

7   Controversies Surrounding Membership in NATO in Private Discourses: The Citizens' Viewpoint

1. See more in Brković (2013) "The Quest for Legitimacy: Discussing Language and Sexuality in Montenegro," in *Mirroring Europe*, ed. Tanja Petrović, 163–185 (Leiden: Brill); and Caspersen (2003) "Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict," *Southeast European Politics* 4 (2–3).

2. This narrative ground includes ethnographic and historical records, as well as traditional folklore material (songs, legends, myths, family narratives, etc.). In that sense, it could be simplified as everything that has been written or sung orally.

3. Speaking of these issues, I would like to make a small digression. In accordance with theoretical principles of cognitive anthropology and the concept of narrative identity, let me point out a phenomenon I will call "two-way narrative interplay." The phenomenon of "two-way narrative interplay" has for a long time permeated the identity relations of Montenegro and Serbia, and becomes particularly prominent if we analyze the person and oeuvre of Petar II Petrović Njegoš, on one hand, and the myth of Kosovo, on the other. Namely, in chapter 3, I have pointed to the key role Njegoš and, in particular, his narrative *Mountain Wreath* played in the formation of modern

Montenegrin identity. There is no doubt that Njegoš was strongly influenced by his teacher and mentor, the Serbian poet and patriot, Sima Milutinović Sarajlija. Under his influence, Njegoš interlaced his own narratives with certain values not at the time characteristic of Montenegrin society, but which have in the meantime come to form the very core of Montenegrin identity through subsequent transmission. In contrast, there is abundant ethnographic material that testifies that the myth of Kosovo has been preserved best precisely in Montenegro (and Herzegovina). Through the transmission of this myth, Serbia accepted a worldview characteristic of the patriarchal warrior society. The "two-way narrative interplay" projected onto Montenegro certain national ideals characteristic of nineteenth-century Serbia; at the same time, a patriarchal, warrior worldview of Montenegro was projected onto Serbia. In projecting Serbian national ideal onto Montenegro, a key role was played by Serbian intellectual elites, whereas the Montenegrin patriarchal warrior society was projected onto Serbia through epic poetry. As we can see, in the first case, the expansion of cultural influences came from the top toward the bottom (from intellectual elites). In the second, it rose up from the bottom (national epic poetry). For over a century and a half, this two-way narrative interplay has permeated the processes of identity formation in Montenegro and Serbia.

4. CEDEM (2014) *Stavovi javnog mnjenja Crne Gore o NATO integracijama* [online] September 2014. The authoritative study by the NGO "Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM)" from September 2014 shows that if a referendum on Montenegrin membership in NATO were to be held now, 45 percent of the population would vote against, 35 percent would vote in favor, and that 20 percent would remain undetermined. When this is looked at through the various nationalities, only 9.3 percent of Serbs in Montenegro would support Montenegro's joining NATO. For example, among Albanians the number is 77.6 percent, among Bosnians/Muslims, 53.8 percent, and among Montenegrins, 39.8 percent. A significant number of Montenegrins and Bosnians/Muslims are still undecided on the issue, while the undecided voters among Serbs and Albanians are miniscule.

5. The fear that NATO membership will tear Montenegro's ties with Orthodoxy is also present in discourses that include the relationship of Montenegro and Russia, which we will see further on in this chapter.

6. On the question of the Montenegrin language, see Brković (2013).

7. I have already pointed out that Gezemans says that old Montenegrins held the belief that the Russian Emperor is familiar with prominent Montenegrin heroes, knows the precise location of their mountain homes, and ask after their health (Gezeman [1968] *Čojstvo i junaštvo starih Crnogoraca* [Cetinje: Obod]: 199).

8. For example, in the conflict between the vice president of SFRY, Tito, and the president of USSR, Stalin, in 1948, there were not a few Montenegrins who supported Stalin. For this support, a number of Montenegrins were imprisoned, brutally tortured, and killed. Apart from that, this conflict provided

Tito with an opportunity to square accounts internally, and a large number of citizens of SFRY were arrested on the charge of supporting Stalin.

9. Putin's public image corresponds to some of the statements put out: "Putin gave Russia back her pride," "Finally Russia has a president who can stand up to the West," "Putin will make an example out of Ukrain to show how strong Russia is," "Now that Putin is president, NATO can no longer play around with Russia," "If he so wishes, Putin will enter Kiev with tanks," "Napoleon fell when he attacked Russia, Hitler fell when he attacked Russia, and NATO will fall if it attacks Russia."

10. The relationship of Russia and Montenegro was often dictated by mutual interest, but in Montenegrin tribal society, this relationship acquired numerous mythic characteristics that were transmitted to later periods (e.g., the period of World War II or the period of Socialism). The analysis of the cult of Russia in Montenegro must combine anthropological and critical historiography approaches. Aside from the available historiographic and ethnographic material, the analysis of the cult must include fieldwork. In addition to being anthropologically interesting in itself, the cult of Russia in Montenegro is interesting for its instrumentalization in politics (including, of course, the debate regarding NATO). The consideration of these topics will probably be the subject of my next book.

11. On DPS's request, the marketing agency Ipsos Strategic Marketing conducted a study regarding identity questions. When asked who they thought best represented the values of their country, the citizens of Montenegro gave first place to Njegoš, followed closely by Milo Djukanović. Only after Njegoš and Djukanović are placed Josip Broz Tito, King Nikola, St. Peter of Cetinje, Marko Miljanov, and Prince Danilo (RTCG (2013) *Djukanović ispred Tita, kralja Nikole* [online] December 21, 2013. Available from: http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/politika/35685/djukanović-ispred-tita-kralja-nikole.html).

12. It is interesting to note that when DPS activists are unsatisfied with a particular state of affairs in certain segments of society or with the activities of the party in general, whether at the state or local level (particularly when it comes to unsatisfactory filling of positions), they are in the habit of saying that "Milo Djukanović does not have the right information" or that "his advisors are keeping information from him," and so on.

13. Local committees are the smallest party units of DPS. In general, each city district or larger village in each Montenegro county has its local committee made up of DPS activists, who are residents of the city or the village. For example, Cetinje is a town of some 17,000 people with 30 active local committees.

14. In the previous chapter we saw that the 1999 NATO bombing is an event that defined the relationship of Montenegrin Serbs toward NATO; in this view, Djukanović's policies from 1999 are acts of treason.

15. The coat of arms of the Republic of Croatia is a red-and-white checkerboard. It is informally known as "šahovnica," meaning chessboard.

16. The basic mechanisms cited for "ensuring the vote" are provision of employment, career advancement, or other benefits offered in exchange for giving one's vote to the ruling coalition. It is thought that in addition to the person whose vote was secured in this way, the person's family will also cast the vote in the same fashion. Whenever the subject of election abuse is brought up, DPS is almost always talked about as the greater coalition partner. SDP is mentioned only as the party that gives support to DPS and silently overlooks such "election engineering" in order to remain in power.

8   The Montenegrin Warrior Tradition in the Arguments for and against NATO: Private Discourses and Formal Political Forums

1. "Language game" is a term primarily connected to Wittgenstein, but my inspiration to undertake this methodological procedure came from an example given by Lyotard. Lyotard cites the statement "the university is ill," given in an exchange or conversation that places the sender (the one who speaks) and the recipient (the one who accepts) into a special position: the sender is put in the position of "knower" or expert (he knows what is happening with the university), whereas the recipient is put in the position of agreeing or disagreeing (Lyotard [2005 (1979)] *Postmoderno stanje* [Zagreb: Ibis grafika]: 11–14).

2. "As part of their occupation of Europe, the Ottomans destroyed the state of Zeta in 1499, which carried the name of Montenegro from the middle of the fifteenth century. However, they were never fully able to subject it to their government. Thus begins the centuries long, bloody war between the Ottoman empire and the Montenegrin people. The latter fought to the death because their national existence was threatened…Due to its importance for life and nation, the concept of battle was built into the overall social organization, the economy, and life of Montenegro…During the early Ottoman aggression against Montenegro, the goal of the Montenegrins was to defend themselves. Later their goal broadened, their desire and hope was the liberation of the rest of the Balkan people from Ottoman oppression." As an example, see Pešić (1996).

3. DPS (2008) *Lokalni izbori u Kotoru, završna konvencija* [online] November 6, 2008. Available from: www.dps.org.me.

4. SDP (2009) *Besjeda predsjednika SDP-a Ranka Krivokapića povodom izbora za predsjednika Skupštine Crne Gore.* [online] May 6, 2009. Available from: http://sdp.co.me/Aktuelnosti/2382.

5. Djukanović, O (2010) *Za buduće generacije bez rata*, *Partner* 2009 (22): 11.

6. Danilović, G (2009) *Panel discussion: NATO—yes or no?* (September 3, Donja Berzna).

7. Vučurović, J. Spokesperson for *New Serbian Democracy*. In DAN (2012) *Vlast hoće silom u NATO* [online] May 5, 2012; NOVA (2009a) Vučurović, J. Spokesperson for New Serbian Democracy, *Nova srpska demokratija je protiv*

članstva Crne Gore u NATO-u [online] April 4, 2009. Available from: www.nova.org.me.

8. DAN (2012).
9. IN4S (2009a).
10. DAN (2012).
11. The Program of Liberal Party (2013).
12. Harović, E. Spokesperson for *Liberal Party*. In LP (2007).
13. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2010a).
14. Lalošević, V. Member of Parliament from the *Socialist People's Party* in IN4S (2009b).
15. Danilović, G. Vice President of the *New Serbian Democracy* in IN4S (2009b).
16. Mandić, A. President of *New Serbian Democracy* in IN4S (2009b).
17. According to the relevant historical literature, the Montenegrin unit on Crete, one of the world's first modern peace keeping missions, executed its task professionally. From the very beginning, the Montenegrins left an impression on the International Police Committee and the military attaches of disciplined, honorable, reliable, and dutiful soldiers, and were thus well respected. Foreign officers wished that their patrols contain at least one Montenegrin because they felt safer with them. Montenegrins were often leaders of units, meticulous and just, and there were cases of not wishing to return home, even when gravely ill. The Montenegrins were fair even to the Muslim population of Crete, protecting it from the revenge of the Greeks. The people of Crete, both Greek and Muslim, respected the Montenegrins out of a sense of justice and protection of people from both violence and abuse. Thus the Montenegrin police officers garnered respect and instilled confidence all around with their dutiful service and virtue. This established the Montenegrin unit on Crete as a secure element keeping the peace on a problematic island. For more, see Babić (2006).
18. Radoman, I. (2009a).
19. *Partner* (2008d: 11).
20. The Cabinet of the President of Montenegro (2010a).
21. Vučinić, B. Minister of Defense (audio record from press conference), in Ministry of Defense (2009).
22. DAN (2009). *Crnogorski vojnici u Avganistanu* [online] July 25, 2009. Available from: http://www.dan.cg.yu/index.php?nivo=3&rubrika=Politika&datum=2009-07-25&clanak=195289 [accessed: September 13, 2009].
23. Ibid.
24. Despotović, I. (2009b) *Politički pacifizam*, *Partner* 2009 (18): 7–8. A Member of Parliament, during a session, said that by sending troops to Afghanistan, the Montenegrin army will become an occupational force…If said Member wanted to become "infamous" by qualifying the mission as "occupying," and if in that way he wished to "protect" the honor and dignity of the army of Montenegro, he has in fact, above all, ignored its past. The Member says that, by passing the act of participating in peace keeping missions, the Parliament

is the "first" to adopt a decision making our military an "occupying" force, but he forgets that this precedent does not belong to this Parliament. The army of Montenegro has already been, at the end of the nineteenth century, an "occupying force" when its troops were, in far greater numbers, sent to Crete, also to a peace keeping mission, where they ensured the truce between the Greeks and the Turks. To be honest, the decision was not made by the Parliament at the time, but by the sovereign himself, prince Nikola, in the conviction that he is thus bolstering the reputation of his country in Europe. About which he was right. Montenegro did indeed, as a result of the military role in Crete, gain stronger diplomatic trust in European governments. Peace keeping missions were later, for other countries too, matters of prestige. Former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], a country of some repute, sent its troops to peace keeping missions in Sinai, a conflict zone between Egypt and Israel. Yugoslav troops were among the most respected in that mission, and brought dignity to their country in an extremely divided and conflicted world. And, by the way, Montenegrins participated in that "occupying" mission.

25. Revija D. (2009).

26. Internet forums (2008/2009/2010).

27. Stevan Pavlov Kilibarda died in the American army in World War I. Vaso Brajović participated in the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire. Vasojević Leko Saičić was a "missionary" in the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese war. Rade Baković died fighting in the American army in World War I. The Spanish Civil War featured Peko Dapčević and Veljko Vlahović. See Despotović, I. (2008c) *Pogled na mirovne misije*, *Partner* 2008 (2): 7–8.

28. This event has been largely forgotten in Montenegro. It was also forgotten in Britain, until certain documents of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) were unearthed. The headquarters of the British SOE and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were located in Bari—both organizations were secret, tasked with "setting Europe alight" by helping local resistance movements that operated behind German lines.

29. The field in Donja Brezna was used for as many as 80 departures per day, evacuating and transporting to safe territory some one thousand wounded Partisan fighters and Allied crew members. The air strip was defended by the Montenegrin Third Division and Sixth Lika Division. This was the last chance for the wounded, because advancing German units were only a few hours away from the village. Less than an hour upon the last airplane's departure from Donja Brezna, enemy troops occupied the village and runway.

30. It is immanent to Montenegro's past as well. It would not be the first time that Montenegro participated in supporting peace, which is a little bit in the very nature of our people (Despotović 2008c).

31. The cultural relations center/periphery are not, in any given point in time, a complete reflection of political and economic power. For example, in the case of America, the unity of economic, political and cultural influence cannot be denied. However, the global cultural influence of the USSR in the world (in

the decades it was at its height), remained modest compared to its political and military might (Hannerz 2002: 38).

32. For example, the influence of countries of the Third World on the West (Hannerz 2002: 39).

33. When writing their dissertations, anthropologists are often under pressure from these two extremes. For more, see Rabinow and Marcus (2006) *Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary* (Durham and London: Duke University Press): 109.

34. Of course, for an authoritative claim, one would have to conduct a detailed comparison with the debates regarding NATO membership held in other countries—certainly an interesting field of research.

9   Concluding Remarks

1. Barjaktarović (1948) "Prilog proučavanju tobelija (zavetovanih devojaka)," in *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu 1*, ed. Dušan Nedeljković, 343–351 (Beograd: Naučna knjiga); (1966) "Problem tobelija (virdžina) na Balkanskom poluostrvu," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja u Beogradu* 28/29: 273–286.

2. About Sandžak, see more in Morrison and Roberts (2013) *The Sandžak: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

3. Speaking of these issues, I pointed out the phenomenon of "two-way narrative interplay." The "two-way narrative interplay" projected onto Montenegro certain national ideals characteristic of nineteenth-century Serbia; at the same time, a patriarchal, warrior worldview of Montenegro was projected onto Serbia. For over a century and a half this two-way narrative interplay has permeated the processes of identity formation in Montenegro and Serbia.

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