ИНСТИТУТ ЗА СРПСКОХРВАТСКИ ЈЕЗИК

ЈУЖНОСЛОВЕНСКИ ФИЛОЛОГ

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VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN LANGUAGE STANDARDIZATION

1. Referring to Jespersen's article in *Scientia* (1914, p. 228 ff.) and his famous book *Mankind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View* (1925), B. Havránek begins his paper at the 4th International Congress of Linguists at Copenhagen (1936) with the following question: „Ist überhaupt die Sprachnorm, die Normierung der Schriftsprache und die Sprachkultur ein Thema der Linguistik, gehört dies zu ihren wissenschaftlichen Aufgaben? Soll der Sprachforscher nur Beobachter bleiben oder kann er selbst eingreifen?"[1] Havránek himself and his colleagues and followers from the Prague Linguistic School answered the question positively, elaborated a theory of standard language and its standardization (and cultivation), and succeeded in practical applications of it. Even though their endeavour has not remained restricted to Czech and Slovak only,[2] this aspect of Prague School linguistics has become far less known than some others.

In fact, the Prague School linguistics has offered the first theory of the Standard Language (SL) and thus furnished the activities of „normative linguistics", „language planning" etc., with a scientific base. The said theory may be summarizingly characterized

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[1] See *Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Linguistes*, Copenhagen, 1936, pp. 151—156. Reprinted in J. Vachek (ed.), *A Prague School Reade in Linguistics*, Bloomington, 1964, pp. 413—420.

[2] The functional theory of the standard language (influenced by ideas of some Russian and Soviet scholars) has been accepted and applied not only in Slavonic languages, but elswhere, even in South America (P. L. Garvin: The standard language problem: concepts and methods, reprinted in: *On Linguistic Method*, The Hague, 1964, 153—158. Same: Aspectos sociolingüisticos de la lingua nacional: La experiencia checa y el trabajo de la Escuela de Praga, in: *Programa interamericano de Lingüistica e Ensino de Línguas*. O simpósio de Sao Paulo, 1969.). The renewed interest of Soviet linguists in the theoretical problems of SL (cf., at least, the volume *Aktual'nyje problemy kuľtury reči*, Moskva 1970, and the corresponding chapters in the first volume of *Obščee jazykoznanie*, Moskva 1971) explicitly carries on these functional traditions. — An overview may be found in A. Jedlička, *Spisovný jazyk v současné komunikaci* [Standard language in present-day communication], Praha 1974.

by the following three principles: (1) functionalism, (2) normativism, (3) dynamic synchronism. According to (1), SL is determined and delimited by the specific (social) functions to which it is called forth to serve;[2a] the highest evaluating criterion is, therefore, the adequacy of the given means to the given function; the system of the means of SL[3] reveals inner functional differentiation and stylistic dissimilation; the main types of special utilization for different functions are: intelectualization (rationalization), automation and desautomation (foregrounding). According to (2) the dichotomy of norm vs. codification is established: the norm, defined as the ensemble of language means obligatorily used, underlines the inherent (intrinsic, imanent) character of it (it exists within the language, is a genuine social phenomenon, connected with the institutional character of language[4] and cannot be simply identified with linguistic usage without the qualification „collective"), whereas the codification of the norm (in the form of various „normative" handbooks, dictionaries, school-grammars) represents a phenomenon existing outside the language, serving practical aims and enabling the linguists to influence the norm in a desirable direction. According to (3) the optimal state of SL is that of flexible stability (dynamic baance).

In the latest decade or so we have witnessed in the world a new interest in the social aspect of language study and in practical questions of standardization, language planning, normative or prescriptive linguistics, institutional linguistics, practical linguistics, language policy, or what names may be applied to the given phenomena. When trying to ascertain the reasons

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[2a] A general characterization (though not a definition) of SL may be found in „Thèses", published in *TCLP* 1 (1929, p. 16): „La distinction de la langue littéraire se fait grâce au rôle qu'elle joue, grâce en particulier aux exigences supérieures qu'elle se voit imposer, en comparaison du langage populaire: la langue littéraire exprime la vie de culture et de civilisation (fonctionnement et résultats de la pensée scientifique, philosophique et religieuse, politique et sociale, juridique et administrative)". — P. Garvin and. M. Mathiot (cf. The standard language problem, p. 155) tried to define SL as „a codified form of language, accepted by, and serving as a model to, a large community" and — developing the Prague tradition — proposed three sets of criteria for ascertaining the degree of language standardization: (1) the intrinsic properties of SL, (2) the functions of SL within the culture of a community, (3) the attitudes of the community towards SL. — The recent Soviet definitions of SL (op. cit. in Note 2, underline the historical character of the category of SL and — in contradistinction to substandard varieties of a national language — its highest social position, and elaboratedness of its norm, as well as the richness of its stylistic differentiation according to its numerous specific communicative functions in the sphere of culture and civilization.

[3] The term „means of language" (Cz.: „jazykové prostředky") seems to be not customary and quite clear in English, but it is justified by the functional conception of language, as it has been formulated in the „Theses": „la language est un système de moyens d'expression appropriés à un but" (see „Thèses présentées au Premier Congrès des philologues slaves", TCLP I, 1929, 5).

[4] The influence of Durkheim (mediated also by de Saussure) may be traced here; cf. also E. Coseriu: *Sistema, norma y habla,* Montevideo 1952.

and incentives of this new interest and orientation, we find that they derive both from the immanent development of the linguistic science as a whole, and from the extralinguistic social factors. Let us mention at least the following ones: (1) the onesidedness of the descriptivist as well as generativist approach, the traditions of the anthropological linguistics and ethnolinguistics in America, and the European functionalist linguistic tradition (with its forrunners, e.g. Noreen,[5] Jespersen); (2) the increasing interest in languages of Africa, and South and East Asia (revealing unexpectedly complicated relations between political, ethnical, social and linguistic structures, and a very deep linguistic stratification and diversification[6]); (3) the revival of nationalism; (4) the impact of practical needs of language standardization and planning in newly created or not yet fully established standard languages; (5) the impact of modern technique and technology (automation, information retrieval, etc.), bringing forth new aspects and activities of „applied linguistics", and, at the same time, calling forth some deliberate changes and modifications of linguistic standards (e.g., of technical terminology); (6) the recent interest of science in transitional or boundary domains between adjacent disciplines.[7]

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[5] A. Noreen, Über Sprachrichtigkeit *IF* 1 (1892), 95—157. Noreen's ideas provoked a discussion (cf. Jespersen's book *Mankind, Nation and Individual...*, Ch. V) and influenced, to a certain degree, some Prague School linguists as well (thus, e.g., V. Mathesius, in his programmative article from 1932 *O požadavku stability ve spisovném jazyce* [The requirement of stability for a standard language] rejects the criterion of „historical purity" as well as „a total freedom and arbitrariness" and recommends „the principle of practical serviceability": the parallelism to Noreen's criteria, namely the „literary-historical" view (or, more precisely, linguistic-historical), the „natural-historical" view (*laisser faire*), and the „rational" view (standard of expediency), seems to be evident.

[6] Cf. the following statement by the sociologist J. Useem „Sociologists accustomed to a society that coincides with a nation-state would find in many non-Western societies unique opportunities to explore the issues originally posed by Park on the role of language in society". *Items*, 17 (1963), No 3, p. 29 f.

[7] Cf. *Actes du Xe Congrès international des linguistes*, I, Bucharest, 1969, p. 75—111. The import of boundary domains was pointed out by Engels and by the founder of cybernetics, N. Wiener. It is worth noting that Wiener — whose father was a philologist — expressed some very interesting opinions concerning the correctness of language, esp. in his book *Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society*. On the one hand he disregards grammatical purism and school authoritarianism, but on the other hand he fully understands the merits of O. Jespersen for a scientifically grounded theory of the standard language. Wiener rightly assumes that the primary task of the study of grammar is to discover what „code" we use in fact, but, at the same time, he is fully aware of the fact that „in the more subtle study of language the normative questions play their role and are of a very different character. They are the highest and finest flower of the problems of communication, but they do not constitute their most fundamental stage".

It is worth noting that the question posited by Havránek was raised and answered anew by E. Haugen some thirty years later. In his paper *Linguistics and language planning*[8] he tries „to formulate once again, for our generation, the nature of linguistic normalization and the potential role of the linguist in codifying norms and giving them the sanction of authority". He proposes to be „neither pro- nor anti-normative, but to insist that correctness in language is a linguistic problem and ...is worth of the attention of linguistic science". He assumes that the line separating the prescriptive and the descriptive activities is a thin one, and „in our day of social science, the description of norms and values is not regarded as an entirely unscientific procedure" ... „Even if this is not a pure science, it is unquestionably an application of linguistic technology which will classify as one branch of applied linguistics".[9]

It appears that it is the notion of social values and of evaluation that is mostly responsible for the periodically recurrent hesitations of linguists to acknowledge the problems of language standardization[10] as a legitimate branch of linguistics. This situation has been sharply characterized by J. Orenstein:[11]

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[8] See: W. Bright (ed.), Sociolinguistics, *Proceedings of the UCLA Sociolinguistic Conference* (1964), The Hague, 1966, p. 50 ff.

[9] Haugen's older standpoint seems to be somewhat weaker. In his article Planning for a Standard Language in Norway (*Anthropological Linguistics* 1959, 1) he says: „Linguists tend to look askance on normative linguistics, because it brings in an element which is not purely scientific ... Linguistics as such is obviously not equipped to deal with these problems, which belong in the realm of social and political values. But linguists will no doubt continue to leave opinions on the subject". Haugen's new position is probably due to the recent development of sociolinguistics and to the influence of the Prague theory of SL (cf., e.g., his use of the Praguian terms „codification of norms").

[10] I wonder what term to use in order to cover the whole field of activities under discussion (cf. here on page 4). I prefer, in English, the term „standardization" (used, e.g., in the title of P.S. Ray's book, see Note 19), though I do not find it ideal, the etymological relationship to „standard languages" showing advantages as well as disadvantages. In my usage, standardization also covers Mathesius' and Havránek's „cultivation of language". (Cf. also Neustupny's „policy approach" and „cultivation approach".)

[11] In the discussion of V. Tauli's paper on the theory of „practical linguistics" at the 9th Congress of Linguists, 1962 (see *Proceedings* of the Congress, The Hague 1964, p. 608 f.). Tauli's book *Introduction to a Theory of Language Planning* (Uppsala 1968) should be remembered in this connection. — A comprehensive treatment of „language planning" presents the collective volume *Can language be planned?* (edited by J. Rubin and B. Jernudd), Honolulu 1971 (cf. especially the contribution by J. Rubin „Evalution and language planning", 217—252).

„It is no exageration to say that sociolinguistics has been one of the most neglected areas of our field. While the social scientists have not hesitated to intervene in virtually every aspect of human affairs, linguists, by contrast, have suffered from inhibitions as regards the study and analysis of social phenomena into which, as specialists in communication, they might have insight. As a result of this timidity, linguists have often remained outside the mainstream of events, concerning themselves exclusively with technical matters".

Anyone who is not blinded by some kind of purely formalistic approach must acknowledge that language is a social phenomenon *kat'exokhen* and, consequently, the science of language ranks among social sciences.[12] Recognizing this we have to do with the crucial question of modern scientism, namely that of the so-called „value-neutrality" in social sciences. First of all a perfect detachment of values is impossible in any science whatsoever. This fact is conceded not only by theoreticians of social sciences, such as C. L. Stevenson[13] or C. W. Mills,[14] but also by theorists such as E. Nagel,[15] whose approach and statements are more rigorous. As for the social sciences (sciences of man), it is evident that they inevitable have to do with values and evaluation, the more so in the case of their practical applications.[16] Investigations in sociolinguistics have certain social values among their objects (thus language itself is a social value), and therefore they cannot do without evaluating judgements.

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[12] As for the important difference between the social sciences and the other ones, cf. the following statement by K. Boulding „For all the attempts of our positivists to dehumanize the sciences of man, a moral science it remains". (Quoted from the book of C. W. Mills, referred to here below, Note 14).

[13] Cf., e.g. C.L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 161: „No inquiry can divorce itself from the evalution considerations that directly concern and guide the process of inquiry itself". The highest possible degree of detachment in any science, including mathematics and logic, is to limit oneself „solely to those evaluations which are essential to the pursuit of its descriptive and clarificatory studies" (ibid.).

[14] Cf. C. W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, 1961, p. 78: „Values are involved in the selection of the problems we study; values are also involved in certain of the key conceptions we use in our formulation of these problems, and values affect the course of their solution. So far as conceptions are concerned, the aim ought to be to use as many „value-neutral" terms as possible and to become aware of and to make explicit the value implications that remain".

[15] Cf. E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, New York 1961, p. 485 ff.

[16] Cf. C. W. Mills: „Work in social science has always been accompanied by problems of evaluation" (op. cit., 76), and „To detect practical problems is to make evalutions" (ibid., 90).

Before going into the problems of evaluation in the process of standardization, let us briefly sketch the content of this kind of activities. Language standardization may be divided into three stages: (1) descriptive, (2) normative, (3) performative.[17]

(1) In the d e s c r i p t i v e stage, the existing norms (in the sense given to this term by the Prague School linguists) of SL are ascertained and described in a fully objective way, taking account of all their complexity and of the inner differentiation and dynamism of SL. Also the different social values ascribed to SL, to its particular means and to their communicative use, as well as various beliefs and attitudes towards SL shared by the given language community have to be objectively stated (employing also procedures of sociological research).

(2) The n o r m a t i v e (or r e g u l a t i v e) stage may be devided into two sub-stages: (a) the evaluative s., and (b) the prescriptive s. (or the codification).

(a) The e v a l u a t i v e stage, employing a set of objective criteria, should differentiate (discriminate) the language means according to the degree of their suitability. At the same time, the actual social needs of expression, and the trends and tendencies, revealing the immanent dynamism of the SL-norm, have to be estimated as well as the (inconsistent) system of social beliefs and attitudes evaluated (objectively, in a critical way), with the objective of proposing a tentative prospect (or plan) of SL.

(b) The c o d i f i c a t i o n of the SL-norm, resulting from the previous stages of standardization, has the chance to be an effective instrument for a planned and prospective influencing of SL. In our conception, codification must not be treated as a rigid, static, dogmatic, and authoritarian prescription of the laws of „correct language“, but as a tool, of an institutional character, controlling the desirable dynamic balance of SL and ensuring its relatively smooth functioning according to the actual social needs of

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[17] In the Preface to his book *Facts and Values* (Yale University Press, 1963), C. L. Stevenson distinguished three branches of ethics: (1) descriptive e., studying moral practices and convictions, i.e., what has been considered good, obligatory, etc.; (2) normative e., seeking to reach conclusions (and systematize them under general principles) not about what others have considered good, etc., but such ones as are intended to supplement, back up, or stand in opposition to what others have considered good, etc.; (3) analytical e., surveying normative e. with the intent of clarifying its problems and terminology and examining reasons by which its conclusions may be supported. — Parallelism between (1), (2) and language standardization seems to me obvious); as for (3), considerations of the kind as our paper reveal the said „analytical“ character.

expression. In other words: codification should represent a theoretically founded application of the scientific knowledge of language and of its functioning in the solution of practical problems of social communication.

Needless to say, the character, and the chances of possible effect of such codification are different in different sections of language (e.g., it is certainly easier to standardize spelling than pronounciation), or in different SL's and in different sociolinguistic situations.[18]

(3) The p e r f o r m a t i v e stage requires the ascertainment and employment of all suitable ways of making codification operative in social practice. It is less scientific and less linguistic than the other stages; rather an art than a science, but an important art, to be sure.

In the following sections of our paper we shall deal with two topics connected with the theoretical problems of standardization which have been mentioned or implied in Prague School writings, but call for further theoretical elaboration: (1) the justification of evaluative judgements, and the ascertainment of objective evaluating criteria in language standardization, (2) the inquiry into the system of attitudes of a community to its language.

2. Before taking up the first question, we have to state that the evaluative orientation is essential to any activity in the field of language standardization, whether such orientation will be found compatible with scientific objectivity, or not. Standardization means making decisions: the standardizer has to select from several possibilities, and such a selection presupposes evaluation according to certain criteria. Further, the very notions of standardization and planning involve changes of language, accomplished, passing through, expected, or planned: languages undergo changes, they can change (or, can be changed), so that the essence of standardization and planning lies in the evaluation of linguistic changes or innovations. (The term „change" or „innovation" has to be taken in a very broad sense: a language change may consist not only in the rise of a new form, construction, or rule, but also in the disappearance of some forms previously existing, in restriction or extension of the validity of a rule, in preferring some forms and

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[18] Cf. B. Havránek, Úkoly spisovného jazyka a jeho kultura, *Spisovná čeština a jazyková kultura*, Praha 1932, p. 32—84 (the second part of this paper has been translated into English in P. Garvin (ed.), *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*, Georgetown University Press, 1964, and into Russian in N. A. Kondrašov (ed.), *Pražskij lingvističeskij kružok*, Moskva 1967), and Obecné zásady pro kulturu jazyka, ibid., p. 245—258. Cf. also further studies by Havránek, collected in the volume *Studie o spisovném jazyce*, Praha 1963.

pushing back others, in changes of stylistic characteristics of various language means, etc.). One has only to agree with the Indian scholar P.S. Ray.[19] „Instead of considering all changes to be equally likely, equally costly, equally far-reaching or equally unbalancing, it [=standardization] distinguishes between changes as unequal in these or other respects". The heart of standardization is „the search of reasonableness in the discrimination of linguistic innovations" (18). Briefly speaking: there is no standardization without discrimination, and, consequently, without evaluation.

This being so, let us ask: does any discrimination and evaluation entail a loss of „value-neutrality", i.e., a commitment to some value(s)? Do we, in any case, abandon value-neutrality, when speaking about values? As a real object of social sciences, values can be neither negated, nor relegated out of the scope of their interest; the problem consists in their objective treatment.

Modern theory of science makes distinction between factual and value judgements; in terms of this distinction we may reformulate our question as follows: Does any statement concerning values represent, *eo ipso,* a value judgement? Evidently it does not, since we may state different beliefs and attitudes of persons or of group of them as merely objectively existing facts, without expressing our subjective agreement (disagreement) with, or approval (disapproval) of, these values, so that our beliefs and attitudes are not involved in such statements. Thus, e.g., if I state: „Some people distaste the use of foreign words in Czech", I am making a factual statement about an attitude, but not a value judgement, since I am not expressing my own attitude and belief, as it would be the case when saying „The use of foreign words in Czech is distasteful for me and ought to be avoided" (or, in a pseudo-objective formulation, „The use ... is undesirable and ought to be avoided", when speaking *quâ* linguist with an authoritarian attitude).

Summarizingly: employing the distinction between sentences about values, and those expressing them,[20] we are able to distinguish between factual and value judgements, and assure our scientific value-neutrality when accounting for social values and treating them.

Nevertheless, the statements occuring in the process of language standardization not only assess attitudes and beliefs concerning language and communication in a given community, but also ascribe certain values to

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[19] P. S. Ray, *Language Standardization. Studies in Prescriptive Linguistics,* The Hague, 1963, p. 17.

[20] This distinction, pointed out by C. Stevenson (*Facts and Values,* p. 204 ff.), can be found (with various terminology) in a number of writers.

particular language forms, etc., to different ways of using them, and make evaluations and recommendations. Is it possible to assure the scientific objectivity in such cases too?

In connection with these problems two other distinctions seem to be relevant. The first one is that worked out by E. Nagel (op.c.): The so-called value judgements either express an approval (or disapproval) of some ideal, action, etc., or they express an estimate of the degree to which some commonly recognized (or clearly defined) characteristic is present (or absent) in a given instance. The first kind of value judgements he calls „appraising judgements", the second one „characterizing judgements". It is clear, that the latter are „value-free", scientifically objective, since they do not entail any commitment to a certain ideal or value standard.

In fact, characterizing judgements are found in any science. It is evident that such linguistic statements, as „The noun *mother* contains six letters", „*teacher* is a derived word", „*achenial* is a rare technical expression", etc., etc., belong to this sort, as well as „The plural formation of the type *men, feet* is highly restricted and belongs to the periphery of the system of ModE morphology", „The spelling based on phonological principle is easier from the point of view of acquisition and writing", „The German verbal forms of the 3rd person plural function also as forms of respect of the 2nd person", etc. In all cases the statement concerns an objectively statable characteristic or property of a language phenomenon and its employment in communication.

Standardization activities, however, cannot confine themselves to these „recognoscative" statements only: they follow a practical aim of influencing SL by means of codification, which presupposes making evaluations and drawing conclusions. Let us quote P.S. Ray once more: „That all linguistic forms are worth study and report does not entail that all are to be, against all empirical evidence, represented as equal in value..." (o.c., 17). In other words: the estimative statements of the type „The language phenomenon X has shown the characteristic a (in... degree)" should be supplied by estimate of their value(s), and by a normative conclusion. Thus „evaluation" in our case means „assessment of a value of a linguistic phenomenon". May such judgements be considered likewise estimative, and not appraising judgements (in Nagel's sense)?

Our affirmative answer is based on the following supposition: Values may be divided (according to modern theory of value, cf. C. Stevenson), into two fundamentally different classes, viz. intrinsic and extrinsic values. An i n t r i n s i c value of a phenomenon is that which is considered its

(ultimate) end, which makes the phenomenon worth for its own sake, not as a means to something else. An e x t r i n s i c value of a phenomenon is its serviceability as a means for attaining an end. The assignment of intrinsic values to objects and actions (as well as the (dis)approval of them) lies out of the field of any social science (these values may be only scientifically, objectively stated as existing in relation to a social group), while questions about extrinsic values belong to the competence of science, since these values are derived from objective facts, namely from the functional (teleonomic, finalist) relation between a phenomenon and its possible employment to a given end.[21] To give an *ad oculos* example: the statement about the serviceability of guns to the end of killing people in wars is scientifically justified, irrespective of the fact whether we approve or disapprove of such killing. In other words: an extrinsic value is an objective property of a phenomenon, since both arguments of the functional relation (i.e., the phenomenon and the end to which it can be subservient) exist independently of the judging subject and his beliefs and attitudes.

Adequacy of the functional approach in sociolinguistics seems to me unquestionable, since this branch is concerned with purposive human behaviour, with its means and ends. I have no intent to discuss here the complicated problems of functionalism in social sciences (a thorough-going analysis has been offered by E. Nagel, op. cit.). I only wish to point out that the so-called functionalism of the Prague School linguistics is to be sought just in its overall teleonomic explanatory principle (the fundamental terms of which being 'ends', 'means' and 'reasons (motives)'), which is different from, but fully compatible with and complemental to the causal explanation, operating with causes and consequences.[22] — The views of contemporory Soviet and other Marxist philosophers and biologists on purposive explanation has been summarized by R. Löther in *Biologie und Weltanschauung* (Leipzig — Jena — Berlin 1972). He makes a principal distinction between „purposive activity" of thinking human beings, directed to a consciously determined goal on the one hand, and „biological purposiveness (teleonomy)" characterizing objectively given organization of systems of living beings, on the other hand. Connections, processes, qualities and ways of behaviour of living organisms are purposive in the sense that in certain environment they contribute to the development and to the maintenance of the existence of individuals and the species. Thus the notion of purposiveness in biology expresses relations, and such terms as adaptibility, function, role, ... are here relevant. Biological purposiveness (teleonomy) has a relative character: in all cases it relates to certain conditions of environment, and the living beings not always are organized fully in a purposive way

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[21] The position of the notion 'function' in respect to the 'means — ends' relation is given by the following statement: If we say that an item x has a function f, we mean that the item x serves (as a means) to an end F.

[22] In my opinion, B. Russell's discussion of it in his essay „On the notion of cause" (in: *Procedings of the Aristotelian society* 1913), which cleared this principle from its supranatural associations, religious misinterpretation, has not lost its significance. A renewed interest in these problems now appears among the philosophers as well as natural scientists.

(in relation to the given environment). To conclude, the notin of „telonomy" avoids both „mechanical determinism" and „idealistic teleology (metaphysical vitalism)", while it is in accord with the principles of „dialectic determinism". — „Language as a psycho-biological and psycho-social structure" (N. A. Bernštejn) underlies human linguistic conducts and behaviour and the teleonomic conception enables us to extend the interpretion in terms of purposiveness (goal—directedness) on the unconscious („biological") components of language and linguistic behaviour as well.

Thus we may conclude that the 'means-ends' relation is value-free. The means-value of language facts may be stated by estimative judgement (with the exclusion of any appraising judgement) under the supposition that the set of end-values (i.e., of the possible functions) is neither ascribed nor approved (or disapproved) by the linguist (when judging *quâ* linguist). In other words, the task of sociolinguists is to ascertain (in the form of a factual judgement) the set of functions (values), ascribed by the given community to language and communication, as mere given facts, without expressing appraising judgements about them, without commitment to this system of values,[23] and to express estimative judgements concerning particular language means.

This, of course, does not mean that the linguist should never express personal, subjective evaluation of his own, voice his approval or disapproval with certain believes or attitudes, recommend, persuade or dissuade. On the contrary, I think that he ought to do all this, since his beliefs and attitudes might be to a high degree positively influenced by his scientific knowledge[24] (in fact, however, the differences between linguists as regards their appraising judgements, their attitudes to different standardization problems and desicions, are sometimes surprisingly enormous). But all this may be regarded as justified on one condition only, viz. that in all cases the linguist explicitly and clearly draws the line of demarcation between the objective scientific statements, and his personal views and ideals.

The systems of linguistic values in different language communities may be more or less different. They depend on the overall value-orientation of the community, which may be characterized for example in terms of a modified Parsons' system of value patterns with five variables; there are two opposite sets of these variables:

[23] Cf. the following characteristic by Stevenson (*op. cit.*, p. 92): „A social scientist attempts to survey people's evaluations with a temporary detachment — for survey them without as yet taking sides, and thus without as yet participating in the normative issues that may occasion". (But Stevenson does not fully identify himself with this approach.)

[24] Cf. also the following statement of Mills (op. c., p. 79): „Whether he wants it or not, or whether he is aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life studying society and publishing the results is acting morally and usually politically as well".

A		B
(1) rationality	—	affectivness
(2) specificity	—	diffuseness
(3) universalism	—	particularism
(4) effeciency	—	quality
(5) long-term aims	—	short-term aims

There exist 32 different possible combinations (i.e., patterns with five variables, e.g., 1 A, 2 B, 3 B, 4 A, 5 A), characterizing different language communities in different sociolinguistic settings and situations. (Thus, e.g., the dominance of the set B often occurs in the stage of constituting a SL, and this orientation appears, under such circumstances, quite natural and to a high degree also as functionally justified.) Of course this does not mean that the presence of a variable of one set presupposes, in a particular case, the total absence of the opposite member of the pair; but one of the two members appears as dominant.

I do not intend to discuss these problems here, since a related topic will be dealt with in section 3 of this paper (in connection with the dialectics of attitudes); one example will suffice to clear the point: Let us suppose that in a language two different technical terms, a and b are available, for one and the same object, a being a well-formed expression of a domestic origin, but very rarely used by the technicians, while b an ill-formed expression, partly of a foreign origin, but very firmly rooted in technical usage. In a community whose value orientation contains 4 B as one of dominant value variables, viz. 'quality', the term a will be chosen and recommended as an official standard term. But in another community, highly evaluating 'efficiency (4 A)', the term b will be preferred: it is much more common and, consequently, it is cheaper to continue to use it than to learn to use b.[25]

Another important point is the difference between o v e r t and c o v e r t end-values. Thus deceiving, telling lies, or obscuring one's intentions does not mostly belong among overtly accepted or proclaimed social values, nevertheless some people do this and are expected to behave so; and it is evident that in doing so they make use of suitable means and ways of language communication. The linguist quâ linguist can only objectively state different degrees of serviceability of this or that linguistic means to this „obscure" end (function), without raising moralist judgements disapproving (or approving) this kind of behaviour.[26]

It has been pointed out by Myrdal[27] and others that people ascribe intrinsic values not only to ends, but also to means. In this wording the statement is logically untenable, since the only value of a means as such is its expediency for the given end; the notion

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[25] The estimate of efficiency in terms of cost of acquisition and maintenance has been proposed by P.S. Ray (op. c., ch. 1, 2). — In our example, even if we admit that it is easier to learn (acquire) the regular form a than the irregular one b for those who have not yet got accustomed to either of them, the continuity of using the customary, deep-rooted form b is evidently more economic (efficient), in respect to the much higher number of those accustomed to b and in respect to the fact that this form will in any case survive in the until then existing technical literature at least.

[26] A very interesting treatment of the question of the responsibility of language for telling lies will be found in H. Weinrich, *Linguistik der Lüge*, Heidelberg 1966.

[27] G. Myrdal, *Value in Social Theory*, London 1958, pp. XXII, 211—213.

'means' acquires its sense in relation to an end only, 'being a means' is a purely relational property. What is really meant by Myrdal's statement is the fact that a social phenomenon, appearing as a means (i.e., an efficient one) in respect to a given end, may, at the same time or subsequently, be viewed as an end (of course, different from that to which it functions as a means) or as a fact beyond the means-ends nexus, and as such it can acquire an intrinsic social value. The well known dictum saying that means are sanctioned by their ends is, from the purely functional point of view, undoubtedly correct. But it is as well true that social phenomena simultaneously enter into very different relationships; from the fact that a phenomenon can satisfy a certain end does not follow that it cannot satisfy another end (or that it must satisfy any other end), neither that it cannot be regarded also as an end, having an intrinsic value.

In this connection it is possible to refer to an idea of Karl Marx, expressed on page 1 of his *Capital*. He maintains that any useful thing is a sum of many qualities and therefore it can be useful in many respects; the utility of any thing is conditioned by the qualities of that thing and does not exist without them.

The problematic character of the notional distinction between 'means' and 'ends' was pointed out by J. Dewey; according to him these terms are two different names for the same reality; they denote not a division in reality, but a distinction in judgement only.[28] We can agree with him, of course, only in the sense that the said distinction cannot be stated as a permanent, inherent, substantial quality of real objects or actions, but only as a typically relational property of them. But in respect to a particular case of means-ends relation, this distinction is necessarily accompanied with a „distinction in reality", since the same object or action cannot represent an end and simultaneously a means for this same end. In other words, the two arguments of a functional relation R between an end and (one of) its means may be only two different objects or actions. Generally speaking: if R is the said asymmetrical irreflexive relation, and w, x, y, z, different objects or actions acquiring these values, then the forms of the type $x R x$, $y R y$, ... are excluded; the possible forms are only of the type $x R y$, $z R x$, or $z R w$ (i.e., cases where x being a means in relation to y, is also an end in relation to z, or where z is a means not only in relation to x, but also to w).

To sum up: From our above considerations follows that the value judgements of standardization display relative character.[29] Their relativity may be considered in four different dimensions: (1) the relativity conditioned by the inevitable limitations of our knowledge (with the perspective of further corrections, supplements, etc.); (2) the validity of our statements is relative to certain circumstances and contexts, to various social moments (of local, temporal and other characters); (3) the relativity is involved in the relational essence of the extrinsic character of means-value; (4) from the estimative character of many value judgements follows that they assess different degrees of characteristics: there is a whole scale of graded values bet-

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[28] See J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York 1930, p. 34.
[29] Cf. also Ray's statement: „One may judge without judging absolutely" (op. c., p. 16).

ween the positive and the negative poles (such as „suitable — unsuitable"). It is exactly this point that is often neglected by many standardizers and in normative handbooks.[30]

When examining different linguistic value judgements or standardization recommendations (decisions) we find out that they make recourse to three different sets of objective criteria: (1) to the first group belong those cases, when the linguist is stating the presence or absence (in the SL norm), and the degree of commonalty and social acceptibility of a given language form or of its way of employment; (2) in the second group we find statements assessing the degree of neccessity and serviceability of a form or of a way of employment (in respect to a certain language function); (3) the third group consists of statements about the regularity or systematicity of a given form or way of employment.

It seems apparent that only group (2) represents estimative judgements of the type we have discussed above, i.e. judgements involving the means-ends relation. Does that mean that the other two groups of judgements are not scientifically justified? A close inspection detects that the underlying criteria of groups (1) and (3) follow from two essential properties of language and its use, namely (1) from the institutional, and (3) from the semiotic character of language. In any case, such judgements are necessarily of estimative character, since they ascertain the presence or absence of a property, and the degree of it. But, in certain sense, they, too, do not stand beyond the means-ends nexus, since we may assume that the essential, intrinsic, „natural" properties of a phenomenon (properties objectively statable) cannot be irrelevant to the employment of this phenomenon as a means to a certain end. On the contrary, we may rightly suppose that the instrumental function (value) of SL (as well as other possible manipulative and declarative functions (values) of it) are conditioned by its essential, natural properties, viz. by its semiotic and institutional character. It is just these properties that makes SL a suitable means for the said ends. In this sense, the two properties may be considered „natural values" of SL. I find it in accord with J. Locke's statement that the „natural worth" of any thing rests in its capability to satisfy people's needs, quoted with approval by K. Marx in his *Capital*[31]. Such values of a social phenomenon may be ascertained

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[30] Flaws of other sorts, incompatible with the scientific objectivity, may be found in the process of standardization as well. Not rarely do we meet judgements that are rather subjective (based on idiosyncrasies), authoritarian, dogmatic, etc.

[31] K. Marx identifies (in footnote 4 in the first chapter of *Capital*) Locke's „natural worth" wirh his own „Gebrauchswert".

by means of its empirical analysis. Language can serve as a capable instrument of articulated thinking, selfexpression, and, in the first place, of interindividual communication on account of the fact that it is a social institution and norm, and a dynamic system of phonic (and graphic) signs.

The institutional and normative character of language deserves some further remarks. The said character was ascribed to social phenomena by the *magnus parens* of modern sociology E. Durkheim[32] (whose influence on de Saussure and the Prague linguists is well known). Sociology regards as an i n s t i t u t i o n any social fact in the moment when it gets a fixed position as a stable element in the structure of community, the existence of which is maintained by means of social mechanism. It is evident that language (and especially SL) meets the said conditions: it has a fixed position in the life of community, based on its most general social functions; it is a relatively stable element (it retains its social identity) in spite of the fact that it is constantly changing (so that its „material" identity is often only partial, rather a similarity, and weak), and the continuity of its existence and its balanced development is secured by means of various kinds of social mechanism of institutional character, as well as by other means of social control (family, school, means of codification; literature, mass media; criticism, praise, censure, etc.).

We have already mentioned the intrinsic conception of the language n o r m in the Praguian approach. Even here the influence of Durkheim (also through the mediation of de Saussure's ideas, presented by Bally and Sechehay) is to be traced. According to Durkheim, every social fact reveals its normative character: it exists beyond the individual (is extrinsic to him) and possesses an imperative and oppressive power, enforcing itself upon the individual, whether he wants or not. But in two footnotes Durkheim adds three very important qualifications: (1) the norms are not accepted by the individual in a passive way; we often adapt and individualize them;[33] (2) nevertheless, the possible range of deviations is limited and varies according to the character of different social facts (it seems to me that in the case of SL the admissible range of deviations is relatively broad); (3) the oppressive power of social phenomena has its opposite: the social institutions are enforced upon us, but at the same time we stick to them; they bind us and we like them, they force themselves on us and we profit from their oppression. Durkheim seems not to know how to explain this unexpected and apparently paradoxical state of things — but those who have recognized the d i a l e c t i c character of social facts are far from being surprised.

Durkheim's conception of the extrinsic status of social norms in relation to individuals (the qualifications (1), (2) are merely stating some important facts, without offering a principled explanation of them) has been criticised by E. Coseriu.[34] He argues

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[32] Cf. E. Durkheim, *Les régles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris 1895.

[33] J. Mukařovský in his book *Estetická funkce, norma a hodnota* (Praha 1936) points out the fact that the norm tends to be binding without exceptions, nevertheless it can never (in its essence) attain the validity of a natural law. The norm not only may be violated (and in fact it currently is), but in some cases there occur two or even more parallel norms. The author concludes that the notion of norm is based on a dialectic antinomy between its validity without exceptions, and a merely regulative character of it.

[34] See E. Coseriu, *Sincronia, diacronia a historia*, Montevideo 1958; a Russian translation appeared in *Novoje v lingvistike* III, Moskva 1963.

that social facts are, no doubt, independent of this or any other member of the community, but only under the condition that all other members keep them (i.e., it is independent of *omnibus*, but depending on *cunctis*). Thus social facts are not extrinsic to individuals -they are not beyond them, but between them, they are inter-individual.[35] And the norms are not enforced on individuals by a power existing beyond them (effecting from outside): the norms are accepted by them and internalized as an obligation in the etymological sense of the word („binding agreement"). — We may say that Coseriu's modification of Durkheim's (and de Saussure's) conception is very similar to the Prague views (often implied only in the treatment of SL problems).

It is necessary, too, to correlate the notion of n o r m to that of v a l u e. From the sociological point of view every society is determined by a common set of aims (ends), it must share a common system of institutionalized values. Such values answer the question „What is desirable?" in a most general way, without specifications as regards special functions or situations; they belong to the highest level of generality. Yet the values need to be specified for different collectives, roles, etc., i.e., on lower levels, according to the functions of the (sub)units of the given social system. And this task will be performed by means of norms. In other words, the inner differentiation of the social system requires — due to the obligatory character of values — a relatively consistent system of norms, uniformly formulated and interpreted. Norms are legitimated (and controlled) by the values institutionalized in the society.

Applying this conception to language, we state that the system of ends of any society includes the inevitable need for inter-social communication; and this aim implies, necessarily, a common instrument of communication. SL, being exactly such an instrument, constitutes a social value and as such it is institutionalized. But this fact does not determine the particular form of SL. And in fact, the aim of communication might be attained by means of different languages or of different varieties of a language within the same society. (This fact is very well known in many societies: there are moments in their history, when they have to decide which language or variety to use as the common tool of communication.) The particular language variety as well as its possible subforms (differentiated according to specific social roles or functions) is determined by a norm (and subnorms), the binding character of which is legitimated and sanctioned by the general value of communicative tool in the overall system of social values. In other words: people feel to be bound to use certain linguistic forms (and not others) because they experience and acnowledge the neccesity and value of a relatively uniform system of common communicative devices.

Thus following T. Parsons' proposal, we may distinguish three different aspects of a norm: (1) from the point of view of the members of the society who have internalized it, the norm represents „the disposition of their (functional) needs"; (2) from the institutional aspect it appears as an integrative factor (integrating the linguistic behaviour of individuals); (3) abstracted from particular situations and functions, it appears as a „value standard".

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[35] Some scholars make difference between 'interindividual' ('intersubjective'), and 'collective', the first term referring to the interaction of the parts or members of a social whole, the second to coherence of such parts or members. (Cf. P. A. Verburg, Some remarks on „Communication" and „Social" in language theory, Lingua XI (1962), p. 453—468.)

In the above considerations I have followed to a certain extent some sociological views of several scholars belonging to the socalled functionalist school. In spite of certain similarities which this approach bears to some basic principles of the Prague functional linguistics, it should be pointed out that, in contradistinction to the „classical" Parsonsian conception, to a great extent dominated by the undialectic ideas of uniformity (integratedness) and static stability, our approach stresses the inner dialectic tension in any social norm, revealing itself in the non-static (dynamic) character of SL norm, and in its synchronic variability (as well as in the inconsistency of the set of beliefs and attitudes towards SL norm in a community).

Let us mention at least two critics of Parsons: P.L. van den Berghe (in his article „Dialectic and functionalism: Toward a theoretical synthesis", *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963, p. 695—705) makes, e.g., an important distinction between 'balance (equilibrium)' and 'integration' on the one hand, and 'stability' and 'inertia' on the other; what is necessary, is a minimum of integratedness, but undue, excessive stability and inertia of certain elements of social structure may have as their consequence an increasing unbalance and a bad integration. (Examples from the domain of standardization might be easily adduced). The notion of „dynamic balance", to which a social system is striving as to its limit, goes back to an idea of F. Engels and has been in linguistics elaborated by J. Vachek and applied by many Czech and Slovak linguists. An interpretation of „dynamic balance" in terms of homeostasis (identified by some authors with goal-seeking) might be of some interest. Also Berghe's stress on the functional and dialectic interpretation of change corresponds to the Prague views. — C. W. Mill's criticism (op. c., ch. 2) concerns mainly the problems of order and change; he emphasizes that the existence and import of a 'common value system' as a mode of integration should not be overrated (his statement that „there is ... no one universal scheme in terms of which we can understand the unity of social structure", p. 46/7, ressembles our view, expressed in the present paper, that there is not one universal and panchronous functional scheme of language evalution), and that the general problem of a theory of history cannot be separated from the general problem of a theory of social structure" (p. 47) (a statement which might also characterize the Prague amendment of de Saussure's conception of language structure).

The last remark concerns the relationship between 'n o r m' and 's y s t e m'. I would stress that any natural language is, simultaneously, both system and norm, that these two terms refer to different but complementary aspects of the same phenomenon. The dynamics of language ought to be sought for in the mutual conditioning of the system and the norm.[39] The systematic aspect concerns the structure of relations between the sign-items of a semiotic whole, while the normative aspect takes into account the socially obligatory character of the rules of implementation of this system. One has only to agree with E. Coseriu,[40] when he argues (against Hjelmslev) that language systems appear

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[39] Cf. also the discussion of these problems by L. I. Skvorcov and B. S. Švarckopf in *Aktual'nyje problemy kul'tury reči*, Moskva 1970.

[40] Cf. *Sinchronia*, ..., p. 175, note 64 (of the Russian translation) and the article *Sistema, norma e „parola"* in *Studi linguistici in onore di Vittore Pisani*, Brescia 1969, p. 235—253.— K. Horálek in his article *Jazyk jako systém a norma*, *NŘ* 55 (1972), pp. 65—68 agrees in principle with Coseriu, but at the same time he rightly states that Coseriu's conception of the norm appears too narrow: the language norm is not only inherent in the system, but it goes beyond it.

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as historically really existing systems, and not as merely hypothetic constructs. Of course, our formulation that the norm is equal to the rules of the obligatory implementation of the system, takes the system as its point of departure purely for methodological reasons (without any ontological and historical implication).

After this rather extensive digression let us briefly analyze and characterize the proposed three groups of estimative standardization judgements.

(1) An instrument (or tool) is „a thing or person serving as a means to an end" (see Webster's „New World Dictionary"), so that language forms or constructions (and their employment in utterances) may be estimated, from this point of view, only in respect to the way in which they comply with the given end, in which they are capable to satisfy the particular functional needs of the community. Briefly speaking, as general evaluative criterion appears f u n c t i o n a l a d e q u a c y. (The respective functions may be of different kinds and on different levels of generality.) The basic presupposition of any adequate language means is its social n e e d. One of the important components of adequacy is e f f i c i e n c y[41] (in a very broad sense). All other, more specific properties of the communicative instrument, often proclaimed as desirable, such as briefness, precision, definiteness, explicitness, non-vagueness, truthfullness, etc., have no general validity, since they are desirable in respect to some specific functions only. Instead of adequacy a more common term s u i t a b i l t y might be used.

(2) In view of its systemic character, any language item and any variation or change of it may be checked what a degree of s y s t e m a t i c i t y it shows. I.e., whether or how it accords with the existing rules of the given language, whether and how it contributes to the inner cohesion and dynamic balance of the respective subsystem and the overall system as well. From such an ascertainment the more or less central or peripheral position (character) of any item of a language system may be deduced.[42] Since the language system is phenomenon of dynamic character, it is necessary to ascertain whether or how the given variation or change conforms with the tendencies of de-

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[41] It has been pointed out by P. S. Ray (op. c.); he calls it „the technology of stanarrdization" and defines it „in the sense of maximal adaption to a specified range of expanse of human resource" (cf. Martinet's notion of „economy"). As specific criteria for efficiency he adduces: linearity, systematicity, contrastive distinctiveness, transitional probability, specialization, versatility. According to Ray, efficiency corresponds to cheapness of an instrument, whereas rationality of language corresponds to dependability of an instrument, and language commonalty to uniformity.

[42] The problems of the centre and periphery have been dealt with in a series of articles published in *TLP* 2 (Prague 1966).

velopment directed to a certain goal. Thus, for instance, having a paradig-matic subsystem P containing the forms $\{p_1, p_2, p_3, p'_3, p_4, p_5\}$ we have to state the systemic character of a newly occurring form p'_2. If our analysis discovers an undeniable systemic tendency to reconstruct P into P', then it is clear that p'_2, appearing as less systematic and very peripheral in respect to P, reveals central character in respect to P'. And since the standardiza-tion decisions or recommendations have to take into account the SL dyna-mism and promote the prospective development of SL, the P' point of view should be considered dominant. (In this context the notion of the „thera-peutic change", i.e. a change aiming at the restauration of an impaired sy-stemic balance, finds its place.) — The traditional criterion of „regularity" coincides with our criterion of systematicity only partially and roughly.

(3) The third criterion consists in the ascertainment of the a g r e-e m e n t (or desagreement) w i t h t h e o b l i g a t o r y S L n o r m. What corresponds to the accepted norm is considered „right", „correct", „good (English, German, ...)". This criterion may be also reformulated as „(social) acceptability". The norms differ as to their strictness (rigidity), and span; these differences may be related to different realms of language, to different realms of the functional employment of language, or to dife-rent SL. Thus the orthographic norms are mostly very strict and rigid, while the orthoepic norms are not so rigorously enforced (demanded) and their span is obviously broader (i.e., the community is more tolerant to the deviations in pronunciation than to those in spelling, and the norms of pro-nunciation contain several accepted alternatives /variations/). On the border-line between acceptability and nonacceptability stand those language forms, that are „tolerable". — Another important point is the functional (stylistic) differentiation of the SL norm (or the existence of functional subnorms) and the fact that some rules of the norm are not „prohibitive" (or „impe-rative"), but rather „preferential".

It is obvious that our three criteria are mutually autonomous, but not hierarchically equivalent, since in cases of possible conflicts of criteria (following from their autonomy) no resolution would be possible. From a logical point of view, the instrumental criterion of adequacy should be expected to occupy the hierarchically highest position. But in fact it is the normative criterion that is dominant and decisive: any language form accep-ted by the given community and customarily used is regarded as „correct" even if it is not (or, not quite) regular and not (fully) suitable or needful. This state of affairs is due to the fact that the linguistic behavior of people is not exclusively controlled by rational motives (cf. here section 3.). Never-

theless, the dominance of custom over instrumentality is very often a see-ming one only, since it mostly appears more economic (and, consequently, in accordance with the functional criterion of efficiency) to maintain a cus-tomary, though less adequate (and/or regular) form than to reject it and try to introduce a new one. (In other words, the cost of outlay in abandonment and acquisition exceeds the cost of maintenance over extended use — to paraphrase P.S. Ray.) On the other hand, in the case of an innovation that accords with the systemic rules, is functionally adequate, and has no com-peting counterpart in the existing norm, the criterion of norm cannot play a significant role (and one may assume that the two criteria will not, in prin-ciple, come into a conflict).

3. In the preceeding section of our paper we have dealt with the pro-blems of objective, scientifically justified value judgments as a basis of lan-guage standardization. But it is not only the language standardizer who expresses value-judgements: any speaker of a SL typically makes such sta-tements in the course of expressing his a t t i t u d e to SL. Those judge-ments are subjective, to be sure, but nevertheless they represent objective social facts that necessarily ought to be taken into account by the standar-dizers. One of the leading members of the Prague Linguistic Circle has mentioned as early as in 1932, that the attitude of a language community to their own language represents an essential part of „le langage", besides language system and „la parole".[43] Recently it has been pointed out by J.P. Rona (inspired by P. Garvin and M. Mathiot) that „the most fertile field for sociolinguistics will ... be found in attitude research".[44]

The term „attitude" will be used here in its current sociological sense, namely as a bias of a person or a community to prefer some ends and ways of conduct (and to reject others), determining its (or their) response to a certain type of situation. On the scale of generality attitude stands in the middle between the lower „motive" and the higher „orien-tation" (or „syndrom of attitudes"). (The relation of „attitude" to „belief", interpreted by different authors in various ways, I am leaving aside.)

The set of attitudes of a language community to their SL represents a system of interdependent items, but this system is not only very intricate, but also inconsistent, containing antagonistic relationships and an internal dialectic tension. Any simplification or idealization of the factual state, to which some sociologists as well as linguists are inclined, is undesirable and

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[43] See: *Spiosvná čeština a jazyková kultura*, Praha 1932, p. 85.

[44] See: J. P. Rona, „A structural view of sociolinguistics", in: *Method and Theory in Linguistics* (P. Garvin, ed.), The Hague, 1970, p. 206.

dangerous for an effective SL-standardization. In the subsequent paragraphs I will only sketch a brief survey of the most significant attitudes. (A more detailed discussion of this topic may be found in some other papers of the present author.[45])

The attitudes mostly occur in pairs of antithetical items, so that the whole complex of attitudes of a given community is governed by a number of antinomies. The most important of them seem to be the following ones:

1. Far-reaching is the antinomy of r a t i o n a l vs. n o n - r a - t i o n a l orientation.

The rational orientation comprises the instrumental and ethical attitudes and accentuates the instrumental character of SL, as well as the obligatory character of its collective norm. The instrumental functions of language are duly supported by the ethical attitudes, since any act of standardization and rationalization presupposes conformity and loyality of the members of the given language community, motivated by the acceptance of social integration as an ethical value.

The non-rational orientation comprises the affective (emotional) and traditional (customary) attitudes. Some aspects of this orientation are compatible with the rational one, and should neither be neglected nor underestimated in the process of standardization. (Thus, e.g., a positive emotional attitude, often associated with the ethical one, may be of great use in the practical performance of the standardization decisions.) On the other hand, decidedly anti-rational attitudes appear as undesirable, since they conflict with linguistic and social progress. (In stating this, the author is aware of the fact that he makes a commitment to a certain value standard, namely to the idea of a society, in which emotions would be regulated by reason to the benefit of all its members. But it seems to him that the objective analysis and evaluation of social history brings much evidence for this conviction).

2. With the first antinomy two minor, closely related pairs of attitudes are in connection:

(a) The first of them results from the opposition between the actual linguistic conduct of the speakers, and their opinions and convictions regarding SL. The speakers may, or may not, be aware of this contradiction. (In the

[45] Fr. Daneš, „Dialektické tendence ve vývoji spisovných jazyků. Studie socio-lingvistická", in: *Československé přednášky pro VI. mezinárodní sjezd slavistů*, Praha 1968, pp. 119—128; Same, „Einige soziolinguistische Aspekte der Schriftsprache", *Die Welt der Slaven* XIII (1968), p. 17—27.

first case we have to do with and unconscious imitation, in the second with an intentional adaptation to an ideal.) (Cf. the opposition between the so-called „realistic" and „ideational" attitudes.)

(b) The second attitude is based on the contradiction between the actual, deep incentives of the speakers' linguistic conduct and convictions on the one hand, and their publically declared motives on the other. In other words, people often disguise their (unconscious) incentives that are socially hardly acceptable, while idealizing and rationalizing them.

3. Another major antinomy is that of r e s i s t a n c e vs. a c c e p-
t a n c e.[46] Since the normal state of any natural language is that of flux, this antinomy is of great significance. Neither rigid stability, nor complete arbitrariness of change are compatible with any SL (cf. Mathesius' para-doxical term „flexible stability" and the notion of „dynamic balance (equili-brium)", common in Praguian linguistics.) The language community tries to retain the identity and existence of its SL, and consequently resists those changes which would, in their opinion, endanger this state.[47] But in fact, the act of recognition of a certain language variety as the (same) standard language of the community in question is a predominantly sociological act, to a high degree independent of the purely linguistic qualities of the given variety. SL as a social institution contains as its essential component the capability of adaptation to internal and external stimulation according to certain structural principles. In other words, the notion of dynamic balance (solving the said antinomy) presupposes a mechanism of linguistic change.[48] (Cf. Engels' invalidation of the principle of „abstract lidentity", and Ray's characteristic of SL in terms of „self-establishment" and „self-
-transcendence".)

From the point of view of standardization it appears necessary to have at disposal an institutional tool for regulating language change and controlling the dynamic balance. It is the so-called codification of SL-norm that may be regarded as that tool. As we have already mentioned in Section 2 of the present paper, in our conception the SL-codification

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[46] Cf. M. M. Lewis, *Language in Society*, London 1947.

[47] Cf. Sturtevant's interesting observation that „... each language is a definite system of forms employed in a definite way; for its users a language is static, although it is actually changing all the time" (*An introduction to Linguistic Science*, p. 53).

[48] In this connection the distinction between synchrony — diachrony, and statics — dynamics, as four autonomous dimensions, pointed out by D. Hymes (cf. *Language in Culture and Society*, 1964, p. 451), should be mentioned here. Hymes rightly claims that not only synchronic invariance and diachronic flux, but also a synchronic analysis of dy-namics (i.e., the structured variability, and the structure of the process of change) and a diachronic analysis of statics (i.e., what appears from the historical point of view as stable) ought to be studied.

ought to be rather a kind of „directive" or „technical norm" than a rigid prescription or regulation.[49] (In fact, codification is either of them: as a prescription or regulation it must be issued by a norm-authority, it needs to be promulgated; and in order to make it effective, the authority may sometimes (e.g., in schools) attach a sanction (different from the intrinsic social sanctions of the SL-norm). As a directive or technical norm it is concerned with the means recommended to be used for the sake of attaining a certain end; it appeals to user's reasoning, to his rationality, telling him: „If you want to express yourself in a standard way (what appears desirable for the following reasons ...), you ought to employ certain language means in a certain way and to avoid others".

4. Another pair of antithetical attitudes is the antinomy of i s o l a-t i o n i s m (divergency) vs. u n i v e r s a l i s m (convergency). The former is motivated mainly by the separatist function of SL,[50] the latter by the fact of language contacts and of the necessity to enrich SL.

5. Finally we would like to mention the antinomy of u n i f o r m i t y vs. v a r i a t i o n. (It must not be identified with the opposition of stability and change (diachronic variability): for example one can imagine changes aiming at uniformity, or changes bringing forth a diversification. But in standardization practice, unification goes hand in hand with stabilization.) The old ideal (or idol) of a neatly uniform (as well as absolutely stable) SL is untenable and false.[51] Both antithetical tendencies result in a patterned differentiation of linguistic means (i.e., in a functionally regulated variation).

In any language community, the mentioned antagonistic attitudes are brought into a temporary (dynamic) balance by means of an accepted value pattern. (Cf. Section 2, p. 13 f. of the present paper.) It should be noted, however, that such patterns are never universal or panchronic. They depend on the particular sociolinguistic situation and may be different not only in different communities, but also in different historical stages of the same community. As we have already mentioned, even the supposition of a single value pattern, accepted by the whole community (in a certain moment of its existence) as its integrating power, is doubtful. It is very probable that

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[49] I am referring to the distinction made by G. H. von Wright in his book *Norm and Action*, London 1963.

[50] P. Garvin and M. Mathiot (cf. The Standard Language Problem, p. 155) designate as „separatist" the function of SL to set off a speech community as separate from its neighbours. (The other symbolic SL-functions are according to the same authors the unifying and prestige function; the frame-of-reference function is considered an objective one.)

[51] Some problems of uniformity has been dealt with, in an unsatisfying manner, by J. O. Hertzler („Social uniformation and language", in: *Explorations in Sociolingustics*, Bloomington and The Hague 1966).

in every community there co-exist several such patterns, competing and conflicting, but one of them mostly appears as dominant (or representative). (An example of conflicting value standards applied to standardization va- lue-judgements is represented by the well known discussion between the progressive Czech functionalists and traditional Czech purists in early thir- ties. The functionalists position might be characterized in terms of the A-set of variables of the value pattern, while the position of the other group in terms of the B-set. The value standard of the „ordinary native speaker" appears less clear and definite.) In my opinion, the standardizer, even if he rightly adheres to the scientifically justified functionalist approach, may neglect neither the real sociolinguistic situation of the community, nor the „public linguistic opinion" (though he may try to reeducate it), if his standardiza- tion decisions or recommendations have to be realistic and promise a suc- cessful result.

The empirical research by means of sociological procedures of the attitudes of the speech community towards SL (advocated by P. Garvin and M. Mathiot as early as in 1956 and interpreted from the viewpoint of the Marxist scientific methodology by A. D. Švejcer[52]), has been prepared by the Institute of the Czech Language of the Czechoslovak Academy of Scien- ces, Prague. In 1968 we have tried to find out the attitudes toward the Czech orthographical rules and the different possibilities of a spelling reform. The second inquiry, concerning the attitudes toward the „foreign words", was accomplished in 1970. The results of the two inquiries has been described and interpreted by A. Tejnor.[53] The experience from these two attempts shows that such a sociological research is fairly possible and brings very interesting and important outcomes.[54]

František Daneš

[52] Cf. P. Garvin — M. Mathiot, „The urbanization of the Guaraní language", in: *Proceedings of the 5th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Scien- ces* (1956), Philadelphia 1960. The authors listed the following typical attitudes: (1) lo- yality (a protective and defensive a.), linked to the unifying and separatist function of SL (and to the broader attitude of nationalism), (2) pride (a positive a.), linked to the pre- stige function, (3) awareness of the norm, linked to the frame-of-reference function. — A. D. Švejcer, *Voprosy sociologii jazyka v sovremennoj amerikanskoj lingvistike*, Lenin- grad 1971.

[53] The research has been accomplished in collaboration with the Institute for the research of public opinion of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Cf.: A. Tejnor, „Český pravopis a veřejné mínění", NŘ 52 (1969), p. 265 ff. — A. Tejnor a kol., „Přejatá slova a veřejné mínění", NŘ 55 (1972), p. 185 ff.

[54] Cf. also R. Buchtelová, „Příspěvek k aplikaci některých socioligických metod na výzkum výslovnosti slov přejatých", SaS 32 (1971), p. 45—54.

Р е з и м е

Ф р а н т и ш е к   Д а н е ш

ВРЕДНОСТИ И СТАВОВИ ПРИЛИКОМ ЈЕЗИЧКЕ СТАНДАРДИЗАЦИЈЕ

Процес језичке стандардизације подразумева три фазе: дескриптивну, нормативну (регулативну) и перформативну. Прашка школа је допринела да се оне с теоријске тачке гледишта студиозно осветле. Остаје, међутим, да се неки концепти још више продубе, односно прецизније сагледају. Аутор овог пута преузима на себе задатак да даље развије теоријску мисао прашке школе у два правца: (1) утврђивањем критерија по којима ће се спознати да ли је могуће или не објективно, тј. научно фундирано вредновање језичких појава подвргнутих контроли стручњака; (2) истраживањем фактора под чијим се утицајем формирају ставови говорне заједнице према језику којим се служи.

По аутору, општи вредносни критериј требало би пре свега да узима у обзир функционалну адекватност језичке појединости о којој се расправља, тј. умесност њене појаве под датим социјално-лингвистичким околностима. Осим тога, будући да је сам језик систем, она би се морала испитати и с обзиром на степен систематичности који испољава. Најзад, потребно је утврдити да ли она стоји у пуној сагласности са оним што је већ постојећа норма у језику. Што се тиче става говорних представника према сопственом језичком изразу, он никако није за потцењивање; о њему стручњак приликом нормативних интервенција мора повести рачуна. Тај став није у свакој прилици рационално заснован. Неизбежна су ту и антирационална опредељења (изазвана каквим емоционалним доживљајем, односно везаношћу са увреженом традицијом). Ни њих стручњаци не смеју превиђати. Аутор, даље, скреће пажњу на спрегу антагонистичких тенденција (изолационализам/универзализам, итд.), које неминовно узимају маха при развоју стандардних језика, инкорпорирајући их у репертоар оних проблемских подручја чије прецизније осветљавање спада у непосредне задатке савремене социолингвистичке теорије.