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SOVJIET AND BRITISH NEGLECT OF THE SERBIAN SITUATION

Abstract: The causes for the contradicting Soviet and British views on the Serbian existential situation from 1941-1945 stem from Austria-Hungary's policy and the ideological heritage of the Comintern and Stalinism. Though the war in Yugoslavia displayed anti-Serbianism from the occupier and Quislings alike, the allies saw the cause for anti-Serbianism in the old "hegemony" or old unsymmetric Serbo-Croat positions, blind to the fact that the occupational reign of terror had been imposed only upon the Serbs. This resulted in the discreditation of the national dimension of Serbian resistance under Gen. Mihailovic and the rise to power of Tito's anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav regime.

The ideological dividing line between British and Soviet policy in the inter-war period was determined by the 1917 overthrow of state and revolution in Russia. Henceforward, old imperial rivalries and conflicts gained impetus, influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations between the two powers. One of the results of these conflicts was an unhindered consolidation of Nazi policy in Hitler's Germany, giving capitulatory expression in the Munich dictate of 1938 and Stalin's rival response with the Ribentrop-Molotov accord of 1939.

In the inter-war period, neither of the two were an important economic partner to Yugoslavia, and judging by later developments in war, neither was ready for such a partnership.

After the World War I alliance, Britain gave France, and then Germany, priority in trade during the years preceding World War II. In broader circles, particularly Serbian, England left the impression of an indifferent partner that did not display much understanding for Serbia's national, state and legal constituting, thereby objectively helping large

parts of the nation to become assimilative raw material for the expansion of several neighboring nations.

Soviet Russia, in a new world of ideas, did not favor anyone who stood in the way of her ideological ecstasy, particularly not the Yugoslav regime, which actively supported the numerous White Guard group, helping to organize anti-Bolshevik activities.

Both powers did not apprehend the essence of Yugoslav socio-political, and particularly national relationships. They reasoned on the basis of notions formed by constituted and consolidated nations or by unilateral ideological grounds.

Serbo-Croat differences and conflicts since the beginning of the existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes centered on the national problem, a problem of the "Greater Serbian oppression of other nations". This "bogy of Greater Serbianism" became on the world scene a landmark for political relationships toward Yugoslavia and a curtain for different forms of manipulation detrimental to the Yugoslav nations, above all the Serbs. Forces of Austro-Hungarian nostalgia and sentimentalism always stressed Serb political preponderance in the leadership, raising it to unreal proportions. This served to encourage schemers to anti-Serbianism and anti-Yugoslavism, and those whose chief goal was to destroy the Yugoslav state.

The young Communist Party of Yugoslavia entered into every alliance after the mid-20s, even with the extreme right, in the fight against "Greater Serbian hegemony". Thanks to Yugoslav communists and individuals from other groups, this concoction, fabricated in the old Austro-Hungarian kitchen, entered the Comintern and Soviet government, crucially affecting the forming of Soviet politics. Thus the Soviet Union viewed relations with Yugoslavia not on the basis of tradition, but political propagandistic fiction. The old postulates of Russian politics toward fellow Orthodox Serbs dissolved, enabling various projectors of Serbian destruction to sneak in the void.

On the level of emotion and volition of the Serbian people, these relations assumed defeatist expressions from the beginning, in keeping with the intentions of the social wave, lifted with the October Revolution in Russia. After this, the relationship toward the Slavic and Socialist Mother became a corrective for differentiating "conservatism" and "avant-gardism", and from disuniting so-called "Greater Serbian hegemony" from the "progressive projections of a federal reconstruction of Yugoslavia". The latter rested on rather romanticized and abstract

visions of national equality, launched chiefly by Croatian political centers. The right to citizenship in such a situation was granted to Serb and separatist groups, with absolutizations of regional peculiarities, because they were backed by a big power, which provided their schemes with particular ethnic, cultural and historical traits, even the character of "new nations". These schemes assumed clear expression during World War II, when on their foundations were built the federative constructions of AVNOJ (National Anti-fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia).

Visions of Serbo-Croat relations perceived by Stalin and the Comintern were dispersed throughout the world via international communist channels, forming a manipulative "public opinion".

Here lie the sources of Britain's and Soviet pre-war and war policy toward Yugoslavia. Observation of the country's problem of instability as a result of the relationship between the "oppressive" Serbian and "oppressed" Croatian nations, was with the Soviets accompanied by associative illusions, that a "counterpart to old Russian autocracy" was the issue, and with the British, associations resembling a "Yugoslav Belfast". Certain quarters were even understanding about the anti-Serbian actions, as in their defense was "Serbian hegemony". Ignorance of Yugoslavia's ethnic, religious, cultural and historical situation was profound; notions of Serbs and Croats as nations differing widely prevailed everywhere. Britain was in this respect best "represented" by Robert Seton-Watson, whose views met all Croatian demands at the account of Serbs.¹ Soviet delusions about Serbia's position in Yugoslavia were a common stand that determined the political behavior of the Kremlin.²

The starting positions of the British and Soviet policies toward Yugoslavia differed considerably in the war, as did their long-term aims. The Soviet Union established its orientation on class and ideological bases, seeking and finding levers for its implementation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as an organization that fed on such sources. The link with British policy was a stand that presupposed uncompromising combativeness to all reasons, as the universal war logic, and to ideological and class motives. A political platform was built on this

1 R. W. Seton, *Watson i Jugosloveni*, correspondence from 1918-1941. Zagreb University - Institute for Croatian History - British Academy, Zagreb-London, 1976.

2 I. Levin, *Nacionalniji vopros v poslevoenoi Jugoslavii*, Moscow, 1934.

mutual interest, determining the fate of the warring factions in Yugoslavia.

Churchill's government saw clearly the advantage of the Serbs in the protest and rebellion of March 1941, but not clearly enough the role of national contradictions in the rapid downfall in April. It perceived the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as part of the occupational system to destroy Yugoslavia as a state (into zones of influence), and unequivocally condemned it. The U.S. administration held the same position. Croatia's illusions of independence were viewed with understanding in late 1941 and first half of 1942. That was when old nationalist disputes reemerged on the political stage of the Yugoslav Royal Government, in response to news of the Ustasha genocide against Serbs, claiming already hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Soviet Union encouraged and supported every anti-fascist sentiment in Yugoslavia even before the war, and during the March rebellion and April war, propagandistically, as a mitigation of its own positions. It did not, however, perceive the true character of inter-war national contradictions, nor the true character of their effects in the war. Russian foreign ministry documents bespeak that certain organs of Stalin's government knew this, knew what was going on in Yugoslavia during the war, but the majority confirmed old Comintern notions of "Greater Serbian hegemony".³ However, there is a vagueness as to how the deceptions on "hegemony" effected certain post-April political vicissitudes: in regard to the Royal government and regarding hesitations within the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia. Though the fact that the policy of restoring Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity was accepted in the Kremlin since early June 1941 evinces that the hesitation, if there had been any in the past month and a half, was overcome.

Churchill's government was pushed in the rear of Soviet politics when the former was convinced it held firmly all the reins of the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement. The "legitimistic" principle to which all the allies took an oath lent it the most favored role. Britain held the chief outposts of Yugoslav legitimism - the King and royal government. It reacted with jealousy at any sign that the U.S. might seize this "advantage". Churchill's government believed it secured through this

3 Arhiv vnešnje politiki SSSR, f. 144, op.3, p.4, d.7, pp 31-36, 130-146; op. 3a.d.2, pp 130-146.

"legitimism" full control over the Chetnik movement and its commander, which was understandable, as Mihailovic had on joining the royal government linked his destiny to the government and king.

Soviet respect for Yugoslav legitimism, demonstrated in regular diplomatic relations and efforts to put "Tito's partisans" under the command of the "more seasoned and prepared officer" was deceitful. Near the end of 1941, after the insurgent rift and abandonment of Serbia, and first half of 1942, it seemed the partisans had forever disappeared from the political scene. They had abandoned the alliance as an option as well. Mention of them was made in London by Chetniks in harsh public criticisms of their "leftist" activities in Montenegro, Herzegovina, eastern Bosnia and Serbia, with long lists of Serbian nationalists brutally exterminated.

All indications were that Churchill's government held the main levers of Yugoslav policy. Owing to an extorted pacification of nationalist passions in Jovanović's government (which in 1942 replaced Simović's) a theoretical symmetry of Serbo-Croat war positions was established, which helped push aside Croatian pro-fascist layers. HSS leader Vlatko Maček was seen as a counterpart to Mihailović, at a time when the Croatian leader had no troops for combat.

This theoretical symmetry became propagandist reality, a basis for building a fictive alliance policy toward Yugoslavia. In the shadow of this fiction was a media war among emigrants, waged with such ferocity that the allies were more preoccupied with this battle than with the war that raged on battlefields throughout Yugoslavia. In the propagandist war, the Serbs were losers a priori, having no ally to sympathize with them and deliberate concrete notions of their existential reality. In the country, they were torn between Orthodox and Slavic Russia and the communist USSR. Outside, between western superficiality and a theoretic orientation for a future Yugoslavia which ignored their sufferings and countless sacrifices, and the tragic national reality that was becoming disastrous. Thus the Serbs were stretched upon a moral crossroads. Dexterous artisans of the Croatian political scene - "invisible" externally but visible in the government and in emigration, incited trouble daily and ironically provoked the Serbs, in light of their orientation for a future with the allies, exhibiting their national and

4 Veselin Djuretić, *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* I-II, fourth edition, supplemented, Belgrade, 1992.

tragic preoccupations as a plea to continue with the old "hegemonic" policy and an obvious resistance to the "general demands".⁴

Mihailović had lost months and years proving that his (Serbian) struggle was conditioned on numerous dangers; he provided numerous bloody testimonies conducive to this. Nothing helped. Tito denied it all, with claims of his fighting spirit, his victories in combat, which were, indeed, considerably magnified, but nevertheless, always evident. Perfunctory Churchill took them seriously. At one point he lent an ear to Serb suffering - apparently with compassion - but always remembering to add a bellicose tutoring that considered the overall scene of the allies.

Mihailović's men defended themselves with the charges of a perfidious Albion, without taking any steps to rupture the relationship. They never even thought of breaking from "their" royal government, not even when the latter had entered the orbit of allied reasoning about Yugoslav reality. Not even when it was showered with political "expertise" marked by a symmetry of Serbo-Croatian positions, that is, levelling the instigator and victim. Mihailović's political center clung to the young and inexperienced king, though he had obviously become a symbol of a fettered governmental policy. It never occurred to him to set up his own government in the country, an independent political center that would present authentic Serbian interests to the world. The Chetnik political center thus sank into a rift between certain Serbian motives and interests of Yugoslav policy and its government, which had during the idle maneuvering objectively conducted a policy of Serbian neutralization, enabling at the end the regrouping of its domestic foes to the winning side.

The cul-de-sac of Mihailović's policy was marked in mid-1942. It was disclosed by Soviet propagandist actions on the line of discrediting the Chetnik leader. Many of Tito's reports had reached Moscow in the first half of 1942, which, by disregarding Serbian war reality on the level of Yugoslavism, strengthened allied theoretical judgments and projections of a future Yugoslav community. They were fatal to Mihailović because they created illusions, before semi-literate allies indifferent to the Serbian situation, that an armed struggle in Yugoslavia was possible, despite the difficult conditions.

The principle of combativeness became by the end of 1941 the only criterion for solidarity toward the allies. During the brief period of the joint partisan-Chetnik struggle from September to November 1941,

both left the impression abroad that a struggle against the occupier was possible. Then they disowned initial beliefs by many, even the Yugoslav and British governments, that time was not ripe for such an action. Churchill's government saw neither then nor later the revolutionary implication in the principle of combativeness, that the Comintern and Stalin were creating a political platform for the international recognition of Yugoslav forces under communist leadership, that it was a moral curtain for seizing power via revolution.

It appears, however, that the Soviet government in mid-1942 viewed uncompromising combativeness from a purely communist angle, when the mortal danger in the battle for Moscow had ceased. Until then it was governed more by military and political realism, expecting backing from Britain anywhere in Europe, even in the Balkans. On the line of realism then was the call for single command in the resistance movement under Mihailović. The Kremlin had due to international reasons avoided direct attacks on Chetnik commanders until mid-1942, when it set out to discredit them, by stressing the contribution to the war by the partisans and publishing reports by "neutral" media to the effect that Mihailović was obstructing the partisan struggle with his cooperation with the occupier.

Britain's apprehension of the principle of combativeness departed from purely war motives, varying around combat tactics. Thus the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet on Yugoslavia had exchanged encouraging and defeatistic instructions in their reasonings. And when it perceived ideological differences and clashes among the Serbian anti-fascist parties, and suspected Soviet influence on the behavior of the communists, it did not infer on the level of analysis the phenomenon of "new socialist revolutions". It saw them as a reality only within an analysis of Soviet reality until the war.⁵

Relations in the anti-Hitler coalition presupposed all combat reasons to ideological ones, whereas British playing host to the Yugoslav royal government posed a particular obstacle for Churchill, because of the discussions about Serbian national and existential problems which persistently disrupted the Yugoslav government throughout the war. To all its cabinets - under Simović, Jovanović, Trifunović and Purić - the issue was not to allow the opening of another front of Serbian suffering. The issue was not the usual front, determined by the mere alter-

5 Staniša R. Vlahović, *Zbornik dokumenata iz britanske arhive, Anglo-jugoslovenski odnosi 1941-1948*, Birmingham 1985, 57-167.

native for or against the occupier, but a front that would on an anti-occupier basis express two different tactics of struggle - one without compromise (partisan) and the other mainly compromising (Chetnik).

In implementing its patronage over the Yugoslav royal government, London took care of its protege in relations within the great coalition. It did so rather unknowingly: it adjusted the Yugoslav refugee center to the overall coalition reasons, forcing it to push its national reasons behind those of the allies. It thus triggered opposition in mainly Serbian agents in the government, who, owing to persisting Ustasha pogroms and German retaliation were governed chiefly by national motives. The royal center thus dictated a policy of perpetual maneuvering, adjusting to Churchill's unstable policy, instructing its forces in the country (the Chetniks) to consider national circumstances and relationships among the allies. But this course, after the rupture of the anti-fascist forces during the severe partisan-Chetnik conflict, was bound to lead to many trials, inconsistencies, compromising both centers. The other side in the conflict (partisans) expediently presented its foes' making conditional any struggle with Serbian existential reasons as an obvious sabotage of the anti-fascist struggle, thus compromising rare sentiments among some London officials concerning the Serbian tragedy, rendering them an anti-Soviet character. The British government was thus in a situation proving its solidarity to the allies before the Soviets, with new tutorial instructions to the Yugoslav pawns: to heed their behavior and not spoil relations in the anti-Hitler coalition.

Clever Croatian agents in the Yugoslav government and emigration offices in the United States, confronted with Pavelić's "anational" policy and its destructive effects (particularly in Dalmatia), were expedient in Britain's ignorant maneuvering to discredit the Serbian Chetniks as a new Greater Serbian center prescient of a bloody revenge. From these circles, that is, from the circles of their back-stage patrons, national symmetries were launched, gradually winning recognition, so that Pavelić's racist, genocidal collaborationism was equated with Nedić's clerical collaborationism in the name of "saving the Fatherland", although the latter was a necessary mediator between the occupier and threatened populace. Anti-Serb circles were thus able to present Mihailović's tactical and political agreement as a groundless capitulation, even mark it as an ideological yoke; to successfully conceal the fact that it was based on the anti-communism aimed at the "instigators" of German reprisals against Serbs and on anti-extremism,

determined by crimes perpetrated by communists in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and, on a smaller scale, in other Serbian regions. This relationship on the level of propaganda assumed pronounced ideological postulates, where domestic subjectivistic deviations were linked to Stalinistic ones, which raised wide anti-communist sentiment throughout the country. The allies viewed it as a sectarian policy that threatened to jeopardize the coalition with the Soviet Union. Because of this "danger", Churchill's Yugoslav policy increasingly resembled Stalin's, which was most apparent in propaganda. News supplied by Tito or the Comintern were casually published in western media, and then taken over by Moscow to be presented to the international public as the "voice of the Soviet public opinion". This deft "revolutionary" game would not have been possible without good coordination with the partisan center in Yugoslavia. In the background, Tito played his pro-Croatian game with Stalin.

Croatian nationalist agents in Britain and the United States used the blind alleys of Serbian maneuvering to enter the political course conducted by the allies which enabled them to omit the past and Serbian war reality filled with nationalist challenges aimed against the entire Croatian populace, and turn all forces toward a "Yugoslav future". Individuals that had until then openly expressed chauvinistic affiliations (such as Krmjević) also took part in these aspirations, which provided an opportunity to occupy a position closer to the policy conducted by the great allies than that of Serbian centers at home and in emigration. They even approached the Soviet policy for which they had until then, owing to ideological and religious (Catholics) motives, felt much enmity. They also adjusted into the wave of sentimentalism that rose throughout the western world on account of Russia's immeasurable suffering. And the triumphs at Moscow and Stalingrad, as well as the one of pan-Slavic character skillfully conducted by communist media in the western world (for instance, the Canadian paper *Free Word*). It created gradually a social atmosphere for the recognition of Sovietism. The chief message of the clime to the Yugoslav warring parties was: a demand for national unity toward a common future, a message that suited the main political stream of the anti-Hitler coalition. Even pro-Croatian centers, the Vatican above all, which sought ways to save the Croatian people from possible Serb retaliation and convey them to the winner's side.⁶

6 Veselin Djuretić. *Vlada na besprijek*, second edition, Belgrade 1983, 33-101.

In this way, a large part of the Serbian emigration, mostly those in the United States and Canada, were in a different position from the allies. Trust in the widely condemned forces of Mihailović diminished among a part of the emigration, owing somewhat to solidarity with their new fatherland, and to patriotic and pro-Russian sentiment, with increasing inclination toward the partisans. Imbibing the muddy springs of national tragedy, flowing perpetually with varying intensity, becoming a real prisoner of the narrow national policy, the first part became at the same time a suitable target for propagandist games which pushed it cunningly in the anti-alliance group, that is, opposed it to the broad commitment for the reconstruction of the new Yugoslav community.

The position and behavior of the Yugoslav emigration presented an important corrective for the forming of the British and American public opinion and, under that influence, the official policy of these countries. Well aware of the prevailing sentiment, the Soviet government (through the Comintern and other intelligence posts in the western world) regularly used the propagandistic and political impulses of this "public opinion" to earn recognition for its communist strategy. Especially its policy toward Yugoslavia, which was conducted through its Communist Party. It performed these activities in a manner that recent history will record as one of the most original revolutionary and political tactics. Continually stimulating the partisans to uncompromising combativeness, it followed the common orientation of the allies. At one point so provokingly that the foes of the Yugoslav communists were by the force of circumstance persistently put to trial and thrown off course - to the position of military and political defeatism. Stalin's regime ignored the Serbian reasons, thus compelling the Serbs with additional provocations to prove their sufferings before the Soviets and offer ideological proof before the western allies. However, the world was benumbed owing to various tricks, doubting Serbian judgements, and western allies had long presupposed their ideological reasons to those of combat.

The strategy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, inspired by Moscow, together with Tito's leadership, had new possibilities for continuing at the end of 1941 its course to win acclaim for the revolutionary forces, assisted by their Yugoslav foes, and with help from a "leftist" and otherwise influenced Yugoslavized public opinion: finally, with the help of western governments, above all Churchill's, which at

the time demanded Yugoslav politics without any of her national-suffering conditions.

Britain's "expertise preparation" considerably helped unhindered movement along this course with its sociologizing about Balkan social structures as unfit for introducing communism. This enabled partisan forces to hide their true ideological face, and, subsequently, with help from the broad headline "national-liberation forces of Yugoslavia", to impose themselves as the only counter-balance to the Serbo-Croatian national obscurity. Particularly as a counter-balance to the movement of Draža Mihailović, who was charged as the true successor of the "old Greater Serbian hegemony and oppression", alleging that a "retaliatory movement", not a liberation, was at stake, which was resisting the Yugoslav policy of the emigrants and allies.

Thanks to Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda, Chetnik ideological proof before the West became increasingly the only ideological and provocative position in Yugoslavia that disturbed joint combat efforts. The partisan demonstration before their own center and ally, considering it had been since the beginning successfully concealed from the western world, hidden beneath institutional, personal and other symbols, which presented it in the broadest democratic sense, it was outside the light of the international scene. Ignorance of this fact enabled that the Chetniks' account of Yugoslav communism as "extremism" were unconvincing, because they were not backed by the uncompromising combativeness of the partisans, and they were also unacceptable because they disturbed relations with the eastern partner who bore the chief burden of the war. Thus they fell into a fresh rift, in which emerged old suspicions of individual western politicians toward Serbs as the "Russian stronghold" and Soviet neglect of Serbian narrow-national motives. It was a state of fatal dilemmas, inevitably leading to new divisions and conflicts.

Mystifications of the partisan ideological position were an overture to international discreditation of the Chetniks and international recognition of the partisan movement. The latter emerged as the sole winner of the differences and conflicts between the narrow-Serbian national and existential reasons and the policy of the allies. Its true fighting spirit and assertive readiness to accept every anti-fascist demand by the allies, regardless of Serbian national circumstances, entered the domestic and world propagandist orbit as the only real anti-fascist and Yugoslav position. After glorious victories by the allies and Italy's ca-

pitulation, such propaganda in the country encouraged new differentiation - within a victorious atmosphere, and a sobering down for all people and nations, for those who had owing to various manipulations by leaderships and foreign factors been cast on the profascist side. The epilogue of the process was the exit of most Croats and Muslims from the net of Pavelić's pernicious politics; a neutralization of Yugoslav national minority leaderships (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Hungarians), drawing these people out from the net of anti-Serbian policy. The national-liberation (partisan) movement emerged as a God-given haven for all those seduced, for their anti-occupier last-moment activation.

The new division among the Serbian people, spurred by the glorious allied victories and their pro-partisan policy, was much more complex than the insurgent one. From the moral standpoint above all: demands for turning toward the future were seen by most as a new provocative policy. Living with tragic memories of hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, they looked more toward the past than the future, or beheld the future with the eyes of an embittered avenger. They saw the propagandistic discrediting of Mihailović's movement as a broad anti-Serbian conspiracy, and expressed their caustic political obstinacy in condemning the British and Soviet policy, rather than the occupier's. This obstinacy led to new existential and tactical yokes with the retreating Germans, motivated by anti-communist and anti-British sentiment, whereby the adversary propaganda won new trumps to present Chetniks as traitors to the world. This was the road to new Serbian trials and tragedy. Other Serbs followed the path of political realism offered by the allies, particularly the Russian bellicose wave moving irrepressibly toward the Balkans. One part, resenting Churchill's policy, turned toward the future, led by faith in the great American civilization and democracy, or belief in the resurrection of staggering France. Most of the people, however, were convinced that the traditional dimension of a dozing Russia would finally speak out in direct encounter with Serbian reality. By accepting the national liberation partisan movement already recognized by the allies, they saw the only framework for regrouping, that is, an opportunity to win freedom with uncompromising engagement in combat, awaiting an end to the war on the "right side". The Russian factor, in connection with the socialist ideology, which became more openly and widely manifest on the platform of the partisan movement, acquired euphoric strength, winning over the "small" man. Its old insurgent anti-communist, as an anti-ex-

tremist sentiment, dissolved before proof of unusual social mobility, which the partisan movement then displayed widely, including in its political and military orbit more common folk - workers and peasants. They became to their fellow countrymen symbols of national revolution and a new socialist era that would ensue.

The Yugoslav "compromise", expressed in the Tito-Šubašić agreement in mid-1944, was thus prepared, with a series of actions of the forces of revolutionary orientation. "Compromise" boiled down to the basic war structure - over the principle of combativeness as the criterion for all values. All political forces that were prisoners of narrow national motives and objectives became antipodal to the overall policy of the allies, and as such bound to fail. The Yugoslav "compromise" was proof that Serbian national peculiarities were being somewhat respected, those that were conducive to the pro-communist part of the populace. But this would not have been possible had there not been a major crossover of Serbs near the end of the war to Tito's side (which the "compromise" had hastened). It would not have been possible without the policy of the USSR and the western allies who backed these forces and appeared as guarantees of the new Yugoslavia - "in which full equality of all its nations was warranted".

Churchill's government, under the illusions that it was the chief creator of the compromise, closed its Yugoslav war policy with new illusions. In putting Tito's forces under the command of King Petar II, it found a formula for an "uncommunist" outcome, without realizing the character of the revolutionary dimension of Yugoslav reality, its firm link with the center in Moscow. It did not see the role of the revolutionary forces in steering Churchill to such a policy, which put all Yugoslav streams and movements into fatal alternatives: cling to the old positions and disappear with the occupier or accept Churchill's "compromise" which lent wide support to the new Yugoslav political center of socialist orientation and its international recognition on the basis of state and lawful legitimacy.

Only after the fait accompli, after the penetration of Soviet forces on Serbian soil, Britain became aware of the fact that the compromise it had backed was merely an incorporate Soviet revolutionary strategy.

The U.S. received evident confirmation of its stands, but, respecting the partner supremacy in the Mediterranean - did nothing to reverse the course of events.

Churchill's government was scarcely aware that the engagement of Ivan Šubašić was only an acceptance of the non-Serbian path toward "resolving" the Serbian problem, and that, by "employing" the young king in the course of talks with Tito was the realization of Stalin's plan to "somehow trick" England, in order to disarm, with help from the "center of unity", its troops, the Chetniks, who were the real rival to the partisan movement.

When Churchill's government became aware of their delusions, prior to the outcome, it did not even attempt to carry out essential political corrections; on the contrary, it quickened its step towards its naive vision of the "compromise". Confronted with the Soviet fait accompli, there was realistically no hope for such a reverse twist.

Nevertheless, the British government continued to express its lack of understanding for the particular Stalinist aspect of "democracy" especially expressed in its faith and hope that the Yugoslav peoples would annul all that had been accomplished thus far in a plebiscitary manner, considerably and with her military and political help. It continued to believe in that possibility even during the Potsdam conference.

СОВЈЕТСКО И БРИТАНСКО ИГНОРИСАЊЕ СРПСКЕ ЕЗИСТЕНЦИЈЗЛНЕ ПОЛИТИКЕ Резиме

Агресија немачких нациста и италијанских фашиста на Југославију погађала је у првом реду Српски народ. Против Срба су окупатори покренули све националне и мањинске сепаратисте, у првом реду Хрвате. Уследио је страшан геноцид.

Срби су били угрожени као народ, и као народ су били обавезни да се бране. Стога је код њих појава идеолошког чиниоца, комуниста, дочекана као удар деструкције самоодбрамбене кохезије народа као отврање још једног фронта против Срба. То је посебно постало јасно после националистичког (четничког) борбеног експонирања, заједно са комунистима (партизанима).

Сурова немачка одмазда над народом истакла је у први план политичи мотив освајача — до бољих дана. Иза ње је стајао народ.

Али савезници, Совјети и Британци, понесени првим борбеним успесима "Југословена" нису видели основно — да су репресалије (100 за једног) условљавале свако српско понашање, а борбеном понашању давале смисао националне неодговорности. Пропагандним путем биле су створене оптималистичке визије ситуације и то под утицајем стаљинско-титовске пропаганде. Илузије о могућности борбе, које су игнорисале српско страдање, постале су одредица савезничке политике према "новој Југославији". Преко њих комунисти (КПЈ) ступили су на југословенску и међународну сцену.