

MIGRATIONS

IN BALKAN

HISTORY

- Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade (special editions No 39)
- Prosveta, Export-Import Agency, Belgrade
- Department of History, University of California, Santa Barbara

Editors in chief:

- Nikola Tasić, corresponding member, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
- Dušica Stošić, director
Prosveta, Export-Import Agency

Editorial board:

- Radovan Samardžić, full member, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
- Dimitrije Đorđević, full member
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
- Ivan Ninić publishing manager
Prosveta, Export-Import Agency

Secretary:

- Dr. Milan St. Protić, fellow
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts,
Institute for Balkan Studies

The publication was financially supported by the
“Republička Zajednica nauke Srbije”

MIGRATIONS IN BALKAN HISTORY

BELGRADE
1989

JV

8331

.M6411

1989

CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

325.1 (497) (082)

MIGRATIONS in Balkan History / [urednik Ivan Ninić]. – Beograd:
Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1989. – 171 стр. : 24 см

ПК: а. Миграције – Балканско полуострво – Зборници

ISBN 86-7179-006-1

1730
7.91

CONTENTS

Radovan Samardžić Dimitrije Djordjević	PREFACE	7
Mark R. Stefanovich	ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION IN PREHISTORY	9
Nikola Tasić	PREHISTORIC MIGRATION MOVEMENTS IN THE BALKANS	29
Robert Frakes	THE IMPACT OF THE HUNS IN THE BALKANS IN LATE ANTIQUE HISTORIOGRAPHY	39
Henrik Birnbaum	WAS THERE A SLAVIC LANDTAKING OF THE BALKANS AND, IF SO, ALONG WHAT ROUTES DID IT PROCEED?	47
Dragoljub Dragojlović	MIGRATIONS OF THE SERBS IN THE MIDDLE AGES	61
Bariša Krekić	DUBROVNIK AS A POLE OF ATTRACTION AND A POINT OF TRANSITION FOR THE HINTERLAND POPULATION IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES	67
Dragan R. Živojinović	WARS, POPULATION MIGRATIONS AND RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISM IN DALMATIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE XVIIth CENTURY	77
Radovan Samardžić	MIGRATIONS IN SERBIAN HISTORY	83
Milan St. Protić	MIGRATIONS RESULTING FROM PEASANT UPHEAVALS IN SERBIA DURING THE XIXth CENTURY	91
Linda L. Nelson	THE BULGARIAN INTELLECTUAL EMIGRATION IN RUMANIA DURING THE VUZRAZHDANE	97
Frank J. Frost	FALLMERAYER REVISITED	109
Dimitrije Djordjević	MIGRATIONS DURING THE 1912-1913 BALKAN WARS AND WORLD WAR ONE	115
Veselin Djuretić	THE EXODUS OF THE SERBS FROM KOSOVO IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND ITS POLITICAL BACKGROUND	131
Dragoslav Antonijević	CATTLEBREEDERS' MIGRATIONS IN THE BALKANS THROUGH CENTURIES	147
Djurica Krstić	MIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE BALKANS	157
Elsie Ivancich Dunin	MIGRATIONS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY EXPRESSED THROUGH DANCE: A STUDY OF DANCE AMONG SOUTH SLAVS IN CALIFORNIA	161

PREFACE

On April 10–12, 1988, a conference was held at the University of California in Santa Barbara on Population Migrations in the Balkans From Pre-History to Recent Times. The conference was the result of an agreement for collaboration reached in 1986 between the History Department of the University of California in Santa Barbara and the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

The purpose of the meeting was to present and discuss the results obtained in different disciplines concerning Balkan migrations (in history, anthropology, ethnography, linguistics) and to study their interaction.

The topic was chosen due to the importance of migrations which stamped the history of the Balkan peoples. For centuries the Balkans were the transit area and the crossroads of European civilizations. Ancient Greece, the Roman and Byzantine empires, the settlement of the Slavs, their medieval states as well as centuries of Ottoman rule left a deep impact on the ethnic, political and cultural composition of the Peninsula. The Eastern Question and the rivalry of the European powers to participate in the Ottoman heritage introduced the Balkans into modern European history, parallel to the birth of domestic, national Balkan States in the nineteenth century. The conflict between modernization and traditionalism created a fascinating symbiosis in the development of Balkan national societies and cultures. Nationalism created confrontations between Balkan States which played an important role in the outbreak of World War I.

Population migrations were among the decisive factors which contributed to the dynamism of Balkan history. The succession of the Illyrians and Thracians and the Celtic tribes changed the ethnic composition of the Balkans. The Roman invasion of Dacia created the Rumanian nation. The Slavic intrusion in the Balkans introduced the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians to the historical stage. The split of the Churches further divided the population and religious heresies stimulated ethnic movements. Throughout the middle ages the mountaineer, the cattle breeder, followed his herds and contributed to the population mixture. The Ottoman invasion caused a massive migration of population from South to North, towards the Western and Northern Balkans. Similar migrations were provoked by the following Austro-Ottoman and Russo-Ottoman wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The formation of modern Balkan states and the establishment of their political frontiers caused new migrations and the intermingling of peoples. The mobility of peoples who lived for centuries in multi-national empires (Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Habsburg) made extremely difficult the establishment of ethnic frontiers based on the principle of national self-determination. This became most evident during the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars, World War I and its aftermath. Ethnic mixtures resulting from

migrations blurred national affiliations in adjacent Balkan national confines. This mixture stimulated nationalism, caused the presence of national minorities in the Balkan States and contributed to the genocide and fratricidal conflicts during World War II.

Twenty-three scholars, among them eight from Yugoslavia, as well as from Hungary, University of California in Santa Barbara, Berkeley, Los Angeles and Stanford took part in the conference. Presented papers were grouped in four parts.

The first group of papers dealt with the migrations in pre-history, ethnicity and social organization in pre-Roman times, the impact of the Huns on migrations, and the Slavic landtaking. The second group included presentations referring to migrations during the middle ages, the movements of cattle-breeders, the city of Dubrovnik and its hinterland. Serbian migrations and ethnic movements in general and in Bosnia and Hercegovina particularly. Papers presented in the third part of the conference dealt with migrations and cultural identity expressed through dances, the effects of migrations on the South Slav dialects, the historian Fallmerayer and his theory of migrations, the impact of migrations on the customary law and the Jewish migrations in the Balkans. The fourth part included papers dealing with the modern period starting from the eighteenth century, wars and migrations during the Ottoman rule, migrations resulting from peasant upheavals in the nineteenth century, Bulgarian migrations to Rumania, migrations caused by the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and World War I as well as recent migrations from the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia.

Papers presented at the conference are included in this volume. The intention of the authors is to contribute to the understanding of Balkan migrations and to stimulate further research in this complex and significant aspect of Balkan social history. The meeting of scholars in Santa Barbara was made possible by grants obtained from the University of California Santa Barbara (the Interdisciplinary Humanities Center, the Opportunity Fund, the Office of Research Development and the Department of History), the support from the International Research and Exchanges Board – IREX, the Center for Russian and East European Studies of the University of California in Los Angeles and the generous private donation of Mr. Peter Dimitri in Geneva. Last but not least this volume could not appear without the funds obtained from the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Our gratitude goes to all of these scholarly institutions.

Radovan Samardžić

Director of the Institute for Balkan Studies,
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

Dimitrije Djordjević

Professor of History
Chairman of Balkan Studies at UCSB.

ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION IN PREHISTORY

Methodological considerations

What in observation is loose and vague,
is in information deceptive and treacherous.

Francis Bacon

Archaeology is most often associated by the lay person with images of exotic temples overgrown with hundreds of years of unfettered verdage, rich tombs, decorated caves, underground cities or meeting places that are now being exposed for the first time by the archaeologist. Although this does happen occasionally – the Mayan temples, Tutankhamen's tomb, the Caves of Altamira and Lascaux or the tomb of Philip the II of Macedon – these stunning finds are more the exception than the rule, yet they are fuel for the romantic imagination of the dreamer in all of us. But the archaeologist is often obliged of necessity to operate with much scantier and less glamorous material in order to reconstruct the cultural, social and economic systems of the past. The archaeologist needs to understand how change takes place and to attempt to comprehend why it has taken place.

When people observe the unearthed remains of vanished societies, the question that most often comes to mind is "Who were the people who made these artifacts or monuments and where did they come from?" The archaeologist, more than any other professional, is faced with this perplexing question. During the unearthing of an archaeological site the origin of the inhabitants is not the archaeologist's immediate concern. Only later with the evaluation of the data does it surface and become a dominant theme for the professional and the layman. Any potential explanation of the presence of an archaeological assemblage may fall roughly into one of three main categories: migration, local development or borrowing from neighboring peoples.

In this paper we wish to explore a methodological approach to migration in prehistory: and to point out the *necessary* indications in the archaeological record which would warrant migration as an explanation. We propose to show that the means of explanation utilized in archaeology concerning migration are for the most part inadequate and lack a key ingredient: accounting for the ontology of the researcher and his/her subjective biases, notably the investigator's ethnicity. Thus, for example witness the controversies and emotional involvement regarding the locating of the Indo-European homeland(s). We would begin with what should qualify as a methodological explanation and the conditions to be met in order for the archaeologist to posit the peopling of an area as the result of a migration. We shall also discuss the sensitive aspect of the researcher's objectivity and subjectivity and how to incorporate it into the methodology.

The archaeologist, in attempting to reconstruct events that will explain the material remains, is faced with establishing the criteria under which his offered explanation would be accepted or rejected – essentially determining the knowable and the probable. This forensic dominates the modern philosophy of science and differentiates various models.

The task for the historian or archaeologist who treats historic peoples is often simplified by the existence of written testimony or oral tradition that can adumbrate the origin of the artifactual assemblage. The prehistorian by definition, on the other hand, performs his task in the opposite direction, by inferring the possibilities based on the cultural remains and utilizing only the written testimony, if it exists, as a confirmation and not as an explanation of the archaeological material.¹

Crucial for the archaeologist is to be able to determine the relationship between the explanation and the evidence. This is not only a task for the archaeologist but also for the audience to whom the data are being presented. The critical appreciation of the explanation of an event is based on the level of knowledge the audience possesses as well as the level of instructions used by the researcher in presenting his results.

The evaluative process is frequently complicated by the fact that science has often been presented as a mass of solid facts, albeit of many types, but always reasonably clear and ready to be assimilated by the observer. Today the interested individual² can view science either as a mass of facts or as a mass of open-ended questions sprouting in all directions and requiring further research. Despite the philosophy of science accepted by the social community, at the core of scientific investigation the ideal of the pursuit of truth has provided generations with the wherewithal for the commitment to meaningful research. Of course the social character of truth affects the judgment of the scientist in deciding which data are sound. The perfection of data is impossible, so the judgment of adequacy rests on the criteria imposed on the solution. This resolution does not yield indisputable facts, but only plausible solutions which are in turn evaluated by the social community in accordance with the developed criteria. Thus the solutions are themselves the product of the accepted facts or the received level of knowledge. It is clear that these standards are different for different disciplines but it is also evident that the standards themselves are a reflection of the strength of the academic and social community. In this manner the solidity of the results is a microcosm of the accumulated social experience and values.

The data excavated by the archaeologist need a great deal of refinement before they can be interpreted, let alone represent “facts”. This transformation often requires the application of new techniques and tools along with new judgments. The new transformed data-set presents new requirements and the data now demand new parameters. These new conditions, through additional transformation and testing move towards producing new meaningful information. However, it should never be forgotten that the process which produced these data unearthed by archaeology cannot be controlled, nor is it reproducible. Rather it is a sample of artifacts representing events that have been produced naturally with variability and trivial features, and where the process of contemporary sampling may have induced new varia-

tions and distortions. The result is that only a part of the information used in the data solution actually derives from the data in the investigation. The remaining information stems from the individual researcher's source materials outside the context of the data in question. Often this additional information emanating from the research of other investigators is accepted as fact, whereas, it should still be considered as no more than possible information since its relevance and reliability cannot be taken for granted for the data in question.³ In addition it is our contention that in archaeology and ethnology much of the utilized information is subjectively remote from the problem in which it is being used. This is not to say that there is always a deliberate attempt to subjectively or objectively contaminate the data with trivial biases, but often the ontological outlook of the researcher will color his valuations and affect his research goals and results.⁴

The approvable criteria for theory acceptance in the social community are embodied within the framework of a philosophy of science which in the Western tradition is based on a logical point of view.⁵ In this section we shall review briefly those approaches that have relevance for archaeology or have been incorporated into archaeological research designs.

1. Science as a human activity would be concerned with questions such as "How are discoveries made?" Or "what is the nature of time and space?"⁶

2. A functional view would raise questions such as "How do scientific laws function?"⁷ A Formal view might ask the question "What is the logical structure of scientific laws and theories?"⁸

3. Science may also be approached from the analytic point of view where the researcher is trying to see how various aspects of science work; questions regarding the form and function of scientific explanations. On the other hand, questions regarding the relationship of morality to science and the critiquing of science as one cultural artifact would be part of the synthetic or empirical approach.

4. Science can be thought of critically either as it is or as it ought to be.

It is in the critical tradition that explanations have been mainly put forth in archaeology.⁹ Let us look briefly at some of the terms that are used in logic as they are implemented in the archaeological models. The terms induction and deduction are familiar to most of us. "An argument is said to be deductive . . . if its premises imply its conclusion . . . [and] whatever truth is in their premises is passed on to the conclusions. On the contrary, the premises of inductive arguments do not imply their conclusions, but merely make them more or less probable, well supported, or plausible, . . . [i. e.] the truth of their premises is not necessarily passed on to their conclusions."¹⁰ The above are often referred to as the *formalist* account. In a *suppositional* account, "an argument is said to be deductive if it is supposed to imply its conclusion and inductive if it is supposed to make its conclusion more or less probable . . . In this case to say an argument is deductive or inductive is merely to say what it is supposed to do, whether or not it does."¹¹

Logical positivists or empiricists are interested in providing rational reconstructions of various aspects of science,¹² and implying that all cognitively meaningful propositions were logically either true or false or at least testable. The difficulty with verifiability is that it made some laws empirically

meaningless. This difficulty is also encountered with the requirement of *complete falsifiability*.

Another set of theories, known as the “received view”, hold that observation terms and theoretical terms should be clearly distinguished, that the latter should be explicitly defined by the former; there are difficulties in formulating explicit definitions of theoretical terms by observation terms.¹³

However, it is the hypothetico-deductive method of trial-and-error procedure that has been of immense impact on archaeological methodology.¹⁴

Four points should be emphasized about this procedure. First, it is basically patterned after a deductive argument form known as *modus tollens*. Second, it is not asserted that the hypothesis is true when it passes its test. It is merely asserted that because it passed its test, we have no good reason to reject it. Third, strictly speaking the hypothesis and its initial test conditions stand or fall together following a test. Following a test, no one is interested in the fact that the initial conditions were as they were supposed to be. However, following a failed test, proponents of the hypothesis may have serious doubts about the conditions. Since a faulty setup may have been the cause of the unsuccessful prediction, the setup must be inspected. If it is clean, then the hypothesis has to bear the brunt of the failure . . .

The fourth point to be noticed about the hypothetico-deductive method is that there is nothing in the procedure described so far that ensures the growth of science. What has to be insisted upon in this scenario is the inverse relationship between empirical *content* and logical *im* probability. If we want bold new scientific hypotheses with an abundance of explanatory power, then our conjectures must be highly improbable. Security can be bought only at the price of timidity. Highly probable hypotheses are highly probable only because they depart minimally from the already accepted evidence and beliefs.¹⁵

Another contemporary view is represented by Thomas Kuhn: an individual is socialized into the scientific community that is committed to what is called a “paradigm”. Scientific discoveries are divided into two types: normal or evolutionary and revolutionary. Evolutionary discoveries do not threaten change in the paradigm, they merely add to the existing body of laws and models. The revolutionary discoveries test the paradigm and threaten change.

This brief review of the above-mentioned approaches outlines some of the diverse means in which different researchers and philosophers have sought explanations for some fundamental questions in science.

Despite the methodological approach practiced by the researcher and championed by the social community the question of what is to be considered a satisfactory “explanation” still remains to be answered. As with any definition, what is to be excluded is as important as what is to be included. We feel that any explanation being applied to an archaeological methodology must take into account the ontology of the researcher as well as the ethnic

and historical traditions of the social community to which the researcher and data belong. It is also of utmost importance that the audience to whom the data are presented are fundamentally aware of these biases – and they are biases, regardless of whether or not they are accepted by all. These biases appear in the form of an ontological outlook: e. g. materialist, idealist or realist. More important to account for are the ethnic and historical traditions that carry tremendous emotional appeal and which frequently cut across ontological conceptions. These considerations are especially important in archaeological explanations as they are an integral subjective component of both the judgment process and the explanation agenda.

Let us first consider the concept of ethnicity and its influence on research. Ethnicity in our view is a concept that only has meaning in relation to specific synchronic social conditions and not diachronically. Ethnicity when viewed diachronically is a collection of historical traditions cherished by the group. Our view can be stated based on the following eight points.

1. Prehistory cannot be treated solely as a period without written testimony in the historical tradition but rather from the socio-cultural viewpoint that utilizes ethnographic parallels and sociological theory in analyzing lifeways, ethnic formation, language acquisition and other culture aspects.

2. Cultural patterns and material manifestations can be described both diachronically and synchronically but not ethnogenetically.

3. The biological basis of ethnogenesis is epistemologically unassignable because of the infinite dialectical syntagmas existing and continually changing the physiognomy of the group.

4. Ethnogenesis in a temporal cadre is arbitrary and can only be conceived of synchronically as a reflection of the social structure which in itself is ever-changing.

5. Ethnicity cannot exist in pre- and proto- forms as conscious awareness is fundamental.

6. Ethnicity can be described only synchronically with changes in concert with the development of social structure.

7. It is self-awareness and heightened sensitivity in reaction to the social organization and the role of the group in society and its *active* participants that designates the visibility of ethnicity.

8. Although a thorough and systematic description and classification of the archaeological record is important, it should not be the only goal of research.¹⁶

The above-mentioned propositions state our concept of ethnicity in prehistory; however let us look at why the contemporary view of the researcher's ethnic and historical traditions could affect his projected explanation of past events.¹⁷

Michael Blakey in his article *Socio-Political Bias and Ideological Production in Historical Archaeology* demonstrates how social and political factors affect cultural anthropology and historical archaeology.¹⁸ He indicates

the area interests of the archaeologists of the respective continents (Europe and North America) and notes that their backgrounds influence the choice of research area. Briefly the data are the following.

Western European archaeologists are most interested in Europe (60%), then the Middle East (36%), and thirdly in Africa and Asia (both 19%), while North Americans show little interest in either Africa or Asia (4% and 3% respectively). Generally, both North Americans and Western Europeans emphasize Judeo-Christian regional backgrounds in their research interests, while Western Europeans have an additional involvement in their former African and Asian colonies. This pattern does not represent a random study of our human past. The North American priority for the Middle East over Africa cannot reflect the effects of proximity, but reflects some form of cultural (and/or economic) priority. Nor does the lesser amount of interest in African archaeology reflect balanced concern for American roots (the proportion of blacks in America is three times the proportion of interest in Africa). Rather these priorities represent the ethnic roots of the overwhelming majority of American archaeologists (The Judeo-Christian/European tradition), and, likewise, reflect North "American" ideology and Euro-American ethnicity.

[He continues]

Eastern Europeans, meanwhile, are the most concentrated in their own backyards, with nearly 80% interested in Europe, followed by North Africa (23%) and the Middle East (18%). The predominant local interests of Eastern European archaeologists correspond to their unsurpassed interest in site preservation and conservation (12%) in which none of the sampled Western European or North American archaeologists were interested in 1975. This may suggest that in Eastern Europe, the relationship between the interests of archaeologists and local or national ideological expression is more closely matched... Indeed, the eastern European archaeologists demonstrate the greatest consistency between their interests and the production of state ideology, evident in the attention given to local investigations, preservation and site reconstruction.¹⁹

Blakey has shown how ethnic and other biases are implicit in the research design, and "[S]elf-conscious attention is required at many levels... if archaeologists wish to understand, control, or change the ways in which people perceive themselves and the historical precedents serving to legitimize their relationships to others."²⁰

We have, endeavored to demonstrate that ontological beliefs, both in the individual and the social community, subjectively and objectively play a substantial role.²¹ Let us now explore what conceptualization of explanation would or could embody this important aspect of data presentation and evaluation.²²

The determination of why something has happened has been at the center of philosophical discussion from the codification of the written word. However, in the tradition of Western Civilization Aristotle was the one who coherently put forth his views which dominated the philosophy of science for more than a thousand years. Why something happened was for Aristotle based on four factors: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes which he outlines in his *Physics and Metaphysics*.²³ He makes the ontological claim that the four types of causes exist in nature. For him each substance has both semantic and ontological features and an explanation is something that gives one or more of the causes he mentions. Achinstein notes that Aristotle's view considers "the concept of an explanation independently of that of an explaining act."²⁴ In *The Nature of Explanation* Achinstein

focuses . . . on the explaining act itself – the act in which by uttering or writing words someone explains something. From that act a "product" emerges: an explanation. To characterize what kind of entity that product is, as well as how it can be evaluated, essential reference must be made to the concept of an explaining act. Otherwise, I argue, we will be unable to distinguish explanations from products of non-explaining acts; and we will be unable to say why various explanations, particularly in the science, deserve praise or blame.²⁵

In the decades of the 60's and 70's when New Archaeology was at its height and archaeology was struggling to qualify as a "science", the explanation of phenomena was an "argument whose premises include laws and whose conclusion is a description of the phenomenon to be explained."²⁶ This position was argued persuasively most recently by Carl Hempel in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* published in 1965, and associated with the deductive-nomological model and inductive-statistical model. Hempel also believed that the "explanation can be understood without reference to the idea of the explaining act."²⁷ The essential difference between the inductive-statistical explanations and the deductive-nomological ones is the relationship between the explanans and the explanandum. This difference is not the one often touted between generality and particularity.

It is rather that, in a correct deduction, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion; in acceptable inductive inference, all the premises may be true and the conclusion yet be false.²⁸

Fundamental objections have been advanced against the usefulness of the deductive-nomological model and inductive-statistical model in archaeology and the root sources lie with

The definition of a potential explanans that Hempel gave when he originally proposed the D-N [deductive-nomological] model was one source of difficulty, for that definition can be shown to allow the explanation of any particular fact by itself.²⁹

[and]

Another source of difficulty was Hempel's definition of the concept of derivative law, a definition which requires that a derivative law be deducible from a set of fundamental laws.³⁰

Other objections have also been launched against the Hempelian models but they need not concern us here. In essence it has been pointed out insightfully by Kelley and Hanen in their *Archaeology and the Methodology of Science* that

satisfaction of the D-N [deductive-nomological] model cannot be regarded as a sufficient condition for there being an adequate explanation.³¹

[and]

We are now in a position to offer a preliminary assessment of the Hempelian models of explanation: however well the models may appear to capture what we mean by scientific explanation, they face two parallel problems of the existence of (1) arguments that fit the Hempelian schema but are not explanations, and (2) explanations that appear to be satisfactory though they do not fit the models. And, it should be noted, these are difficulties with the models that are largely independent of problems of applying the models to archaeology.³²

Another attempt that requires the need for laws in explanations was embodied in Salmon's statistical relevance model. He proposes that an explanation be viewed not as an argument but as a set of sentences.

These sentences provide a basis for an inference concerning the event to be explained; but Salmon... does not require that this inference be to the conclusion that the event definitely, or even probably, occurred. The explanation need provide only a basis for inferring with what probability (however small) it was expected to occur.³³

The difference between Salmon and Hempel lies in the fact that

Salmon does not regard explanations as arguments or inferences, because, in his view, there are insuperable problems with conceiving of inductive logic... as being concerned with inductive arguments that have premisses and conclusions.³⁴

Other models of explanation exist³⁵ but the above-mentioned have been prominent in archaeology, especially in the last three decades.

Achinstein, as mentioned above, considers the pragmatic and contextual features as an integral part of the explanation. He maintains that what will count as an explanation depends largely on the person to whom one is doing the explaining.

The explainer may recognize that his audience is in an n-state with respect to Q and *many different instructions*. He may choose to explain

q in a way that satisfies some particular set of instructions I because he believes that the audience is interested in understanding q in a way that satisfies I, and because he believes that it is valuable for that audience to do so.³⁶

Accordingly, if, for a given audience, an explainer intends to achieve this end with respect to instructions I, then he is committed to the belief that, for this audience, instructions I are appropriate. Now I am suggesting the latter belief is true only if that audience has, or would have, an interest in understanding q in a way that satisfies I, and such an understanding would be valuable for it... On the other hand, an audience may have no interest in understanding q in a way that satisfies I, even if the explainer believes that it should have, and even if the audience believes such an understanding is possible.³⁷

[and]

Whether the instructions are epistemically appropriate ones depends on what it is reasonable for the explainer to believe about them and about the audience.

When an evaluation of instructions is made without explicit reference to an audience, such a reference is implicit in the context of evaluation. The audience may be broadly or narrowly characterized ("everyone that is literate," "professional physicists," or "the persons now in my office"). To judge instructions non-epistemically is to judge them as appropriate for some audience. And to judge the epistemically one determines whether it is reasonable for the explainer to believe certain things with respect to some audience.³⁸

[and]

A scientist's reasons for following the instructions he does may include not only specific beliefs about the world and his audience, but also very general methodological beliefs concerning values reflected in science.³⁹

Achinstein also offers criteria for deciding if an explanation is a good one: e. g. relevance, level of correctness, completeness and manner of presentation. He insists that pragmatic and contextual features are essential to any account of explanation. In addition he does not believe that general statements of laws are necessary for a satisfactory explanation. The flexibility provided by Achinstein's model removes the rigid patterns and allows for the acceptance of explanations in archaeology where explicit laws are often not cited.⁴⁰

The critics of the Hempelian account of explanation have mainly centered on three arguments: the requirement "that a law be part of any adequate explanation,..."⁴¹ "that a philosophical account of explanation should be concerned only with the logical features of explanation, not with the contextual or pragmatic,"⁴² and "the claim that properly construed

explanations show that the events being explained were to be expected, or at least that their occurrence was highly probable.”⁴³ Another view of the explanation of human behavior that differs from the positivists is put forth by R. Harré and P. F. Secord in *The Explanation of Social Behaviour*. They differ in their acceptance of intentions, reasons and expectations as part of the explanation model.

The things that people say about themselves and other people should be taken seriously as reports of data relevant to phenomena that *really exist* and which are *relevant* to the explanation of behaviour. This contrasts with the mistaken view that the statements themselves are the phenomena. It is essential to take self reports seriously in arriving at adequate explanations of behaviour. Traditional arguments against taking self reports seriously overlook the fact that at least some statements are not a *sign* of a state of mind, but themselves constitute that state of mind... It is through reports of feelings, plans, intentions, beliefs, reasons and so on that the meanings of social behaviour and the rules underlying social acts can be discovered.⁴⁴

Harré and Secord also accept the view that causal explanation is the main goal of science and in this they are similar to the positivists, however they do differ on their acceptance of realism. Their view is summarized in the following:

1. A man is capable of initiating action, action that may take place only after deliberation and with a more or less clear end in view...
2. Most human actions cannot be, and many need not be traced to antecedent events linked to the actions in a regular chain-like fashion in order to be explained in a satisfactory manner. An explanation is not unscientific because it makes reference to such items as plans and rules, or because it assumes the social actor to be one who deliberately follows them.
3. Action cannot be described reductively in terms of movements which are the vehicles for action, without losing its character and meaning.⁴⁵

What Harré and Secord are actually advocating is which type of social entities social scientists should study. The positivists have long been obsessed with the idea that unobservable nature e. g. beliefs or reasons cannot be properly considered objects of scientific investigation. However, Harré and Secord feel that only by studying these entities can we explain the aspects of behavior that are most interesting to us.⁴⁶

A most important alternative to realism is put forth by Bas Van Fraassen in his *The Scientific Image* published in 1980 where he proposes three theories: the first the “relation of a theory to the world”, the second a theory of “scientific explanation, in which the explanatory power of a theory is held to be a feature which does indeed go beyond its empirical import, but which is radically context dependent, and the third “is an explication of probability

as it occurs within physical theory.”⁴⁷ He develops a non-positivist “constructive” empiricism and notes that “scientific activity is one of construction rather than discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to the phenomena, and not discovery of truth concerning the unobservable.”⁴⁸

The acceptance of a theory for Van Fraassen, “is to believe that it is empirically adequate – that what the theory says about what is observable is true.”⁴⁹ Thus a distinction can be made between what is observable and what is not. This does not mean for the author that theories be confined only to the observable, but

My view is that physical theories do indeed describe much more than what is observable, but that what matters is empirical adequacy, and not the truth or falsity of how they go beyond the observable phenomena. And the precise definition of empirical adequacy, because it relates the theory to the *actual* phenomena... does not collapse into the notion of truth.⁵⁰

In order to provide the most plausible explanation, the inferences from the available data should be interpreted in their widest sense. The question that needs to be discussed is how to choose the most adequate one from rival hypotheses. Of course, the possible range of hypotheses is not the same for each researcher depending on whether the possible hypotheses include only those manifestations which attribute adequacy to those under consideration or include all entities postulated, observable or not. The anti-realist stresses the idea that actions appearing in nature may or may not have an explanation in unobservable facts. Therefore, the extensity of the possible hypotheses is based on how well the hypothesis explains the accessible evidence. When the hypotheses are formulated based on only what is observable, then empirical adequacy and truth are one and the same. For Van Fraassen experimentation is not only construed as a means of discovery, but also as a means of strengthening the empirically adequate theories. This interchange between experimentation and construction is crucial.

Built into this philosophical approach – constructive empiricism – is the idea that the researcher is completely restricted to the scientific *Weltanschauung* of his/or her time. This immersion in the scientific “culture” is not a question of truth but of the empirical adequacy of that world’s image. In addition, the acceptance of a theory, through empirical adequacy, is influenced by pragmatic dimensions of context. These dimensions of context are features that relate our ideas to the epistemological theory and furnish it with meaning. The acceptance of a theory as explanatory depends on the speaker, the audience and other contextual features. Explanation may not be required unless it enhances further empirical consequences. Of course explanation needs some clarification. “Explanation of why an event happens consists (typically) in an exhibition of salient factors in the part of the causal net formed by lines ‘leading up to’ that event.”⁵¹ However, the events are purely dependent on the context – the interests of the persons explaining and being explained to and various matters.⁵² Thus dissimilar explanations of the same hypothesis may exist, but this does not mean that only one of them is

true. They are different alternatives that mirror the incongruously appearing spheres of interest. Which alternative hypothesis is selected and which one is best to explain the event in question is determined by a context outside of the dialectical contrast itself. Thus explanations are not a direct relation between theory and fact but actually a mediator among theory, fact and context. This means that the knowledge required for a why-question varies from context to context, along with the background data needed to evaluate how well the answer replies to the posed hypothesis.

Difficulties encountered in explanation in archaeology are not uniquely related to that discipline, and there is no reason to think of explanation in archaeology in terms different from other social sciences. On a theoretical level, there is no reason why a model in the developed sciences, e. g. physics, could not be applicable to archaeology. The oft-mentioned argument that the social sciences are more complex than the physical sciences is not the essential factor for the difficulty, rather, it is more the nature of the social science problems and the wide variety of variables that cannot be controlled.⁵³

However, this is not to say that there are not specific problems in archaeology and other related disciplines requiring a level of analysis beyond the parameters associated with an archaeological assemblage. "Also, several "new" archaeologists have inferred the existence of specific social institutions from data which could hardly be so specifically interpreted."⁵⁴

Thus empirical adequacy and probability are core to a scientific approach. A hypothesis cannot be proved, it can only be put forth as more likely to be correct than any other alternative under the same circumstances. So the parameters set for the model are crucial, since as the parameters expand or contract so does the likelihood of a hypothesis to be the best alternative. For this very reason multiple hypotheses and multiple methodological approaches must be employed in order to ensure the most appropriate alternative. Concomitant testing of multiple hypotheses has the benefit of highlighting the flaws as well as the benefits of the individual hypothesis. The concurrent usage of multiple methodological approaches from the same or related disciplines also enhances the possibility of contrary evidence, since by dint of the discipline itself, it is concerned with different aspects of the model. In linear fashion this produces:

1. Elimination of alternative hypotheses until one fits the parameters of the test.
2. The validated hypothesis is further tested under more rigorous conditions until a second set of alternatives is produced.
3. Step two is repeated until no new alternatives are produced.

Rouse in his book on *Migrations in Prehistory – Inferring Population Movement from Cultural Remains*, refers to this procedure as strong inference.⁵⁵

The conflict between ideas is frequently the result of terminological confusion and imprecision, and for this reason I shall attempt to set forth some definitions of my usage of archaeological terminology. In this I shall follow Rouse who has clearly and cogently defined the relevant concepts.⁵⁶

1. *Cultural units*. Artifacts and other material remains deposited purposefully or accidentally by human beings are called assemblages. The inhabitants of an area that have similar assemblages can be said to incorporate a culturally homogeneous people.

These assemblages allow the archaeologist to infer standards, customs and beliefs, and the artifact types and burial types can tell us about the environment. These manifestations of the assemblages dictate the culture norms and are collectively interpreted as a culture. A people carry their culture with them when they migrate.

2. *Social units*. The organization of the local population into groups that allow the functioning of activities, e. g. villages, religious and political elites are called societies. The principles of organization are called social norms and collectively this is the people's social structure. Societies and their attendant social norms leave fewer material remains than cultures.

3. *Spatial and Temporal units*. The location of a culture in time and space is achieved by dating the assemblages and then setting them within a chronological framework. The chronological mapping of the assemblages on a graph furnishes a visual presentation – the vertical dimension represents the time elapsed and the horizontal one is the area distribution. The columns are further divided into regional and local areas and sequences of local and regional periods. The local periods form distinctive cultural units. The closer attention is paid to smaller regions and details, the more sensitive the distinctive cultural time markers become, and the more they can contribute to future discoveries.

The local trends can then be generalized to embrace a wider and less differentiated set of culture norms and thus form general periods. When culture norms extend horizontally across local areas within a general period they are called horizons and are diagnostic for that period. Norms that exist vertically through a number of periods within a single area are considered local traditions. These traditions can also extend in a horizontal direction and then would probably be considered the result of diffusion.

Diffusion means transmission by contact . . . It is analogous to *gene flow* in biology; just as a gene may “flow” from one biologically defined population group to another by means of interbreeding among members of the two groups, so a norm may “diffuse” from one culturally defined population group (a people) to another as a result of interaction among members of the two groups.

Biologists make a distinction between gene flow and migration. In the former case, individual genes pass from one local population to another, and in the latter, a single population carries it [sic.] entire pool of genes into another area. . . . I shall here distinguish between the spread of individual norms through diffusion and the spread of a people's total repertoire of norms, that is, its culture, by means of either migration or acculturation.⁵⁷

Archaeologists speak of the changes that take place in a norm as development – “the pattern of change from norm to norm.”⁵⁸ A succession of

local cultures is called a series. When a culture complex is a discrete unit it is called a style and when referring to the changes between complexes, it is a phase.

4. *Local Migration.* A culture complex can be used to trace a migration, although not within a local period, since by definition a culture complex only contains one unit. Seasonal movement is followed through the comparison of tool kits and food remains in order to determine why the occupants moved from one site to another. Kill sites would be an appropriate example.

5. *Interareal migration.* When a household or a village-site contains an alien complex, we assume that the former inhabitants intruded from the homeland of that complex, this intrusion will be called immigration. When the immigrant groups are small in size and not numerous, they will sooner or later be assimilated and adopt the local complex. These sites by definition are hard to discern. When, on the other hand, the incurring groups are numerous and absorb the local population or alternatively drive them out – a population movement has taken place. Thus the area has been re-peopled or, if it is virgin territory, it has been peopled. It must be noted that it is extremely difficult to trace population movements in terms of single culture complexes, because when a group moves from area to area it encounters different natural and cultural conditions that modify its physiognomy. In addition the complete replacement of one population by another is a lengthy process which manifests its own changing patterns. Moreover the group may not carry its complete cultural complex with it when it migrates.

From the above-mentioned caveats and reasons, population movements can only be elicited from the pattern changes in peoples' complexes. Each series of complexes is called a tradition. Rouse makes the excellent suggestion of adding the suffix *-oid* to the name of the tradition or relevant locality. The series of complexes can further be subdivided into subseries to which the suffix *-an* can be added to designate this subseries.⁵⁹

6. *Alternatives to migration.* When a series is distributed through time, we can consider it a *local development*. If it is also distributed through space, we can say that it expanded from one area to another.

When we are faced with the expansion of a series contact among individuals and groups takes place. This is called *interaction* and it is often divided into weak interaction and strong interaction after the division by Lévi-Strauss.⁶⁰ Weak interaction is considered to be trade, intermarriage and other types of social activities. Strong interaction refers to warfare, political control, economic pressure and other forcible activities.

Weak interaction results usually in local development and each group of people retains its own cultural identity. On the other hand, strong interaction leads to a disappearance of cultural identity. One people or group in this case usually become dominant while the smaller groups lose their distinguishing traits and assume a new identity. The subordinate group may still retain some of its distinguishing traits but will meld into the dominant group. This process is called acculturation.⁶¹ If the population movement is only in one direction and establishes new residence patterns, its presence overwhelms the local group and as a result there is a change in the people as well as the culture.

When a population movement has been proposed as an explanation it is essential that we also provide an explanation of what caused it. Otherwise the explanation will be defective. Let us just note in passing that the explanations of the diaspora of the Indo-Europeans have not provided reasons for those migrations, rather they have concentrated on the modus of dispersal and have not accounted sufficiently for the cause of movement.⁶² The adaptations to the new environment by the incurring peoples may be in the form of cultural, natural, or social innovations and need to be accounted for. These can be manifested in new settlement patterns, subsistence strategies or social institutions.

In the beginning of this article we mentioned that archaeological assemblages usually result from one or more of the following: migration, local development or borrowing from neighboring peoples. Now let us look at the conditions necessary for the researcher to posit migration as the explanation for an artifactual assemblage.

If migration is posited then similarities should exist between the archaeological assemblages of at least two areas: the proposed origin and the acculturated area. It must be understood that after the similarities have been noted and categorized this meets only one set of criteria. Any new finds do not add additional explanatory power because all that is being provided is more information of the same type and not independent evidence that could confirm the data. Simply put, with masses of categorized similarities any possible migration can be proven over alternative hypotheses. As it stands, the reasoning is circular, for in order to bring additional hypothesis into the model, local development must be clearly separated from people movement. A further distinction frequently not taken into account is the difference between migration and immigration, both implying people movement, though the extent and character of immigration is more isolable. Immigrations result in the intrusion of households or village-sites within the alien complex.

We propose first of all that archaeologists investigate the work that linguists have done in defining and accounting for migration and secondly that all data-sets be classified and categorized before inferring migration or any other alternatives to account for archaeological assemblage. Only then can the data be subjected to statistical analyses and other methodological treatments. In addition archaeologists should consult, for example with physical anthropologists, linguists, biogeographers, paleontologists, zooarchaeologists and palynologists. A multi-disciplinary approach is imperative for determining the components and ascertaining the aspects of migration.

In 1958 Emil Haury published a set of conditions, derived from the standard-diffusionist principles that he felt needed to be met before judging the archaeological record in terms of migration.⁶³

A migration is the probable, though not the only, explanation in the record of past people:

1. if there suddenly appears in a cultural continuum a constellation of traits readily identifiable as new, and without local prototypes, and

2. if the products of the immigrant group not only reflect borrowed elements from the host group, but also, as a lingering effect, preserve unmistakable elements from their own pattern.

The probability that the phenomena outlined above do indeed represent a migration, rather than some other force that induces culture change, is increased:

1. if identification of an area is possible in which this constellation of traits was the normal pattern, and

2. if a rough time equivalency between the “at home” and the displaced expressions of the similar complexes can be established.⁶⁴

It is important to underline that Haury did not begin his investigation with a migration hypothesis in mind – it was the observed evidence that suggested this hypothesis to him. We would also assert that methodologically it is preferable to first test for local development and only when the *complete falsifiability* has been demonstrated should we propose migration as an alternative. At this point it is also necessary to test rigorously for immigration⁶⁵ and be sure that if migration is in question it is a re peopling and not just small incursions that appear out of proportion due to the extent of archaeological field work completed. The reason for this is that the homogeneity of the archaeological record should be tested first and only then should we allow for extraneous influences.

Here we have been dealing with the question of migration as a possible explanation for an artifactual assemblage, bearing in mind that migration hypotheses are constantly being reevaluated and either extended or narrowed as the case might be.⁶⁶ As Kelley and Hanen conclude,

[i]t remains true that no nomothetic explanation of migration has been advanced. More generalizing hypotheses or perhaps even nomothetic explanations could be developed, . . . , from repeated and critical tests of specific cases, distillation of the variables involved in ethnographic and historical movements, and other sources . . . such as ecological models. . . The hypotheses and theories must then be analyzed for archaeological analogues, and the hypotheses must be continually taken back to the archaeological data. Not only population movement itself is of interest, but its role in culture change and the stages of adaptation occurring during movement and subsequent resettlement are of great importance to understanding other cultural processes.⁶⁷

We have attempted to demonstrate that regardless of a multidisciplinary approach to archaeology, which we advocate, and despite the various philosophies of science that stand behind hypotheses testing – e. g. empiricism, positivism or materialism in their various forms – it is the acceptance of the elements of explanation that ultimately defines the possible acceptability of the explanation. What this means is that if contextual and pragmatic considerations are part of the explanation then the approvable explanation will be less restricted than if it is not part of the level of explanative definition. As mentioned earlier, we feel that the contextual and pragmatic

aspects of the explanation as well as other extra-logical premises, biases and prejudices have a fundamental effect on the outcome of the presented research. These extra-logical considerations are manifested at each level of context of evaluation and refined judgment selection, and affect the decision both objectively and subjectively. The feedback received from the historical traditions and ethnic background of the researcher and social community often take on the form of information about the world that does not fit into the current accepted social beliefs and thus directly or indirectly affects the explanation of the data-set.

How can we study the data and, at the same time factor in this cultural baggage that is part of the researcher's ontological and world view? We maintain that it is not only the data matrix itself that needs to be subjected to testing but the researcher's ethnicity and historical traditions must also be part of the design. This can be accomplished by expanding the ideational concept of explanation and constructing models that follow the decision-making strategy from different points of researcher biases concurrently so that ultimately not only one view will be presented for an acceptable explanation of an event, but rather multiple views that have factored in the contextual aspects of the researcher and the social community. These models would not only be independent of a fixed philosophy of science, but also would not represent any specified level of truth as they would assert a level of plausibility based on the data-set as well as the context of the researcher and the social community. This approach could be used to compare the capacity of the individual versus the social community and the public at large to perform complex problem-solving tasks, and it would also be able to follow the processes by which individuals form illusory beliefs about relationships and correlations between variables. The impact of new information on the data-set could also be followed. In other words, the researchers would also serve as a part of the explanation of variables that are systematically manipulated and controlled. The explanation of the event must take into account the relationship between the exposure of the researcher to information pertaining to hypotheses and the evaluation of the hypotheses.

It is our feeling that with regard to archaeological methodology there is no one-to-one correspondence between subject and theory. We thus advocate the possibility of the co-existence of various theories about the same data-set – a pluralism of scientific theories and a pluralist conception of these theories. In other words, it is a matter of a variety of views on the problem that must be presented in order to survey the alternatives; however, these alternatives in their own right are all valid from the standpoint of the researcher and his social community as they have been infused by conditions of ethnic, and historical traditions both objectively and subjectively. It is only from the plurality of scientific theories that a relationship between the unity (the archaeological data) and the diversity (the researcher's and social community's ethnic and historical traditions) that meaningful reconstructions of past events can give a fuller and more complete understanding to the world audience that may or may not be part of the ontological background of the concerned researchers and their social community.

Notes

- ¹ Glock 1985, 465.
- ² Ravetz 1971, 14. Professional scientists and interested persons of the general public who have a detailed acquaintance with scientific knowledge and techniques number roughly around 5–10 per cent.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 75–209.
- ⁴ Glock 1985, 469.
- ⁵ Wylie 1985. Offers an overview of the “studies in the logic of confirmation and explanation” that have been applied to archaeology in the last fifty years.
M. Salmon 1982, 31–56.
- ⁶ See Rudolf Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*. New York: Basic Books, 1966.
- ⁷ See N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
- ⁸ See Patrick Suppes *Studies in the methodology and Foundations of Science*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969.
- ⁹ Kelley and Hanen 1988.
- ¹⁰ Michalos, 1980, 223.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 223.
- ¹² See Thomas S. Kuhn *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd. edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. and Thomas S. Kuhn *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1977. Also Carl Hempel *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* The Free Press, New York, 1965.
- ¹³ Michalos 1980, 197–281. Esp. 217–232.
- ¹⁴ Kelley and Hanen 1988. Discuss this approach in detail from the standpoint of its usefulness in archaeology.
See also Karl Popper *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Science Editions, New York, 1961.
- ¹⁵ Michalos 1980, 235 f.
- ¹⁶ This methodological approach is detailed in my forthcoming book *Ethnicity in the Social Prehistory of Southeastern Europe*.
- ¹⁷ Rowlands 1984, 153 f.
Rouse 1986, 16–18.
Kelley and Hanen 1988, 123–49.
- ¹⁸ Blakey 1983, 5.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6 f.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.
- ²¹ J. Rouse 1987.
Harris 1970.
- ²² Jeffreys 1957, 197. We use objective and subjective in the sense defined by Jeffreys.

In philosophy the object was held to be studied by the subject; so a primary meaning in a realist system would be that the external world is objective and the thinker the subject. But then, since other people are part of *his* external world, they would be objective, and everybody would have a different definition of objectivity. To avoid this the meanings have been modified. On the one hand the judgments of all people are classed together if they are coherent according to some criterion of general agreement, and then called objective. On the other hand, the whole process of thought is called subjective, whether there is, or could be, agreement about it or not.

- ²³ Achinstein 1983, 5.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, VII.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁸ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 174. Cf. also footnote 2 174, text 224.

See also our footnote 11.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 175.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 176.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 178.

³² *Ibid.*, 180.

³³ Achinstein 1983, 10.

³⁴ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 197.

³⁵ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 165–224. Furnish a complete and clear review of explanation models and their relevance to archaeology.

Achinstein 1983, 74–102; 157–92.

e.g. B. A. Brody, "Towards and Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation," *Philosophy of Science* 39 (1972), 20–31. Quoted in Achinstein 1983, 12.

³⁶ Achinstein 1983, 110.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 112.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 113 f.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁴⁰ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 200 f.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 207.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁴⁴ Harré and Secord 1972, 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 40 f.

⁴⁶ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 208.

⁴⁷ Van Fraassen 1980, VII.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁵² Kelley and Hanen 1988, 218.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁵⁴ Johnson 1972, 369. Also cites L. Binford *Archaeology as Anthropology* American Antiquity 1962 vol. 28, 217–225; *Ibid.*, *Archaeological Systematics and the Study of Culture Process* American Antiquity 1965 vol. 31, 203–210; also authors (J. Deetz, W. Longacre, and R. Whallon) in S. R. Binford and L. R. Binford Eds. *New Perspectives in Archaeology* Chicago: Aldine 1968.

Johnson 1972, 369. The following is a more complete quote;

I refer to the inference of post-nuptial residence norms, or lineal descent groups (e.g. Whallon 1968) from archaeological evidence about the patterned distribution of artifacts and site features which might also reflect only the existence of localized task groups of a non-corporate sort or else slight differences in the ages of the assemblages which archaeology is hard put to detect. The most dangerous procedure is to infer specific descent groups from "correlated" residence types which were themselves inferred, apparently, from intrasite patterns of artifact and debris distribution. (e.g. F. Hole 1968 [*New Perspectives in Archaeology*]).

⁵⁵ Rouse 1986, 3. This approach was used by the biophysicist John Platt *Strong Inference* Science, 146 (no. 3642): 347–53.

[t]he conflict and exclusion of alternatives that is necessary to sharp inductive inference has been all too often a conflict between men, each with his single Ruling Theory. But whenever each man begins to have multiple working hypotheses, it becomes purely a conflict between ideas. It becomes easier then for each of us to aim every day at conclusive disproofs – at *strong* inference – without either reluctance or combativeness. (p. 350) Quoted in Rouse 1986, 3.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3–12. I am using Rouse's categories and definitions.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶² Although we are in disagreement with the model proposed by Colin Renfrew for the dispersal of the Indo-European languages through the agency of demic diffusion in the Neolithic, it does take into account a possible cause for the movement. For a detailed review see M. Stefanovich "Can Archaeology and Historical Linguistics Coexist? A Critical Review of Colin Renfrew's *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins*," to appear in *The Journal of Indo-European Studies* 1988(?).

⁶³ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 280. Discusses Haury's work in detail as an example of archaeological explanation.

⁶⁴ E. Haury 1958. "Evidence at Point of Pines for a Prehistoric Migration from Northern Arizona." In *Migrations in New World Culture*. University of Arizona Social Science Bulletin, No. 27, 1–6. University of Arizona Press, Tuscon. Quoted in Kelley and Hanen 1988, 280.

⁶⁵ Rouse 1986, 13. Uses migration as a cover term for both immigration and migration.

⁶⁶ See our footnote 62.

⁶⁷ Kelley and Hanen 1988, 284.

References Cited

- Achinstein, P. 1983. *The Nature of Explanation* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blakey, M. L. 1983. "Socio-Political Bias and Ideological Production in Historical Archaeology." In *The Socio-Politics of Archaeology* Editors J. M. Gero, D. M. Lacy and M. Blakey 5–16. Amherst, Mass: Department of Anthropology, University of Massachusetts.
- Glock, A. E. 1985. "Tradition and Change in Two Archaeologies." *American Antiquity* 50(2):464–77.
- Harré, R. and P. F. Secord. 1972. *The Explanation of Social Behaviour*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Harris, E. E. 1970. *Hypothesis and Perception: The Roots of Scientific Method*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Jeffreys, H. *Scientific Inference* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, L. 1972. "Problems in "Avant-Garde" Archaeology." *American Anthropologist* 74(3):366–77.
- Kelley, J. H. and Marsha P. Hanen. 1988. *Archaeology and the Methodology of Science*. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press.
- Michalos, A. C. 1980. "Philosophy of Science: Historical, Social, and Value Aspects." In *A Guide to The Culture of Science, Technology, and Medicine*, General editor Paul T. Durbin. 197–281. New York: The Free Press.
- Ravetz, J. R. 1971. *Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rouse, I. 1986. *Migrations in Prehistory: Inferring Population Movement From Cultural Remains* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Rouse, J. 1987. *Knowledge and Power. Toward a Political Philosophy of Science*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Rowlands, M. 1984. "Conceptualizing the European Bronze and Early Iron Age." In *European Social Evolution: Archaeological Perspectives* Editor John Bintliff. 147–56. Bradford, West Yorkshire, England: University of Bradford.
- Salmon, M. H. 1982. *Philosophy and Archaeology*. New York: Academic Press.
- Van Fraassen, B. C. 1980. *The Scientific Image*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wylie, A. 1985. "Between Philosophy and Archaeology." *American Antiquity* 50(2):478–90.

Nikola Tasić

Senior Research Associate,
Institute for Balkan Studies
of The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts,
Belgrade

PREHISTORIC MIGRATION MOVEMENTS IN THE BALKANS

(Third to First Millennium)

The problem of migrations and migratory moves throughout Prehistory in Central and South East Europe, has been a topic studied by a considerable number of experts. In terms of methodology, most significant are the approaches made by G. Gihilde, presented in his book *Prehistoric Migration* (Oslo, 1950). The author attaches great importance to economic, geographic-topographic and ecological elements on the one hand, and to the Danube Valley, as the principal European transversal, on the other. It is only natural, when treating the topic of population movements, to consider other components, of which the most significant one is the demographic increase of the population in certain areas, followed by the climatological situation which may be the starting point of the migratory moves on a large scale.

In the case of the Yugoslav Danube Basin and of the Central Balkans (namely, the Morava – Vardar watershed), it is also understandable that one has to take into account some specifics, such as their openness toward the Pannonian expanses in the north, and the natural connections with the Eastern Mediterranean area (Aegean in the first place).

The space and character of this paper do not allow for the treatment of all aspects of migration movements throughout Prehistory, namely local migrations, cattle-breeders' nomadic moves, the expansion of cultures, military expeditions, migrations of entire peoples and so on. Instead, we will concentrate only on the last category – migrations of the population, which are of importance in prehistoric archeology not only due to the blending of material cultures and different populations, but also as a wide phenomenon instrumental in delimiting chronological and individual prehistoric periods.

The development of prehistoric cultures in the Central Balkans and Yugoslav Danubian Basin comes in several "migratory waves", some of which belong to the transition times from the Neolithic to the Metallic Era (Eneolithic Period), while others belong to earlier times. In considering the development of cultures, the emergence of foreign elements within the material culture, changes in burial customs, the sphere of economy, organization within the society and so on, it is possible to determine the existence of two basic migratory waves. The first is related to the Indo-European migration, and the second – to the invasion of the Kymero-Scythian tribes. Beside these two principle migratory waves there are two others: the first was in the area of the Yugoslav Danubian Basin, and the second – in the central Balkan region. In relation to the previous waves, the latter represent small-size movements of cultures or migrations. The first one of these could be traced

back to the transitional period from the Early to the Intermediate Bronze Age and covers the movements of the Trans-Danubian encrusted ceramics style protagonists along the Danube from the central areas of the Pannonian Plains toward the lower Danube Basin. The second is related to the "Doric migration". These latter migrations are quite hypothetical, since the available data does not entirely serve as evidence for the directions of the movements and the participation of the Balkan tribes on the Danubian Basin in the genesis of the Old-Greek civilization. The bibliography related to these problems is rather profuse, but the arguments far from provide the solution (Comp. V. Miložić, 1949; A. Mozsolics, 1957; M. Garašanin, 1961; A. Benac, 1977). There is the possibility of mentioning some other movements in the Balkans and the Danube Basin, but they have the character of a cultural expansion, or the influence of stronger cultural and economic centers in the adjacent regions (for instance, the emergence of the so-called Mycenaean elements in the Early and Intermediate Bronze Age cultures of the Danube Basin).

I – Migration of "Steppe-Shepherds" – Indo-European Migration

The conception according to which "the Indo-Europeanization" of Central and South East Europe ended is generally accepted in archaeological literature. It was related to the emergence of the steppe cultures, first in the lower Danube Basin, and then in other areas all the way to the Adriatic Sea in the South, and to Central Europe in the North. (N. Tasić, 1983 and the above quoted literature). While refraining from going into details concerning the appropriateness of the term "Indo-European", we would like to point to the fact that in the course of the Eneolithic (third millennium), a wide area in the East, Central and South East Europe witnessed intensive changes in material and spiritual cultures, something that could only be ascribed to large-scale ethnical migrations. The area evinced profound changes of Neolithic agrarian cultures belonging to the Tripolje type, and to those of Vinča, Theiss, Lengyel, Salcuta, Gumelnița etc., as well as the phenomenon of a wide-spread complex of Cernavoda – Boleraz – Baden cultures with changed economics that are oriented toward the cattle-breeders' and nomadic component.

The cause of these changes and phenomena should be sought in the movements of the steppe cultures beginning with the Orenburg Steppes of the Euro-Asian Zone in the east, toward Central and South East Europe in the west. The basic role in these movements had been taken by the Pit-grave culture – a wide-spread phenomenon with a specific material culture and a characteristic burial custom, which accounts for its name (Pit-grave, *jamnaja* or Ocher-grave culture). We have attempted, in several studies, (comp. N. Tasić, 1982–1983, 15 and the subs.; 1983, 18 and the subsequent pages) to determine the model of these migrations and to point to the fact that the "Indo-Europeanization" of Central and South East Europe had been not a population wave, but a *process*, which had eventually transgressed the mentioned areas and assimilated the post-Neolithic cultures. The long term

migration process, namely, the successive movement of a population, is characterized by the gradual change from one cultural center in the east to one in the west, and by driving back the autochthonous cultures (or assimilating with them). In short, the primary nucleus of the migratory move of the Pit-grave culture existed somewhere north from the Caspian Lake. However, it was compelled to move from there, undoubtedly pressured by various tribes and cultures from the west-Asian expanses, and this move-on gave rise to the forming of a secondary center in the area of the Dnieper and Dniester rivers and the assimilation of the Srednji Stog I culture. Further moves westward led to the creation of the third center in this invasion wave, in the region between Dniester and the lower Danube, namely, in the area where prior to, and during the breakthrough made by the steppe tribes, the Tripolje (B1) and Usatova cultures developed, as well as the Cernavoda III culture southward from the first two. Due to this transfer to the Danube, the "Indo-European tribes" gained opportunities for penetrating into the Pannonian Plains and the Balkan Peninsula. Since then, the Yugoslav countries were engaged in the Indo-Europeanization process of autochthonous cultures and their protagonists. Bearing in mind the significance of these events for subsequent historical development of Central and South East Europe, we will now proceed to the mechanism of movement, when old cultures were driven out, and new ones were created, all in the direction of the principle blow.

The protagonists of the Pit-grave culture migration wave, after stabilizing themselves in the northern Pontus regions, began their penetration through the lower Danube Basin and the Balkans, in the first half of the first millennium. In the beginning, they kept to the lowlands between the south east Carpathians and the Danube, because of the resemblance to their own native land. The advancing of the steppe shepherds toward the Danube caused the post-neolithic agrarian cultures to move southward and westward. They made their first contact with subjects of the Cernavoda III culture in Dobruja. Pushed back by the steppe tribes, they went southward and westward, pressuring the same way other cultures of the time, first those that later on became known as the Gumelnița and the Salcuta groups. The first withdrew in the direction of its strong centers in central Bulgaria and Thrace, whereas the second mostly sought its *modus vivendi* in the west, where it joined the Bodrogkeresztur culture and formed the Hunyadi Weiss group. Otherwise, it crossed the Danube, penetrating to the south of eastern Serbia (deposit Bubanj near the town of Bor), Kosovo (Hisar at the Suva Reka and Gadimlje near Gnjilane), all the way down to Pelagonia (Bakarno Gumno, Shuplevac, Crnobuki) and Albania (Maliq II).

The intensity of the steppe culture migratory wave weakened, and the resistance of autochthonous cultures in the Danube Basin slowed down their penetration toward the Yugoslav Danubian Basin and the Central Balkans. Instead of a direct large-scale migration, an infiltration of cultures took place, through mutual cultural influence (imports). Various findings of "steppe origin", attest to the existence of new populations in these areas, first, long flint-stone knives (Decia Mureșului, deposits from Kladovo, supplements in the Keteghasa graves, Nosa near the town of Subotica,

Perlez etc.), then, ceramics with "Schnur ornamentation", anchor-like pendants (Govora Sat and Salcuța in Romania, Ezero in Bulgaria, deposits in eastern Serbia, etc), stone sceptres (Reznevci in Bulgaria or Shuplevac near the town of Bitolj), ending the infiltration with tumuli and ochre graves.

The process lasted for some 500 years. The appearance of tumuli and burial places saw the end of a long period, chronologically determined by material originating in Romania and the Serbian Basin. Thus V. Zirra, E. Comsa and other Romanian archeologists provide evidence showing that steppe tumuli were heaped up with mould contain ceramics of the Cotofeni culture (Seaca de Sîmp, for instance; comp. V. Zirra, 1960, 98; E. Comsa, 1976, 35). Reliable stratigraphic data on the Serbian Danube Basin are given by the Jabuka Tumulus near Pantchevo. In that deposit, the Pit-grave culture burial place was heaped up with ochre and excavated in the Kostolac culture settlement; it even broke through the foundation of a house (LJ. Bukvić, 1978, 14; N. Tasić, 1983, 24; drawing 1). This was the manner of determining the exact chronological position of the "steppe burial places" in the Danube Basin and the time of the "Indo-Europeanization" in these areas. Stated in figures, it was the second half of the third millennium, somewhere around 2300, the time when signs of the Vutchedol culture can be found in Srem, Slavonia and larger parts of the Central Balkans, and traces of the Ezero culture in the eastern parts of the Peninsula, in Bulgaria. In the Vutchedol culture the symbiosis of the novel burial habit with the Balkan tradition is indicated. In the final stage, besides the autochthonous custom of skeletal burial in a contorted position in flat graves, there were burials under the tumuli. Vessels of the burned burial places in Batajnica or at Moldava Veche are sprinkled with red ochre paint, a habit used in skeletal burial in places of the Pit-grave culture (Vojlovica, for instance: comp. B. Jovanović, 1975, 12).

The final vestiges of the breakthrough made by the steppe cultures across the Danube into the eastern and central parts of the Peninsula, were various objects that survived these cultures (Schnur ceramics, stone sceptres) as well as tumuli on the ochre graves. One may cite, as evidence of the existence of the Indo-European tribes, the infiltration of the Cernavoda III culture south of the Danube (ruins Likodra in Radjevina, deposits at Smederevska Palanka, etc.). The penetration of new populations ensued, who buried their dead in pits under the tumuli, a manner unquestionably belonging to the steppe origin. In northern Bulgaria, between Vrace and Varna, some ten necropolises, containing several tumuli, were explored, of which the most significant was grave I in tumulus one, Plačidol at Tolbuhin, where the dead were buried in a cart, layed on a rush mat and sprinkled with ochre paint (I. Panajotov – V. Dergačev, 1984, 99 and also: Abb. 4). The grave indicates the mobility of the steppe tribes that had lived, died and been buried in the carts. It also explains the limited number of registered and explored tumuli dating from steppe origin, whereas there are no data concerning settlements and dwelling habits. Some findings in Serbia and Herzegovina, south of the Sava and Danube rivers, also belong to the tumuli period from northern Bulgaria. Thereafter, two tumuli at the Bare village, in Sumadija, belong in terms of rituals and burial customs, to the horizon of steppe burial places (D. Srejić, 1976). The same indication relates also to

a tumulus Pustopolje in Herzegovina, where the dead were laid down on a sledge, a custom analogous to the one discovered at Plačidol in Bulgaria (A. Benac, 1986, 53).

With the appearance of steppe elements on the Adriatic Coast (Mala Gruda tumulus near Tivat), the long steppe-tribal descent comes to an end, and their migration is termed "Indo-European" in literature. For more than five centuries, centers had been transferred, territories conquered, and autochthonous cultures pushed back. Its importance is great, since it formed a substratum in South East Europe that would serve, one thousand years later, as a basis for the appearance of the first-known paleo-Balkan tribes. A. Benac calls it the pre-Illyric and, analogous to that, the pre-Thracian or pre-Daco-Getic substratum.

II – The Problem of the "Doric" and "Aegean" Migration

After a long period of cultural stabilization, in the Yugoslav Danube Basin and Central Balkans during the final Eneolithic and early Bronze Age, significant changes took place by the end of the Bronze Age. To what degree were they related to the "Doric" or "Aegean" migration?

When treating the problem of the "destruction of the Mycenaean world" and the Mycenaean civilization, many researchers pointed to strong penetrations by "barbarous peoples" from the Balkan hinterland that brought an end to a long and highly developed culture. After F. Schachermeyer (1929, footnote 2) and G. v. Merhart (1942, 12 and subs.), the subject was brought up again after the Second World War by a number of researchers, beginning with V. Miložić (1949, 12 and subs.), then by A. Mozsolics (1957, 115 and subs.), followed by W. Kimmig (1964, 220 and subs.), as well as Yugoslav researchers (M. Garašanin, 1962, 37 and subs.; A. Benac, 1967, 319 and subs.). Their standpoints were based, first, on archeological documents, and second, on linguistic data found in the studies of well-known paleo-linguists (A. Mayer, 1957; H. Krache, 1954, etc). These stand-points can be reduced to two opinions: according to one, Illyric tribes took an active part in the Doric migration (V. Miložić, W. Kimmig, G. v. Merhart) inciting thus W. Kimmig to use the term "Illyric migration"; according to the other, the migration was caused by the Balkan-Danubian tribes that were urged forward by the expansion of the *Hügelgräber* and *Urnenfelder* cultures' stretchers, from Central to South East Europe (A. Mozsolics, and with some modifications M. Garašanin and A. Benac – comp. quoted studies). The misunderstandings between these two opinions were cleared up by A. Benac, who reduced Illyric territory to its real borders, thereby reconciling, to a degree, these divergent opinions. Archeological documents which would confirm the Doric migration thesis by the tribal movements from the Danubian Basin and the adjacent Balkan regions, are rather scant. They comprise "Balkan" ceramics in the post-Mycenaean findings and Peschiera fibula, daggers and spears with flame-like points (thirteenth century B.C. – the period of the Mycenaean culture destruction). The bended and knee-form fibulae, needles with vase-like heads, the so-called Illyric spears, course

ceramics of the Gradina type, etc. could be ascribed to more recent times (sub-Mycenaean and proto-geometric period, twelfth and eleventh centuries). Finally, some findings originate in most recent time (from ninth to eighth century) and were discovered in the Balkan hinterland at the beginning of the Iron Age – like, for example, needles with the seal-form head, eye-glass fibulae, Glasinac swords, etc. The classification of “foreign” Balkan findings in Greece induced V. Miložić to state that three connecting phases existed between Balkan and Greek tribes at the time, emphasizing thus the

More recent studies, especially in the Morava-Vardar rivers region, provide data showing relations and movements of protagonists belonging to cultures along the Carpathian – Danubian Zone and Continental Greece. We are referring to the establishment of clearer contacts between these regions in the Middle and Late Bronze Ages, namely, somewhat prior to and during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages, namely, somewhat prior to and during the time of the Mycenaean culture destruction. The first findings belong to the Kantaros ceramics group, particularly the two handled goblet with the motive of concentrated and spiral circles on the belly – which can often be noted since the Romanian deposits of the Verbicioara-Govor group, the Bulgarian (Čerkovna group) and Serbian (Paraćin group) and finally, the Greek Vardar Valley findings (B. Hänsel, 1982, 14 and subs. and A. Hochstetter, 1982, 99 and subs.: Abb. 3–5). The Paraćin culture in the Morava Basin, along with the Mediana group in the Nišava river Basin, represents an important link in cultural movements and influences from north to south, and the Mycenaean world. The more so, since it contains other elements that were found in the Greek deposits, like, for instance, the channalled ceramics and ornaments with Buckel bulges which, although not exemplar of the Paraćin culture, act as mediators between the ceramics in the Danube Basin and the findings in the south. (Comp. A. Benac, 1967, 333; N. Tasić, 1972, 110). In the course of the cultural movement phase, stress is given to the pressure of the Hügelgräber style protagonists against the cultures in the Serbian Danube Basin and in the Morava Valley, namely against the Belegiš culture on the one hand, and the Paraćin culture, on the other (N. Tasić, 1972, 110). The existence of the channalled ceramics within the boundaries of Paraćin, Mediana, Belegiš and, later on, in the Gava culture as well, could be dated to the thirteenth century – the period corresponding to the time of the Mycenaean world destruction.

The adequacy of these elements in the attempt to explain the “Doric”, namely, “Aegean” migration, whose protagonists were tribes from the Balkan and Danube Basin hinterlands, shall no longer be the topic of our discussion. Nevertheless, it is a fact that, at the time the Mycenaean palaces were destroyed and, for that matter, the Mycenaean civilization, many foreign elements appeared in the material culture, of which many were analogous to cultures in the north. However, they do not belong to the same period, so it would be wise to believe the existence of several phases of population “influx” from the Balkan hinterland from the thirteenth to the ninth centuries. Findings of different cultural backgrounds (Danube Basin ones, Illyric, Thracian) prove the heterogeneous character of these movements where, depending on the wave, various elements prevailed.

III – Kymero-Scythian Penetrations into Yugoslav Danube Basin and the Migrations

The third migratory wave is similar, in terms of its route and origin, to movements of the “Indo-European” tribes during the Eneolithic period. It is related to the penetrations of the “equestrian peoples”, as called by Galus-Horvat, from the woods and the steppe zone of South Russia toward the Pannonian Plains and the Balkan Peninsula. In literature, they are known as Thraceans, Thracian-Kymerians, or only as Kymians (M. Dušek, 1966; Z. Vinski, 1955; N. Majnarić-Pandžić, 1971; A. Meljukova, 1979), names that could be found, it seems, in classical sources (Odyssey, XI singing or in Herodotus). Their arrival to the Carpathian Basin, the Yugoslav Danube Basin and to the northern parts of the Peninsula, was marked mainly by “equestrian equipment” and, to a lesser degree, by bronze and iron ornamented items, armaments or tools originating in deposits (Adaševci, Šaregrad, Ilok, Ritiševo, Sinoševci, Rudovci, Janjevo), graves (Ritopek, Hrtkovci, Dalj), and seldom in settlements (Gomolava, Zlotska Cave, Zemun). The findings are so untypical and differed greatly from everything that belonged to the previous cultures, that one may rightfully consider their appearance the result of the steppe tribal penetration, namely the equestrian people, into the Central and South East European regions. While studying migratory moves in South East Europe, there arose no need to contest the term “equestrian tribes”, traces of whom can be found in the first centuries of the millennium B. C. from Czechoslovakia in the north all the way down to Greece in the south, and from the Alps in the west to the South Russian steppes, in the east. Instead, we are going to attempt to determine the time of the wave and the directions of its penetration into the Balkans.

The earliest Kymerian (Thracian-Kymerian) findings in Yugoslav Danube Basin go back to the beginning of the Bosut (river) culture (first century of the first millennium). Near the town of Ilok, in the Šaregrad deposit, (comp. K. Vinski-Gasparini, 1973, 220 T. 131), that belongs to the group grave period at Gomolava, parts of horse-trappings were found of Thracian-Kymerian origin (N. Tasić, 1972, 27). The deposit, as well as the grave at Gomolava, coincide with the beginning of the Bosut culture (Bosut I, the Kalakača phase), and are related to the beginning of the Early Bronze Age. The dating for the earliest Thracian-Kymerian findings in the Danubian Basin was confirmed by stratigraphic data. They also appear later on within the boundaries of the Basarabi culture (in settlements and necropolises in Romania, eastern Serbia and north-western Bulgaria: Balta Verde, Gogosu, Zlot Cave (Zlotska pećina), Sofronijevo, etc.), and finally, until the penetration of the Scythians into these regions, i. e. the fifth century B. C., namely, during the rise of the Bosut culture (Bosut-Basarabi complex). These findings are but a continuation of the existence of the steppe cultures parallel to the penetration of smaller or larger population groups from the east toward the west and south-west. This explains the numerous Scythian findings, discovered more often in the Danube Basin (Vršac, Ritopek) than in the mountain regions of the Peninsula.

The Kymerian (Thracean-Kymerian) and Scythian tribal moves from the woods and steppes of South Russia toward Central and South East Europe, were made along the same paths (even by the same model of successive migration) that were characteristic for the moves of the Indo-European tribes in the course of the third millennium B. C. One line of movement was from the lower Danube Basin toward the south (Dobruđža, northern Bulgaria – comp. A. Meljukova, 1979, *passim*), while the other turned westward, through the plain between the Southern Carpathians and the Danube toward the Pannonian Plains. Thracean-Kymerian findings south of the Danube and Sava rivers (Zlot Cave, Vrlišće) are connected to the ones in north-western Bulgaria (Sofronijevo, Vrace), but also to the phenomena registered in the Yugoslav Danube Basin, and especially in the region of Srem (Adaševci, Šarengrad, Hrtkovci). Even findings from the surroundings of the town of Kragujevac, and those of Kosovo, are related to that group. Southward, the Thracean-Kymerian findings are registered all the way down to the town of Ohrid (V. Lahtov, 1956), although the issue may be raised as to whether they reflect an ethnical penetration or represent merely an import.

The expansion of the Thracean-Kymerian “equestrian equipment” to the west was observed up to the eastern spurs of the Alps (Sopron, Stiffield), in the area of the Urnenfelder culture, but, again, that poses another question out of the framework of this paper.

The presence of the Scythians in the Yugoslav Danube Basin, and in the Balkans, except the north-western parts of Bulgaria (Ravna, Dobrina, Kregulevo – comp. A. Meljukova, 1979, 115 and subs.) and south-east Romania (Alexandria, Cernavoda), was less intensive. Findings in Serbia, south of the Sava and Danube rivers, are rare, and, rather than being extant in these regions, could be considered Scythian imports. They belong to the fifth century B. C. and are connected to the end of the Bosut culture (Bosut III). That is the period when the channelled ware ceramics appeared, when ornamented vessels with “S” motives and “S” spirals were abandoned, and when, in the East, the Ferigile-Birsešći culture developed, whose framework frequently contained Scythian armaments (“akinakes” daggers, curved knives – spats, Scythian triangle arrows) or parts of horse trappings (iron cheek pieces, for instance).

* * *

Three migration waves, oscillating more or less, extended over the Yugoslav Danube Basin and Central Balkans, denoting, at the same time, a cesura in the prehistoric cultural developments of these regions. They mark the end of one period and the beginning of another, when newcoming populations altered their cultural properties, traits in style and their way of life. The Indo-European migration intercepted the long development of Neolithic and early Eneolithic agricultural cultures. It introduced the cattle-breeding economy which fundamentally changed the habits in the sphere of material and spiritual cultures. The Doric migration, of which the Danubian and Balkan migrations had been a part, contributed to the downfall of a civilization that reached its peak with Mycenae, Tirins and other centers.

Finally, the penetration of Kymerian (Thracean-Kymerian) equestrian peoples into the Carpathian Basin and the Balkans played their part in the constellation and dispersion of paleo-Balkan tribes, leaving them, the way they are, and the way they were going to be encountered, several centuries later, in the works of classical writers (Herodotus, Strabonius).

Bibliography

- Benac A., 1977 – *O učešću Ilira u Egejskoj seobi*, Arheološki radovi i rasprave IV–V, Zagreb.
- Benac A., 1986 – *Praistorijski tumuli na Kupreškom polju*, Sarajevo.
- Bukvić Lj., 1978 – *Results of the Researches of the Mund near Jabuka*, Archeologia Iugoslavica XIX, Beograd.
- Comsa E., 1976 – *Considérations portant sur le tombe á ocre de la Zone du Bas-Danube*, Istraživanja 6, Novi Sad.
- Dušek M., 1966 – *Thrakische Gräberfeld der Hallstatzeit in Chotin*.
- Garašanin M., 1961 – *Pontski i stepski uticaji u donjem Podunavlju i na Balkanu na prelazu iz neolita u metalno doba*, Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja XV–XVI, Sarajevo.
- Hänsel B., 1982 – *Südosteuropa zwischen 1600–1000*, Berlin.
- Hochstetter A., 1982 – *Spätbronzezeitliches und früheisenzeitliches Formengut in Makedonien und in Balkanraum, Südosteuropa zwischen 1600–1000*, Berlin.
- Jovanović B., 1975, – *Tumuli stepske kulture jama u Podunavlju*, Starinar XXVI.
- Kimmig W., 1964 – *Seevölkerbewegung und Urnenfelderkultur*, Studien aus Alteuropa I, Köln.
- Krache H., 1954 – *Sprache und Verzeit*, Heidelberg.
- Mayer A., 1957 – *Sprache und alten Illyrier*, Wien.
- Meljukova A., 1979 – *Skifija i Frakijski mir*, Moskva.
- Milojević V., 1949 – *Die dorische Wanderung im Lichte der vorgeschichtlichen Funde*, Arch. Anzeiger 63–64.
- Mozsolics A., 1957 – *Archäologischen Beiträge zur Geschichte der grossen Wanderung*, Hung. VIII, 1–4, Budapest.
- Panajotov I.-Dergačev V., 1984, – *Die Ockergrabkultur in Bulgarien*, Studia Praehistorica 7, Sofia.
- Schachermeyer F., 1929 – *Etruskische Frühgeschichte*.
- Srejić D., 1976 – *Humke stepskih odlika na teritoriji Srbije*, Godišnjak Centra XIII, Sarajevo.
- Tasić N., 1972 – *Die pannonische Tiefebene und der Zentralbalkan...*, Balcanica III, Beograd.
- Tasić N., 1972a – *An Early Iron Collective Tomb at Gomolava*, Arch. Iugoslavica XIII, Beograd.
- Tasić N., 1982/1983 – *Das Problem der sukzessiven Migration während des Äneolithikums im Karpaten–Donau–Balkan–Gebiet*, Arch. Iugoslavica XXII–XXIII, Beograd.
- Tasić N., 1983 – *Jugoslovensko Podunavlje od indoevropske seobe do prodora Skita*, Novi Sad–Beograd.
- Vinski-Gasparini K., 1973 – *Kultura polja sa žara, a u sjeverozapadnoj Hrvatskoj*, Zadar.
- Vinski Z., 1955 – *»Tračko-kimerski« nalaz iz Adaševaca u Srijemu*, Rad Vojvodjanskog muzeja, 4, Novi Sad.
- Zirra V., 1960 – *Kultura pogrebenija s ohroj v Zakarpatskij oblasti RNR*, Materijali i isledovanija po arheologiji, Kišinjev.

THE IMPACT OF THE HUNS IN THE BALKANS IN LATE ANTIQUE HISTORIOGRAPHY*

From the end of the fourth century to the present, the Huns have been synonymous with wild, barbaric terror. The works of pagans and Christians, of literary figures and screen writers, and both Western and Eastern historians have been flavored with dramatic references to these Eastern nomadic warriors.²

In light of this tradition when we ask about the impact of the Huns on the Balkans, we conjure up a view of wild horsemen ravaging the peninsula. These were, after all, the people of Attila, the nomads from the Asian steppes who pushed the Visigoths and Ostrogoths into the Eastern Roman Empire in the late fourth century,³ who later sacked and pillaged Byzantine cities, only to return to their homeland in Central inner Asia less than a century later, leaving nothing but misery in their wake. Thus, L. S. Stavrianos, in his famous Balkan survey text, describes the Huns as "marauders rather than settlers, (who) did not pause long enough to obtain a permanent foothold."⁴ Professor Barbara Jelavich of Indiana University agrees, writing that "the Huns... came as raiders... conquered and looted large areas and then passed on."⁵ However, recent scholarship when combined with a more careful analysis of late Roman historiography shows that this monolithic view of the Huns as nomadic tribesmen who raided the Eastern Roman Empire for 85-odd years and then returned to the steppes of Asia is in need of revision.

The entry of the Huns into the Roman world is described well by two contemporary late antique Historians: Eunapius and Ammianus Marcellinus.⁶ Ammianus, who wrote his History in the last decade of the fourth century, was a retired Roman soldier. The extant portion of his work is our main source for political and military events of the middle of the fourth century A. D.⁷ This self-proclaimed former "soldier and Greek" clearly depicts the Huns as the primary cause of the great age of population migrations in the Roman Empire, calling them "The seed and origin of all the ruin and various disasters that the wrath of Mars aroused."⁸ In particular, Ammianus saw the Huns as the force behind the migration of the Visigoths into the Balkans. "When the report spread widely among the other Gothic peoples," he writes, "that a race of men hitherto unknown (the Huns) had now arisen from a hidden nook of the earth, like a tempest of snows from the high mountains, and was seizing or destroying everything in its way (the Visigoths) ... looked for a home removed from all knowledge of the savages... Therefore... they took possession of the banks of the Danube, and sending envoys to Valens, with humble entreaty begged to be received."⁹

Ammianus is not alone in this view. Eunapius and Zosimus also describe the billiard-ball effect the Huns had on the Visigoths, pushing germanic tribesman into the Balkans with their horse archery tactics.¹⁰ It was these self-same Visigoths, of course, who destroyed the Eastern Roman Army at the

Battle of Adrianople in 378, a massacre worse than any since Cannae, one which destroyed two-thirds of the Eastern Roman army.¹¹ The military catastrophe accelerated the use of barbarians in the Roman army, a process which Arthur Ferrill, in a recent work, postulates as the military cause of the "Fall of Rome".¹² Therefore, while one does not necessarily have to accept Ferrill's view, his work indicates how pervasive the picture is of the Huns as a root cause for the end of Roman civilization.

Reinforcing this negative portrait is the first picture of the Huns in late antique historiography, also preserved by Ammianus. He describes a people that "from their horses by night or day everyone buys and sells, eats and drinks, and bowed over the narrow neck of the animal relaxes into a sleep so deep as to be accompanied by many dreams." "No one in their country," he continues, "ever plows a field or touches a plow handle. They are all without fixed abode, without hearth, or laws... and keep roaming from place to place, like fugitives accompanied by the wagons in which they live."¹³

What Ammianus describes here is a way of life classified by modern anthropologists as that of a "nomadic horse people". Anthropologists divide early societies into four categories: food-gatherers, horticulturalists, agriculturalists, and pastoralists. Pastoralists do little farming, but rely chiefly upon domesticated animals for their food supply.¹⁴ Pastoralists are also seen as having a less stratified society in terms of political and social organization. Ammianus' description places the Huns firmly in the pastoral category, with the occasional raid as a supplement to their food supply. Thus, Ammianus' Huns are people in a pre-agricultural phase, virtually welded to their horses. Clearly no positive impact could be expected from such primitive barbarians.

Ammianus's depiction of the ugliness and sheer horror of the Hun's appearance serves as a micro-view which confirms the larger picture of the wildness of these horse-people. In a colorful description, Ammianus writes: "the cheeks of the children are deeply furrowed with the steel from their very birth, in order that the growth of hair, when it appears at the proper time, may be checked by the wrinkled scars, (and thus) they grow old without beards and without beauty, like eunuchs. They all have compact, strong limbs and thick necks, and are so monstrously ugly and misshapen, that one might take them for two-legged beasts or for the stumps... that are used in putting sides to bridges."¹⁵

How reliable is this picture? Modern ethnographic studies have determined that the Huns were not as racially unified a people as was thought in late antiquity. Some scholars have argued that Ammianus may never have seen a Hun, but was basing his descriptions on earlier historians' views of horse nomads, such as Herodotus' picture of the Scythians.¹⁶ Herodotus, writing over 750 years before Ammianus, described the Scythians as "a people without fortified towns, living... in waggon which they take with them wherever they go, accustomed, one and all, to fight on horseback with bows and arrows, and dependent for their food not upon agriculture but upon their cattle..."¹⁷

Although the extent to which Ammianus relied on it remains in doubt, this topos of the eastern steppe horsemen, as transmitted by him, clearly influenced subsequent late antique historians. Jordanes, a Christian Goth writing in the sixth century, describes the “great fear” created by the appearance of the Huns in terms so broad as to be almost a cartoon. “They made their foes flee in horror,” he writes, “because their swarthy aspect was fearful, and they had, if I may call it so, a sort of shapeless lump, not a head with pinholes rather than eyes . . . they are beings who are cruel to children on the very day they are born, for they cut the cheeks of the males with a sword, so that before they receive the nourishment of milk they must learn to endure wounds.” As he continues, Jordanes shows his debt to Ammianus: “Hence the Huns grow old beardless and their young men are without comeliness,” he writes, “because a face furrowed by the sword spoils by its scars the natural beauty of a beard. They are short in stature, quick in bodily movement, alert horsemen, broad shouldered, ready in the use of bow and arrow . . .”¹⁸ Ammianus’ picture has become a stereotype.

The importance of the view of the ancient classical historians, or “*scriptores antiqui*” should not be overlooked in examining the biases of late antique historians.¹⁹ Thus, Synesius of Cyrene, in describing the Huns c. 400, goes so far as to say that there were no new peoples which the wise scholars of the classical past had not known, and thus the Huns were just an earlier people who had gone back to inner Asia, changed their appearance and their name and returned to bother the Romans.²⁰

Thus, the dominant view of late antique historiography of the Huns is that of a static picture of horse nomad barbarians. Ammianus’ picture was probably valid for his time. However, the influence his description had on his successors, such as Jordanes, as well as Synesius’ statement about the importance of the testimony of the ancient writers, do tend to cloud the true picture of the Huns. The Huns are presented as a perpetually static nomadic horse people, forever stuck at the pastoral level of anthropological development.

The late antique historians standing by themselves, have, on the whole, been of limited use in probing the mystery of the Huns. Modern studies, especially those using intra-disciplinary methods such as archeology and anthropology, have shed some useful light on the background and development of the Huns. The late Professor Otto Maenchen-Helfen was one of the great modern scholars of the Huns. He was so interested in their culture that he lived with Mongolian horseman for three months as a young man. Pointing to archeological evidence, Maenchen-Helfen stressed that the Huns were less pastoral (and thus more advanced) before 370 than the late antique sources would lead us to believe. They used large bronze cooking cauldrons, which indicates skill in metal-working, as also does the jewelry they wore. Maenchen-Helfen also concluded that the Huns had an inherent aristocracy prior to 370 which was not a product of cultural assimilation. Thus, they had a stratified society, another proof for a non-pastoral society. In a revision most pertinent to this conference, Maenchen-Helfen argued that the Huns did not greatly affect the local populations of the Balkans because the peasants, “like peasants everywhere, and at all times,” steadfastly clung to

their land. When the Huns arrived, the peasants fled, carrying all that they could. When the Huns left again, the peasants returned to their land after "the storm had blown over."²¹ Although, Maenchen-Helfen believed that the Huns remained a nomadic horse culture, he did not think they left with the dissolution of Attila's empire. Rather he concluded, they continued living off the exploitation of natives, until they were assimilated into later nomadic invaders like the Bulgars. This suggests an important revision: the Huns assimilated into other peoples instead of leaving.

Work since Maenchen-Helfen has gone even further, suggesting that the Huns evolved beyond horse culture while in the Balkans. Dr. Rudi Lindner of the University of Michigan,²² concluded from a study of modern steppe ponies that the Huns ceased to fight from horseback after entering the Balkans. A steppe pony requires twenty-five acres of grazing land a day to live, according to Lindner. Since steppe horse warriors need a string of ten ponies to keep rapid mobility, a huge amount of grazing land was necessary to support a Hunnic horde that characterized their fighting style on the steppes. In central Europe, only the Alfold (or great Hungarian plain) provides such grazing and even there, Lindner concludes, the Huns had lost most of their surplus ponies. The physical limitation of their environment, Lindner argues, would have forced major changes in societal organization on the Huns once they entered the Balkans. Correspondingly, their effectiveness as a rapidly mobile fighting force would have quickly diminished.

Indications of this "hidden evolution" in Hunnic society, can be found in the late antique historians. Although they continued to describe the Huns in terms of the literary topos of Scythians, no extant historian after Ammianus, save those who merely copied him word for word, refers to Huns fighting strictly on horseback. Olympiodorus of Thebes was a pagan Greek historian who in 412 was sent as an ambassador to the Huns. His first-hand account of the Huns praises their great gift for archery, but says nothing about use of horses in battle. Priscus of Panium is one of our most important sources for the study of the Huns. In 449, this fifth-century Byzantine official and historian also accompanied an embassy to Attila's camp. Further showing the evolution in Hunnic tactics and society, Priscus discusses the Huns using siege machinery in their attack on Aquileia.²³

The model of Ammianus does not compare well with modern scholarship, yet, we have seen it was very influential. The problem of the power of the Scythian topos can be seen in the work of Priscus. When Priscus, who composed his history around 476, describes Attila's rise to power, he comments: "Attila, the son of Mundius, a Scythian and a brave and haughty man, killed his elder brother Bleda, and became sole ruler of the kingdom of the Scythians (who they also call 'Huns')".²⁴

When Priscus comes to his visit to the camp of Attila, the historian describes a setting that does not coincide with tents and wagons of nomads. He mentions, for instance, a stone bath house of Attila's lieutenant, Onegesius, and the beautifully carved wooden stockade of the camp. He also tells us that Attila's own house had a stone foundation. What is particularly striking is that none of this is particularly unusual or noteworthy to Priscus. He seems to have expected nothing else, as if tents would have surprised him

more. Priscus' account advocates a level of sophistication in more than just housing. He describes a secretariat manned by both Romans and barbarians, one of whom is Orestes, father of the future last Western Roman emperor, Romulus Augustulus. Attila's court sends and receives ambassadors to and from both Western and Eastern Roman empires, as well as contemplating campaigns against the Persians.²⁵ All these examples of settled life do not point to a culture of wild nomadic horse barbarians.²⁶ How do we explain this seeming discrepancy with the topos of Scythians and of Ammianus?

Evidently, the economic and social level of the Huns had changed over the 85-year period from Ammianus to Priscus. In Ammianus, one reads of the Huns having "no need of fire nor of savory food, but eat the roots of wild plants and the half-raw flesh of any kind of animal whatever, which they put between their thighs and the backs of their horses, and thus warm it a little. They are never protected by any buildings, but avoid these like tombs..."²⁷ These examples are, once again, clear indications of the pastoral nature of the Huns in 390. Obviously, these "noble savages" living off primitive "steak tartare" are far removed from Priscus' bathing kings. All this opens a door to some positive impact for the Huns. Recall that Maenchen-Helfen said the peasants did not suffer. Priscus indicated real prosperity for the Huns. The Huns might not warrant an image of total terror.

A fascinating encounter in Priscus' work is his conversation with an unlikely Hun. While waiting for an audience, Priscus writes that "someone, whom I took to be a barbarian from his Scythian dress, approached me and greeted me in Greek, saying, 'Xaire'... I returned his greeting and asked who he was and where he came from to the land of the barbarians and took up a Scythian way of life... He laughed and said that he was a Greek and for purposes of trade he had gone to Viminacium... on the river Danube... He had lived there for a very long time and married a very rich woman. When the city was captured by the barbarians (the Huns in this case), he was deprived of his prosperity... and was assigned to Onegesius himself in the division of the spoils... Having proven his valour in later battles against the Romans... he had won his freedom. He had married a barbarian wife and had children, and, as a sharer at the table of Onegesius, he now enjoyed a better life than he had previously." A Roman opting for life with the Huns does not quite square with the ferocity and horror of the static stereotype.²⁸

The Christian historiographic tradition gives similar hints of evolution in Hunnic society. Thus far, we have only examined pagan historians. In addition to the pagan historical tradition, the period of late antiquity saw major Christian historiographic work, although it emphasized Church history, rather than political history.²⁹ Two Christian historians of the fifth century, Orosius and Sozomen, shed light on the subject of the Huns.

Orosius was a Spanish theologian and Church historian. This Western disciple of St. Augustine presents a widely-different view of the later Huns from the stereotype of Ammianus. After describing how Theodosius I' prayers helped defeat the Huns in "many great battles" through his trust in Christ, Orosius adds that "soon after this, also the barbarians detesting their swords, turned to their ploughs and now cherish the Romans as comrades and friends, so that now there may be found among them certain Romans

who prefer poverty with freedom among the barbarians than paying tribute with anxiety among the Romans."³⁰ So, here in Orosius' work intended as a diatribe against paganism, we find an extremely useful confirmation of changes in Hunnic lifestyle that we saw in Lindner's work and in the changes in Hunnic tactics. The Huns were exchanging the tools of nomadism for agriculture.

Orosius is not alone in this depiction. The Byzantine ecclesiastical historian Sozomen, writing in Constantinople c. 450, describes an early fifth-century Roman victory³¹ against the Huns by stating that "the immediate attendants and leaders of the tribes... were discussing the Roman form of government, the philanthropy of the emperor, and his promptitude and liberality in rewarding the best and good men. It was not without the love of God that they turned to the love of the points so discussed and seceded to the Romans."³² Sozomen goes on to state that many of the Hunnic soldiers were settled in Bithynia cultivating the hills and valleys. It would seem unlikely to us to imagine wild horseman discussing the virtues of Roman government. The generals were probably bribed by the Romans. Yet even the fact that the former nomadic leaders would prefer a rich Roman lifestyle, and the Hunnic soldiers an agricultural life, demonstrates that the mid-fifth century Huns were different from those of Ammianus in 390. This is verified by the converse assimilation of Priscus' renegade Roman choosing life with the Huns.

What, then, was the Huns' impact on the Balkans, and more specifically to population movements? They did drive the Visigoths and Ostrogoths westward into the Roman Empire. Yet the Visigoths are more famous for sacking Rome in 410 and then settling in Spain, and the Ostrogoths for their deeds in Italy, than for either of their actions in the Balkans. The hidden question that we see emerging is not what happened when the Huns first entered the Balkans, but what happened to the Huns after Attila's death in 453. We have references to two of his sons asking for trading centers to be opened for them on the Danube, clearly implying trade and a fairly settled life.³³ This contradicts Maenchen-Helfen's picture of the Huns continuing to plunder. Although some Huns undoubtedly pursued the life of plunder and pillage, or mercenary military service as we see in the sixth-century Procopius' work.³⁴ But some did settle as we have seen. When this desire for trading centers is seen in the context of Huns choosing the plough over the sword, a much different sort of Hunnic society begins to appear to us.

From Priscus' renegade Roman, and from Orosius we saw Romans opting for life with the Huns. From Sozomen, we saw Huns choosing the society of the Romans. The static image of the Huns, which colorfully portrayed them as ever-lasting blood-thirsty nomads, is misleading. Ammianus' description shaped an entire historiographic tradition that has been long-lasting. In fact, one might say that he has provided a basis for a picture as distorted as that of the more famous Roman historian Tacitus, of a more famous barbarian people, the Germans.

With the correctives of modern archeological and anthropological studies, we note that a subsidiary late Roman historiographic tradition, that of Priscus, Orosius, and Sozomen, is largely correct in their changing view of

Hunnic society. However, this is not to say that Ammianus was wrong. He described the Huns as accurately as he could c. 390, shortly after they touched the Roman world.

In the intervening 85 years between Ammianus and Priscus, due to cultural assimilation and topographic influences, many Huns were evolving into a settled agricultural people. It is not inconceivable then, that instead of the older view which holds that the Huns returned to the Asian steppes to devolve culturally back to nomadic pastoralism, a great number of the Huns settled and assimilated in Hungary and the Balkans. Thus, in the Huns we see the continuation of population movement and assimilation in the Balkans that started before the Greeks, and continued through the Middle Ages.

* I would like to thank Dr. Dimitrije Djordjevic and Dr. H. A. Drake of the University of California, Santa Barbara for their help in preparing this paper. I would also like to thank Professors Henrik and Marianna Birnbaum of the University of California, Los Angeles for their comments during the conference. Of course, I hold the responsibility for all errors.

² The Huns and Attila figure prominently in Western literature from Late Antiquity onward. George Meredith's "The Nuptials of Attila" and Wagner's works are obvious. The Jack Palance film is a classic. It is interesting to note that Soviet historians stress the Huns' role in the world historical process. This is due chiefly to Engel's sociological work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, 268-269. For further information, cf. N. Ia. Merpert, *Očerki istorii SSSR* 2, 153 and A. N. Bernshtam, *Očerki po istorii gunnov* (Leningrad, 1951).

³ The Ostrogoths, of course, went on to have a devastating impact upon the Western Roman Empire, and eventually set up a tribal kingdom in Italy.

⁴ L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York, 1958), 23.

⁵ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* (Cambridge, 1984) Vol. 1, 10.

⁶ A hot scholarly argument exists concerning which author wrote first. Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *American Journal of Philology* LXXXVI, (1955), 384-399, felt that Ammianus wrote first and influenced Eunapius, whereas T. D. Barnes, *Classical Philology* LXXI, (1976), 258-268, redates Eunapius to 378 and thus influenced Ammianus. Most recently cf. R. Goulet, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100 (1980) 60-72 dates Eunapius' publication at 395/6 while Thomas Banchich, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* (1986) argues for Barnes' dating of Eunapius' first edition culminating in the Battle of Adrianople. So, the question is still open to hot debate.

⁷ Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae* XXXI. 16. 9

⁸ Ammianus, XXXI. 2. 1

⁹ Ammianus, XXXI. 3. 8-4. 1

¹⁰ Zosimus, IV. 20

¹¹ Ammianus, XXXI. 13.19

¹² Arther Ferrill, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation* (New York, 1986), 68-77.

¹³ Ammianus, XXXI. 2. 6.

¹⁴ Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, *An Introduction to Anthropology* (New York, 1954), 271-300.

¹⁵ Ammianus, XXXI. 2. 2

¹⁶ E. A. Thompson, *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford, 1948), 6.

¹⁷ Herodotus, *The History* IV. 47-48.

¹⁸ Jordanes, *The Gothic History* 127-129.

¹⁹ Ammianus, XXII. 8. 1; XXIII. 5. 20; XXIII. 6. 2; XXIII. 6. 30; XXIV. 2.16; XXV. 9. 9; XXV. 9. 11; XXVIII. 4. 14; XXX. 4. 2; XXX. 4. 19.

²⁰ Synesius of Cyrene, *On Kingship* XI

²¹ Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns* (Berkeley, 1973), 124.

²² Rudi Paul Lindner, "Nomadism, Horses, and Huns", *Past and Present* 92 (1981), 3-19.

- ²³ Priscus XXII and Olympiodorus XIX also cf. Lindner, 9 for Priscus and Hunnic seiges.
- ²⁴ Priscus, IX. 4
- ²⁵ Priscus, XI. 1-20ff. describes Edeco and Orestes whose more famous sons were, respectively, Odoacer and Romulus Augustulus.
- ²⁶ Priscus, XI. 355-565.
- ²⁷ Ammianus, XXXI. 2. 3-4
- ²⁸ Priscus, XI. 405-450.
- ²⁹ Arnaldo Momigliano, "Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century," in *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, ed. A. Momigliano (Oxford, 1963), 84-91.
- ³⁰ Orosius, *Seven Books Against the Pagans* VII. 34-41.
- ³¹ Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, 62-66 dates this war to late 408.
- ³² Sozomen, *Church History*, IX. 5
- ³³ Priscus, XLVI.
- ³⁴ Procopius, *History of the Wars* II. IV. 1-12.

ABSTRACT

The Impact of the Huns in the Balkans in Late Antique Historiography by Robert Frakes

The impact of the Huns in the Balkans has often been seen as a century of violence caused by the actions of the Huns themselves and by the population movements that the Huns precipitated. This paper addresses the question of how the Huns were viewed by their contemporaries, and near contemporaries, the Late Antique Historians. By combining examinations of Late Antique descriptions of the Huns with recent scholarship, it becomes clear that the static negative picture of the Huns needs revision. While not denying the violence caused by the Huns, the evidence suggests that a great number of Huns gradually evolved into farmers and merchants in the Balkans and thus fit into a long series of migratory peoples who assimilated into the native populations of the Balkans from Pre History to Recent times.

WAS THERE A SLAVIC LANDTAKING OF THE BALKANS AND, IF SO, ALONG WHAT ROUTES DID IT PROCEED?

Until quite recently, and mostly also today, it has been, or still is, common to assume that the Slavs invaded, and soon enough indeed literally inundated, large parts of the Balkan Peninsula beginning with the rule of Emperor Justinian I (527-65). The first appearance of Slavs north of the Danube is recorded in the fifth century. At that time, they seem to have been divided into many separate tribes, which, however, were grouped, at least according to contemporary sources, into two larger ethnic entities, the *S(c)laveni* and the *Antes*. Procopius, writing in the early 550s, stated that the two groups spoke the same language and looked alike. A half-century later, a military manual, *Strategikon*, usually attributed to Emperor Maurice (582-602), corroborated Procopius's claim, pointing out that the *S(c)laveni* and *Antes* (of which the latter ethnonym, incidentally, seems to betray Iranian origin) shared a common lifestyle. While Slavic incursions across the Danube-Sava line, which formed the border of the Byzantine empire, had occurred earlier, the number of raids increased dramatically in the second half of Justinian's reign or by c. 550 at the latest. In fact, Procopius and other sources report that such raids had virtually become an annual occurrence. Moreover, Procopius lists a number of Slavic place-names in present-day Yugoslavia (primarily in the Morava and Timok River valleys) and northern Bulgaria, suggesting an early permanent settlement of some Slavic elements in Byzantine territory. It is also known that there were Slavs in the ranks of Justinian's armies fighting in Italy. By and large, though, up to the late 560s, raiding mobile bands crossing the Danube and occasionally penetrating deep into the heartlands of Byzantium, constituted the basic pattern of Slavic activity in the Balkans, and the fairly numerous but obviously small-sized Slavic settlements on Byzantine soil did not yet amount to anything like an actual Slavic landtaking.

As was indicated at the outset, however, these migratory moves toward the south have been viewed, at least until recently, as part, or rather the beginning, of a far-flung and massive expansion or the Slavs from their original homeland, located somewhere beyond the Carpathians, and soon – or in any event within a matter of a few centuries – taking them as far south as the Peloponnesus (which, according to some scholars, they reached as early as 587 whereas others believe that the Slavs came into that region only after 746) and the shores of the Adriatic. In the west they reached and crossed the Elbe-Saale line and temporarily settled on the upper Main River (cf. Samo's semilegendary state in the mid-7th century), advancing to the Baltic coast from the mouth of the Vistula to the foot of Jutland. Moreover, in their conquest of the north and northeast, the Slavs subjugated and

absorbed Baltic and Finnic tribes all the way to Lakes Peipus, Il 'men', Ladoga, and Onega and settled in the reaches of the upper Volga and the Oka Rivers. For a discussion of the highly controversial views concerning the location of the Slavic protohome, see Birnbaum 1986a and forthcoming.

Thus, the very fact of the arrival to the Balkans of the Slavs, originating in their assumed erstwhile protohome, their invasion, in several waves, and landtaking of large portions of the Peninsula have so far basically as such not been in doubt, and only the details of their initial Balkan migrations – in other words, the question of which main routes they may have taken – have been the subject of scholarly debates; cf., e.g., Ivić 1971, 7-14; 1972, 66-72; 1981; Birnbaum 1984/85, 78-9, Kovačević 1981; Fine 1983, 25-73. However, in the 1980s this whole question has come into a somewhat different light given the advancement of some new theories concerning the location of the Slavic protohome and, among some scholars, the recent doubts expressed as to the justification for even operating with a concept of a single protohome (or original homeland) of the Slavs altogether. I am referring here, in particular, to a contribution toward resolving this issue by the Soviet linguist O. N. Trubačev (1982/85) and to a number of articles, all based on a novel, broad overall conception, by the German Slavist H. Kunstmann.

Concerned with a number of theoretical and methodological issues, including a critique of the very notions of protohome and landtaking, which we need not go into here (for a discussion, cf. Birnbaum & Merrill 1985, 78-82; Birnbaum 1986a, 32-41 and 1987a, 359-9), Trubačev places the earliest ascertainable area of Slavic settlement south of the Carpathian Mountains, basing his hypothesis primarily on etymological and onomastic data and in so doing vindicating, as it were, the claim of the author – or rather compiler – of the Old Russian *Primary Chronicle* who had located the cradle of the Slavs on the Danube, “where nowadays are the lands of the Hungarians and Bulgarians.” By the same token, Trubačev’s theory carries certain unmistakable Slavo-centric overtones as it locates the presumed earliest known habitat of the Slavs in what he (as well as some other scholars) considers one of the core regions of settlement of the as yet essentially undifferentiated Indo-Europeans. If we were to accept the basic tenet of Trubačev’s bold yet impressively underpinned hypothesis, the Slavic advances into the heart of the Balkans, across the Danube and Sava Rivers, would therefore amount to only relatively short-range migratory moves while the Slavs’ resettlement in the Danubian basin could be viewed as a recovery of previously held territories. Cf. Trubačev’s own statement (1982/85; 4: 11 and 5: 7/205 and 227): “Perhaps then this famous Danubian-Balkan migration of the Slavs did prove to be a *Reconquista* that ran somewhat out of control owing to favorable circumstances and to the eagerness of the Slavs... The South Slavs are newcomers in the Balkans, but they probably came from whence they could also penetrate by early infiltration to the East and to the North.” It should be noted here, though, that Trubačev’s view has by no means met with general agreement. Thus, for example, the German onomastician, J. Udolph (forthcoming) has recently reexamined Trubačev’s various arguments and endeavored to prove them wrong, claiming in a paper titled “Kamen die Slaven aus Pannonien?” that neither historical Pannonia’s

toponymy nor the relationship of Slavic with other Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages, neither ancient tradition nor the results of archeological research, and also not the assumption of a Slavic center of linguistic innovations in Pannonia are viable arguments for a Proto-Slavic settlement of that region. Udolph therefore stands by his own previously expressed and thoroughly substantiated view that the linguistic, archeological, and historical evidence points to the Slavic ethno- and glottogenesis as having evolved north of the Carpathians – or, to be exact, in a region just north of the Carpathians between the Tatra Mountains and the Bukovina (thus roughly in historical Galicia) – and that the Slavs consequently did not originate in Pannonia. For further archeological arguments against the thesis of an early appearance of Slavs in the Carpathian basin (originally advanced by L. Niederle), see also the references cited in Kovačević 1981; 111, fn. 3. The archeological data presumably does not corroborate a Slavic presence in that area (other than in today's southern Banat) prior to the 8th century.

In this context, it is worth noting, however, that L'. Novák (1984) recently has again expressed views fairly close to those of Trubačev. Thus, Novák, like Trubačev, considers the Carpathian basin and the adjacent mid-Danube region the last compact protohome of the Slavs. From this core area, they would have subsequently moved in the course of complex migrations in various directions, thus creating new geomorphological conditions at somewhat different periods for the gradual differentiation of the separate Slavic languages, among them those of the Southern Slavs. According to the Slovak scholar whose study synthesizes and enlarges upon previous work on the subject (Novák 1939/40), the crystallization of an autonomous ethnolinguistic entity can be viewed as a result of the Altaization (or, in his words, "Mongolization") of the southeastern branch of the Indo-European group of the "Balto-Slavs," or rather of their ancestors, once settled on the Dnieper River. The effect of this Altaic (Turkic) superstratum would have begun with the appearance of the Huns in the Pontic Steppe region (c. 375 A. D.). That splinter group of the larger Indo-European complex would thus have been drawn into the Eurasian language alliance, or *Sprachbund*, once assumed by R. Jakobson merely on phonological grounds. I for one am highly skeptical about Jakobson's assumption of such a linguistic convergence area and have so stated repeatedly (cf. Birnbaum 1965, 15-17, 1968, 71-2, 89-90; 1975, 12; 1981, 403-4; 1983, 45-6). On the "Eurasian" thinking of N. S. Trubeckoj, the first to formulate the notion of *Sprachbund* and Jakobson's close friend and fellow scholar, see now Gasparov 1987. In Novák's view, it was the defeat and annihilation by Charlemagne's campaigns in the 790s of the Avar state (or rather perhaps the loosely organized political-military entity centered in the Carpathian-Danubian region and including a fairly large number of Slavic tribes under Avar sway or possibly allied with that Turkic people) that prompted what amounted to a remigration, primarily from today's Transylvania, of Slavic groups (which were subsequently to be identified as Eastern Slavs), settling – and in part rejoining local residual Slavic elements – on both sides of the mid-Dnieper.

In my opinion the assumption of an Altaization of part of the "Balto-Slavs" – the latter itself a dubious ethnolinguistic notion – is far from

convincing. Rather, we can conceive of the Slavs as having emerged from a larger Late Indo-European subgroup, also including the forebears of the Baltic and Germanic peoples, as a consequence of the invasion by Iranian (Scytho-Sarmatian) tribes of the steppes of southeastern Europe. While the ancestors of the Balts and Germanic peoples managed to escape Iranian domination, the precursors of the Slavs were not so fortunate. But it was only later that various Slavic tribes encountered and were partly subdued by Turkic peoples of the steppe, among them in particular the Avars, who may also have been instrumental in forcing the Slavs out of their earlier areas of settlement and in making them move into the mid and lower Danube region only to subsequently impose themselves on them there also. The latter clearly applies to the Bulgars (Proto-Bulgarians) in the lower Danube valley and to the Avars in the mid-Danube (and Sava) basin.

In this connection it should further be noted that according to P. Ivić (1972, 67), the “Slavic dialects in most of Transylvania belonged to the eastern group,” that is to say, the eastern branch of the forebears of the Southern Slavs. While the eastern branch of the subsequent South Slavic tribes for some time seems to have dwelled in the Dacian plains, the western group previously inhabited the Pannonian plain (now Great Hungarian Plain, in Hungarian *Alföld*) with the Carpathians north of the Iron Gate and probably also the smaller Apuseni mountain range separating these two Slavic groups. The mountainous districts themselves were presumably not settled by Slavs but rather by Proto-Romanian (Vlach) and Albanian ethnic groups adapted to a transhumant, pastoralist lifestyle.

As for the potential role of the Avars as a formative and unifying force in the crystallization of the Slavs and their common language as a relatively homogeneous whole, H. G. Lunt, following a suggestion of O. Pritsak, has seriously considered such a possibility. Thus, he wrote (Lunt 1985, 203): “The historical intervention of steppe-peoples, principally the Avars, between about 500 and 750, created a Slavic lingua franca which spread throughout Slavic territory and well beyond into new areas, obliterating older dialects and languages. This new uniform language remained fairly stable through the 9th century with a small number of new isoglosses that began to form before OCS [i. e., Old Church Slavonic, H. B.] was written down.”

An even more unorthodox view as to the early migrations of the Slavs has been voiced since the beginning of the 1980s by H. Kunstmann. In a number of articles published in the journal *Die Welt der Slaven*, the German Slavist has argued that a large number of Slavic ethno-, topo-, and hydronyms, as well as designations of certain regions in the Slavic north, i. e., north of the Carpathian and Sudeten Mountains, should be interpreted as brought there by various Slavic groups – tribes (in the sense of *gentes*) or even merely clan-like formations – in the course of their settling in these new, northern territories, arriving there from the Balkans sometime around or shortly after 800 A. D. Without insisting on (or, for that matter, being able to identify) the exact location of their earliest habitat – but presuming it to have been somewhere north of the Black Sea – the Slavs, or rather, a great variety of small-sized, as yet unconsolidated Slavic splinter groups, would originally have been swept away by the Avars moving from the Pontic Steppe region

into the Carpathian-Danubian basin. Settled in various – Thracian, Greek, Latin (Early Romance), and Illyrian – parts of the Balkans, these relatively small Slavic groups, who fully took shape only during their stay in the Balkans, would have subsequently moved north carrying with them their ethnic and geographic names, which therefore are said to echo their Balkan past, brought to an end by Byzantium's drive and counteroffensive begun c. 800 A. D. Cf. now also Kunstmann 1987, with further references.

While much in Kunstmann's conception needs further corroboration and clarification, its main thrust, underpinned by a wealth of thoroughly verified linguistic, textual, historical, and archeological data, is certainly worth considering much as it would dramatically change our previous notions of the Slavic invasions and outright landtaking of the Balkans. This new conception, in one variety or another as of late supported by such authorities as the Croatian historian N. Klaić and the East German archeologist J. Herrmann, would imply that we no longer conceive of the Slavic invasions of the Balkans as momentous, massive events, but rather view the arrival of the Slavs in these regions as a gradual, limited penetration and infiltration of initially relatively small and isolated groups whose clear-cut ethnolinguistic identity and self-consciousness may well have fully formed only at that time, under the pressure of the Avars. At any rate, they would not have conceived of themselves as part of some large, unified ethnic entity prior to the Avar-Slavic symbiosis. In this connection, and in support of Kunstmann's basic thesis, it is worth quoting here the statement by J. Herrmann when he discusses the analogous penetration of Slavic tribes, notably the Serbians/Sorbians, into present-day Germany (1985, 27): "Es ist...wahrscheinlich, dass aus dem Stamm der Serben/Sorben, der am Ende des 6. Jh. im mittleren Donaugebiet an den Grenzen von Byzanz stand und der sich mit den Awaren auseinanderzusetzen hatte, ein Teil ausschied und nordwärts wanderte. Einige Gruppen aus dem Stamm der Kroaten, der zusammen mit den Serben an der mittleren Donau operierte, scheinen sich dieser Nordwanderung angeschlossen zu haben, ebenso vereinzelt Bulgaren."

Nonetheless, the appearance of Slavic groups in the Balkans (as well in the region of the Eastern Alps; cf. below), particularly in the 600s and 700s, in increasing numbers is a fact even if we perhaps have to reconsider the kind, extent, and force of these Slavic invasions, which therefore, at least in their earlier phase, may indeed not simply be termed a full-scale landtaking. In particular, the fact that Slavs, in alliance with Avars, as well as in part with Bulgars and Germanic Gepids, did militarily assail Byzantium, capturing in 614 the Dalmatian provincial capital of Salona (near today's Split into whose Diocletian Palace the Romance population of Salona fled) and launching major, albeit unsuccessful, attacks on Salonica (Thessaloniki), in 614-16 and again in 618, and, in 626, on Constantinople itself, should not lead us to believe that at that time the vast regions of Byzantine territory – other than presumably the environs of Salonica – were as yet solidly and permanently settled by a Slavic-speaking population only. Yet, as J. Fine (1983, 26) notes: "Since imperial control was lost from such a large area, we can assume that, though the Balkans were not evenly settled throughout, the Slavs must have had large numbers of settlements in every region of the Balkans lost to the

empire.” Also, some Slavs moved into territories that remained Byzantine-controlled, notably Thrace. In this context mention should, incidentally, be made of the fairly small-sized Slavic-settled regions known as *sclaviniae*, scattered over much of the Peninsula, referred to by Byzantine historians and chroniclers.

Which, then, were the routes by which the Slavs – or more precisely, the future Southern Slavs – arrived and settled in what is today Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as parts of Greece and Albania? To consider this question, it is useful, I submit, to first take a look at the specific peoples, or earlier ethnic subgroups, involved. In doing so, it should be kept in mind, however, that these subgroups in all likelihood actually emerged, as previously indicated, only after the various smaller Slavic entities had arrived in the Balkans. Note in this connection particularly also the fact that Constantine Porphyrogenitus, writing in the mid-10th century, in his famous work, *De administrando imperio*, still singles out a number of individual Slavic tribes in addition to the ethnically controversial Serbs and Croats. More specifically, Constantine, to be sure, in a somewhat confused manner, refers to “Slavs... who were also called Avars” (*Sklávoi, hoi kai Ávaroi kaloúmenoi*, ch. 29; Moravcsik & Jenkins, eds. & trans., 1967, 122-3), and later speaks again of “Slavs/Slavenes” subject to the Church of Patras (ch. 49; *ibid.*, 228-32) and of “the Slavs of the province of Peloponnese” (*hoi toũ thématos Peloponnésou Sklávoi*), i. e., the Milingoi (Mélíggof) and Ezerítai (*Ezerítai*; ch. 50; *ibid.* 232-45; cf. Birnbaum 1986b). But, in addition, he also singles out the Croats (*Chrōvátoi*, chs. 13, 29-33, 35, 40-41), the Serbs (*Sérvloi*, chs. 29, 31-33, 36), and further the Zachlumites or Zachlumi (*Zachloūmoi*, chs. 29, 30, 32, 33, 35), the Terbouniotes (*Tervouniotai*, chs. 29 and 34), the Kanalites (*Kanalítai*, chs. 29, 32, 34), Diocletians (*Dioklētianoí*, chs. 29 and 35), as well as the Arentani or Pagani (*Arentanoí / Paganoí*, chs. 29, 30 and 36). While the ethnic identity of the Croats and Serbs in Constantine’s account is controversial, his Bulgarians (*hoi Voulgaroi*, chs. 5, 8, 13, 22, 131-32, 40-41) were probably still the Turkic tribe of the Bulgars and his Ragusans (*Rhousaítoi*, ch. 29) in all likelihood refers to the early Romance population of Ragusa/Dubrovnik.

As is well known, just as the Turkic Bulgars eventually – but possibly not as rapidly as sometimes assumed (cf. Fine 1983, 74–78 and 94–112) – were assimilated by the Slavs of the lower Danube valley whom they had conquered and ruled, so the ethnonyms of both the Serbs and the Croats mentioned by the Byzantine emperor point to non-Slavic origins. It has been fairly common until recently to assume that both these ethnic designations can be traced to Iranian sources. However, Trubačev (1982/85, 5:13–14/242–3) is inclined to assume Old Indic origin for the name **sŕbi*, while for **xŕvati* rather than an Iranian derivation a Turkic (and, more specifically, Avar) etymology now seems highly plausible; cf. Kronsteiner 1978, 146–9. See further also Gołab 1982 and Birnbaum & Merrill 1985, 82, Birnbaum 1987a, 339. The question of whether Constantine with Serbs and Croats had in mind Slavic ethnic groups, as would seem likely, or referred to as yet non-Slavic leadership strata, in charge with Slavs who obviously outnumbered them (similarly to the Bulgars controlling the Slavs of the lower Danube

region), has not been settled, though there can be little doubt that fairly soon these originally unequivocally non-Slavic ethnonyms came to refer to Slavs; cf. also above, the reference to the undoubtedly Slavic Serbian/Sorbianians discussed by Herrmann. At any rate, while there is certainly no reason to distinguish between Slavic-speaking Bulgarians and Macedonians when we are dealing with the early Middle Ages (or, for that matter, even considerably later, namely up to the mid-18th century; cf. Fine 1983, 37 and 105; Birnbaum 1987b, 378–9, 383, 393–4), there is every reason to assume the existence of two distinct ethnic entities, referred to as Serbs and Croats, respectively, for the earliest (and throughout the medieval) period of the history of these two Slavic peoples once they had consolidated as distinct political entities, their essentially – so far – shared common language notwithstanding.

This broad, general statement is in need of two qualifications, however. On concerns the ancestors of today's speakers of the Serbo-Croatian (historically, Serbian) Torlak dialects, also known as Prizren-Timok dialects (the latter term referring to their southern- and northernmost extension); the other one applies to the Serbo-Croatian (historically, Croatian) dialect justification for the proper classification of these regional varieties of Serbo-Croatian. For as early as the mid-1950s (Ivić: 1956, 121) he pointed out that the main isoglosses which link the Prizren-Timok dialects with Macedo-Bulgarian are chronologically secondary in relation to those which mark their closeness with Serbo-Croatian and notably its Štokavian dialect group. Though highly significant for a typological classification of Torlak, the latter isoglosses are of no bearing on the origin of the dialects in question. Salient in structural-typological terms, the Balkanisms of Torlak are outnumbered by the far more numerous features that this dialect group shares with the rest of Serbo-Croatian, which also reflects its origin and earliest evolution. When speaking of the ancient Serbs (or their forebears) we should, consequently, also include here the ancestors of the speakers of Torlak.

The situation appears to be the opposite, as it were, when it comes to the origin of the Kajkavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian, notwithstanding the fact that the capital of Croatia, Zagreb, is in Kajkavian-speaking territory. As I have indicated previously (Birnbaum 1980, 167–8), I share the opinion of those linguists who, contrary to Belić or, for that matter, I. Popović, believe that Kajkavian and Slovenian go back to a common dialectal base. This was, or is, the view of such Slavists as van Wijk, A. Margulíés, F. Ramovš, Sławski, and Ivić. As is well known, Slovenian is among those Slavic languages whose territory shrunk considerably in early historical times. The Late Common Slavic dialect group that, with some qualification, we may call Proto-Sloarea of Kajkavian and the original settlers in this linguistically fairly compact territory.

As for the former, let me summarize here what I have earlier stated on that score (Birnbaum 1980, 168–70). While Bulgarian linguists of an older generation were inclined to consider the transitional Torlak dialects regional varieties of Bulgarian and also such unbiased an expert in South Slavic dialectology as the Polish Slavist F. Sławski (1962, 115) could state that “from

a contemporary point of view these are already dialects of the Bulgarian-Macedonian type, marked by virtually all the Balkanisms characteristic of the Bulgarian-Macedonian group," it is now the consensus of most scholars in the field that as far as their origin and earliest evolution is concerned, these were Serbian dialects. Thus, N. van Wijk (1956, 104), discussing the transitional status of Torlak between Serbian and Bulgarian (Macedonian not yet having been recognized as an independent language), stated in a lecture originally delivered at the Sorbonne as early as the 1930s: "Cette répartition des particularités linguistiques des deux langues n'admet qu'une seule conclusion, à savoir: que le dialecte de transition était serbe à l'origine, mais que dans la suite, il a traversé avec le bulgare une période d'évolution commune." The two Yugoslav linguists A. Belić and M. Rešetar had counted Torlak among the Serbo-Croatian dialects (though Belić, contrary to Rešetar, would not acknowledge its autonomous status, separate from Štokavian); but it was only P. Ivić who, as far as the status of Torlak goes, shifted from Belić's to Rešetar's point of view (Ivić 1958, 88–9) and provided a modern theoretical venian, or more accurately perhaps, Early Alpine Slavic, once extended across today's Slovenia, the Kajkavian portion of Serbo-Croatian, western (or at any rate southwestern) Hungary, i. e. Transdanubia up to Lake Balaton if not beyond, and deep into present-day Austria, viz., Carinthia, Styria, and parts of the provinces of Lower and Upper Austria as well as Salzburg/Salzkammergut, Tyrol, and Burgenland (the Croatian population of the latter being immigrants of a more recent date); in addition Alpine Slavs penetrated also into northeastern Italy (Friuli; cf. Katičić 1980, and further Birnbaum 1977). Most of the major characteristics that today separate Kajkavian from Slovenian – eleven by Ivić's count – can be traced to the period of the 10th through the 15th centuries while some of the shared features of Slovenian and Kajkavian may well antedate the arrival of the ancestors of the speakers of those languages and dialects in their present-day sites. Having previously noted that the region of Croatia bordering on Slovenia is among the most differentiated dialect areas of the Serbo-Croatian linguistic territory, cut across as it is by the historically most important bundle of isoglosses in the Slavic southwest, a bundle marking the sharp boundary between Kajkavian-Slovenian and Čakavian-Štokavian, respectively, virtually lacking in any transitional dialects (Ivić 1961, 21), Ivić subsequently had this to say on the subject: "Since there was no specific political link between Slovenia and the Kajkavian area in northern Croatia before the 16th century, and since the geographic conditions in the present habitat of Slovenians and Kajkavians did not favor their common linguistic development distinct from that of their eastern and southern neighbors, it seems likely that their common linguistic features stem from the propinquity of their ancestors in the period preceding their settlement in what is now Yugoslavia" (Ivić 1972, 71). Needless to say, while Kajkavian can thus be considered a secondarily Croatized form of the language once shared with the subsequent speakers of Slovenian, or, as Ramovš once put it, a language "wrestled by Serbo-Croatian from Slovenian," there is no doubt, of course, that Kajkavian today is, and, as a matter of fact, for the last five hundred years or so has been, part of the Croatian speech community into which it has

been firmly integrated; Kajkavian does therefore not merely represent a deviant dialect group of Slovenian (cf. Ivić 1971, 36–7).

Summing up this part of our discussion, we can therefore posit four major subgroups of the Slavs settling south of the Danube, Sava, and Drava, as well as in the Eastern Alps and their foothills, once we abstract from the various smaller Slavic tribes and clans that originally invaded and subsequently penetrated deep into the Balkans and the East Alpine-Adriatic region, and who partly later may have remigrated to the north. They were: the Bulgarians, once they had absorbed and fully assimilated the non-Slavic Turkic Bulgars, and including also the forebears of today's Slavic-speaking Macedonians of southernmost Yugoslavia; the Serbs and the Croats, both early on having assimilated any possible non-Slavic ethnic elements which originally may have dominated them (as echoed in their ethnonyms), and including the various Slavic groups in the area mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus; cf. above; and the Slovenes, including the ancestors of the subsequent speakers of the Kajkavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian, and once spread over territories extending to Lake Balaton, today's central Austria and Italian Friuli. However, it should also be kept in mind that, although representing several separate ethnic groups (and originally even many more tribal divisions and clan-like clusters), all of these various Slavs must still have spoken a language which in the second half of the first millennium of our era was only minimally differentiated. For, as clearly attested by the effective supra-ethnic (but not yet truly supra-national) function of Old Church Slavonic, devised and introduced in the second half of the 9th century and by and large only insignificantly adapted to regional needs and speech habits, this largely uniform language was understood throughout not only the Slavic south but indeed all the Slavic-settled lands.

However, as indicated elsewhere (Birnbäum 1984/85, 80–1), it is possible that present-day Serbo-Croatian may be the result of a secondary process of language and dialect mixing or convergence, which could have taken place in the Balkans only after the Southern Slavs had settled there. Thus, the forebears of that portion of the Serbs that had originally migrated south could have split off from the Slavic ancestors of the Bulgarians, moving west- and southwestward into their historical heartlands (of Raška and Zeta/Duklja); and the Proto-Croats could have similarly separated from the Proto-Slovenes and, on the one hand, advanced into Slavonia between Sava and Drava, and, on the other, pushed toward the Adriatic, occupying large parts of Dalmatia in the process. Even more likely, though, it would appear that the main thrust of the Slavic invasions across the Danube-Sava line, and, along with the Avars, already earlier across the Drava and into East Alpine regions, proceeded along three – and not only two – main routes once they had swelled to more than a mere trickle of isolated settlers or occasional raiders. Therefore, one would have been the Black Sea – lower Danube track, circumventing the Carpathians in the east (and south) and migrating through and settling in the Dacian plains. Another one would have led through passes and valleys of the Western Carpathians and Eastern Alps, or adjacent to them, and could be viewed as geographically more restricted, essentially not reaching beyond the territories now and in the recorded past

occupied by Slovenes and Kajkavian Croats or their immediate ancestors. These two routes (with the western one further extended) are those traditionally assumed; the unresolved issue, given this hypothesis, primarily amounts to the question of whether the east vs. west track division closely coincides with the established subgrouping of the South Slavic languages into a (south) eastern and a (north)western branch, i. e., Macedo-Bulgarian vs. Sloveno-Serbo-Croatian. For the gradual emergence of a largely unified Serbo-Croatian as the shared language of two peoples – the Serbs and the Croats (in which context we can disregard subsequent further national identifications as Bosnians/Muslims and Montenegrins) – we could thus hypothesize a secondary linguistic merger shortly before recorded and during early historical times, with part of the speakers of Serbo-Croatian (viz., the Proto-Serbs) arriving from the east and northeast after having separated from the Slavs of the lower Danube valley (and northern Greece, as well as, possibly, districts in Albania), i. e., the forebears of the Slavic-speaking Bulgarians. Alternatively, and more likely perhaps, an additional, third main route could conceivably have followed the central course of the Danube and the Tisza Rivers, through the Pannonian plain and leading straight into what are now the Jekavian-Štokavian and Čakavian-speaking regions of Yugoslavia. These, therefore, would be the ancestors of the present-day Croats, while the predecessors of the present-day Serbs (speaking Ekavian-Štokavian) would have come from the east after having separated from the early Bulgarians. Here, by way of qualification, it should be pointed out, though, that when referring to speakers of Ekavian and Jekavian Štokavian, as well as, for that matter, to the Čakavian, Kajkavian, and Torlak dialect groups, we are using, somewhat anachronistically, terms whose present-day and relatively recent underlying reality does not evoke any doubts, but which, when projected into a more distant, preliterate past, can serve at best as makeshift labels to designate certain ethnolinguistic entities whose salient peculiarities presumably were, in part at least, of a different kind than their most striking modern characteristics, that is to say, the three different forms of the interrogative pronoun 'what' (*što, ča, kaj*), the far-gone "Balkanization" of some Serbian dialects (Torlak), or the various reflexes of Common Slavic *ě* (*e, jelije, i*). For some further discussion, of the somewhat biased, but as regards the primary sources highly knowledgeable treatment in Mandić 1971, 31–54 ("Dolazak Hrvata i Srba na jug").

In conclusion, let us take a brief, yet closer look at the two wings – the southeastern and the northwestern – of the migratory moves of the prehistoric and early historic Slavs invading and at least temporarily settling in the Southern Balkans (notably Greece) and the Eastern Alps, respectively.

As for the Slavic advances into Greece, and the onomastic evidence of a Slavic presence on Greek soil previously studied thoroughly by M. Vasmer (1941/70) and in more recent years critically reexamined particularly by Ph. Malingoudis (1981, 1983, 1987; of, also Birnbaum 1986b), it should be noted that I. Pătruț (1972) concluded, primarily on the strength of toponymic data, that the first phase of Slavic penetration, by him dated up to the 8th century, was, linguistically, still essentially Common Slavic. Only the second phase of Slavic influence and settlement, now limited largely (but not exclusively, of

the aforementioned Slavic tribes of the Milingoi and Ezeritai in the Peloponnese) to northern Greece – Macedonia, Thrace, and, to a lesser extent, Epirus and Thessaly – shows unequivocally Bulgarian linguistic characteristics. See further Fine 1983: 59–66. Concerning the symbiosis of Slavs and Greeks and the agricultural lifestyle of the Slavic settlers in Greece as reflected through language, see esp. Malingoudis 1987. On the Roman (Byzantine) defense line (*limes*) along the lower Danube and the advances of the Slavs into present-day Bulgaria and southeastern Yugoslavia, cf. also Velkov 1987.

Turning now to the other end of the advancing Slavs in Southeastern Europe, it may be noted that O. Kronsteiner (1975) concluded on the basis of Slavic anthroponymic data in the East Alpine region that the term “Alpine Slavic”, designating a Late Common Slavic dialect or dialect group, is applicable to the period up to the 11th century, but not later. After that, the Slavic evidence also from Carinthia and Styria (south of the ridge of the Alps) exhibits unambiguously Slovenian features. While Alpine Slavic displays phonological, morphological, and onomastic peculiarities unique to that area, markedly South Slavic characteristics cannot be found in the onomastic material north of the Alpine ridge. By the same token, characteristics otherwise encountered in West Slavic (historically, Moravian) did occasionally reach south of that line and their traces can thus be found throughout today’s central and eastern Austria, that is, not only in Upper and Lower Austria but also in Carinthia, Styria, and East Tyrol. Some early recorded names of Carinthian nobles are further proof of the linguistic ties once existing between the Alpine Slavic region and the Slavic west, notably Moravia. The Slavic area of the Eastern Alps was thus linguistically somewhat heterogeneous, with West Slavic elements playing a larger role than previously thought. Superseding his earlier assumption of some minor Old Croatian splinter groups in the Eastern Alps, Kronsteiner has subsequently (1978) identified the earliest attestation of Croats with the Avar military echelon among the Alpine Slavs. On Avar-Slavic relations, and the partly coterritorial symbiosis of the two peoples, see also Pohl 1987; Comşa 1987; Ciglencčki 1987; and further Fine 1983: esp. 29–33 and 41–9. On the Southern Slavs – *Carantani* – and the Avars in subsequent Austrian territory, see, moreover, Hantsch 1959, 29 and, particularly, Wolfram 1987, 341–57.

To answer the question posed in the title of this paper, we may now state that there was indeed a Slavic landtaking of the Balkans (and at least temporarily also of parts of the East Alpine region). But it occurred gradually, with increasing force and in ever larger numbers; yet, by around 800 A. D., it was slowed down and, in part, rolled back as a result of a large-scale Slavic withdrawal from Greece (and Albania) and a certain thinning-out and possible remigration of Balkan Slavic groups toward northern territories, in central and Eastern Europe, the extent of which, in terms of even approximate numbers of people involved, is not easy to estimate. As far as the routes of the Slavic southward moves from north of the Carpathians and, by a somewhat later date, from the Carpathian-Danubian basin is concerned, it seems most likely that there were in fact three major tracks – an eastern one, into and through Moldavia and Wallachia, a western one,

through the Moravian Gate west of the Carpathians and along the foothills and valleys of the Eastern Alps, and a third, central one, through the Pannonian plain along the Danube and Tisza Rivers and beyond.

Postscript: Only after this paper was completed did I have an opportunity to familiarize myself with the essay by O. Pritsak, "The Slavs and the Avars," Spoleto, 1983, which not only forms the basis for H. G. Lunt's relevant hypothesis but also provides considerable detail. In more than one respect Pritsak's views coincide with some of the ideas set forth in the present paper, while at the same time providing a reasonable framework for H. Kunstmann's at first blush stunning conception.

References

- Birnbaum, H. 1965. "Balkanslavisch und Südslavisch. Zur Reichweite der Balkanismen im südslavischen Sprachraum," *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie* 3, 12-63.
- 1968. "Slavjanske jazyki na Balkanax i ponjatje tak nazyvaemyx jazykovyx sojuzov," *Glossa* 2, 70-92
- 1975. "Typology, Genealogy, and Linguistic Universals," *Linguistics* 144, 5-26.
- 1977. "Der österreichische Jasomirgott und die frühe Verbreitung der Alpen-slaven (Urslovenen)," *Anzeiger für slavische Philologie* 9, 33-48.
- 1980. "Language, Ethnicity, and Nationalism: On the Linguistic Foundations of a Unified Yugoslavia," in: *The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918*, D. Djorjević, ed., Santa Barbara-Oxford, 157-82.
- 1981. Review of G. R. Solta, *Einführung in die Balkanlinguistik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Substrats und des Balkanlateinischen*, *Studies in Language* 5, 399-406.
- 1983. "Tiefen - und Oberflächenstrukturen balkanlinguistischer Erscheinungen," in *Ziele und Wege der Balkanlinguistik*, N. Reiter, ed., Berlin-Wiesbaden, 40-58.
- 1984/85. "A Typological View of Serbo-Croatian: Some Preliminary Considerations," *Zbornik Matice srpske za filologiju i lingvistiku* 27/28 (Festschrift M. and P. Ivić), 77-84.
- 1986a. "Weitere Überlegungen zur Frage nach der Urheimat der Slaven," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 46, 19-45.
- 1986b. "Noch einmal zu den slavischen Milingen auf der Peloponnes," in: *Festschrift für H. Bräuer zum 65. Geburtstag...*, R. Olesch and H. Rothe, eds., Cologne-Vienna, 15-26.
- 1987a. *Praslavjanskij jazyk. Dostiženija i problemy v ego rekonstrukcii*, V. A. Dybo and V. K. Žuravlev, trans. and ed., Moscow.
- 1987b. "On the Genealogical and Typological Classification of Old Church Slavonic and its Textual Evidence," *Die Welt der Slaven* 32, 362-407.
- forthcoming. "Recent Theories Concerning the Location of the Slavic Protohome (With Some Observations on the Origin of the Indo-Europeans)," to appear in the Proceedings of the International Colloquium "Aux origines des cultures slaves," Bad Homburg, 14-18 December, 1987.
- Birnbaum, H. And P. T. Merrill. 1985. *Recent Advances in the Reconstruction of Common Slavic (1971-1982)*, Columbus, Ohio.
- Ciglencečki, S. 1987. "Das Weiterleben der Spätantike bis zum Auftauchen der Slaven in Slowenien," in: *Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, B. Hänsel, ed., Munich-Berlin, 265-86.
- Comşa, M. 1987. "Slaven und Awaren auf rumänischem Boden, ihre Beziehungen zu der bodenständigen romanischen und späteren frühromänischen Bevölkerung," in: *Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, B. Hänsel, ed., Munich-Berlin, 219-30.
- Fine, J. V. A., Jr. 1983. *The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Sixth to the Late Twelfth Century*. Ann Arbor.
- Gasparov, B. M. 1987. "The Ideological Principles of Prague School Phonology," in: *Language, Poetry and Poetics. The Generation of the 1890s: Jakobson, Trubetzkoy, Majakovskij*, K.

- Pomorska *et al*, eds., Berlin-New York-Amsterdam, 49-78.
- Gołąb, Z. 1982. "About the Connection Between Kinship Terms and Some Ethnica in Slavic (The Case of **Strbi and Slovène*)," *International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics* 25/26 (Festschrift E. Stankiewicz), 165-71.
- Hantsch, H. 1959. *Die Geschichte Österreichs*, Vol. I, 4th rev. ed., Graz-Vienna-Cologne.
- Herrmann, J. 1985. "Einwanderung und Herkunft der Stammesgruppen," in: *Die Slawen in Deutschland. Geschichte und Kultur der slawischen Stämme westlich von Oder und Neisse vom 6. bis 12. Jahrhundert. Ein Handbuch*. Neubearbeitung, J. Hermann, ed., Berlin, 21-32.
- Ivić, P. 1956. *Dijalektologija srpskohrvatskog jezika. Uvod i štokavsko narečje*, Novi Sad.
- 1958. *Die serbokroatischen Dialekte, ihre Struktur und Entwicklung*, Vol. I.: *Allgemeines und die štokavische Dialektgruppe*, The Hague.
- 1961. "Prilozi poznavanju dijalekatske slike zapadne Hrvatske" (with English summary), in: *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, Vol. VI, 191-212.
- 1971. *Srpski narod i njegov jezik*, Belgrade.
- 1972. "Balkan Slavic Migrations in the Light of South Slavic Dialectology," in: *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change*, H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis, Jr., eds., The Hague-Paris, 55-86.
- 1981. "Jezik i njegov razvoj do druge polovine XII veka," in: *Istorija srpskog naroda*, Vol. I: *Od najstarijih vremena do Maričke bitke (1371)*, S. Ćirković, ed., Belgrade, 125-40.
- Katičić, R. 1980. "Slavica Foroiuliensia", *Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch* 26, 28-32.
- Kovačević, J. 1981. "Doselenje Slovena na Balkansko poluostrvo," in *Istorija srpskog naroda*, Vol. I: *Od najstarijih vremena do Maričke bitke (1371)*, S. Ćirković, ed., Belgrade, 109-24.
- Kronsteiner, O. 1975. *Die alpenlawischen Personennamen*, Vienna.
- 1978. "Gab es unter den Alpenlawen eine kroatische ethnische Gruppe?," *Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch* 24, 137-57.
- Kernstmann, H. 1987. *Die Besiedlung Nord- und Mitteleuropas mit Balkanlawen*, Munich (*Slavistische Beiträge* 217)
- Lunt, H. G. 1985. "Slavs, Common Slavic, and Old Church Slavonic," in: *Litterae Slavicae Medii Aevii* (Festschrift F. V. Mareš), J. Reinhart, ed., Munich, 185-204.
- Malingoudis, Ph. 1981. *Studien zu den slavischen Ortsnamen Griechenlands*, Vol. I: *Slavische Flurnamen aus der messenischen Mani*, Wiesbaden.
- 1983. "Toponymy and History. Observations Concerning the Slavonic Toponymy of the Peloponnese," *Cyrrilomethodianum* 7, 99-111.
- 1987. "Frühe slawische Elemente im Namengut Griechenlands," in: *Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, B. Hänsel, ed., Munich-Berlin, 53-68.
- Mandić, O. D. 1971. *Hrvati i Srbi, dva stara različita naroda*, Munich-Barcelona.
- Moravcsik, Gy. and R. J. H. Jenkins, eds. and trans. 1967. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, Greek Text Edited by Gy. Moravcsik, English Translation by R. J. H. Jenkins, New rev. ed., Washington, D. C.
- Novák, L'. 1939/40. "Slovenské a podkarpatoruské nárečia vo svetle európskej fonetickej geografie. Synchronické a diachronické poznámky k porovnávacej jazykovede stredoeurópskej," *Linguistica Slovaca* 1/2, 85-105.
- 1984. "Vznik Slovanov a ich jazyka (Základy Etnogenézy Slovanov)," *Slavica Slovaca* 19, 219-32.
- Pätrut, I. 1972. "Pierwsze kontakty językowe słowiańsko-romańsko-greckie a okres trwania języka prasłowiańskiego," *Rocznik slawistyczny* 33, 7-19.
- Pohl, W. 1937. "Das awarische Khaganat und die anderen Gentes im Karpatenbecken (6.-8. Jh.)," in: *Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, B. Hänsel, ed., Munich-Berlin 41-52.
- Ślawski, F. 1982. *Zarys dialektologii języków południowosłowiańskich (z wyborem tekstów gwarowych)*, Warsaw.
- Trubačev, O. N. 1982/85. "Jazykoznanie i étnogenez slavjan. Drevnie slavjane po dannym étimologii i onomastiki," *Voprosy jazykoznanija* 1982: 4, 10-26; 5, 3-17. English version:

- "Linguistics and Ethnogenesis of the Slavs: The Ancient Slavs as Evidenced by Etymology and Onomastics." *The Journal of Indo-European Studies* 13: 1-2, 203-56.
- Udolph, J. forthcoming. "Kamen die Slaven aus Pannonien?" to appear in the Festschrift for W. Hensel.
- Vasmer, M. 1941/70. *Die Slaven in Griechenland*, Berlin/Leipzig.
- Velkov, M. 1987. "Der Donaulimes in Bulgarien und das Vordringen der Slawen," in: *Die Völker Südosteuropas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, B. Hänsel, ed., Munich-Berlin, 141-69.
- Wijk, N. van 1956. *Les Langues slaves: De l'unité à la pluralité (Serie de leçons faites à la Sorbonne)*, 2nd corr. ed., The Hague.
- Wolfram, H. 1987. *Die Geburt Mitteleuropas. Geschichte Österreichs vor seine Entstehung, 378-907*, Vienna.

DA LI JE BILO SLOVENSKOG ZAUZIMANJA ZEMLJE (LANDTAKING) NA BALKANU, I AKO JESTE, KOJIM PUTEVIMA JE PROSLEDILO?

REZIME

Uzimajući u obzir istorijske podatke, svedočanstva o rano-utvrđenim toponima na nekadašnjoj teritoriji Vizantije, današnje Bugarske i Jugoslavije (južno od linije Sava-Dunav); zatim delimično novo-protumačene slovenske onomastične podatke (toponomija i antroponimija) današnje Grčke, Albanije, severo-istočne Italije (Friuli), kao i dobrog dela Austrije; skorašnja gledišta u pogledu pretpostavljene prapostojbine Slovena i njihovih najranijih kretanja izvan tog ograničenog područja; potom najranije društvene strukture i brojnost slovenskih etničkih grupacija, kao i ulogu Avara i proto-Bugara – sve to dozvoljava davanje potvrdnog odgovora na gore-postavljeno pitanje, i ako uz izvesna ograničenja.

Prvobitni upadi Slovena u šestom veku n.e. po svoj prilici nisu bili ni masovni ni opsežni. Pravo zauzimanje zemlje (landtaking), i ako ne kompaktne i povezane teritorije, može se pretpostaviti samo za sedmi ili osmi vek n.e. Oko 800. godine slovensko prodiranje na Balkan bilo je znatno usporeno, a delimično čak i suzbijeno, kao rezultat slovenskog povlačenja iz današnje Grčke (izuzev severne Grčke), Albanije, i Austrije (sem južne Austrije), i izvesne proredjenosti stanovništva kao i moguće ponovne migracije Slovena prema severu (u centralnu i istočnu Evropu).

Prodiranje Slovena na jug sa severa Karpata, i kasnije sa Karpata i Podunavlja, verovatno je sledilo tri glavna puta: istočni put, preko Moldavije i Vlaške (dopirući do najranijih naselja slovenskih Bugara i Srba); zapadni put, preko moravske kapije u doline i na padine istočnih Alpa i susednih pokrajina istočno od toga (naseljenih od strane proto-Slovenaca, uključujući i pretke kajkavskog govornog kolektiva); centralni put, preko Panonske nizije, duž Dunava i Tise, na teritorije kasnije naseljenim Hrvatima.

MIGRATIONS OF THE SERBS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The migratory movements of the South Slavs into the Balkan Peninsula, completed during the first decades of the seventh century, has fundamentally changed the ethnic structure of that part of Europe. The Byzantine Empire, as far as the Balkan Peninsula is concerned, was reduced to Constantinople and its immediate surroundings, to Thessaloniki, and to a few fortified towns along the Black Sea, the Aegean, Ionic and Adriatic coasts, where the Greeks and the scattered Romanized old-Balkan population had taken refuge. While the Greek and Romanic peoples from coastal towns rather quickly made contact with the capital city, owing to their dominance on the sea, the oncoming Slavs remained dispersed over wide areas on the Peninsula, organized into narrow territorial frameworks known as "sclaviniae" to Byzantine historians and chroniclers.

Among the masses of settled Slavs there is mention of Serbs, who populated the central areas of the Balkans, along the Adriatic massif. They bordered with Neretlians, Zahumljans, Travunians and Docleans in the hinterland of the Adriatic Sea – the peoples treated by Byzantine authors as Serbs. Larger or smaller groups were found in the region of Lika, then in the hinterland of Thessaloniki, as well as in Central Greece, to the north of Olympus, while their center was Srbica. Some of these Serbs were moved by the Byzantines by the middle of the seventh century into Asia Minor, more precisely to the area of Vitinia, where, in the town of Gordoservon, in 680–681, a Serbian tribal name was first mentioned.

The growing power of Byzantium at the end of the seventh century, set limit to further Slavic expansion, while the creation of Thracian and Hellenic themas pushed them northward. The Bulgarian invasion, which started in 680, caused new migratory movements in the eastern parts of the Balkans. By the second half of the eighth century, the sclaviniae were replaced by two powerful states – Byzantium and Bulgaria. The latter, in its territorial expansion at the beginning of the ninth century, subjugated Slavic tribes to present-day Macedonia, and to the Morava and Danube rivers, and further more, to the areas between the Adriatic Sea and the Sava river northward, and the Ibar river eastward to Ras, the town bordering Bulgaria, both of which were populated by Serbs, according to Byzantine historians. The frequent Bulgarian incursions into the Serbian mainland urged migrations of the Serbian people, first to Bulgaria, Croatia and other adjacent countries, whereas in the centuries to follow, they were to inundate the whole of South-East Europe and Asia Minor.

Byzantine reoccupation of the Balkan Peninsula after the fall of Samuel's Empire at the beginning of the eleventh century brought, at least seemingly, some appeasement. The Zahumlie, Duklia and Rashka areas became independent principalities in a vassal relationship with Byzantium.

After the year 1020, Byzantium dedicated all its attention to the restoration of those towns which began to adopt, as centers of military and political power, a more Greek character, where the interior of the Peninsula was concerned, and a Romanic character for those lying on the Adriatic coast. This was all in accordance with the general principles of its policy and urban character, where Byzantine civilization was concerned.

The liberation and union of the Serbian mainlands, with its center in Duklia, in the second half of the eleventh century, was comparatively short-lived. The weakened Duklia was replaced by Rashka in the first half of the twelfth century, and by the end of the century, under the rule of Stephan Nemanja, it succeeded in liberating and uniting not only the Serbian mainlands, but also the Metochia-Prizren area with Kosovo, part of the Morava river basin, Pilot in the Drim valley and the Upper and Lower Polog regions in the Vardar river Valley. Owing to the conquests during the reigns of kings Dragutin, Milutin, Stephen of Dechani and Emperor Dushan, the Serbian state extended over Macedonia, Albania, northern Greece, all the way down to Chrysopolis, with the exception of Thessaloniki and central Greece with Epirus and Thessaly.

With the enlargement of the Serbian state, the Serbian tribal name gradually expanded to almost all Slavic areas which were formerly within Bulgaria or Byzantium. Preserved authentic sources contain valuable data on deserted estates of Greek feudal lords in newly conquered areas, but also on regions devastated by war which were populated by Serbs who came from the central and western parts of the Serbian State. Thus Grgur Golubović, who built a monastery dedicated to the Mother of God of Zahumlie, by the Ohrid Lake in 1361, belonged to the third generation of Serbian immigrants from Herzegovina. On an inscription from 1379 in the vicinity of Ohrid, there is mention of Ostoja Rajković, a relative to Marko Kraljević (Marko the Prince), whose ancestors were of the Ugarčići tribe near Nevesinje town. The migrations of Serbs into newly conquered territories of the Serbian State, although tacit and hardly noticeable in authentic materials, had wider proportions than presumed. This is attested by the fact that Jovan Kantakuzen found in Ber (Veria), in 1350, some thirty Serbian feudal lords, women and children, as well as 1500 horsemen which obviously belonged to Serbian settlers from lower social strata.

The highlanders' settlement in the fertile plains of the central and southern areas of the Balkan Peninsula acquired a more Serbian character once adjoined to the Serbian State, and led a follow-up of other migrations of the Serbian population resulting from havoc wrought by war, famine, plague, cases of vendetta or difficult living conditions among lower social layers. The Serbian people paid dearly for their participation in the Hungarian-Byzantine wars during the first decades of the twelfth century. The Byzantine army mercilessly sacked habitats, and a great many prisoners were deported at the express order of Jovan II Komnin, to Asia Minor, in the area of Nikomedia.

The Serbian liberation struggle from Byzantine power continued through the second half of the twelfth century and caused devastation and large migrations. After one military expedition, Emperor Manoylo Komnen took thousands of slaves from Serbia and deported them to the Serdika

region. Thus Nikita Akominat describes the ravaged Serbia as “a desert of deserts” that remained “only a lair for winds”.

A lot of information concerning the displacement of the Serbian people dates from the period of the Turkish conquests of the Balkan Peninsula. After the defeat at the Maritza river near Tchernomen in 1371, the Turks – as noted by the monk Isaije – slaughtered part of the Serbs who survived the battle and took the rest as slaves. Incursions of the Turkish army into Serbia became more frequent and merciless after the defeat at Kosovo field in 1389. A large number of people from the region of Aleksinac then fled to the interior of the country, leaving void fertile plains of the Morava valley to Sultan Musa, whose troops pillaged the region in 1413. The attack of Sultan Murat II on Serbia gave cause for a vast mass of people to flee the Morava valley in all directions. Some escaped to Hungary, to the north, while others took to the Adriatic Sea and even reached the islands.

The advances of the Serbs to south Hungary were so intensive that – according to a Franciscan source from 1437 – most of the population in the Srem region were Serbs. On all the oldest Hungarian maps Srem is named Raszia. Emigrants from Serbia also took refuge in south Banat and the Batchka regions. According to a document dating from 1433, Serbs made up the majority of the population in the towns of Kovilje, Kovin, and Hram, and before that time, in Bela Crkva. When the Turks conquered Boratch in Gruza in 1438, an intensive migration of Serbs moved to south Hungary, so that this region has become more and more Serbian since the middle of the fifteenth century. After the Turkish army invaded the town of Kovin the Hungarian king resettled the Serbian inhabitants to the island of Czepel, near Budapest, while some moved even further – to Erdelj, Poland and even Russia. The greatest migrations to south Hungary took place after the fall of the Serbian Principality in 1459 (Serbian term *despotovina*) when masses fled in all directions from Turkish slaughtering.

Ruthless displacement of the Serbian population was done also by the Turks. An eyewitness to the times of the Turkish offensive on Serbia in 1438 and 1439 noted that sixty thousand people were forcibly transported out of Serbia to the East. The deportation of Serbs to slavery was most aggressive in 1439 and 1444. In the course of the Turkish army invasion of Serbia in 1454, there was an attack full of unseen atrocities, some fifty thousand people were moved and settled in the surroundings of Constantinople, by order of Mehmed the Second. A Serbian chronicler recorded that, at the time, those who fled from the Turkish army to the region of Homolje, suffered a great deal, while even harder afflictions were endured after the fall of Novo Brdo in 1455, since many Serbs were slain and others forcibly settled in Anatolia and Persia.

Those who were not taken prisoners, or who escaped the fate of being sold and resold as slaves, fled to the north, to Hungary, or to the west, towards the seashore. A group of Serbian refugees reached the town of Jajce and the region of north-eastern Bosnia, but the majority sought their salvation by the sea, where their destination was primarily the area of Dubrovnik. Some even crossed over to Italy by boats. A more intensive flight to Italy began after the Grbalj rebellion was crushed in 1452, and continued

during the years of famine (1454 and 1455), when many "poor people from Sclavinia", forbidden to settle down in Dubrovnik, occupied the caves at the seaside, awaiting the opportunity to move to Italy. Another wave of refugees was tossed to the Adriatic coast after the fall of Serbia in 1459. The Senate of Dubrovnik continued, in order to get rid of the unwanted guests, to help the transportation of "refugees from Turkey" to Italy. The Serbs, who were called "Slavs" in Italy, after their homeland "Sclavinia", were settled in Apulia, Marca and Venice.

Great population movements were also due to famine and plague. The monk Theodosius describes rather vividly the phenomenon of famine in Serbia during the struggle of Nemanja's sons over the throne, which caused many to flee the country and »go abroad«. Monk Isaiye recorded that after the defeat of the Serbian army at the Maritza river in 1371, extreme hunger destroyed the populace, thus turning this part of the Serbian state into a desert. Serbian chroniclers mention severe famine compelling people to flee their century-old homesteads in search for food. Thus, during the great famine of 1454 and 1455, many "poor people from Sclavinia" sought out refuge in Dubrovnik, but in vain. Instead, they were left to dwell in caves at the seashore and feed on acorns, grass and roots.

Other intensive migrations were due to plagues which devastated entire regions. When the Serbian *Despotovina* fell for the first time in 1439, the plague raged through the entire region of the Rudnik mountain. The plague phenomenon was recorded by Serbian chroniclers when they speak of the whole country being affected as far back as 1437 and 1456. During the siege of Belgrade, the plague wiped out its most famous defenders Janko Hunyadi and John Castran. When Mehmed II abandoned the siege of Smederevo, in 1454, the plague spread throughout the whole country, urging many to flee Serbia and run for the Adriatic coast and towns. The phenomenon of deserted villages ("*selišta*") which were restored at times, are indirect evidence of these migrations wrought by war devastation, famine, and plague.

A different kind of internal migration in medieval Serbia, except the regular cattle-breeders' seasonal migration, was the flight of dependent peasants from the estates of their lords. This phenomenon was witnessed by Nemanja's charter, given to the monastery of Hilandar, requesting the compulsory return of all who escaped from the monasterial estates. The fugitives most often took to the Serbian seashore towns of Budva and Kotor, and later on Dubrovnik, which did not observe these regulations and gladly received the settlers. The statute of the town of Budva gave protection to everyone, even those who served the ruler or high feudal lords, and the town of Kotor welcomed all who were willing to pay municipal expenses.

After ceding the town of Ston to Dubrovnik in 1333, the Dubrovnik government assumed the duty of expelling every single Serb who resided on

the Peliyeshac Peninsula. An epistle of a Dubrovnik Franciscan gives evidence to show that Dubrovnik did not adhere to this obligation since it permitted continual immigration to the schismatics' (i.e. Serbs) town, and then undertook to convert its inhabitants to Catholicism. The non-adherence to the accepted treaty instigated Emperor Dushan and Emperor Urosh in 1349 and 1357 respectively, to make a request to Dubrovnik to honor the earlier treaty which restrained the settling of Serbian fugitives on Dubrovnik territory. The phenomenon of fleeing the feudal estates was wide-spread, evidence for it can be found in the amendments to Dushan's Code, where both Church and feudal lords were prohibited to receive settlers in towns and markets. The penalties were severe. However, the interest of the Church and feudal lords to populate their deserted estates with refugees from different parts of the Serbian State prevented consequent compliance to the proviso.

The existing authentic sources frequently mention feudal lords from Bosnia and Serbia as newcomers to the Dubrovnik Republic, but there were settlers from lower social strata as well. When Dubrovnik gained the region of Konavlye in 1430, sixty Vlach families from Biyelitza in Montenegro settled therein, yet these settlers mention other Vlachs from the Neretva river, the town of Trebinje, the Drina valley, Rudnik mountain, the Morava valley and even the town of Prizren.

Valuable information concerning the Serbian population in the Dubrovnik hinterland (they are termed Vlachs in Dubrovnik) is provided by the Dubrovnik archives. Their migrations to the west and north-west of the Peninsula, outside the borders of the Serbian State, were promoted, on the one hand, by the need for new grazing fields, and on the other, by trade in cattle and transportation of the merchandise they were engaged in. One direction of the Vlachs' migrations was towards Dalmatia, while the other was oriented towards the north and north-west, namely to Bosnia. There is mention of Vlachs in central Dalmatia whose origins are in Herzegovina, about 1322, while their presence in the town of Knin and around the Krbava region dates from 1345. One source from 1376 mentions Petar Martić as a duke of Knin and the Vlachs, whereas at the beginning of the fifteenth century the Voivode »of the Vlachs of the Hungarian King« in Croatia and Dalmatia was Butko Branković. The names of Vlachs mentioned in these sources point to the fact that most of them came from Herzegovina, called Morlachia by the people of Dubrovnik and the Venetians of the fifteenth century. A document bearing witness to this states that in 1436 the town of Klis obtained, from the Croatian governor (i.e. *ban*) Ivan Frankopan, confirmation of the Serbs' rights, based on their "old laws".

The second migratory direction of the mobile Vlach communities led from the Hum and Drina valleys into the interior of Bosnia, and, although continual, hardly left a trace in preserved authentic sources. In addition to the Vlachs of the Bosnian governor, termed Vlachs of the king of Bosnia in original Dubrovnik fifteenth century documents, there are also the Vlachs of distinguished feudal lords – Pavle Radenović, Sandalj Hranić, Radoslav Pavlović, Ivaniš Pavlović and Duke (Herzeg) Stevan, mentioned as "Vlach Duke (Voyvode)" in a document issued by the Venetian State.

While a number of Vlachs – as original archival materials call the Serbs-immigrants – in Dalmatia and Croatia, were Catholicized and Croatized, the Vlachs in the medieval Bosnian State preserved their national identity and Orthodox tradition after being conquered by Stepan II Kotromanich and King Tvrtko, since a large part of the original Serbian lands, from the Drina valley up to Zahumlye (Zahumlje), was annexed to Bosnia. Besides the Hum region, termed Morlachia by fifteenth-century Dubrovnik and Venetian sources, the Vlachs, or Vlachs-schismatics, so called in Franciscan sources and papal provenence, were most frequently traced to western and north-western Bosnia around Glaz and Jajce. They had been settled since the second half of the fourteenth century, namely an entire century earlier than these regions had begun to be settled by Serbs fleeing from the Turkish invasion prior to and after the fall of the Serbian Princedom (Despotovina), in the year 1459.

The migrations of the Serbian people, before the Turkish invasion in the course of the second half of the fourteenth century, had two main streams. One came to an end by the middle of the fourteenth century in Greece, while following the expansion of the Serbian State to the south of the Peninsula, and the other gradually, but steadily, expanded beyond the borders of the Serbian State west-ward and north-ward of the Peninsula. This second wave spread out in a great arch over the Adriatic coast, namely Dalmatia, Bosnia, whole new streams of Serbian refugees followed intermittently in the fifteenth century.

First to bear the brunt of the Turkish invasion of the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the fourteenth century were the newly independent feudal regions in the south of the former Serbian State, whose ethnically heterogeneous population had been moving northwards to the strong Serbian Princedom (Despotovina), whereas at the beginning of the fifteenth century refugees from the Princedom inundated the southern and then central parts of Hungary, moving in larger or smaller groups further to the north – to Poland, and east – to Russia.

Migrations to the north were coupled with an unseen extermination of the Serbian people enslaved by Turkish conquerors, as well as with forced displacement of those who survived, resulting in the dispersiveness of the Serbs over Asia Minor and even Persia. In the decades preceding, and particularly following the fall of the Serbian Princedom in 1459, the Serbian people were already partly decimated and partly scattered all over South-East and East Europe, Asia Minor and Italy through forced migrations which continued throughout the centuries to come – an event without precedent in medieval Europe.

DUBROVNIK AS A POLE OF ATTRACTION AND A POINT OF TRANSITION FOR THE HINTERLAND POPULATION IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Fifteen years ago, in 1973, Professor Dušanka Dinić-Knežević, of the University of Novi Sad, published the article "Prilog proučavanju migracija našeg stanovništva u Italiju tokom XIII i XIV veka,"¹ in which she gave a pretty detailed and comprehensive survey of the migrations of the people from the Balkan hinterland to Dubrovnik and through Dubrovnik to Italy in that period. She concentrated first on the traffic of Bosnian slaves through Dubrovnik to Italy and described a whole series of cases where Bosnians, especially women, were bought by local and Italian merchants in Dubrovnik and shipped to Venice, Florence, Genoa, Apulia and other areas of Italy. However, Dinić-Knežević also pointed out that a number of slaves stayed in Dubrovnik as property of local people. Generally speaking, slave trade involving people from Bosnia was more intense in the late thirteenth than in the fourteenth century, and the fifteenth century introduced new actors on the scene.

Indeed, although Dinić-Knežević does not go into the fifteenth century, she does mention the famous decisions of the government of Dubrovnik from 1416 and 1418 and interprets them – together with many other scholars – as signifying the abolition of slavery in Dubrovnik. Nevertheless, she admits that slave trade continued and that new participants in this activity now appeared – Sicilian and Catalan slave traders. As I hope to have demonstrated in a recently published article², the decisions of 1416 and 1418 did not, in fact, constitute the abolition of slavery, but only a limitation of slave trade in Dubrovnik, a trade which continued a long time after those decisions.

Thus, one finds in the early fifteenth century a whole series of cases where persons from Dubrovnik and the surrounding areas were sold to Sicilians or Catalans: for example, in January 1412, two women were sold "in mercato Narenti... uni Ciziliano" for 20 ducats; in May of the same year another woman was grabbed by three men "in Desna territorii Narente" and sold to a Catalan, whose ship was waiting near the island of Lokrum; and in July of 1412 three men from Korčula sold in Dubrovnik a woman to an Italian from Apulia³. Men, as well as women, were sold into slavery: thus in 1417 a man from Messina and one from Korčula smuggled two men out of Dubrovnik with the intent of selling them to some Sicilians, whose ship was docked in Gruž⁴. Several attempts to abduct women and sell them to Sicilians and Catalans occurred in 1418⁵, and of particular interest is a case from February of that year, when a group of Catalans, who had arrived from Venice, attempted during the night to capture by force entire families of poor people, which lived outside the city walls, obviously near the sea⁶.

It seems that Korčula was a place of a certain importance in the slave trade. Apart from the already mentioned men from Korčula, active in the

slave market of Dubrovnik, we find in 1418 eight "teste" of slaves, which were to be sent from Dubrovnik to Korčula, but the operation was prevented by the authorities of Dubrovnik⁷. Without going into further details, suffice it to say that throughout this period there were numerous cases of sale or attempted sale to overseas merchants in Dubrovnik and in Neretva of people, especially women, from the nearby area and from the hinterland⁸. This situation continued, although with lesser frequency, throughout the fifteenth century. One of the more unusual cases occurred in 1481, when a man from Dubrovnik, Maroje Miljević, was "captivus in Hidronto, in manibus Turcorum"⁹.

It might be mentioned, incidentally, that, in addition to the traffic from east to west, there was also, in the fifteenth century, movement of people from west to east, more precisely from the coastal area and Dubrovnik itself towards the hinterland. For example, in May 1409, an "Obstoya Crechich . . . desviavit" a servant of the mason Ivan Radostić and "secum duxit eum in Sclauoniam"¹⁰. In 1417, two men "seduxerunt et vendiderunt" a woman and her son to the Turks¹¹. A sad case took place in 1430: a Turk from Kratovo had bought a Hungarian girl named Caterina and she was "abducta", escaped from him and came to Dubrovnik. This caused trouble for Dubrovnik's merchants in Ottoman territory, so the government of Dubrovnik decided first that she should be held by people "qui ipsam presentialiter habent," and the man who had "abducted" her from the Turk was arrested. Subsequently Caterina was handed over to the representatives of merchants who had been harassed by the Turks because of her, and it is not difficult to imagine what was her further fate¹².

Selling of Christians to the Ottomans continued and eventually reached a point, in 1466, where the government of Dubrovnik felt impelled to issue a decree which began with the following words:

*"Quia nonnulli flagitiosi et scelerati homines, obliiti quanti precii et quante excellentie sint homines quos Deus creavit ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, postposito timore divino et humano vendunt ex ipsis hominibus tamquam pecora, et quod peius est, eos vendunt Turcis et aliis infidelibus, ut simul corpora et anime perdantur"*¹³.

Such sales were strictly prohibited, but these prohibitions did not stop the sales. In 1470, for example, the servant of a Ragusan craftsman was "abductus in Seruam"¹⁴ and two years later a man was taken "ad partes Turcorum" by a Bosnian and sold there¹⁵.

Obviously, slaves, or to be more precise, the export of slaves from the Balkan hinterland to Dubrovnik and through that city to Italy and beyond was a significant component of the migrations of the Balkan populations, but certainly not the most important one. For one thing, the presence of those slaves in the West had very little, if any, impact on their new environment and, because of their position in society, they could not perpetuate themselves and their habits in places that they now inhabited. They were forever lost to their old country and condemned to disappear without trace in the new one.

From the point of view of migrations, another population group was much more important. Those were the servants, people of very humble social standing and of very low economic status, but still a significant notch above slaves. Most of the servants came to Dubrovnik from the nearby area, but there were also those who came from more distant regions of Bosnia and Serbia. They were driven by poverty and political turmoil in their areas of origin. They were attracted to Dubrovnik by its growing wealth, political stability and the many job opportunities that the city offered throughout the late medieval and Renaissance period. Professor Radovan Samardžić published a long time ago a pioneering article on the servants in Dubrovnik¹⁶ and Professor Dušanka Dinić-Knežević, in her article that I have mentioned earlier, gave a lot of interesting information on the numbers, provenance and destination of many servants who came to Dubrovnik or moved further west through that city.

Thus, according to Dinić-Knežević, in 1310, 50 women and 28 men, for a total of 78 persons from Dubrovnik's hinterland went to work in Barletta, Trani, Venice, Milan, Genoa, Bologna etc. for periods of from one to twenty five years. Next year, 1311, a total of 94 persons went to Italy and 55 remained in Dubrovnik, and in 1312 a whopping 158 servants from the hinterland left for Italy – mostly Apulia – and 19 remained in Dubrovnik. Another significant east-west movement occurred in 1325, when 148 persons went to Venice, Florence, Ancona, Cremona, Bologna, Salerno, Mantova and Apulia, and an additional 85 came to Dubrovnik, for a total of 233 individuals, while in 1329 the servants going to Italy numbered 43, and those staying in Dubrovnik 47¹⁷.

What prompted these mass migrations, in addition to political instability and economic difficulties, were – more than anything else – periodical famines, which haunted the poor hinterland areas. Not only servants, but large numbers of other people moved in times of famine towards Dubrovnik, because it was well known that Dubrovnik had an excellently organized and efficiently functioning system of provisioning, thanks to which the city hardly ever suffered famines during the late medieval and Renaissance periods¹⁸. However, the attraction that Dubrovnik exercised on the surrounding starving populations created lots of problems for the city itself.

As early as March of 1330 a special office of twelve patrician guards was instituted with the task of patrolling the city at night “ne furta aliqua fiant, et accusare omnes euntes per civitatem post tertium sonum campane”¹⁹. In July of the same year the system of guards in Dubrovnik was considerably strengthened and expanded with the organization of two groups of fifty men each, under the command of four patricians. They were to patrol the city on alternate nights “propter magnam gentem forestariorum qui sunt in Ragusio et continue veniunt”²⁰. In September, 1330, additional measures were taken “ut custodia civitatis melius et securius quod non fit fiat,” both during the day and at night, including the prohibition for local citizens and foreigners from carrying arms in the city²¹. Later on, in 1357, a committee of three patricians was set up “ad ponendum mentem de omnibus forensibus qui intrarent civitatem, cuius conditionis sunt, et ipsos examinare quid vadunt faciendo”²². These and other similar measures were not, of course, always prompted by

immigration from the hinterland alone, but also by other political and economic causes. However, there is no doubt that, while Dubrovnik welcomed individuals who came to the city as servants, couriers, merchants, craftsmen and, generally speaking, as manpower, it did not welcome mass movements of the hinterland populations towards the city at any time and for any reason.

In the eighties and nineties of the fourteenth century, when large numbers of starving people from the surrounding areas began invading not only Dubrovnik's territory, but the city itself, the government responded by ordering some to be shipped to Apulia, others to be expelled from Dubrovnik and its possessions, and the rest to be arrested. In 1384 it was decided to ship to Apulia 130 poor people. Access to Dubrovnik and its territory was prohibited for people seeking refuge from famine, but it was difficult to enforce such measures. In 1395, when it ordered the expulsion of all poor "Slavs" from Dubrovnik, the government tried to alleviate somewhat the situation by allocating them rations of bread²³. However, the attitude of the Ragusan authorities was quite different in 1398, when they were eager to strengthen the defences of Ston. The government decided "*de recipiendo in Stagno personas aufugentes timore Turchorum et aliorum exercituum volentes se reducere ad salvandum in Stagno, et recipere eorum familias et res, ac homines armorum qui venire voluerint*"²⁴. At the same time a decree "*pro nobilibus circhavicinis reducendis in Ragusio*" stated that it had been decided "*subveniendi dominis et aliis nobilibus circhavicinis volentibus se reducere ad salvandum in Ragusio timore Turchorum et aliorum inimicorum de comoditate et habilitate quibus possint huc venire et se reducere... ac illis dandi in Ragusio domum pro habitatione*"²⁵.

In the 1450s and 1460s, when the Ottomans arrived in the vicinity of Dubrovnik itself, large numbers of people from the hinterland tried to escape the invaders by seeking refuge in the Republic of Saint Blaise. In 1454 special guards under patrician command were posted at both city gates, Pile and Ploče, hungry people were not to be admitted, those already inside the city were to be watched, and homeless hungry persons were to be expelled from Dubrovnik. Similar decrees were reissued time after time after 1454, a clear indication that they did not work²⁶.

In March, 1460, the government prohibited Ragusan ships from carrying local people or foreigners outside the territory of the Republic²⁷, but in February 1464, when large numbers of starving hinterland people again inundated Dubrovnik's area, the government decided to lease two or three ships to transport as many of them as possible to Venice, Apulia, Marche or elsewhere in Italy, and to provide some food for the trip. The captains of the ships were explicitly ordered to see to it that the starving people do not return. As a matter of fact, a few days later all ships intending to travel to Apulia or Marche were prohibited from leaving, unless they were carrying poor persons assigned to them by the authorities²⁸. Similar problems continued in 1465 when, once again, the government gave extra foodstuffs to ships carrying poor and hungry people from the hinterland to Italy. Still, waves of refugees continued arriving on Dubrovnik's territory for years thereafter²⁹. These vast movements of people from the hinterland areas to

Dubrovnik and through it to Italy, together with numerous servants who, as we have seen, already in earlier times were going to various Italian cities, constituted, no doubt, a significant element in the westward migrations of the Balkan Slavic populations.

Yet another, although no doubt far smaller and less significant channel through which people from the eastern coast of the Adriatic migrated to the western coast were desertions of seamen in Italian ports. Many local and Italian shipowners hired seamen in Dubrovnik for various trips, mostly to Italian harbors³⁰. Life on ships, of course, was not easy. For example, in 1329 a seaman, who entered in Dubrovnik the service on a Venetian ship had to promise “non dormire modo aliquo vel ingenio absque sui (sc. the owner’s) expressa licentia in aliqua terra et loco ubi secum fuero... et si de die de dicto suo ligno absque sui expressa licentia descendero” he will have to pay each time a fine³¹. Such conditions, on top of many other hardships of maritime life, provoked – not surprisingly – lots of desertions from ships³². In many instances deserters – men from Dubrovnik, its area and from the hinterland – stole money and various goods from captains and shipowners, or received loans and advances for the trip, and then escaped³³. One can assume with great certainty that most of these men never returned to Dubrovnik, where they would have been sued for damages and punished for desertion, but that they remained somewhere in Italy (probably not Venice either) and blended into the new environment. However, they certainly did not represent a significant segment of the migratory population.

A special group which deserves at least a brief mention are the Gypsies. As Professor Djurdjica Petrović has demonstrated in her article “Cigani u srednjekovnom Dubrovniku”³⁴, the first Gypsies can be found in Dubrovnik in 1362, but the first Gypsy colony on present-day Yugoslav territory existed in Zagreb, not in Dubrovnik, in the late fourteenth century. Professor Petrović has calculated that more than one hundred Gypsies lived in Dubrovnik, and she even listed twenty seven of their names. As for the provenance of this Gypsy population, Professor Petrović thinks that they came to Dubrovnik from Serbia, Bosnia and the Adriatic coastal area and that, during the fifteenth century, they moved towards Dubrovnik more to find refuge from the Ottoman invasion, than because of Dubrovnik’s economic attraction, although the second reason should not be disregarded, either³⁵.

It is well known that a good portion of the hinterland people coming to Dubrovnik and moving to Italy – especially many young men – learned various crafts while working as servants and apprentices with numerous artisans in Dubrovnik and in Italian cities. For example, in 1313 Bogoje Gredić entered for eight years the service of a Venetian goldsmith in Dubrovnik, who was supposed to teach him his craft³⁶. Another Venetian goldsmith took a servant in Dubrovnik in that same year³⁷. In 1325 Bratoje Dobrosalić entered the service of a Venetian “spatarius” who was going to teach him his craft³⁸ and next year, 1326, a young man from the island of Mljet became an apprentice of the wellknown glassmaker Donato Pyanigo, from Murano³⁹. Such cases continued throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries⁴⁰.

However, while we frequently find in the Historical Archives of Dubrovnik enough information on the fate of many people from the hinterland who migrated to Dubrovnik and settled there, the fate of most of those who moved on to Italy remains rather dim. One can assume that, similar to what happened with those who settled in Dubrovnik, at least part of those who went to Italy got married and had families there. As Professor Momčilo Spremić has shown, the majority of immigrants settled in existing Italian towns and villages, but some founded new settlements and a few Slavic communities became relatively strong⁴¹. In Molise alone fifteen Slavic settlements came into existence⁴², but the majority of Slavs in cities and villages were, in fact, poor people, of low social standing⁴³, and the majority of their descendants were eventually integrated into the local, Italian society⁴⁴.

Still, not all the people from the Balkan hinterland found an easy way to insert themselves into local societies, either in Dubrovnik, or in Italy. Even in Dubrovnik, where there was no language barrier between the newcomers and the vast majority of the Ragusan population, which spoke the “lingua sclauonesca,” there were numerous conflicts and troubles between the immigrants and transients on one side, and the local people on the other. Entire volumes in several series of judicial acts in the Historical Archives of Dubrovnik illustrate this point very vividly. It was probably much worse in Italian cities, where people from the Balkans were total strangers, could not communicate, were mostly destitute, frequently starving and, especially in the fifteenth century, desperate refugees. All of this could only put them in an inferior position and expose them to all kinds of humiliation, derision and deprivation.

It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the behavior of immigrants themselves contributed sometimes to their less than favorable reputation. A few examples of trouble that persons from Dubrovnik and Dalmatia had in fourteenth-century Venice will suffice to illustrate this point. In 1325 “Thomasius de Spalato, Sclausus,” was condemned to spend one day “in berlina,” to subsequently spend three years in jail, and then to be expelled from Venice – all of that because he had attempted to bribe a witness⁴⁵. Next year a Venetian was fined 50 libras for having abducted from her home “causa fornicationis” a girl from Zadar, but the interesting point is that his accomplice in this unsavory deed was his servant, also a woman from Zadar, maybe an acquaintance of the victim⁴⁶. In 1329 a man from Šibenik was the Venetian court rejected the accusation⁴⁷. That same year a Bogdan from Dubrovnik was sentenced to spend three days “in berlina” and one year in inferior jails because he had falsely pretended to be an official of the Venetian government and as such had taken possession of some things belonging to a merchant from Fano⁴⁸. A much more dramatic case occurred in 1337, when a man from Dubrovnik was accused of stealing various spices from a galley which had just arrived from Trebizond. He was sentenced to be taken to the “puncta Sancti Bene” and there “suspendatur per gulam cum una catena ferri taliter quod moriatur, et non possit inde moveri usque ad unum mensem”⁴⁹.

Similar, although less drastic, cases happened throughout this period, not only in Venice, but elsewhere in Italy as well. Now, if people from

Dubrovnik and from Dalmatia, who knew Italy, usually spoke the Italian language and were close to the Italian mentality and way of life, could get themselves into such trouble, it is easy to imagine that people from the Balkan hinterland fared much worse. Nevertheless, the vast majority of those people never returned to Dubrovnik or to their hinterland places of origin. For one thing, most of them were too poor to travel, and for another there was not much reason for them to return, once they settled in their new environment and found a way of surviving in that society. On the contrary, it is quite probable that at least some of those individuals who had arrived in Italy eventually ended up in countries even farther removed from their homeland in the Balkans⁵⁰, moving around in search of better work and life (craftsmen, merchants, seamen) or simply being sold to new, more distant, masters in the case of slaves.

To conclude: even on the basis of the limited documentation presented here, it seems reasonable to say that Dubrovnik did, indeed, serve as a powerful pole of attraction for the populations from the nearby area and from farther removed hinterland regions of Bosnia and Serbia, and that it was an important point of transition towards Italy and the West for those populations. In spite of difficulties that this role from time to time imposed on the city, Dubrovnik also greatly profited from those migratory movements, especially in acquiring a cheap and numerous men –and women– power for the needs of a growing city and of a burgeoning economy.

As in its many other activities, in this one – population migrations – Dubrovnik again played its traditional role of intermediary between East and West, a role which had been and remained the mainstay of its prosperity and of its very survival.

Notes

¹ D. Dinić – Knežević, Prilog proučavanju migracija našeg stanovništva u Italiju tokom XIII i XIV veka (Contribution to the Study of Migrations of Our Populations to Italy during the 13th and 14th Centuries, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, vol. XVII/I, 1973, 39 – 62.

² B. Krekić, L'abolition de l'esclavage à Dubrovnik (Raguse) au XVe siècle – mythe ou réalité? *Byzantinische Forschungen*, vol. XII, Amsterdam 1987, 309 – 317

³ Historijski arhiv u Dubrovniku (Historical Archives in Dubrovnik, hereafter HAD), *Lamenta de foris*, vol. 2, ff. 174v, 147v, 197. M. Dinić, *Iz dubrovačkog arhiva*, vol. III, Beograd, Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti 1967, 89.

⁴ HAD, *Lamenti politici*, vol. 2, f. 89.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 101v–102v, 109v–110.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 118–118v.

⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 119. Other cases involving people from Korčula: Dinić, *o. c.*, 78–82, 85–87, 93–94, 125–126.

⁸ In 1418: *Lam. polit.*, vol. 2, ff. 120v, 130, 156v, 158v, 166, 218v, 227, 239, 261; in 1419: *ibid.*, ff. 275, 284v–285, 321; in 1426: HAD, *Consilium minus*, vol. 4, f. 10; in 1442: HAD, *Lamenta de intus*, vol. 2, ff. 177, 229; in 1472: *ibid.*, vol. 24, f. 178v, etc. Numerous documents in Dinić, *o. c.*

⁹ HAD, *Consilium maius*, vol. 14, f. 207v. Dinić, *o. c.*, 167. On sales of slaves to persons from Southern Italy and Sicily see M. Spremić, La migrazione degli Slavi nell'Italia meridionale e in Sicilia alla fine del Medioevo, *Archivio storico italiano*, vol. 2, 1980, 7–9.

¹⁰ HAD, *Lamenta de criminale*, vol. 2, f. 205. "Sclauonia" here probably meant an area not too distant from Dubrovnik. Indeed, in 1417 a "Radossauus Crechich" is explicitly mentioned as being "de Rudina." HAD, *Diversa cancellariae*, vol. 41, f. 123.

¹¹ *Lam. polit.*, vol. 2, f. 11v. Dinić, o. c., 90.

¹² HAD, *Consilium rogatorum*, vol. 4, f. 256. Dinić, o. c., 100.

¹³ Krekić, o. c., 315–316.

¹⁴ *Lam. de crim.*, vol. 2, f. 109.

¹⁵ *Lam. de intus*, vol. 24, f. 178v.

¹⁶ R. Samardžić, Podmladak dubrovačkih trgovaca i zanatlija u XV i XVI veku (The Apprentices of the Ragusan Merchants and Craftsmen in the 15th and 16th Centuries), *Zbornik studentskih stručnih radova*, Beograd 1948, 64–78.

¹⁷ Dinić-Knežević, o. c., 51–57. See also Spremić, o. c., 10–11.

¹⁸ R. Jeremić – J. Tadić, *Prilozi za istoriju zdravstvene kulture starog Dubrovnika*, vol. 1, Beograd, 1938, 27–35.

¹⁹ HAD, *Reformationes*, vol. 9, f. 47v.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 56.

²¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 63v, 116v.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. 17, f. 45v.

²³ Dinić-Knežević, o. c., 58–59. Jeremić-Tadić, o. c., vol. II, Beograd 1939, 185–186.

²⁴ *Reform.*, vol. 31, f. 108. At the same time soldiers were sent to Ston. *Ibid.*, ff. 108–108v.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 162.

²⁶ Jeremić-Tadić, *ibid.* 186–187.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 187.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 187–188.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 188. Spremić, o. c., 11–12.

³⁰ In 1325: *Diversa canc.*, vol. 8, f. 21; in 1335: *ibid.*, vol. 12, f. 78; in 1344: *ibid.*, vol. 14, f. 98; in 1347: *ibid.*, vol. 15, f. 26, and many similar cases in the following years.

³¹ HAD, *Diversa notariae*, vol. 5, f. 215.

³² *Diversa canc.*, vol. 4, ff. 33v, 91; vol. 11, ff. 26v, 33, 33v; vol. 30, f. 121v; *Diversa not.*, vol. 4, f. 76. In a number of cases owners of ships took a kind of insurance against seamen deserting their ships and against damages resulting from such desertions: *Diversa not.*, vol. 4, ff. 19v, 25v, 26, 27v; *Diversa canc.*, vol. 8, ff. 40, 54, 57v, 59, 59v, 61v. In other instances, replacements were pre-arranged at the time seamen entered service: *Diversa not.*, vol. 4, ff. 36, 36v, 37; *Diversa canc.*, vol. 12, ff. 310, 310v; HAD, *Debita notariae*, vol. 8, f. 48v.

³³ *Diversa canc.*, vol. 15, f. 64.

³⁴ Dj. Petrović, Cigani u srednjovekovnom Dubrovniku (Gypsies in Medieval Dubrovnik), *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta*, vol. XIII/1 Beograd 1976, 123–158.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

³⁶ *Diversa canc.*, vol. 5, f. 58v.

³⁷ *Diversa not.*, vol. 1, f. 103v.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, vol 5, f. 63.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 106v. See also V. Han, *Arhivska gradja o staklu i staklarstvu u Dubrovniku (XIV–XVI vek)* (*Archival Materials on Glass and Glassmaking in Dubrovnik – 14th–16th Centuries*), Beograd, Srpska akad. nauka i umet., 1979, 18–19; similar document from 1327, *ibid.*, 19–20. See from the same author also *Tri veka dubrovačkog staklarstva (XIV–XVI vek)* (*Three Centuries of Ragusan Glassmaking – 14th–16th Centuries*), Beograd, Srpska akad. nauka i umet., 1981, 14–17. B. Krekić, Trois fragments concernant les relations entre Dubrovnik (Raguse) et l'Italie au XVIIe siècle, in B. Krekić, *Dubrovnik, Italy and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1980, no. II.

⁴⁰ Dinić-Knežević, o. c., 60–61.

⁴¹ For example: Lecce, Lanciano, Giovinazzo. In 1468 there is mention of a "universitas Sclauorum Trani". Spremić, o. c., 13.

⁴² Spremić, *ibid.*.

⁴³ Ibid., 13–14.

⁴⁴ Nevertheless, some Slavic colonies survived to this day (Collecroce, Acquaviva, Montemitro and San Felice del Molise). Spremić, o. c., 14.

⁴⁵ Archivio di stato, Venezia, *Avogaria di comun, Raspe*, vol. 1, f. 21.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 23v. On sexual crimes in Venice see G. Ruggiero, *The Boundaries of Eros: Sex Crime and Sexuality in Renaissance Venice*, New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

⁴⁷ *Raspe*, vol. 1, f. 66v. A similar accusation against a man from Trogir was rejected in 1333. *Ibid.*, f. 122v.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 76.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 177v.

⁵⁰ Dinić-Knežević, o. c., 61.

WARS, POPULATION MIGRATIONS AND RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISM IN DALMATIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE XVIIth CENTURY

From 1645 until 1699, the Balkans were passing through a series of wars, which seriously affected its political structure, changed the balance of power among the Powers concerned (Turkey, Austria, Venice) and brought about an almost interminable movement of population. The Serbian Orthodox population living in the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg realm and the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and Albania were constantly on the move. Descriptions of these movements and their consequences, particularly those relative to the migrations and settlement in Hungary are well-known, and should not be discussed here. Briefly, in 1690, the Serbian Patriarch, Arsenije Černojević, arrived with tens of thousands of his flock from the Kossovo to Beograd. There he negotiated with Austrian Emperor Joseph the conditions under which the Serbs could settle into his lands. The agreement which was signed had guaranteed the Serbs certain privileges and rights, the protection of the freedom of faith being one among the most important. In subsequent years, however, despite the Emperor's word, the Primat of Hungary, Cardinal Kolonich and other high church dignitaries, tended to disregard it. They had initiated a strong proselytizing efforts in order to bring the Serbs to the union. The threat to their religion was certainly one of the most dangerous aspects of these movements. They seemed to be repeating itself in other parts of the Balkan as well.

The migrations to other territories, their size, conditions under which they were made, and consequences are hardly known, and thus deserve our attention. They offer an opportunity to understand and explain certain common and specific features, such as conditions in which the Serbian and other people lived, reasons and motives which led to their movements, and the nature of these migrations. No less significant were conditions they found in the new land, especially their relationships with local authorities, lay and ecclesiastical.

In this communication, it is my intention to discuss the movements of the population from the Ottoman territories to the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia. The case of Venice is a point in itself. Its practice is less known and offers a convenient opportunity to analyze the reception accorded to the Serb by the Venetian authorities and the Catholic church. Their concern for the settlers appeared to be genuine, and efforts to make them stay in Dalmatia sincere. Since these two were important pillars of the Venetian political system, they could do a great deal of good and/or inflict much harm upon immigrants. Also, the cooperation between lay and ecclesiastical authorities seemed to be on the higher level than one in Austria.

Political reasons had played an important role in the Venetians welcoming these immigrants. The Ottoman Empire was still the most formidable

threat to the Venetian domination in the Adriatic, since the Venetian-ruled part of Dalmatia had been reduced to a very narrow territory, and Venice had a toehold in Albania. By the sea, threat was less direct, as long as Venice possessed the Ionian islands and Crete. In the ensuing wars, which lasted with interruptions until 1718, Venice fought the Turks in Dalmatia, the Aegean and Ionian seas. The Greek population was not enthusiastic in fighting Turks, while in Dalmatia, and the neighboring Bosnia, many peasants, uskoks and others were ready to do so. With their, as well as other mercenaries help, Venice made sizable acquisitions in Dalmatia. The Turkish subjects, frequently called Morlachs, took fortress of Klis; in subsequent years, territories around Zadar and Split were conquered, as well as around the Bocche de Cattaro. The size of Venetian Dalmatia almost tripled. Thus, Venice had strengthened her hold against the Turks on the Adriatic thanks to these immigrants.¹

This was accomplished with a great deal of pain and destruction. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 1645, the Turkish detachments attacked the Venetian territories in vicinity of Split and Šibenik. The presence and activities of hostile troops made these and neighboring areas a wasteland, with a heavy destruction of human lives and material goods. In the fall of 1646, the archbishop of Split informed the Roman Curia about these destructions and the movements of population from Turkey, hunger, diseases. He had nothing nice to say about the prospects. The population were looking for protection, food and shelter on the Venetian territory, he wrote, adding that they were unwilling to return to their homes.² It was an announcement as to what was to follow.

Similar information were addressed to the Curia in years to come (1647, 1648) by other Church dignitaries. In the spring of 1648, the Turks put to fire several villages in the bishopric of Šibenik, which had to be evacuated by their inhabitants. The pressures and deprivations induced the Archbishop of Split to ask the Curia to transfer him to another see, preferably in Italy.³ Later, in 1654, the bishop of Nin wrote about the Serbian refugees who escaped from the Turkish tyranny. Similar news were sent by the bishop of Makarska; he wrote that because of war many people escaped from Turkey to the Venetian territories, while many others were hiding in the mountains and caves. In 1657, the bishop of Trogir reported that the Passa of Bosnia invaded his diocese, and that everything was put to fire and destroyed. The defenders of Trogir were massacred and the city towers razed.⁴

In 1658, the archbishop of Zadar informed his superiors about the settlement of the Serbs in the vicinity of the city, although he did not mention their numbers. The archdiocese of Zadar was not spared of devastations either; in the following years, the Turks had repeatedly attacked it, bringing tears and destruction, and depriving the archbishop and people of their means of life.⁵

The major movements of population, however, have occurred during 1670s and 1680s. In 1676, the bishop of Nin wrote about the Orthodox people living in his diocese and their religious activities. The archbishop of Zadar reported about the Orthodox and Mohamedan population in the city and its environments. The influx of the Serbs seemed to be constant, and many of

them settled to the islands. In 1679, there existed the Orthodox church St. Veneranda on the island of Hvar. People moved to the islands in order to secure protection and avoid permanent harassments. Early in 1684, the archbishop of Split wrote about the Christians, subjects of the Ottoman Empire, settling into his diocese. He described them as "barbarious and wild", but mentioned that they were good Christians. They were sent back to attack towns, villages and fortresses in the Turkish territory.⁶

The arrival of the Serbs on the Venetian territory, restless and poor, created a great deal of troubles for the authorities and the Catholic church. Destitute and miserable, these immigrants were made to suffer immeasurably because of the inability of the local authorities to support and protect them. The archbishop of Split complained, in the spring of 1684, about the "extreme misery" of the former Ottoman subjects "now living in the Republic of Venice". For this and other reasons, many of them were considering of returning to their native villages. The archbishop informed his superiors in Rome that he will do everything possible to help those suffering in the interest of the Catholic religion. He wrote that the Provedur General of Dalmatia had made great efforts to persuade the people to remain loyal to the Republic. The Provedur had promised to work diligently to persuade other Turkish subjects to come over. Once in Dalmatia, they were to be enrolled to defend it. For this, he needed money, and in order to get it, he asked the archbishop to help; he dutifully obliged.⁷

Similar news were coming from the bishop of Nin, who worked hard to induce these newcomers to fight for the Republic.⁸ The Venetian decision-makers had clear intentions and designs in regard to the immigrants, but had no attractive means to keep them in Dalmatia. The Serbs coming to Dalmatia looked to provide themselves and their families by plundering, stealing and taking away corn, cattle and other provisions across the border.

The numbers of the Serbs passing over seemed to be growing. In December 1684, archbishop of Zadar, Parzaghi, wrote that six thousand soldiers were recruited from their ranks. The total number must have been much higher, since they were passing over with their families. The archbishop admitted that the authorities were unable to provide them with food and shelter, that people went hungry and that the Turks were trying to attract them back. That would mean the destruction of Dalmatia, insisted the archbishop. Domenico Mocenigo, Provedur general for war, was planning the expansion of military activities and attacks on the Turkish territory in order to protect Kliss and lands around Trogir and Split. This would bring back loyalty of the Serbs who wanted to return to Turkey.⁹ Obviously, without the Serbs the Provedur could not accomplish much.

The Provedur's plans were thwarted as the Passa of Bosnia passed, in the summer of 1685, River Cetina with eight thousands soldiers. It was believed that his aim was to induce the Serbs to return to Turkey. His efforts came to nothing, since the Serbs have decided to remain loyal to the Republic, and after valiant attacks on the Turkish positions, chased them away. The Venetian designs were evident: by engaging the Ottoman subjects, they hoped to force them and the Morlachs to remain in Dalmatia, dependent on the Venetian mercy. After that, their return to Turkey would be impossible.¹⁰

In the summer of 1685, archbishop of Split, Cosmi, wrote that the prominent uskoc leader Stojan Jankovic brought three hundred Serbian families to Dalmatia. At the same time, he added that around Split and Trogir there were about five thousand immigrants from Turkey. They were without food, a fact he considered to be a serious threat to the defense of Dalmatia. Grain sent by the Pope was distributed, but was not sufficient to satisfy needs. It forced the Serbian leaders to organize an expedition into the Turkish territory to secure necessary food. In August 1685, Stojan Jankovic, Smoljan Smiljanic and other with 2500 followers left Zadaar and forced their way into Bosnia and Lika. They went as far as Vakuf, plundering. Five hundred Serbian families from Lika joined them on their return to Dalmatia, where they brought along about ten thousands heads of cattle and sheep. Despite such *ad hoc* "solutions", the lack of food was constantly hampering the efforts of the lay authorities and the Church to make the immigrants stay on the Venetian possessions.¹¹ There seemed to exist a permanent conflict between desire, on the one hand, to carry out their designs towards the immigrants. Yet, these did not stop, and with time the pressure became more evident.

Another important aspect of migrations to the Venetian possessions was religious. Attitude of the ecclesiastical authorities, including the Vatican, towards the Orthodox Serbs coming to Dalmatia and Albania was clearly defined, while its aims and persistence were fixed and unquestionable. The proselytism was its main feature, and it was pursued with a singular determination. Under no conditions, it was to be given up. This policy was practiced in the Habsburg Empire and the Venetian territories. The presence of the Serbs only increased already pronounced ambitions.

These were formidable, indeed. Throughout the Balkans all archbishops and bishops were obsessed with proselytism; they wrote about it extensively, and acted accordingly. Their reports were replete with references about opportunities, prospects and successes, sometimes excessively assessed. They have painted a rosy picture of having almost all Orthodox population in the Balkans converted to Catholicism. Very few ever admitted a failure. Orthodox population in various parts was under a constant surveillance and scrutiny, while presence and activities of the Orthodox priests in villages, towns and cities were reported about. The neighboring countries (Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia) were looked into as well. Some bishops even advised the local authorities as to how to deal with the Orthodox priests and believers. Efforts to conversion in the form of the union were constant.

In the summer of 1648, bishop of Kotor, Vice Buće, reported that in villages of Ljuštica, Krtola, Lješevići had lived both, orthodox and catholic families, while in Župa there lived Orthodox only (Greci schismatici); he described his relations with orthodox priests and plans of attracting them to Catholicism.¹² In 1654 and 1656, bishop of Nin Francesco Andronico wrote about orthodox refugees from Turkey and his efforts to bring them to the Catholic religion. He insisted that in two villages there lived orthodox priests, who served in churches according to the rites of the Orthodox church. "They are primitive and ignorant, and it would be easy to convert them to the Roman faith and make them recognize the Supreme Pontiff", wrote the

bishop. However, it was not possible in the existing circumstances, namely times of war.¹³ Early in 1658, the archbishop of Zadar reported about the Serbs from Bosnia which lived around the city. He argued that it would be possible to convert them to Catholicism since their episcops and priests were ignorant and primitive.¹⁴

The outbreak of the war in 1683 and the continuous migrations of the Serbs from Turkey helped proselytism flare up again. Early in 1684, archbishop of Split, Stefano Cosmi, reported that the orthodox Serbs have settled on the other side, i. e. Turkish, of Cetina river.¹⁵ Archbishop of Zadar, Parzagli, reported about the Morlachs, meaning the Serbs, living in Vrana and their attachment to the Catholic faith. Archbishop Cosmi also described his efforts among the refugees from Turkey, at present subjects of the Serenissima, in "order to advance the religion". He succeeded in baptizing one orthodox, and claimed that there were many more ready to undergo the same.¹⁶

Bishop of Nin, Giovanni Borgoforte, confirmed the spirit and zeal of the hierarchy. In November 1684, he wrote that he was engaged in spreading the Catholic faith among the immigrants which came to his diocese from Turkey six months ago. At the same time, he was preparing them spiritually to combat the common enemy and accept orders from the Providur General. It was necessary since the immigrants were suffering from hunger and destitution on the whole, and were on the verge of returning to Turkey.¹⁷

The Vatican approved quickly the initiative when confronted with prospects of conversions among the immigrants. In an undated letter prepared in 1684, the Curia ordered the archbishop of Split to provide for the opening of the Church and appoint a priest for six thousand refugees encamped on Cetina river. The Vatican only encouraged already over-zealous church dignitaries.¹⁸

Since numbers of Orthodox immigrants were increasing, ambitions of the Church hierarchy became more pronounced and stronger. After Stojan Jankovic returned with three hundred families from his expedition to Lika, early in August 1685, archbishop Cosmi insisted that it was a favorable moment to convert these orthodox immigrants to the catholic faith. "I believe in the Divine benevolence", he wrote, "That the arrival of the Morlachs on the territory of the Republic will bring under the wing of the Holy Church a great many of these poor and restless people." He added that he helped few of those who were in a need of help.¹⁹

Archbishop Cosmi insisted that the Republic ought to pursue an aggressive policy and conquer more Ottoman territories in the interior. In September 1685, he argued that the possession of Knin would bring about three thousand Orthodox Serbs under the Venetian rule; they will also be converted to catholicism. This last he believed to be more important, since it would be "good for the glory and the spirit of the Church." Those orthodox people were "good and ready to accept the true religion provided they were removed from the influence of their priests. Bringing them to the possessions of the Republic was a great step towards conversion; there they will mix with catholics and be instructed by our priests . . . Soon after they will embrace the true religion". According to the archbishop it was the first step only. After

the war, "Catholicism will expand into the distant parts of the Ottoman state", he concluded.²⁰

Similar proposals and suggestions were to come in the forthcoming years. They reflected an aggressive drive for new converts, much in evidence among the Dalmatian catholic hierarchy. It enjoyed the support of and was approved by the Roman Curia itself.

The Catholic church and the Venetian Republic had seen eye to eye in the matter of immigrants. The Catholic church wanted new converts, a new souls to bring to its fold. The State needed the immigrants to serve as defenders or interlopers into the Ottoman territory. In other words, both wanted to use them and make benefits for themselves. They were aware that only through the joint efforts they could accomplish their goals, namely to transform these destitute and restless immigrants into the obedient tools of the state and good catholics. For that reason, the orthodox priests were to be removed from their flock and made harmless. The strategy was developed, although it proved to be a faulty one. It appeared that brutal pressure was needed in order to get rid of those priests, and thus deprive immigrants of their spiritual and national guardians.

Footnotes

- ¹ F. C. Lane, Venice. A maritime Republic (Baltimore 1973), 408–411.
- ² M. Jačov, Spisi tajnog vaticanskog arhiva XVI–XVIII veka (Beograd, SANU 1983), 57.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 64–65, 66–67.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 67–68.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 82, 82–83, 86.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 92–93.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 100.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 101–102.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 109–110.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 120–121.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 59–60.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 64–66.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 67–68.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 86.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92–93.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 101–102.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 120–121.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 129–130.

Radovan Samardžić

Member of the Academy, Director of
the Institute for Balkan Studies of
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts, Belgrade

MIGRATIONS IN SERBIAN HISTORY

(The Era of Foreign Rule)

The history of the Serbian people, since its appearance on the world stage, has been marked by migrations from beginning to end. Ever since their arrival from the ancient homeland, to the Danube Basin and the Balkan Peninsula, the Serbs almost never properly settled down.

Driven either by the violence of foreign masters or through the obedience of their own rulers, they trod through the Middle Ages in an attempt to come to the light of history – or be forever swallowed by the darkness of oblivion. They migrated mostly in search of a better life – down great river valleys into fertile sunny plains or developed towns, towards summer grazing lands or winter quarters, but then to devastated areas also, in the hope of finding shelter under a more benevolent feudal lord. Due to these movements, parts of the Serbian history have remained concealed under other names, thus presenting a rather complex relationship between the linguistic situation in medieval South East Europe and the modern dialectological map of the Serbian language. Yet, the medieval migrations influenced the subsequent destiny of the Serbian people.

However, a more direct effect of these movements on Serbian history can be observed within the long period of foreign rule, beginning in the fifteenth century and lasting until the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars. An individual chapter in the story of the Serbian movements is the migrations in the unified Yugoslav state after 1918, which had various causes and motives, (including the Second World War years).

In the course of the foreign rule period, the Serbian people moved out of their former territories for various reasons and in different directions. The typology of those movements may be reduced to the following:

¹ Movements of the Serbian people that hindered Turkish penetration toward the north and northwest.

By the end of the fourteenth century the center of state activities and culture had been transferred to the wider Morava Basin area. As a result, the northern parts of Serbia acquired priority over the southern ones, which were, moreover, exposed to continual pressures by other ethnical groups. In the areas north of the Sava and Danube rivers, the Serbian population began to grow its roots, not wholly with the arrival of the settlers, but partly through achieving certain positions and roles within the military system of the Hungarian Kingdom. In return for their services, the population gained privileges: they could practise their religion in peace and preserve their traditions.

After the fall of Serbia in 1459, the state (despotovina) was restored on Hungarian territory until 1537. At that time, numerous holy places and spiritual centers in the Danube Basin emerged, concentrating mainly on the Fruska Gora mountain. In these sanctuaries the Serbs deposited historically valuable items of the Orthodox religion, for protection against the Turks. They revived the cult of the sacred Nemanjić family in the Danube Basin, and created the tradition of the sacred Branković family. Wherever there were Serbs, the cult of Saint Sava, father and healer of Serbian Orthodoxy, was on the rise. One of the greatest uprisings in Serbian history burst into flame in 1594 in the Banat region. The Turks took revenge by exterminating the rebels and burning at the stake relics of Saint Sava. The Serbs remained scattered all over the Pannonia valley, mostly under arms and in the service of various masters. Even though the seventeenth century saw entire regions, above all Banat and parts of Wallachia, stamped by their name, the presence of Serbs had not been sufficiently noted. This was to change with the Great Migration in 1690, led by Patriarch Arsenije, the third Čarnojević.

Following the migration, which was limited in scope, the Serbs became an important factor in the Danube basin. By acquiring privileges from Emperor Leopold I, they, in fact, obtained not only the autonomy of the Church, but special legal status as well. Their presence on the Hungarian territory, expressed particularly during the eighteenth century, was enforced and supported first, by the Church – which had been established as a Karlovac Diocese – then by their expansion over these areas, and finally, by the institution of the Vojna Krajina (military border area between the Austrian Empire and the Turks). This area was populated mostly by the Serbs and characterized by an intensive growth of towns, whose inhabitants, the Serbs, Greeks and Tzintzars, promoted contacts between southern Turkey and Central Europe.

Another phenomenon in the history of Serbian migrations is the emergence of other Orthodox merchants and craftsmen into their way of life. The empress Maria Theresia granted the Serbs their privileges in 1743, soon after the advancement of the new settlers headed by Patriarch Arsenije the Fourth Jovanović, from their homeland to the Habsburgs' territory in 1737. In the meantime, in 1739, the state border had been established along the Sava and Danube rivers between Austria and Turkey, creating thus a turbulent frontier, seemingly made forever. However, this only prompted the flow of people from the south to the north. In Turkey, south of the borderline, the region became densely populated due to the possibility of escaping abroad.

² Forceful movings of the population of northern Serbia into Slavonia, after the Turkish conquest in 1537.

Until that time, a large part of the Serbian people, due to the frontier position of Serbia, had the status of privileged soldiers, with collective responsibility for efficient service. By taking Slavonia, the Turks established, by resettling the population, a military district, (*krajishte*). The remaining part of the population in Serbia was proclaimed *raya*, namely the category obliged to work on land and supply provisions to the landowners, (*spahije*).

This gave rise to the formation of the first large settlements in Slavonia, which were, however, subject to changes: they gained in strength and number by the coming of new settlers, or weakened and decreased under the pressure of Catholicising.

³ The advancing of the population from northern Serbia into Bosnia, mostly western Bosnia, and the formation of an integral Serbian cultural area.

In the course of the first half of the sixteenth century, the Turks, as conquerors, moved the Serbian military population to Slavonia and Bosnia. This prompted the process, the cultural unification process of the earlier Serbian layer in Bosnia with new settlers advancing from Serbia. Thus, Bosnia finally accepted the Orthodoxy that was taught in Serbia by Saint Sava, and medieval traditions related to the Nemanjics, Kosovo, Marko Kraljevic and despots completely subdued the local ones. Even before the restoration of the Peć Patriarchate in 1557, the Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia became totally equal to those in Serbia and other Serbian provinces. Only those who lived on the margins of that process succumbed to the pressure of Islamization.

⁴ Creation of a Military Border in the Habsburg Monarchy and the migrations of Serbs.

The escape of Serbs across the Turkish border into neighboring Croatia and Slavonia, which were under Habsburg rule, gave considerable support to the Monarchy in its endeavour to transform, in the course of the sixteenth century, its southeastern regions into a defense belt against enemy invasion. The Serbs would have "jumped on to" Austrian soil on condition that they become privileged soldiers, a status they had enjoyed in Turkey. This status, granted by the Habsburg Monarchy, matched the one they had had in the Ottoman Empire, and gave them the right of calling themselves *Vlachs*. (That class term probably originated in medieval Serbia, since similar categories of population appear under the same denomination in the Dushan's Code.) The final establishment of the Military Border ended in the eighteenth century, when its organization had been extended to the regions of Srem and Banat as well.

⁵ Continuous movings of the population of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Brda (mountain regions) and Montenegro towards parts of the Adriatic coast that were under rule of the Venetian Republic.

This continuous migratory process, which began in the Middle ages, was intensified in the course of Turkish invasions and penetrations, when the Slavs, who were on the run, settled in regions of the Appenines Peninsula. The process did not cease even after Austria took over Venetian possessions on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea in 1815. The Serbs rooted on the narrow strip of land along the coast, walked into the towns, and crossed over to the islands when driven off by their masters. Wherever they took root, they rapidly lost their characteristics, first their religion, then lifestyle, customs, and finally, their language. The first significant Serbian oasis that

remained on the ethnic map of the Venetian Republic was created in northern Dalmatia during the second Candian war in 1645–1669, when the Venetian rulers (*Signoria*) established a military border on the narrow land possessions formed mostly by the Serbian settlers.

6 Settling of the eastern Bosnian population in the course of the eighteenth century as a characteristic instance of internal movements in the Turkish Empire.

At the beginning of the second decade of the eighteenth century, the Sublime Porte had decided to send punitive expeditions against the Herzegovinian, Mountain (*Brda*) and Montenegrin tribes, because they sided with Peter I the Great in the Russian-Turkish war. Consequently, many people were killed, while others were moved out to eastern Bosnia in the Romania Mountain region, where they were given the status of protected sultan's slaves. Strangely enough, not long after that, refugees from these same areas flowed again toward eastern Bosnia with their entire families. For most of them Bosnia provided only a temporary shelter, since their real destination was northern Serbia. In Serbia they would seek permanent and safe residence.

7 The forming of northern Serbia in the eighteenth century as a promised land of the Serbian people.

During the great war of the Saint Alliance against Turkey in 1683–1699, the entire Serbian territory became depopulated (particularly its northern part). The wasteland was created by the many Serbs who perished after volunteering to organize a rebellion as soon as the army of Leopold I approached Belgrade. The failure of the army's expedition was followed by an unprecedented Turkish reprisal at the end of 1689 and the beginning of 1690. Entire regions became devoid of population through slaughtering and the deportation of many to the central Danube Basin. Northern Serbia was to remain exposed to turmoils full of migrations and other demographic changes until 1739, namely, until the establishment of the border between Austria and Turkey along the Sava and Danube rivers. As time went on, the Serbs looked up on this frontier more and more as a stronghold which could enable them to survive and look into the future with more audacity. Rivers did not separate, but, instead, linked the kindred subjects of both empires. To the Serbs living in Turkey, cultural achievements and political ideas were accessible without much hindrance or delay.

The Serbian liberation movement against the Turks, which reached its peak by the 1804 Revolution, gave good ground for that influence. The importation of cattle across the Sava river from Serbia to Austria, which meant assets to both empires, strongly promoted the education and establishment of cattle-breeders' activities, including those of pig-exporters who became more independent, richer and even acquainted with complex issues of national transformation. The Serbs in Austria thus found, in all of this, proof of their great past in the old homeland, and hoped that their restored state would again be permanently established there. They, too, altered ideas

that came from the West so as to serve the inherited historical traditions, Serbian Orthodoxy and the realisation of the ideas of the state.

This was the way to establish the new Serbia. The deserted lands, fertile and rich with forests and shrubs, attracted settlers from all over, particularly from eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro with its vast hinterland (*Brda*) and Kosovo. After the Turks had again constituted their power in northern Serbia in 1739, the people expressed servitude through their leaders (*knezovi*) while obtaining in return self-governing rights. That very decree lay the foundation for an inevitable development of national self-awareness. The vicinity of the frontier, formed by the two rivers, could be crossed undisturbed and without greater danger, since one could always find a shelter among one's fellow countryman on the Austrian soil. This contributed considerably to the feeling that Serbia was becoming an outlaws' refuge, and, more than that, a land of untamable outlaws.

The turbulent frontier attracted settlers because the liberation process in Serbia, while unshackling itself from the restraints of a tribal society, had begun. The settlers developed individual resourcefulness and capabilities and became more cunning in their dealings with the Turks, who gathered in the Belgrade Pashalik while turning it into a hypertrophic example of a hasty increase of *čitlučenje*, a term in Serbian historiography referring to a form of unlawful and forced feudalism in Turkey. In search of a more merciful master, these cattletraders changed residence, killed and robbed Turks on the roads and took refuge in Austria. They closed themselves in their self-governing communities, villages and districts (*knezine*) with which communication was possible only through the mediation of their representatives who became more and more independent with the rise of the Turkish oppression (*zulum*).

While merging with the natives and former settlers, the refugees, who had constantly been coming to Serbia, were involved in the commotions within the society, and they, too, contributed to the acceleration of the Serbian emancipation process along the restless frontier. They became closer to each other through a common language, historical tradition, and similar mentality, all of which constituted the major part of their anthropological properties. Mutual assimilation, was, in fact, a historical phenomenon in the creation of new societies. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Serbian people developed many capacities in the vicinity of the border, primarily those of a spiritual nature, meaning that the creation of the Serbian state in the 1804 revolution, was entirely in concordance with the ways of historical development.

* * *

As they settled in the central parts of the Balkan Peninsula, which was characterized by a network of major land and river ways that incited invasions, and was the stage of collision between conquering empires, the Serbs, having lost their state, began their centuries – long wandering, either under the pressure of another master or by their own free will. They went in search of their promised land. And, after all, a strange fact remained: namely, in almost every Serbian settlement in present-day Yugoslavia, and

even in the surrounding countries, there is mention of the tradition of their coming from another region. It relates that those who undertook to migrate were rarely individuals, mostly families, several households or entire villages, even large groups of the population. Many lost trace of their true origin, being constantly engaged in moving while searching for better and safer living conditions.

The consequences of these migrations were more disastrous than advantageous to the Serbs throughout the centuries:

¹ While frequently setting out to a destination unknown and an uncertain fortune, the Serbs remained composed in their self-awareness and carried in themselves their historical traditions, Serbian Orthodoxy, and requested of every new master on new land the privileged legal status they had enjoyed previously. And while moving within the expanses of the universal empires such as the Habsburg, and, to a considerable degree, the Ottoman Empire, the Serbs expanded their Lebensraum and imposed the extent of their presence to both their neighbors and foreign masters, and compensated whatever they might have lost by recovering it in other places, reaching the peak in the second half of the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth century.

² Incessant migrations amounted to either internal unification of the Serbian people, or, at least, a suppression of the excessively developed regional differences. The linguistic division among the Serbs was lesser than with the majority of other larger and culturally more advanced European peoples; it was reduced to the existence of dialects that reflect no misunderstandings in mutual relations and do not jeopardize the unity of the Serbian expression. Since the fifteenth and until the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the course of foreign rule, the Serbs formed and then preserved their common historical heritage. The corresponding forms are, first of all, the oral heroic epics and also, parallel with them, the written historiography, such as chronicles, genealogies and other more extensive historical works. The founding of the Serbian spiritual community was the Orthodoxy reformed by Saint Sava in the thirteenth century and has not been exposed to any serious aberrations thereafter.

³ However, their migrations helped the Serbs stretch their settlements to such an extent that many of them separated from the national entity, while remaining in the diaspora. No matter how strongly they were devoted to their religion and traditions, they tended to disperse and vanish within the densely populated foreign surroundings. The first and decisive step in losing the national identity was the acceptance, mostly under pressure, of union with the Roman Church. These Serbs were the subject, particularly later on, of historical documents and old chronicles. Their half-dead settlements with richly decorated churches also bear witness to this, rather than their small number. The first to disappear were the ones who left for Russia, since the same religion and linguistic kinship facilitated assimilation. In southern regions, the Serbian population that survived the Turkish pogroms managed so only with great effort, unless it continued to move to northern parts of Serbia or to Austria. The Turks used all means, especially the Albanian penetration from the mountains into the plains, to destroy the numerous and

spiritually hegemonous Serbs and the cradle of their medieval civilization. In that respect, the Turks received ample assistance from the Catholic missionaries and clergy. Yet, the Serbs kept migrating out of these regions. This was to mark the beginning of the process that ends nowadays with the Serbian loss of Kosovo and the surrounding areas of Old Serbia. The Serbs were strong enough to bind themselves in respect to nationality already in the eighteenth century. The Principality of Serbia was created in 1815 on territory which had formed the core of the Serbian people. Migrations to the promised land were intensified, which meant that the process of reducing Serbian positions in the south was continuing. Reason for this lay in the neglect of regions under foreign occupation due to the Princedom's overly engagement in state politics and domestic affairs.

MIGRATIONS RESULTING FROM PEASANT UPHEAVALS IN SERBIA DURING THE 19th CENTURY

The nineteenth century was often named – the age of nationalism. All European states witnessed fundamental changes in political, socio-economic and cultural spheres which were all generally directed towards the establishment of the national states. The Balkan nations merely followed in the footsteps of their European examples. The nineteenth century in Southeastern Europe was stamped by continual struggle for national independence primarily against the Ottoman occupator.

The Balkans were a permanent battlefield throughout the 1800's. The region was repeatedly shaken by uprisings and wars. It represented the soft spot of Europe where all European Great Powers confronted their political interests.

For those reasons, the 19th century dramatically changed the ethnogeographical map of the Balkans. Great numbers of Balkan population migrated from one part of the Peninsula to the other, looking for shelter from invading armies, more peaceful spot to establish their families and lives or escaping from persecutions and social and religious discriminations.

The Serbian nation was the first to start the insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, already in 1804. Throughout the 19th century it fought, by force as well as by political means, for its national emancipation, finally winning independence at Berlin Congress in 1878. Being an autonomous region since 1830, it gradually grew into the center of the Christian population in the Balkans.

Serbia, which occupied the central geographical position in the Balkans attracted primarily Serbian people from other regions but also Christian population from all over the Balkans. On the other hand Muslims who largely populated Serbian town due to the favorable social position of that particular religious group in the Ottoman Empire, gradually started to leave their Serbian homes. This process resulted from the fact that the achievement of the Serbian autonomy worsened Muslim socio-economic position and minimized their political influence.

The 19th century migrations, however, were not as massive as those of two previous centuries, when huge masses of the Serbian population moved from the South to the North reaching the suburbs of Budim. Still, the migrations of the 19th century, which were taking place in several waves, finally drew the ethnographic map of Serbia, although the Balkans remained an area of instability and continual change until nowadays.

* * *

Discussing the problem of Balkan migrations, Jovan Cvijic an outstanding Serbian geo-anthropologist from the first half of the 20th century, pointed

out three major aspects of migrations in the Balkans: historical – political aspect – migrations as a consequence of Turkish occupation and the Ottoman system of government as well as of numerous rebellions and wars against the Ottomans; socio – psychological aspect – which included reactions of the local population against the Turkish system of timar – chiflik feudal structure (forceful labor, augmentation of agrarian obligations, expropriation of land etc.); geographic or natural aspect – migrations as a result of the lack of fertile land and a high birth rate.

Another Serbian scholar, Tihomir Djordjevic, dealing with a similar question, emphasized socio-ethnographic aspect of migrations from neighboring areas to Serbia. Prominent Yugoslav historian Vasa Čubrilović also touched upon the problem of migrations insisting on a complex of historical, political, social and cultural-ethnic factors. He found the basic motive of migration processes in patriarchal organization of South Slavs which was forcefully jeopardized by the Turkish rule.

Finally, it was Sreten Vukosavljevic who pointed out the important role of mountain population from Southwestern parts of Serbia who, driven by needs of extensive sheepbreeding activities, were coming down to the valleys and regions of milder Turkish regime, namely Beograd Pashalik.

* * *

Although there are no statistical data about Serbian population prior to the First insurrection, one could assume with relative certainty that Belgrade Pashalik numbered between 200,000 and 250,000 Serbs and about 40,000 Turks. According to Ljubomir Jovanović, in 1804 Serbia had 188,000 males or about 368,000 inhabitants. Grgur Jakić gave a very similar figure 300–400,000. Already in 1808, the estimates made in Paris assumed that Serbia had about 600,000 inhabitants.

In 1799 about 2,000 jannisaries returned to Serbian towns (Beograd, Smederevo, Šabac) and some 4,000 Turks came from Bosnia. According to Prota Matija Nenadović, in five fortresses of Belgrade Pashalik there were 25,000 Turks: in Beograd 16,000, in Smederevo 1,500, in Šabac 2,000, in Soko 1,500 and Užice 4,500. Generally speaking, during the First insurrection (1804–1813) the Christian population in Serbia augmented importantly while the Turks almost disappeared from the region. In terms of ethno – geographical changes, there were two separate periods: first from 1804 to 1807, which was characterized by massive emigration of the Turks by way of Danube river towards Ada Kale, Kladovo and Vidin; Muslims originally from Bosnia, returned to their native region by way of Srem and finally, a number of Turks died of disease, exhaustion and in armed conflicts. In that same period a number of Jews left Serbian towns and moved to Zemun (Austria). According to archival sources from 1807, there were 55 Jewish families with 143 members in Zemun. The Serbs were coming to Beograd Pashalik from Southern regions, Morava-Vardar valley and Southwestern Macedonia as well as from Bulgarian regions of Vidin and Sofia. After the offensive of the Serbian army in the West in 1809 about 10,000 people escaped from Bosnia to Serbia proper. Some 15,000 people moved from Novi Pazar region together with Karadjordje's army.

Some fragmental statistics of the newcomers' numbers during the First insurrection might be rather illustrative:

Gornje i Donje Dragačevo	– 158 families
Lepenica	– 571 families
Požarevac	– 342 families
Mlava river	– 149 families

During that same period 1806–1807, a number of wealthier Serbs from Austrian areas (Srem and Slavonia), Bosnia and Southwestern Macedonia moved to Serbia. Newcomers came also from regions of Prokuplje, Niš, Sofia and Vidin. They inhabited mostly cities and smaller towns and formed a new layer of elementary urban class: businessmen, merchants, teachers, administrators and students (The Velika škola (High School) was founded in 1808 and the Clerical School in 1810).

The second period (1807–1813) witnessed an opposite process: massive migrations of Serbs from Eastern Bosnia, regions of Stari Vlah mountain, Lim river, Novi Pazar, Niš, Leskovac and Vidin to the North took place after the Serbian defeat at Niš (Cegar) in the summer of 1809. In that same year there were about 50,000 people ready to escape from the vicinity of Belgrade to Austria. After the final breakdown of the Insurrection in 1813, about 100,000 Serbs moved to Austrian territory. According to Austrian sources, the Serbian emigres in Zemun, who arrived in the period from October 1813 to the first months of 1814, originated from the liberated territory of Serbia but also from other parts of the Balkan Peninsula, namely from Južna Morava region, Southwestern and Southern Macedonia, Western Bulgaria and from Bosnia. More than 180 Zemun families gave shelter to those refugees. On the other side, the Turks as well as Jews, Tsintsars and Greeks gradually returned to Serbian towns. In general, this composition of the population remained until 1830.

* * *

The process of migrations of the Christian population to Serbia continued during the Second Insurrection (1815–1830). Those demographic changes went as follows: in 1815 Serbia numbered 43,527 persons who paid taxes (harac). That number augmented to 115,885 in 1818 and by 1819 it reached 119,854. In 1833, 177,427 Serbs paid dues to the Turks. According to the same source, the Serbian population doubled in the period 1815–1833 and according to other authors it even tripled. It is beyond doubt that the influence of the Serbian national emancipation process was the instrumental factor in causing those massive demographic changes.

Three major ethnic groups came to Serbia during that particular period: Christians from Bosnia, Stara Serbia, Rumeli, Macedonia, Epirus, Tessaly and Bulgaria; Tsintsars and Greeks from Turkish regions; and Vlachs and Gipsies from Vallachia.

The causes of those migrations were essentially threefold: first, Serbia was a region of favorable natural and economic conditions; second, Prince Miloš Obrenović distributed land to all those who took Serbian citizenship. He kept on promoting colonial policy in order to strengthen human, financial and defensive potentials of the country; and third, Serbia represented

a relatively democratic environment especially for the Christian population which was subject to various mistreatments in other parts of the Balkans. Particularly massive were migrations from Greece due to the Greek war of independence which lasted throughout the 1820's.

For those reasons, during the period 1815–1830, the Serbian village made substantial progress becoming the major cornerstone of the Serbian economic strength.

The process of colonization from neighboring parts of the Ottoman Empire continued after 1833. Among the members of the central Serbian administration there was a good number of Serbs from Austria while the local bureaucracy originated from various parts of Serbia proper. During that period the Serbian population grew for almost one fourth: from 678,133 in 1833 to 849,236 in 1844.

Another wave of migrations to Serbia from the South came in 1841. After the breakdown of the rebellion against the Ottoman rule in Niš region, several hundred families from Niš, Piroć, Prokuplje and Leskovac moved to Serbia.

Several years later, after the revolutionary events in Hungary which resulted in severe reprisals in the spring of 1849, a substantial number of Serbs from Vojvodina escaped to Srem and Serbia. In March of 1849, between 20 and 25,000 people moved from Backa to Serbia. They inhabited places on Danube river facing Banat, Beograd, Smederevo, and Požarevac areas. A number of those emigrés were sent to the hinteland and were settled in Kragujevac, Krajina and Valjevo regions. The exact figure of those migrations is impossible to specify, but according to certain estimates between 30 and 200,000 Serbs migrated to Serbia.

The growth of the overall population in Serbia continued steadily throughout the 1860's and 1870's: in 1866 – 1,200,000 and in 1874 – 1,350,000.

* * *

The Serbian-Turkish wars 1876–1878 caused the most massive migration process in the Balkans in the course of the 19th century. About two million people changed their living spaces: a million Christians and a million Muslims. About 200,000 Serbs escaped from Kosovo to Serbia and about 70,000 fled to Montenegro. After the uprising in Hercegovina in 1875, another 200,000 Serbs migrated to Serbia. The negative outcome of the first Serbian-Turkish war in 1876 initiated migration movements from frontier regions, especially around Kragujevac, Aleksinac and Knjazevac. Escaping from Turkish reprisals the population from those regions moved towards inland and Beograd. The Serbian Minister of Interior gave an instruction to the people from those areas in March of 1877 in which he called the local population not to leave their homes because of the danger that the Albanians might inhabit their villages and homes. In April of 1878 general Kosta Protić sent a report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Beograd informing about Serbian escapations to Vranje “from regions from Kumanovo to Skoplje” on a daily basis “due to the abuses of Turkish soldiers”. Particular massive migrations of Serbs were those from the areas of Lab, Kopaonik and Toplice.

According to Jovan Cvijić about 30,000 Serbs moved out of those regions. Deserted villages were almost immediately inhabited by Albanian families. Already in 1867 14,963 inhabitants of Albanian origin arrived to those parts of the country. 460 Serbian families left Vučitrn-Kopaonik in 1876 and after 1879, only 597 Serbian homes with 5217 inhabitants remained in Toplice, a region of 3,679km² – about 11 inhabitants on 1 km².

* * *

The second aspect of migrations in Serbia were the inner movements from the village to the towns. This process was caused by substantial socio-economic changes in the society. During the Turkish occupation, it was largely the Muslims, Jews, Greeks and Tsintsars who inhabited the cities while the Serbian population lived in the villages. It was only in the second half of the 19th century that the Serbs started to move to the urban settlements in greater numbers. Until then less than 10% lived in cities. In 1866 still only 10% of the Serbian overall population belonged to the urban class. The Turks finally left Serbian towns in 1867, but that fact did not immediately change the percentage of the Serbian urban population. That figure slowly grew to 13% in 1878. Until 1882 the percentage augmented for modest 0,2% and by 1890 it reached 14%.

The growth of the population in the period 1878–1903 was mostly by natural birthrate although migrations were still going on, especially from Turkish areas of Stara Srbija and Macedonia, from Montenegro and Hercegovina.

* * *

Migrations to and out of Serbia in the course of the 19th century had three major aspects. First, like most of the Balkan migrations, they were caused by political unrests, turmoils and upheavals. Numerous insurrections and rebellions resulted in massive movements of the population from one region to the other. Second, those migrations were religiously colored. Christian population in general, and especially the Serbs, kept on coming to Serbia while the Muslim population gradually left Serbian territory. Third, the 19th century migrations had their inner aspect – population movements caused by socio-economic changes which enabled the build up of the Serbian urban class and modern society in general.

In the course of the 19th century Serbia gradually grew into a central region in the Balkans which attracted Serbs and other Christians from all over the Peninsula. Its role of Piedmont which was finally achieved at the beginning of the 20th century was prepared already in the 1800's.

Bibliography

1. Vladimir Stojančević, »Politički uzroci promenama stanovništva Beograda i okoline u vreme prvog srpskog ustanka«, *Godišnjak grada Beograda*, 20, Beograd 1973, 89–105,
2. . . . , »Tursko stanovništvo u Srbiji pred prvi srpski ustanak«, *Zbornik Matice srpske*, Novi Sad 1956, 127–134.

3. ..., »Migracije iz Bugarske u Srbiju za vreme kneza Miloša«, *Glasnik Etnografskog instituta*, 8, Beograd 1960, 61–79.
4. ..., »Protokol izbeglica iz Srbije u Zemun 1813«, *Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije*, 8–9, Beograd 1972, 43–85.
5. ..., »Knez Miloš i problemi balkanskih migracija u Srbiji posle drugog ustanka«, *Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije*, 5, Beograd 1968, 23–39.
6. ..., »Stanovništvo Srbije za vreme prvog ustanka«, *Istorijski glasnik*, Beograd 1955, 41–58.
7. Vidosava Stojančević, Etničke promene i migraciona kretanja u Srbiji usled srpsko-turskih ratova 1876, 1877 i 1878«, *Gledišta*, 9, 1978, 812–819.
8. Vasilije Krestić, »Vojvodjanske izbeglice u Srbiji 1849. godine«, *Zbornik Matice srpske*, 29, Novi Sad 1961, 101–111.
9. Radoslav Lj. Pavlović, »Seobe Srba i Arbanasa u ratovima 1876 i 1877–1878 godine«, *Glasnik Etnografskog instituta*, 4–6, Beograd 1955–57, 53–101.
10. Jovan Cvijić, *Antropogeografski problemi Balkanskog poluostrva*, Beograd 1902.
11. ..., *Metanastazička kretanja, njihovi uzroci i posledice. Naselja i poreklo stanovništva*, Beograd 1922.
12. Tihomir Djordjević, *Iz Srbije kneza Miloša. Stanovništvo – naselja*, Beograd 1924.
13. Vasa Čubrilović, »Politički uzroci seoba na Balkanu 1860–1880«, *Glasnik Geografskog društva*, 16, Beograd 1930.
14. ..., *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji 19. veka*, Beograd 1958.
15. Sreten Vukosavljević, *Istorija seljačkog društva, 1*, Beograd 1953.

THE BULGARIAN INTELLECTUAL EMIGRATION IN RUMANIA DURING THE VUZRAZHDANE

The 19th century Bulgarian intellectual emigration in Rumania played a significant role in the development of Bulgarian culture during the *Vuzrazhdane*, or National Revival period. Seeking to throw off the “double yoke” of Ottoman political oppression and Phanariote spiritual domination, Bulgarians sought means of advancement and liberation outside their political and ethnic boundaries. Residence in Rumania offered cultural, educational and professional opportunities, contacts with an international revolutionary community and, during the latter stages of the *Vuzrazhdane*, the freedom to express nationalist sentiment and to engage in anti-Ottoman activities. Although the emigre-intelligentsia was highly politicized, this paper will not focus on revolutionary activities, but rather on the formation and cultural activity of the emigre-intelligentsia before the 1878 Liberation.

A Soviet historian, Elena Siupiuir, has identified approximately 400 Bulgarian intellectual emigres in Rumania during the 19th century.¹ The formation of this group reflects three socio-political processes: 1) emigration from various parts of the Ottoman Empire, 2) formation of a Bulgarian emigre-intelligentsia on Rumanian soil, accepted, supported and influenced by the native intelligentsia, and 3) inclusion of Bulgarians in the social, political and cultural life of Rumania.² Following the 1878 Liberation, many of these emigres returned to Bulgaria, assuming leading roles in the process of nation building.

The Bulgarian intelligentsia developed from the late 18th century as an expression of the secularization of society. The first representatives of this group were mostly teachers of village origins. Gradually, the intelligentsia assumed a more bourgeois character as Bulgarians of merchant and artisan backgrounds took on a new social position resulting from their education and new professions.

The quest for education or a place to apply education and talent is the most distinguishing characteristic of the emigre-intelligentsia. In the early part of the century professional motives prompted emigration. Bulgarians educated in the Greek language became private teachers for boyar families. A few doctors, educated in Paris and Munich, practiced in Rumania or became professors at the Bucharest Medical School. Bulgarians of various occupations – lawyers, engineers, artists, mathematicians and physicists – sought a place to practice their professions. Not only did Bulgaria lack professional institutions, but the specter of arrest upon return there faced those who had studied abroad. Also, clerical emigres, fleeing persecution of the Phanariote spiritual authorities, taught in Rumanian villages where a substantial Bulgarian population existed or produced theological publications. The first 19th century Bulgarian intellectual, political emigre was a cleric, Bishop Sofronii Vrachanski, a follower of the pioneer of the

Vuzrazhdane, Fr. Paisii. Sofroni lived under the protection of the Wallachian Metropolitan, in Bucharest in the early part of the century. There he wrote the greatest part of his well-known work, "The Life and Sufferings of Sinful Sofronii" (*Zhitie i stradanie greshnago Sofroniia*). This work, anti-Ottoman and anti-Phanariote in content, revealed reasons for the migrations of intellectuals – not to perish spiritually and to fulfill a duty to the people. In the final analysis, it was the political, social, professional and moral repression of Ottoman and Phanariote domination, in conflict with an educated and secular intelligentsia that sparked the migrations.³

The 19th century intellectual emigration expanded the areas of Bulgarian colonization in Rumania which dated from the 14th and 15th century diaspora of Balkan peoples fleeing the advancing Ottoman Empire. Christian Orthodox intellectuals, primarily clerics, fled north of the Danube and organized spiritual centers, which served as cultural preserves. Throughout the 18th century Bulgarian cloth merchants and agricultural workers migrated seeking economic opportunity.

Mass Bulgarian migration north of the Danube, mostly to Wallachia, dates from the late 18th century when nearly 10,000 Bulgarians fled the manifestations of the decaying Ottoman Empire: the abuses imposed by Ottoman authorities and independent pashas, such as Pasvan Oglu in northern Bulgaria, renegade Ottoman mercenaries and the terror of janassaries and kirdjalis. Exploitation of the peasantry by large landowners and *chorbadjis* (the wealthy Bulgarian bourgeoisie) as well as the imposition of the chiflik landholding system which reduced the peasantry to serfdom also prompted migration. These emigres created an artisan labor force for the cloth merchants who had emigrated earlier and formed communities in Bucharest and Giurgiu which attracted later migrants and built the material base for *Vuzrazhdane* activists.⁴

The first two waves of 19th century mass migration were prompted by the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1806–12 and 1828–29. Official sanction was given to the second wave by Point 13 of the Peace of Adrianople (Odrin) which permitted free emigration for eighteen months to any citizens who had taken sides in the conflict, with the conditions that the emigrants sell their real property and emigrate with their families and movable possessions. Dislocations of war and fear of Ottoman retaliations prompted some 100,000 to migrate, leaving southeastern Bulgaria nearly depopulated. In the town of Sliven, for example, only 65 of 4,000 families remained.

Throughout the 19th century Bulgarian colonies grew in Bucharest, Braila, Ploesht, Aleksandriia, Galats, Giurgevo, Zimnich and Kraiova, as well as in smaller towns and villages. After 1856 Bolgrad and Izmail became significant areas of colonization. The majority of the migrants were artisans and merchants who settled in the towns – for example, the number of Bulgarian families in Ploesht grew from 320 in 1831 to 479 in 1838 – and horticulturists, stockbreeders and sheperds who were dispersed throughout the countryside.⁵

Development of the emigre colonies was furthered by the expanding Rumanian economy. The Rumanian Organic Statutes, established by the 1829 Peace of Adrianople, freed trade from Turkish restrictions, thereby

promoting economic modernization and development of domestic and foreign trade. Many Bulgarians settled in Danubian communities, conducting trade with their co-nationals and various European countries. An initially brief period of freedom from taxation was extended as a result of emigre initiatives. An 1834 protocol of the Wallachian government granted a three year complete exemption, followed by a 7-year period in which the emigres were taxed at half the rate imposed on the native population.⁶

These favorable economic conditions prompted the growth of a prosperous emigre merchant class which made substantial contributions to the development of Bulgarian culture, especially during the 1850s–70s. Prominent among this group are the Georgiev brothers, Christo and Evlogii, who emigrated to Bucharest in the late 1830s. Beginning as livestock traders, they extended their scope of activity to sale of other goods and extension of credit and by the 1860s were wealthy enough to lease several boyar estates. Their international economic activity made them leaders among the emigre merchants, who, as a class, provided substantial funding for Bulgarian schools and supported Bulgarian students.⁷ However, this merchant class, conservative or bourgeois-liberal in character was to later clash with the emigre-intelligentsia, political and revolutionary in character.

The third wave of emigration, beginning during the years of the Crimean War had a determined intellectual and political-revolutionary nature, despite the reform measures taken by the Porte to improve relations with its Balkan subjects and stem the growing tide of emigration. The geographical distribution of the emigre-intelligentsia was determined by existing centers of Bulgarian population and Rumanian centers of political and cultural life, that is, Bucharest, Braila, Galats, Ploesht and Bolgrad. The Wallachian capitol of Bucharest, the most populous city in Southeastern Europe, numbering nearly 60,000 by 1831, was especially attractive. The large number of foreign progressive and revolutionary elements there, together with the city's history as a leader in the struggle for national independence made it the ideological and political center for Southeastern Europe.⁸

Rumania became a center for Bulgarian social and political activists who came into contact with their counterparts from Russia, Austria, Serbia, Greece, Constantinople, Germany and Czechoslovakia. The conditions that permitted the formation of a Bulgarian emigre-intelligentsia and national liberation center were Rumanian in character. The participation of the Rumanians in numerous Balkan liberation struggles as well as their personal struggle for independence, fostered sympathy for the plight of their neighbors to the south of Danube. Social, political and cultural democratization of Rumanian society following the 1859 unification of the Principalities provided encouragement to progressive Bulgarians. Following the 1866 ouster of the Rumanian Prince, Alexander Cuza, the Rumanian liberals supported the Bulgarian liberation movement. Within Rumanian territory, the Bulgarians were permitted complete freedom to indulge in anti-Ottoman and national liberation activity. Material and moral support was afforded the emigres, as well as diplomatic and political coverage protecting Bulgarians who committed revolutionary acts or expressed revolutionary ideas.⁹

Vital to the liberation of Bulgaria was the development of a national culture. The emigre-intelligentsia played the leading role in establishing a network of Bulgarian cultural-intellectual institutions, conducted in the Bulgarian language, and regulated by the Rumanian Ministry of Education and Religions. Political, legal and material support was received from the Rumanian state, which similarly supported Greek and Albanian institutions. This network of Bulgarian cultural institutions was unique among Bulgarian emigres in Rumania; few such establishments existed in other areas of Bulgarian colonization.¹⁰

Foremost among the new cultural institutions were the Bulgarian schools. Education was a dynamic social phenomenon at the center of *Vuzrazhdane* cultural life, closely connected with the preparation and implementation of the liberation movement. Spiritual and physical liberation could only come about when modern education tore down medieval traditions and stilted social norms. Education created a politically active populace, established new structures necessary to administer educational facilities, formed a national intelligentsia and developed national and international contacts which influenced the national liberation movement. The establishment of Bulgarian schools was therefore not only a sign of social progress, but a means of ensuring further social development.¹¹

Education of the Bulgarian emigres began in Rumanian educational institutions. Of the 400 identified Bulgarian intellectuals in Rumania, some 235 studied in Rumanian schools which included Greek language schools, boarding schools for both sexes, gymnasiums, seminaries, philosophical institutes, and institutes of music, forestry, agricultural, engineering, medicine and pharmacology. Between 1835–78 more than 100 Bulgarians graduated from the medical school in Bucharest and 71 finished the classical gymnasium in Bolgrad. From 1847 a number of Rumanian primary schools included courses in the Bulgarian language.

The emigres took a leading role in two seminal events in the development of Bulgarian education. In 1824 Dr. Peter Beron, who had emigrated to Brashov during the 1821 Greek Uprising, published the first primer written in colloquial Bulgarian, known popularly as the *Riben Bukvar* or *Fish Primer*. This book, which ran to 25 editions before the Liberation, expressed the rejection of traditional monastic education in favor of modern, secular education.¹² The first secular school within Bulgaria was established with the aid of some Bucharest merchants, the Moustakovi brothers and Ivan Hadju Bakaglu, who worked together with the Odessa merchants Vasil Aprilov and Nikola Palaouzov. In 1834 they dispatched a monk from Rila Monastery, Neofit Rilski, to Bucharest to study the requirements of secular education. Rilski then opened a school in Gabrovo in January 1835.¹³

The first Bulgarian school in Rumania was founded in Bucharest in 1830 by Vasil Nenovich, a merchant emigre who had turned to teaching, translating, writing and publishing. Lacking sufficient students, the school was short-lived, but the desire of the emigre-intelligentsia to organize Bulgarian education persisted.¹⁴ In 1836 a Bulgarian-Rumanian school, notable for its teaching of the humanities, was established in Alexandria by the Orthodox church. The progressive views of two Rumanian social activists, George

Lazar and Ion Eliade Ruduleski, influenced the curriculum. These men espoused as their ideal the liberation of the entire Balkan peninsula, led by educated citizens. Ruduleski's view was that "Without the school we can expect nothing – not good parents, not good sons, not good public servants, and in the end not a state, well organized and preserved."¹⁵ Alexandria was also the site of a private school, opened upon the insistence of the emigre merchants, which trained interpreters in Greek and Bulgarian.¹⁶ In 1841 Georgi Rakovski, the famous Bulgarian social and political activist, opened a private school in Braila, furthering the movement for Bulgarian-language education.¹⁷

A major advancement of Bulgarian education came with the 1858 opening of the Bulgarian Central school in Bolgrad which included a pedagogical course. Following the 1859 Unification of the Rumanian Principalities, numerous Bulgarian primary schools were established under the direction of the Rumanian Ministry of Education. Some 27 schools functioned under the jurisdiction of the Bolgrad Central School, expanding to 38 by the Liberation. In addition, three boarding schools were opened and Rumanian statistics for 1864 show the existence of 100 private schools, most of which were Bulgarian.¹⁸

Educational opportunities were extended to Bulgarian girls from the emigre families, echoing the extension of education to females within Bulgarian lands. A girls' school was opened in Bolgrad during 1846–47, but was of brief duration, probably due to disagreement among the emigres about the need for educating females.¹⁹ However, by the 1860s, two girls' schools were operating in the Bolgrad region. In Bucharest a primary school was established for both sexes and during the 1860s a girls' boarding school was opened by Maria Kasabova, who had been educated in Bucharest and Munich and was married to a Bulgarian emigre merchant and political activist, Ivan Kasabov.²⁰

Disunity among the emigres proved to be an impediment to the development of the schools. It was largely the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who maintained the schools with help from the merchants, but the two groups frequently clashed.²¹ The progressive and revolutionary elements among the teachers, such as Christo Botev, who preached a revolutionary path to liberation, disturbed the more conservative emigres who preferred diplomatic means. Conflicts sometimes resulted in the temporary or permanent closing of schools. In Giurgevo, for example, a Bulgarian school was established in 1864 with donations from Bulgarian patriots, but suffered interference from the outset from *chorbadzhis* and had ceased to function by 1871. In 1869 the conservative elements in Braila, concentrated in the *Dobrodetelna Druzhdina*, or Benevolent Association, objected to the teaching of a dramatic version of a patriotic work "Raina, the Bulgarian Princess" and succeeded in driving out the school board. The school continued to function however, and was reorganized within two years.²²

Emigres funded the education of Bulgarian youth in various European nations. Major contributions were made by the above-mentioned *Dobrodetelna Druzhdina*, supported mostly by the merchant Georgiev brothers. Funds raised by churches and other emigre associations augmented these

efforts. Most of the students were educated in Russia due to the Slavophile orientation of the Georgievs, but some were schooled within Rumania. The general viewpoint of the emigre community was that Bulgarian national education was a strong weapon with which to defend the territorial integrity of the homeland. This idea found expression in emigre support of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia with money and educational materials dispatched to towns and villages. Again, the *Dobrodetelna Druzhdina* was especially active in this endeavor, having contacts with the *Makedonski Druzhdina* in Constantinople whose goal was to extinguish the lamp of Hellenism.²³

A highly significant and unique Bulgarian educational institution was the *chitalishte*, literally reading room. Established within Bulgarian lands from the late 1850s, the *chitalishta* spread to nine emigre centers in Rumania, functioning as specific institutions of political and cultural activity of the emigre-intelligentsia. They contained libraries with both Bulgarian and foreign literature; functioned as gathering places for the emigres, especially on national holidays; presented dramatic and musical events; sponsored lectures in history, science, medicine and other areas; and supported Bulgarian schools. In addition they became centers for the political press and political activists, maintaining close connections and having overlapping membership with revolutionary committees. Strong relations were maintained among the *chitalishta* as well as between them and other cultural institutions.²⁴

In response to the *chitalishta*, almost purely male enclaves, Bulgarian women's associations (*zhenski druzhestva*) were established from the mid-1850s, numbering approximately fifty by the time of the Liberation, with three established by the emigres in Bucharest, Bolgrad and Braila. The majority of educated women participated in these associations which played a central role in the integration of women into society and provided a forum for use of their skills and knowledge. Educated women formed a "passive intelligentsia" – functioning as bearers of culture without applying their education and talent to outside professions²⁵ Within the women's associations, they found a place to apply their education and work for social advancement. Membership afforded women opportunities for a move outside the traditional sphere of the home, church and marketplace; development and application of social, political and communication skills; a forum in which to share knowledge; and developed a nascent feminist sense of sisterhood among the members. The social significance of the associations was reflected in the development of nationalist sentiment among members; interaction among associations and with male political and social groups which encouraged the breakdown of the gender-separate spheres; the organization and support for the national liberation movement; and their role in the organization of civic and political life and in the training of post-liberation social activists.

The primary activities of the *zhenski druzhestva* were the support of girls' schools and benevolent activities. The emigre women's associations took on special significance in the area of benevolent work after the April Uprising of 1876 and the vicious Ottoman reprisals, the famous "Bulgarian Horrors." The Bucharest association sent an appeal to the British politician, William Gladstone, thanking him for his protest against the Ottoman out-

rages and requesting him to appeal to the British public for aid for the suffering areas. A second appeal, published in French in July 1876, publicized the terror inflicted on Bulgarians and Serbs and made a Europe-wide plea for help. A special humanitarian committee, formed by women from Braila and Galats, attempted to ransom Bulgarian women and children taken as slaves by the Turks, and to establish connections with all philanthropic associations in Europe to obtain moral and material support. They succeeded in gathering and distributing significant quantities of money, food and clothing. The Braila women's society, founded in 1870, provided material aid to victims of the uprising and the emigre community at large, and was known for its connections with the women's associations within Bulgaria and its ties with the women's section of the Slavic Committee in Moscow. The Braila group received substantial funding from the Bulgarian Literary Society, reflecting the interaction typical among emigre associations. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 all the women's associations provided aid to sick and wounded Russian soldiers and Bulgarian volunteers, as well as to the civilian population in the war-torn areas.²⁶

Various other political, professional and cultural associations were founded, with the political groups being the strongest and most active. These included the Bucharest Committee, The Secret Central Bulgarian Committee, the Bulgarian Central Revolutionary Committee and The Bulgarian Humanitarian Board. The *Dobrodetelna Druzhdina* was active in the organization of Bulgarian volunteers during the Crimean War, played a role in the organization of the April Uprising, and during the 1860s was connected with a Serbian-Bulgarian Association which formed the Second Bulgarian Legion in Beograd.²⁷

The emigre-intelligentsia found a specific political and cultural expression in their periodical press which included 57 newspapers and magazines, published mostly in Bucharest (24), Braila (22), Giurgevo (4), Bolgrad (4) and Ploesht (3). Many of the publications were connected to political associations – the Secret Central Revolutionary Committee's *Narodnost*, (nationality), the *Dobrodetelna Druzhdina*'s *Otechestvo* (Fatherland), the Central Revolutionary Committee's *Svoboda* (Freedom), *Nezavisimost* (Independence) and *Zname* (Banner). The titles of the publications bespeak their political and nationalist orientation. Various cultural periodicals existed such as the Bolgrad Central School's *Obsth Trud* (Societal Work) and the publication of the dramatist Dobri Voinikov, *Danube Dawn*. Many emigres purchased books to be sent to schools and *chitalishta* within Bulgaria and to other centers of Bulgarian emigration and were also regular subscribers to various publishing houses.²⁸

Cultural advancement found many avenues of expression among the emigre-intelligentsia. The well-known painter, Nikola Pavlovich, produced many works reflecting national consciousness. An emigre in Braila, Atanas Duchevev, collected Bulgarian art, antiques, documents and other cultural artifacts. The first pioneers of music among the emigres, the Mikhailidi brothers from Sliven, wrote patriotic songs. A number of literary figures were among the emigres – Christo Botev, Dobri Voinikov, the dramatist Vasil Drumov and the author of the later famous novel of the uprisings,

Under the Yoke, Ivan Vazov. Voinikov led the development of Bulgarian national theater, establishing a theatrical association in Braila which operated from 1865–76 in which women appeared on stage for the first time in Bulgarian theatrical history.²⁹ Braila was also the site of the Bulgarian Literary Society, founded by Marin Drinov, the renowned scholar of Bulgarian language, literature, folklore, and ethnography. This society evolved into the present day Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia.

Although religion played a strong role in Bulgarian life, few Bulgarian churches were founded in emigration because of the presence of the Rumanian Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian churches that were opened in Bucharest, Braila and Galats had two aspects: cultural/political and educational. Many priests served as teachers and the churches printed books for the Bulgarian schools. The clergy were politicized, taking part in revolutionary activity and delivering sermons about the Bulgarian historical and national cause. The clergy, as well as the emigration as a whole, fervently supported the movement for a Bulgarian church, free of Greek spiritual authority, which was achieved in the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870.

The emigre-intelligentsia found a place in Rumanian cultural and political life, participating in professional and cultural associations and educational institutions. They became central and regional administrators in government, organized theatricals and lotteries, served on school boards and political committees, and worked in publishing houses.³⁰

Bulgarian political and revolutionary activity on Rumanian lands is a well-known development. As noted earlier, Bulgarian emigres were part of an international revolutionary emigration in Rumania. The most famous liberation theorists and revolutionary leaders – Georgi Rakovski, Liuben Karavelov, Vasil Levski and Christo Botev – developed much of their political thought and activity in Rumania. Bulgarian volunteers took part in the 1821 Greek and Rumanian uprisings, launched several abortive revolts from Braila between 1841–43 in cooperation with Greeks and Serbs with the goal of fomenting general insurrection throughout the Ottoman Empire, and supported revolutionary actions in the Principalities in 1848. From the 1850s a number of Bulgarian revolutionary-political committees were formed with the tacit permission of the Rumanian government. Illustrative of the Rumanian attitude toward the activity of the emigres is the response of Ion Bratianu, the Liberal Party leader, to a deputy in Parliament who questioned him about the organization of Bulgarian rebel bands on Rumanian territory. Bratianu, although familiar with police evidence of the *cheta*, denied any knowledge saying: “I am asking you, sir, if you have seen, your honor, if you have heard the bands, which are forming in order to cross the Danube and to incite rebellion in the East? In any case, the government knows nothing and furthermore does not desire to be accused that it is not taking measures.” Bratianu continued to say “I maintain sympathy for all who suffer, for all who yearn for freedom, because we have the same strivings. I, sir, love and sympathize with all unhappy peoples.”³¹ From this atmosphere emerged a fully politicized Bulgarian emigre-intelligentsia, essential to the national liberation movement.

The Eastern Crisis of 1875–78 brought revolutionary forces into full play. The uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 facilitated the spread of Balkan revolutionary activities, especially among Bulgarians. The emigres were among the leaders of the April 1876 uprising and Botev's abortive raid was launched from Rumanian soil. The Bulgarians, however, lacked the resources and strength to achieve their liberation alone. It was the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War, in which a number of Bulgarians fought as volunteers, that finally freed Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke.

Following the Liberation, many of the emigre-intelligentsia returned to their homeland to assume a role in the development of a new society. The scope of their activity is broad; they served as ministers, politicians, diplomats, administrators, civil servants, military officers, educators, judges, lawyers, writers, journalists, publishers, doctors, merchants and clerics. Those who remained in Rumania kept close ties with their newly liberated homeland.

The nature of this emigration as a largely temporary expedient is evident from the nationalistic activities of the emigres, their unceasing connections with their co-nationals still under Ottoman domination and the return of many of the emigres to liberated Bulgaria. Emigration was a lofty expression of political ideals, not a refutation of their homeland. They were a self-determined political emigration, developed over nearly a century, whose cultural and educational initiatives prompted political activism and developed cultural and political ideas that would influence the post-Liberation era.

The institutions established in emigration preserved and furthered Bulgarian culture, without, however, constituting a separatism on the part of the emigres, many of whom participated in Rumanian educational, cultural and political institutions. Furthermore, the curriculum of the Bulgarian schools included Rumanian language and literature and, conversely, Bulgarian courses were taught in Rumanian schools, thereby creating a bilingual segment of both populations which assured enduring Bulgarian-Rumanian cultural and scholarly ties.

Although a foreign environment, Rumania was, at the same time, familiar to the Bulgarian emigres, given the similar historical development and common social traditions. The moral, material and political support afforded to the Bulgarian emigres by the Rumanian state was a major factor in the development of the emigre intelligentsia who provided not only the cultural and political foundations for the National Revival and Liberation, but also became post-Liberation social and political activists who were essential to the development of the modern Bulgarian state.

Notes

¹ Elena Siupiur, *Bulgarskata emigranska inteligentsia v Rumuniia prez XIX vek*. Siupiur identifies the emigres as members of the intelligentsia on the basis of education and occupation.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 27–29

⁴ Nicholas Gianaris, *The Economies of the Balkan Countries*, 33; John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950*, 45–46.

⁵ Siupiur, 24.

- ⁶ Nikolae Chakir, *Khristo Botev v Rumuniia*, 14; Konstantin Veliki and Veselin Traikov, compilers, *Bulgarskata emigratsiia vuv Vlakhiia sled Rusko-Turskata vojna, 1828–29*.
- ⁷ Lampe and Jackson, 140; Khristo Glushkov, *Evlogii i Khristo Georgievi*, 9 & 206.
- ⁸ Radu Florescu, "Social Class and Revolutionary Ferment in Nineteenth Century Bucharest," in *Romania Between East and West*, 165.
- ⁹ Siupiur, 26–28.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 83.
- ¹¹ Angel Dimitrov, *Uchilisheteto, progresut i natsionalnata revoliustionnia*, 275.
- ¹² *Modern Bulgaria*, 43; *A Bibliographical Handbook of Bulgarian Authors*, 87.
- ¹³ *Bibliographical Handbook*, 90.
- ¹⁴ Siupiur, 84–85, 177.
- ¹⁵ Chakir, 87.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ¹⁷ Virginia Paskaleva, review of Nikolai Zhechev's *Braila i Bulgarskoto kulturno-natsionalno Vuzrazhdane*, 289.
- ¹⁸ Siupiur, 83–86; Chakir, 54.
- ¹⁹ Virginia Paskaleva, *Bulgarkata prez Vuzrazhdaneto*, 49–50.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 111; Zhecho Atanasov, "Bulgarskite uchilishta v Rumuniia predi Osvobozhdanieto," p. 39; Siupiur, 161–162.
- ²¹ Paskaleva, Review of Zhechev, 128–29.
- ²² Atanasov, 37.
- ²³ Zhechev, 112–13, 115–16.
- ²⁴ Siupiur, 92.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.
- ²⁶ Paskaleva, *Bulgarkata*, 192–95.
- ²⁷ Glushkov, 206.
- ²⁸ Siupiur, 95 & 104.
- ²⁹ *Rechnik na bulgarskata literatura*. 230.
- ³⁰ Siupiur, 97–102.
- ³¹ Chakir, 29.

Bibliography

- Chakir, Nikolae. *Khristo Botev v Rumuniia*. [Christo Botev in Rumania]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1980.
- Djordjević, Dimitrije and Stephen Fischer Galati. *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*. New York: Columbia Universty Press, 1981.
- Dimitrov, Angel. *Uchilisheteto, progresut i natsionalnata revoliustionnia*. Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1987.
- Florescu, Radu. "Social Class and Revolutionary Ferment in Nineteenth Century Bucharest." *Romania Between East and West*. Ed. Stephen Fischer-Galati. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1982.
- Ganev, Todor N. *Bulgarsko-Rumunski nauchni i kulturni vruski, 1869–1944*. [Bulgarian-Rumanian Scientific and Cultural Connections, 1869–1944]. Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1973.
- Gianaris, Nicholas V. *The Economies of the Balkan Countries*. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Glushkov, Khristo. *Evlogii i Khristo Georgievi*. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1982.
- Iz istoriata na bulgarskata nauka, prosveta i kultura prez XIX i XX vek*. [From the History of Bulgarian science, education and culture during the 19th and 20th centuries]. Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1986.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Lampe, John R. and Marvin R. Jackson. *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950*. Bloomington,

- Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- MacKenzie, Andrew, ed. *A Concise History of Romania*. London: Robert Hale, 1985.
- Modern Bulgaria*. Ed. Georgi Bokov. Sofia: Sofia Press, 1981.
- Paskaleva, Virginia. *Bulgarkata prez Vuzrazhdaneto*. Sofia: Otechestven Front, 1984.
- Paskaleva, Virginia. Review of *Braila i Bulgarskoto kulturno-natsionalno Vuzrazhdane* by Nikolai Zhechev. In *Istoricheski Pregled* 27:6, 1971.
- Rechnik na Bulgarskata Literatura*. 3. vols. Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1976.
- Siupiur, Elena. *Bulgarskata emigranski inteligentsiia v Rumuniia prez XIX vek*. [The Bulgarian emigre intelligentsia in Rumania during the 19th century]. Sofia: Bulgarskata Akademiia na naukite, 1982.
- Veliki, Konstantin. *Rumuniia i bulgarskoto revoliutsionno dvizhenie za natsionalno osvobozhdenie (1850–1878)*. [Romania and the Bulgarian Revolutionary Movement for National Liberation]. Sofia: Otechestvenniia front, 1982.
- Veliki, Konstantin and Veselin Traikov. *Bulgarskata emigratsiia vuv Vlakhiia sled Rusko-Turskata voina, 1828–1829*. [The Bulgarian Emigration in Wallachia after the Russo-Turkish War]. Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1980.
- Zhechev, Nikolai. "Bulgarskata emigratsiia v Bukeresht prez Vuzrazhdaneto i uchebnoto delo v Iugozapadna Bulgariia." [The Bulgarian Emigration in Bucharest During the National Revival and Education in Southwestern Bulgaria.] In *Iubileen sbornik v chest na akademik Dimitur Kosev*. [Jubilee Collection in Honor of Academician Dimitur Kosev.] Sofia: Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1985.

FALLMERAYER REVISITED

During the long, repressive occupation of the Greek-speaking Balkans by the Ottoman Turks, Greece as an entity was virtually forgotten by the rest of Europe, which had the opportunity to go through a Renaissance, an Enlightenment, to rediscover political pluralism and the scientific method.

It was therefore a shock to some and a thrill to most when in 1821 the news reached northern Europe that there was in fact a Greece and that it was engaged in a heroic struggle to liber itself from the hated Turk, a struggle rivaling any campaign from the vaunted past of this indomitable and talented race. In the next few years the philhellenic movement was born and began to send money, supplies, and even volunteers to a Greece risen from the ashes. After the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1828 it became increasingly easy to travel in Greece and the Aegean and adventurers and curiosity seekers alike ventured south and east to see for themselves what had happened to the land of Zeus, Homer, Perikles, Plato, and Alexander the Great. Newspapers and magazines of the period show the impact of the philhellenic movement. There was a great deal of romantic theorizing about the descendants of Miltiades and Leonidas, sometimes spiced with a little wonder at the lack of resemblance between the noble statuary of the ancient Greeks and the actual physical appearance of the modern inhabitants.

In 1830 a book appeared that attempted to explain this discrepancy by claiming that there were in fact no Greeks left. The author of this thesis was a brilliant young Bavarian named Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer. Although scholarly doubts about the continuity of the Hellenic people had already been expressed in a guarded way, Fallmerayer dismissed the notion of a Greece reborn as sentimental rubbish and it would be difficult to exaggerate the anger, confusion, and controversy that attended the publication of his book.

Jacob Fallmerayer was born in 1790 to a poor peasant family from the Tyrol. At a young age he began the study of philology, ancient languages, and theology, demonstrating a startling brilliance from the very start. His education was interrupted briefly by military service at the end of the Napoleonic Wars but in 1818 he began a series of teaching jobs at progressively more distinguished institutions. In 1824 he began work on a subject proposed by the Royal Danish Academy, the Kingdom of Trapezunt and in 1827 won a prize by publishing a book with the same title, based on his fortuitous discovery of manuscript material in Vienna and Venice. The distinction of his scholarship in this work raised him to the top rank of historians of the Levant in the Middle Ages; inevitably he turned his attention to the land and people of a rediscovered Greece. Fallmerayer was contemptuous his whole life of popular enthusiasms. It was characteristic that he would view with suspicion the philhellenic picture of the rebirth of the Greek people. But few were prepared for the violence with which he

introduced his opposing thesis in his next book, *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters*, published in 1830.

“The Hellenic race in Europe has been exterminated,” was the first sentence, leaving no doubt where he was going from there. “Beauty of bodies, soaring spirituality, symmetry and simplicity of custom, art, stadion, city, village, stoa and temple – even the name has disappeared from the surface of the Greek continent. The graves of this ancient folk have been covered with a twofold layer of detritus, piled up from the wreckage and decay of two new and distinct races of man.” Fallmerayer then identified the culprits. “Not one drop of pure, unmixed Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of Greece today. A storm has flooded the entire earth’s surface between the Danube and the most remote corner of the Peloponnesus with a new race, related to the great tribe of the Slavs. And a second, perhaps no less important revolution caused by the migration of the Albanians into Greece has completed the destruction. Scythian Slavs, Illyrian Arnauts, children of midnight lands, blood relatives of the Serbs, Bulgars, Dalmatians, and Muscovites – these are the people whom we call Hellenes today and whose ancestry, to their own astonishment, we trace back to Perikles and Philopoimen.”

The reaction of Fallmerayer’s thesis was just as extreme, with patriotic Greek historians insisting that no invader other than a few Vlachs and Albanians had ever remained in Greece. In the 19th century the controversy continued unresolved because of the lack of much historical documentation for the Slavic invasions. The most famous passage was from the *De thematibus* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Referring to the plague years 746–747, he said, “the entire land was slavized and became barbarian when the deadly pestilence was wandering the ecumene,” but the Greek verb could equally have meant “enslaved”, and it was not certain what part of the Balkan peninsula Constantine was talking about.

Near the end of the introduction to his 1830 book Fallmerayer had noted what he thought were specific physical characteristics of the Slavic and Albanian incursions. “A population with Slavic facial forms, or with the bow-shaped eyebrows and sharp features of Albanian mountain sheperds did not spring from the blood of a Narcissus, an Alcibiades, or Antinous.” Curiously, Fallmerayer had come to this conclusion before he had ever traveled in Greece. In 1831 he left for a three year journey, accompanying the Russian Count Ostermann–Tolstoi through the Balkans, Greece, and much of the Near East, where he was finally able to see Trebizond for himself, the fabled Colchis of Jason, Medea, and the Golden Fleece. His experience in the southernmost Balkans caused him to revise his thesis to the extent of emphasizing the importance of the Albanian element in Greece, for in the 1830s there were whole communities in the Peloponnesos and some Aegean islands where only Albanian was spoken. In the second volume of *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea*, which appeared in 1836, Fallmerayer traced the Albanian deluge to the 14th century and thereafter.

The question continued to be discussed through the 19th century, but interest waned at the same rate as the new Greek kingdom threw its energies into a re-Hellenization of city and countryside. Particularly after the great

archaeological discoveries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries it became more and more difficult to envision the restored acropolis of Athens, the shrines of Olympia, Delphi, and many other famous sites in the custody of Slavs and Albanians, who further confused the matter by speaking, reading, and writing a clearly recognizable Greek language. Racial conclusions nonetheless continued to be drawn. For instance, for over a century some Greeks have insisted that the system of *rousfeti*, or government by bribes, favors, and patronage, was instituted by the corrupt prime minister John Kolletis in 1844. Kolletis was a Koutsovlach and therefore this system was to be blamed not on the Greeks but on Kolletis' Romanian ancestry, a notion that will be immediately rejected by any student of ancient or Byzantine Greek politics. If such racial equations could be drawn one would have to attribute Koutsovlach ancestry to the Attorney General of the United States.

Fallmerayer's Slavic thesis received new support from an unexpected source during the early decades of the Soviet state. In 1939 the historian B. Goryanov asserted that the Slavic element was responsible for the survival of the Byzantine Empire: "By their clan organization and by the vigor of their barbarism, the Slavs rejuvenated the Empire, prolonged its existence a thousand years." And elsewhere, speaking of Byzantium as the intermediary between antiquity and the Renaissance: "This merit is due not to the abstract idea of the Greek empire, as the representatives of bourgeois historical science have called it, but to the Slavs, their clan organization (*rodovoy stroy*) and their commune (*obschina*)."

The Fallmerayer debate is one of the classic examples, in the annals of history, not only of coming up with the wrong answers but of asking the wrong questions. Until recent decades no scientific investigation of ethnicity in modern Greece could easily be conducted because of the lack of statistical records and accurate ethnic designations. Moreover, political partisanship, which continued to be the most vital concern in Greece, cut across all ethnic lines and tended to obscure questions of national origin. Studies from recent years have, however, made it possible to identify and classify some important ethnic minorities in modern Greece.

By far the most important, and most obvious to any traveler in Greece, is the Albanian element. Fallmerayer may have been right in attributing the beginning of the migration to the 14th century, but the really massive transfers of population took place from the 16th to the 18th century when the Turks, usually following onslaughts of plague, or revolts and resulting massacres, repopulated areas of northern Greece, the Peloponnesos, and some Aegean islands with whole communities of Albanians. The Albanians were a less settled people than their southern neighbors; they were hardy mountaineers with an ancient and rigorous code of honor and vengeance and they took easily to mercenary service in the Ottoman empire. For the period immediately preceding the Greek War of Independence their settlement patterns are obscured because some proportion had become Moslem during Turkish service and Greek writers tended to refer to all Moslems as *Tourkoi*, whether they were actual Turks, or Moslem Albanians like Ali Pasha of Ioannina, or even Moslem Greeks like Barbarossa, the admiral of the Ottoman fleet in the 16th century. Easy penetration of northern Greece

through the mountain valleys of Epiros made Albanian migration a constant element in Greece. But after the First World War borders hardened, the flow stopped, and Albanian communities in Greece became easier to identify.

The whole debate, of course, should never have been about ethnicity or racial origins, which is largely an ideological distinction, but language and culture. The Albanian language persisted in Greece right up to World War Two. Archaeologists report that during excavation near Corinth in the 1930s all the workmen spoke Albanian. The distinguished historian and indefatigable traveler Nicholas Hammond visited Albanian speaking villages in widely separated districts of Greece, also in the 1930s. But even then, he reported, the villagers referred to themselves as Greek and seemed to have no sense of being anything but Greek. I have spent some time in the Albanian village of Kranidi in the Argolid and on the Aegean island of Ios, which was repopulated twice by Albanians; in both communities Greek has become the everyday language and I would have difficulty pointing out any way in which the inhabitants differed culturally – that is, in religion, in family structure, in education, in public behavior – from, say, their neighbors on the island of Naxos, which is thought to be one of the most purely Greek areas in Greece. (Ironically, when any Naxiote today demonstrates unusual entrepreneurial talents his friends are likely to accuse him of Venetian ancestry acquired sometime during the three-century dominion of the Sanudo family. Such are the hazards of playing the ethnic guessing game.)

Today, because of the conditions of universal education, military service, ease of travel and communication, and probably most influential, the penetration of the television set to the remotest districts of Greece, the Albanians have been virtually completely assimilated in a cultural sense. This may be contrasted with the Albanian population of the autonomous district of Kosovo, in Yugoslavia, where they retain both language and an intense sense of Albanian identity.

Although Fallmerayer in his first volume attributed more importance to the Slavic element in the medieval migrations, modern studies show that the Slavic invasions had far less impact than the Albanian. The Slavs came earlier but tended to settle where they first found vacant land for stock raising and farming. Their settlements were therefore bunched in northern Greece in Epiros, Thessaly, and the plains of Macedonia. A study of Slavic place-names in Greece shows 334 in the canton of Ioannina and 120 in western Thessaly, as opposed to 270 in the entire Peloponnesos. There were also areas originally settled by Slavs during the earlier Byzantine empire that later on fell to Albanians in turn, so the original Slavic distribution will never be known, especially since Greek writers tended to lump all barbarians contemptuously, as in the term "*Serbalanitobulgaroblachos*", used by the author of the *Epeirotika*. Again, only the pastoral Slavs in the mountains retained language or culture for very long; those in the plains had already by the ninth century become Hellenized in both language and religion, according to the Emperor Leo VI.

The process of Hellenic acculturation has been complex and involved, but there is no doubt that a most important factor was the city, the descendant of the ancient Greek polis, in which Greek law, literacy, religion,

traditional family structure, traditional occupations, and traditional pleasures were preserved. The Greek language has always proved to be a remarkable vehicle for the communication of ideas. Even in ancient times the Romans, who were just as literate, learned Greek instead of vice versa; during the medieval migrations no matter how minute the Greek speaking communities had become they had the enormous advantage in that none of the invaders brought literacy with them. More specifically, a recent study has shown what happened to a patchwork of ethnic minorities in the southeastern Peloponnesos. In 1668 a Turkish traveler distinguished Christian Greeks, Christian Albanians, and speakers of Tsakonian (which he thought was a separate language but which is actually a descendant of the ancient Doric dialect, preserved by isolation). The Turkish conquest of 1715 made the ethnic mosaic more complex by adding Moslem Albanians and actual Turks themselves to the region. During the War of Independence the Moslem element among the Albanians either fled to other areas of the Peloponnesos or converted to Christianity. The Christian Albanians identified with the new nation state and gradually gave up their language, often simply deciding not to teach it to their children. Turkonian still lingers in the mountains of eastern Lakonia but universal education and television have rendered it obsolescent.

Thus if Fallmerayer were given the opportunity to return to Greece in 1988 he would be hard pressed to define in what way the present inhabitants can be classed as Slavs and Albanians. To argue the prevalence of culture over ethnicity in another way, I would cite the example of two ethnic minorities neglected by Fallmerayer. The Vlachs and the Sarakatsani are two distinct groups in Greece which practice nomadic, transhumant stock raising. Unlike Albanian shepherds, who go alone with their flocks into the mountains, both Vlachs and Sarakatsani travel as a people with their herds of sheep and goats. Their nomadic way of life, their diet, their handicrafts, and their traditions are very much alike, in fact, the untutored observer would be hard put to tell a Vlach community on the move from one of Sarakatsani. And yet ethnically and linguistically they are completely different. The Vlachs are speakers of an old form of Romanian. They may always have been nomadic, even before they wandered into Roman Dacia in the early centuries of the Christian era. The Sarakatsani, in contrast, are purely Greek and some historians believe they may have been the original pastoral Greeks of the central mountain range even before the Vlachs arrived and partially displaced them.

These examples would seem to show that culture exerts a far stronger influence on human behavior than ethnic origin and that Greek culture, even when Greek populations had been shrunk to the vanishing point by invasion, brigandage or plague, was pervasive and contagious. Neither Fallmerayer nor anyone else in the early 19th century had even heard of the discipline of cultural anthropology, but no cultural anthropologist today would be the slightest bit surprised by the tenacity of the culture enjoyed by a highly religious and literate people with a strong sense of their own history.

Usually neglected in the debate over Greece racial purity was a fantasy that undoubtedly contributed strongly to Fallmerayer's despairing vision of

a vanished Greek race. This was the notion expressed in his very first paragraphs of "pure Hellenic blood". This phrase implies that at some given time there existed a race of pure Greeks. But from the very beginning the wandering Indo-European tribes that would one day create a Greek culture intermarried freely with the pre-Greek population of the southern Balkans. The Mycenaean doubtless married Minoans, Egyptians, and Anatolian peoples. In the early Iron Age Phoenicians were frequent visitors to Greek shores and we are told they were notorious seducers of local women. Some local traditions even held that Phoenicians had settled in the Greek world and had become Hellenized. By the fourth century B. C. the general Greek attitude to the definition of a true Hellene was that of the orator Isocrates: "The name Hellene has come to mean an outlook rather than ancestry and we call those Hellenes who share our culture rather than our common origin."

One of the most curious examples used by Fallmerayer was the beautiful lad Antinous. For several years he was the lover of the Emperor Hadrian and when he died young many cities in the Roman Empire realized that they would find favor in the emperor's eyes by dedicating statues of his lost loved one. For this reason there are dozens of portrait busts of Antinous preserved from the ancient world and his face has become a paradigm for Greek male beauty. But Antinous was a peasant boy from the province of Bithynia in northwest Anatolia and his home town lay on the route of every migration and invasion since the early Bronze Age. There is scarcely a blood line we can definitely rule out in his case, except perhaps ancestors from the Amazons and from Atlantis.

I close with two examples of the earliest Greeks whose portraits we possess as actual death masks. Fallmerayer had been dead for twenty years before these portraits were unearthed by Heinrich Schliemann at Mycenae, from strata that we now date to approximately 1,500 B. C. If there was a Greek racial type these two gentlemen would show it in their facial features. But not only are they completely different, I would also argue that the first could easily be mistaken for one of Fallmerayer's sharp featured Albanian mountain shepherds; the second, I submit, looks like no one so much as that true Hellenic type, Nikita Krushchov.

MIGRATIONS DURING THE 1912–1913 BALKAN WARS AND WORLD WAR ONE

Population migrations stamped the history of humanity from ancient to recent times. As one distinguished writer put it, the number of displaced persons could populate entire continents. ¹ This was especially true for the Balkans, placed in between Europe and the Middle East, over which transit area different civilizations crossed, various ethnic groups settled and large empires clashed.

Migrations in the nineteenth century were caused by a profound crisis which seized the Ottoman empire and by agrarian-national revolutions which gave birth to the modern Balkan States. Migrations during the first quarter of the twentieth century resulted from the wars and the final adjustment of the Balkan political map.

Migrations were of a twofold nature: temporary and permanent. The first were caused mainly by economic reasons in the quest for family and individual survival. The second were triggered by wars and revolutions and were of a massive character. They often changed radically the demographic structure of particular Balkan Regions. Temporary migrations were usually spontaneous, with emigrants returning after the reasons for the move were over. Permanent population motions were forceful, organized and extorted. They were often motivated by political reasons, nationalism or the pursuit of a nationally homogeneous state.

During the nineteenth century migrations followed opposite directions. While the Muslim Turkish population moved out of the politically and nationally emancipated areas and was partially resettled in the neighboring regions still under Ottoman rule, Christian nationals from regions tended to join their respective national States.

It is very difficult to reach the exact figures of these popular movements. The exodus of Muslims from Serbia (1867), Bulgaria (1878–9), Bosnia and Hercegovina (1879) and Greece (during the 1897 crisis) was evident. It is estimated that approximately one million Muslims moved out of the Balkan States during the three last decades of the nineteenth century.² On the other side, the population growth in the Balkan countries was largely due to the influx of their co-nationals coming from the Ottoman territory. Peasants were attracted by the free land holding, but were also pushed away from their domiciles by Muslim re-colonization, Albanian pressures and uprisings, as well as armed conflict of bands in Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century.³

I

Large migrations of a permanent character occurred during the 1912–1923 Balkan wars, which introduced a period of dramatic reshuffling of

population which was to last over a decade. They expressed the end of a process which was put in motion a century ago, and which resulted in the dissolution of two historic empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg.

The struggle of Balkan nationalists for emancipation from foreign rule and unification of their co-nationals in independent states was carried on with the call for the principle of national self-determination. The application of this principle was seriously challenged in regions ethnically mixed during centuries of their development in a common Ottoman state. The national mosaic, manifested especially in the central Balkans, contributed to the escalation of nationalism, rivalries and mutual conflicts. Economic and strategic factors contributed to the shaping of Balkan politics and the fixing of state boundaries. Finally, the military issues in the 1912–1922 wars proved to be decisive in determining the political and demographic make up of the peninsula.

In such a complex situation the goal to reach a nationally homogeneous State held priority over national self-determination. In this regard both push and pull factors were applied. The first was channelled through the forceful exchange of population as well as pressures on national minorities to leave. The pull factor was expressed in the trend of a minority to join its main national body and find protection from national abuses. A. Pallis, who studied Balkan migratory statistics, registered seventeen migratory movements in Macedonia alone in the 1912–1925 period.⁴

Victories obtained by the Balkan allies in the 1912 war started the process of migrations. It is impossible to establish the exact number of populations which moved during the war, due to the lack of accurate evidence as well as to the number of returnees after the war ended. However, it is estimated that 114,000 Muslims fled before the advancing Balkan armies, 104,000 of them from Thracia and 10,000 from Macedonia.⁵ One can join to this number some 15,000 to 28,000 Bulgarians who left for Bulgaria from the Serbian and Greek parts of Macedonia, where they took part in Bulgarian *komitadji* bands prior to the war, or volunteered for the Bulgarian army during the war.⁶ As we shall see later, the exodus of Greeks from Asia Minor already started at that time.

The second Balkan war, waged among former allies in 1913, triggered another wave of migrations. The Bulgarian defeat confirmed Serbian and Greek frontiers established in 1912. Turkey regained Eastern Thrace and Rumania obtained Southern Dobruja. New frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Bucharest on July 28–August 10, 1913 made migrations which occurred during the war permanent.

Bulgarian sources claim some 150,000 refugees coming from the territories which were lost in the 1913 war. C. A. Macartney augments this number to 200,000, joining all refugees from the period 1912–1914. Sir John Hope Simpson offered an itemized number of refugees from the 1913 war according to which some 15,000 Bulgarians retreated with the Bulgarian army from the region of Kilkis. At the same time 5,000 Greeks from Bulgarian Macedonia, accompanied by 5,000 Greeks from Serbian Macedonia and 5,000 from the area of the Caucasus moved to Greece. During 1913 some 70,000 Greeks fled from Thrace before the Bulgarians and

49,000 Muslims left Thrace in accordance with the Turko-Bulgarian Treaty, while 47,000 Bulgarians left in exchange for the Muslims.⁷ The same figures appear in the chronology of migrations offered by Stephen Ladas.⁸ Serbian reports point to 20,000 refugees from the regions of Drama, Dojran, Melnik, Kukuš and Nevrokop in Sofia alone.⁹ They also quote some 20,000 Albanians who switched from Kosovo to the newly established Albanian State.¹⁰ Thus, the total number of migrants in the second Balkan war amounted to over 350,000 persons, although a certain number of refugees later returned.

This time migrations were caused not only by the effects of war devastations and issues of military operations but also by international agreements concluded between the former belligerents at the end of the war. In this regard the Protocol annexed to the Treaty signed in Constantinople between Bulgaria and Turkey on September 29, 1913 was to serve as a model for similar arrangements made in the near future.¹¹ The main Bulgaro-Turkish Peace Treaty included guarantees to both Muslim and Christian minorities in regard to their civil, political and confessional rights. Residents of the territory ceded to Balkan States obtained the right to opt for their nationality.¹² However, the Protocol which was annexed to the Treaty went much further.¹³ It stipulated the exchange of population along a 15km. zone on both sides of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier (Art. 5, c). The exchange was anticipated to be optional but essentially confirmed the *fait accompli*, because the respective population already moved out from that zone. The move was not voluntary and was extended over a territory larger than 15 km. It involved some 48,570 Muslims and 46,764 Bulgarians.¹⁴ The Mixed Commission, consisting of six Turkish and nine Bulgarian members began working in the Spring of 1914, but the outbreak of the war cut short its activity.¹⁵

II

The exodus of Greeks from Turkey which started already during the 1912-1913 wars was to continue on the eve of the great war and its aftermath.

According to Greek sources there was in Turkey before the war, some 600,000 Greeks in Eastern Thrace, half of whom were settled in Constantinople. The Greek population in Asia Minor was estimated to be around 1,600,000 of which one million was centered in the coast area of Western Asia Minor and half a million in the region of the Pontus.¹⁶

In early 1914 the Young Turks decided to get rid of their Christian population, which caused constant troubles, and to replace them with Muslims. A vigorous propaganda was launched to attract the Muslims from the Balkan States to come to Turkey, parallel to pressure on the Greeks and Armenians to leave Turkey. The result of the campaign was that in 1914, on the eve of the war some 115,000 Greeks were expelled from Turkish Eastern Thrace to Greece, and 50,000 to 85,000 of them were deported to the interior of Asia Minor. At the same time some 150,000 Greeks were forced to leave the shores of Western Anatolia for Greece. In the meantime 115,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey, joined by 135,000 Muslims who emigrated from other Balkan countries.¹⁷

According to their policy towards the minorities, the Young Turks proposed to the Greek government in May 1914 a "voluntary and reciprocal exchange" of Greeks from the vilayet of Smyrna for the Muslims in Greek Macedonia. The agreement was to be similar to the one obtained with Bulgaria in September of 1913. Faced with the fact of the already ongoing exodus of Greeks from Turkey, the Greek premier E. Venizelos accepted the offer, suggesting to include Thrace in the bargain.¹⁸ In June 1914 a Mixed Commission to supervise the exchange was established in Smyrna, but when Turkey entered the great war in October 1914 the agreement came to naught.

III

Migratory movements continued during World War I when the Balkans became the battlefield of the great powers and the polarized Balkan States. After the invasion of the country in 1915 the Serbian army, accompanied with civilian refugees, a total of some 120,000–150,000 people crossed the Albanian mountains on the way to the Adriatic Sea. Bulgarian refugees, of whom 33,000 were drafted into the Bulgarian army, returned to Macedonia after its occupation by Bulgaria, and became the most zealous oppressors of their former adversaries.¹⁹ Regions close to the Salonika front were depopulated as was the area of Toplica where an uprising against the Bulgarian occupation broke out in 1917. After the Bulgarian occupation of Western Thrace in 1916 some 46,000 Greeks were deported to Bulgaria while 16,000 of them fled to Greece. They were replaced by 39,000 Bulgarian migrants.²⁰ The persecution of 1,6 million Armenians in 1915 in Turkey had an impact on Balkan migrations also.

After the 1918 armistice a counter-wave of migrants took place. The war issue stimulated the return of previous migrants to domiciles abandoned during the war. Some 51,000 Greeks returned from Greece to Western Thrace and 83,000 of them came back to Eastern Thrace. About 100,000 moved back to Asia Minor.²¹ As we shall see, they will have to move again in the opposite direction.

The outcome of the civil war in Soviet Russia brought to the Balkans supporters of the defeated army of General Wrangel. In 1922 they numbered 138,000 persons, half of whom permanently settled in various Balkan countries and the other half moved during the following years to Western Europe and the United States.²²

The inherited mixture of population as well as the advantage which the victorious states had towards the defeated in defining new frontiers, resulted in large minority groups left in successor States in East Central and South East Europe.²³ In order to protect their rights and to correct the invalidated principle of national self-determination, the League of Nations introduced minority treaties, in addition to the main peace treaties concluded between the former belligerents. Minority treaties aimed to protect freedoms of nationality, language, race and religion.²⁴ However, from 1920–1931 nineteen national minorities from thirteen States submitted to the League of Nations 525 petitions protesting the violation of their rights.²⁵ In all Balkan countries

agrarian reforms, and colonization of war veterans on vacant land or previously nationally disputed areas were primarily directed against the minorities. This contributed to internal migratory movements.

In the Northern Balkans the Hungarians were the main victims of the partitioning of the old Monarchy.²⁶ Changes which took place from November 1918 to March 1919 triggered a mass exodus of Magyars towards what was left of the Hungarian State, now reduced to 28 percent of its pre-war territory. The separate military convention between the victorious allies and the Hungarian government, signed in Beograd on November 13, 1918 envisaged the functioning of the old civil administration on the evacuated territories (Art. 1).²⁷ In practice, a national and social upheaval of the local Yugoslav population, supported by the advancing Serbian army, destroyed the old establishment and introduced the new authority.

In between 1918 and 1924 some 426.000 emigrants from Czechoslovakia, Rumania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes poured into Hungary.²⁸ The official Hungarian Refugee Office registered 350,000 newcomers. To that were to be joined some 76,000 persons already in Hungary at the end of the war who refused to return to their previous homesteads, now under foreign rule.²⁹ 44,903 Refugees coming from Yugoslavia were officially registered; in reality the number was 55,000. Some 197,000 emigres were officially recorded from Rumania, in fact the figure amounted to 220,000. The last flow of refugees came after the conclusion of the Trianon Treaty in 1920 when the last hope to return faded away.

The largest group of refugees belonged to the former Hungarian social elite. Among them were former State officials, business people, aristocratic landowners and local gentry. Few peasants were listed. The loss of privileged social status and land-estates, the fear of the vindictive domestic population as well as allegiance to Hungarian nationalism were among the main motives for migration.³⁰

The refugees found in post-war Hungary a country ravaged by national despair, a social revolution and economies in shambles. Mainly of bourgeois and aristocratic origin, refugees supported the right wing in domestic politics and contributed to the ascendancy of Hungarian revanchism and fascism.³¹

IV

The 1913 Convention between Bulgaria and Turkey and the 1914 negotiations between Greece and Turkey introduced proceedings to exchange the minorities on the State level. The same idea guided Venizelos to propose to King Constantine in 1915 an exchange of population with Bulgaria before she sided the Central powers. Agreements reached at Neuilly-sur-Saine between Greece and Bulgaria in 1919 and in Lausanne between Greece and Turkey in 1923 marked the final stage in the reciprocal exchange of minorities after World War I.

As a result of the defeat in the war, Bulgaria lost the entire Aegean Littoral. Victorious Greece was confident in 1919 to obtain Eastern Thrace and Smyrna from Turkey. Both Greek and Bulgarian governments were

interested in getting rid of their minorities. Venizelos wanted to eliminate the Bulgarian irredenta in Greece, profiting from the favorable post-war climate for his country. Stamboliski's agrarian government in Bulgaria wished to settle the problem of refugees who crowded the country, to resolve the question of the property they left behind, and to pave the way for friendly relations with Balkan neighbors.

Initially Venizelos had in mind an exchange of population which would include Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government refused to enter the deal. It was supposed in Beograd that the outflow of population would be much larger than the influx. It was anticipated that time and life in the common State would turn the flotant national consciousness in Macedonia towards Serbia and Yugoslavia. Finally, there was a suspicion that under the cover of returning refugees, IMRO would introduce promoters of the Bulgarian national cause in Macedonia.

The exchange of population was restrained to Greece and Bulgaria. In the Treaty of Peace Between the Principal and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, signed on 27 November 1919 in Neuilly-sur-Saine the Article 56, paragraph 2 acknowledged the right of individuals to "choose whether or not they will recover Bulgarian nationality." At the same time Bulgaria was obliged to recognize "the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities."³²

Based on this Treaty and on the same day when it was signed, a special Convention between Greece and Bulgaria was concluded. It specified the simultaneous and reciprocal exchange of population between the two countries. Article 1 stipulated the voluntary emigration of racial, religious and linguistic minorities to their respective countries. Both governments were obliged to facilitate the exercise of this right (Art. 2). Emigrants were to lose the nationality of the country they left and obtain one from the country of their destination (Art. 5). They were free to take with them all their movable property, while their rural and urban immovable property as well as the property of their communities (churches, convents, schools, foundations etc.) were to be liquidated by a special Mixed Commission, authorized to supervise the emigration (Art. 6-9). The Mixed Commission was to be composed of one Bulgarian and one Greek member, and two neutral members belonging to a different nationality, between whom the president of the Commission was to be nominated and confirmed by the League of Nations (Art. 8-9).³³

The voluntary character of the exchange soon became questionable, as well as the criteria to decide nationality.

Both populations, mostly peasants, were reluctant to migrate and change the environment to which they were accustomed. By June 1923 only 197 Greek and 166 Bulgarian families submitted applications to migrate.³⁴ However, both governments were eager to see the minorities go. When the Greek refugees from Asia Minor started pouring into Greece, Athens pressured Bulgarians to move out and make place for the Greeks coming from Turkey. Frightened Bulgarians rushed towards Bulgaria which triggered the reciprocal measures against the Greek minority, to make place for its own incoming migrants.

Religion and language were decided to be the criteria for nationality. Both of Eastern Orthodox religion Greeks and Bulgarians belonged to two separate churches: the Patriarchate and the Exarchate. Although the distinction was clear, the transition from one to the other was easy to make. The language offered a more solid criteria due to the difference between Greek and Slavic Bulgarian. However, mixed marriages and the resulting bilingualism created difficulties in assessing nationality. The Mixed Commission faced insurmountable difficulties in evaluating the migrants' property due to the complicated Turkish system of landholding. The problem became even more confusing when it was decided to include all persons who emigrated in both countries in between 1 December 1900 and 18 December 1920.

The Mixed Commission which started to work in 1920 was induced to extend the deadline for emigration applications four times from 1922 and 1932. The Commission and its sub-commissions received applications from 154,691 persons, among them 101,800 Bulgarians and 52,891 Greeks. Among them 40,000 Bulgarians and over 20,000 Greeks were emigrants before the Convention came into force. The final result was that 46,000 Greeks left Bulgaria for Greece (16,000 among them did it before the Convention). On the other side some 92,000 Bulgarians moved out of Greece (among them 39,000 prior to the Convention). The indemnities to emigrants were paid only 10 percent in cash; the rest was remunerated in State bonds with the value constantly depreciating.

After the population exchange the number of Greek speaking population in Bulgaria dropped from 69,820 in 1905 to 12,782 in 1926. At the same time the Slavic speaking population in Greek Macedonia was reduced to 82,000 (in 1928).³⁵In the 1920's in Bulgaria there were 251,309 refugees, of whom 121,677 came from Greece, 31,427 from Yugoslavia, 70,294 from Turkey and 29,711 from Rumania.³⁶

V

The Greco-Turkish war 1921–1922 and the dramatic defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor, followed by the Lausanne Peace Treaty, caused another page to be turned in the story of Balkan migrations.

The result of the Asian campaign wiped out the Treaty of Sèvres and the gains attributed to Greece at the end of World War I.³⁷Panic seized the Greek population in Smyrna and Asia Minor. In September 1922 Smyrna was sacked and looted by the Turkish army and every Greek who could escape took to the sea. Entering the city, the Turks deported 25,000 Greeks to the interior, to work in "labor battalions." Some 10,000 of them perished and the rest was transported to Greece in 1923.³⁸A similar situation occurred in Eastern Thrace after the armistice was signed in Mudania on 11 October 1922.

Kemalists were determined to profit from the victory and to get rid, once and for all, of the Greek *irredenta*. On the other side, for the defeated Greeks nothing else was left than to obtain the exchange of population with Turkey, when their own people were already moved out. Both sides found

a common interest: the Greeks to settle their incoming refugees on vacant Turkish land; the Turks to invigorate their country's homogeneity³⁹

The Convention of the Exchange of Population between Greece and Turkey was signed in Lausanne on 30 January 1923. The exchange was made compulsory on the demand of the Turks and was endorsed by the great powers, and by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, appointee of the League of Nations. The stipulation which forbade the refugees to return in the future was especially painful. It destroyed their hopes to come back after the situation calmed down.

Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and Muslims in Western Thrace were exempted from the exchange (Art. 2). Emigrants since the beginning of the Balkan War, October 18, 1912, were included in the Convention (Art. 3). Refugees' properties (Art. 8-10) were settled in a similar way as was done in the Neuilly Treaty. The Mixed Commission, established to supervise the exchange, was enlarged to eleven members (art. 11).⁴⁰

This time only religion, not the language, was taken as the criteria for nationality, as there were many Greeks in Asia Minor who spoke only Turkish. However, the religious affiliation proved to be rather vague because the Orthodoxy included Serbs, Rumanians, Russians, Gipsies and even Orthodox Arabs, while a good number of Albanians and Gipsies belonged to the Muslim faith. The Mixed Commission subsequently decided to limit the religious criteria only to members of the Greek Patriarchate, excluding those belonging to autocephalus Orthodox Churches in the Balkan States and Russia as well as to the patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria.⁴¹

The January Convention was included and reinforced in the text of the final peace treaty between Greece and Bulgaria signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923.⁴²The Treaty contained minority rights (Art. 37-43).⁴³

As we have seen the Greek diaspora was scattered all over Turkey, from Thrace and Pontus to Anatolia and the coast of Asia Minor as well as in the Caucasus in Soviet Russia. It is estimated that from 1919-1920 some 60,000 Greeks moved out of Soviet Russia, mainly from other parts of Russia.⁴⁴The Greeks shared similar misfortunes with the Armenians of whom over one million and a half were either massacred or expelled from Turkey from 1925 onward.⁴⁵Both Greeks and Armenians in Pontus and Trebizond tried to present their grievances together to the Paris Peace Conference. The Greek government recognized in 1919 the Armenian Republic but diplomatic relations did not materialize until the collapse of the Republic in 1920. Greeks from the Kars, Ardahan and Olti region, where mutual slaughter of rival races and religions, war and anarchy prevailed, tried to move out and emigrate to Greece. Some 15,000 people embarked in Batum on Greek ships as the first wave of emigrants from the Georgian coast. Another group of 10,000 left Kars in July. Until September 1920 a total of 29,000 left Armenia for Thessaloniki.

Squeezed between the Kemalist and the Soviet armies the Armenian Republic collapsed at the end of the year.⁴⁶The Armenians were radically estranged from Turkey: only 65,000 were left, among them 37,000 in Constantinople. Some 100,000 Armenians, who moved out from the Smyrna area, were scattered all over the Balkans, Syria and Soviet Armenia, or

emigrated further to Western Europe. Of 45,000 Armenian emigrants in the early 1920's, 33,634 were still in Greece in 1928. The number of Armenians increased in Bulgaria to 6,000 from 1920 to 1927. Approximately the same number came to Rumania.⁴⁷

The final account of the 1923–1925 Greek-Turkish exchange of population, based on the agreements reached in Lausanne, included 189,916 Greeks who came from Turkey to Greece and 355,635 Muslims who moved in the opposite direction. After the exchange some 118,000 Muslims were left in Western Thrace (90,000 among them Turks) and some 125,000 Christians in Constantinople (among them 108,000 Greeks).⁴⁸

VI

Terror stricken refugees poured into Greece and the Balkans which were already exhausted and ravaged by the recent wars. About half of the Greeks from Asia Minor were Turkish speaking peasants. In 1923 the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission⁴⁹ was organized and the League of Nations fostered two international loans to Greece in 1924 (\$60 million) and 1928 (\$45 million). However the estimated expenses of the refugee settlement ran over \$1,700 million.⁵⁰ The agrarian reform had to be extended with additional land to be given to the newcomers.⁵¹

The Commission had to settle the refugees in urban and rural areas of the country. The cities in Greece were already overpopulated. Professional men, street vendors, workers crowded the streets of Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki, which absorbed sixty percent of the urban settlers.⁵² At first they were lodged in schools, theatres, museums, hospitals and then in houses provided by the State, or in private. The total urban settlement included, according to the Refugee Commission, 124,483 families or 484,747 persons. In 1927 there were still 31,225 families lacking shelters, and on the eve of the war, in 1939, they still lived in barracks and shanties in the suburbs of Athens.⁵³ Many new small towns in Macedonia and Thessaly were replicas of communities in Asia Minor even carrying their names.

The rural settlement augmented the population in Northern Greece. From 513,000 in 1912 this population rose to 1,314,000 in 1928. The predominant part of the 638,253 refugees in Macedonia were settled in the countryside.⁵⁴ Seventy thousand obtained houses abandoned by the departing Turks and Bulgarians.⁵⁵ Turkish homes were predominantly poor, dirty shacks. The Greek State had to provide 144,000 additional houses, but in 1927 there were still 8,755 families left to be settled.⁵⁶

Bulgaria was not in better shape. Stamboliski's government had to enlarge the agrarian reform in order to accommodate the refugees.⁵⁷ Three-fourths of them were peasants, day laborers and rural artisans.

Muslim refugees in Turkey represented a similar social structure. In 1913 the Turkish government established the Department of Settlements and Tribes which was reorganized in 1923 into the Ministry of Reconstruction, Exchange and Settlement. In Eastern Thrace 152,770 refugees were settled and the rest of them was placed in the coastal part of Anatolia. The Turkish

refugees had several advantages. They arrived in rather organized groups, were able to carry their property and occupied the well cultivated land and farm houses from former Greek owners.⁵⁸

As could be expected, the refugees exerted influences in their new homeland on both the economy and politics. In rural areas they utilized the heretofore neglected land. The incoming Greeks from Asia Minor were on a higher level of industrial development than their fellow countrymen in Greece. The value of tobacco production jumped from eleven million dollars in 1922 to forty million in 1925. The output of the oriental rug industry in Greece more than trebled in the same period.⁵⁹ A similar progress in the tobacco industry was manifested in Bulgaria. The urban refugees provided cheap labor to the growing industry. Businessmen from Asia Minor, rich merchants, ship-owners and industrialists brought to Greece their capitals and new methods in business. Intellectual elite also moved to Greece: the first Greek Nobel prize winner, the poet George Sefheriades was born in Anatolia.

Embittered, desperate and angry, refugees contributed to the radicalization of domestic Balkan politics. They moved the political pendulum either to the extreme right or the extreme left. The Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria made the core of revanshism. They supported the pro-fascist leadership of IMRO, which became the State in a State. They took an active part in the assassination of Alexander Stamboliski and King Alexander of Yugoslavia. The profascist tendencies of the Hungarian refugees has already been mentioned. On the other end, psychological, economic and political adjustments pushed Greek refugees towards republicanism, as well as to the extreme left and the KKE. The turbulent history of inter-war Greece, torn between the monarchy and the republic, between the military huntas and democracy cannot be explained without reference to the refugees.

Although a curse for contemporary generations, the exchange of populations appears to be for Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey a blessing in the long run of history. It transformed them into predominantly nationally homogeneous States. It stabilized their frontiers along which refugees were mainly settled. In regard to Greece it named the end of the emotional but unrealistic Megali Idea which dominated national politics for more than a century. According to the Report of the Refugee Settlement Commission of the League of Nations the percentage of Greeks in Aegean Macedonia grew during the period 1912–1926 from 42.6 percent to 88.8 percent, while the percentage of Muslims declined during the same period from 39.4 percent to 0.4 percent. The Slavic, including Bulgarian population dropped from 9.5 to 5.1 percent. The population in Greek Macedonia increased from 1.2 million to 1.5 million, or 25 percent.⁶⁰

VII

Migrations from 1912–1923 followed the changes inflicted by wars and the establishment of new Balkan political frontiers. These changes triggered the dislocation of approximately two and a half million people. If we

disregard emigrants who returned to their homesteads after the war was over, we still find that the majority of population movements were of a permanent character. While 275,000 Hungarians moved out of Yugoslavia and Rumania, Bulgaria received 251,000 refugees coming from neighboring countries. However, Greece and Turkey were the most affected. Over one million and a quarter Greeks moved to Greece while more than half a million Muslims left the Balkans for Turkey. Armenians and White Russians supplemented the final number of emigres.

In 1912 the Balkan States had a population of approximately 23.1 million. During the 1912–1913 war this population declined to 22.8 million mainly due to the departure of Turks and war casualties. With the formation of Yugoslavia and the enlargement of Rumania, the new Balkan map included 41.7 million people.⁶¹ Persons effected by migratory movements made 10.4 percent of the 1912 Balkan population, and almost 6 percent of the post World War I Balkan States. If one adds approximately two million people killed, wounded and dead from epidemics during the decade of continuing wars, the toll of the Balkan migrations, casualties and people effected by wars amount to four and a half million which goes over 19.4 percent of the total population in 1912 or 10.8 percent of the population in 1923. This number does not include the emigration during the immediate post-war period towards the United States and Europe.

The reshuffling of population caused a reduction in the number of national minorities in the Balkan States. Greece came out as the most nationally homogeneous state. Bulgaria was left with 13.2 percent, Rumania with 27 percent and Yugoslavia with 14.8 percent of national minorities.⁶²

Previous migrations in the nineteenth century were sporadic, disorganized and spontaneous reactions of the population to abuses and pressures coming from foreign authorities. In the twentieth century they were triggered, organized and conducted by Balkan States' authorities and resulted from the issues of the 1912–1922 wars. Defeated Bulgaria, once winner and then loser Greece, the emerging national Turkey, as well as Yugoslavia and Rumania, the two successor States of the former Habsburg monarchy, entered the inter-war period carrying heavy wounds and scars inherited from the recent past. Events which colored the turbulent Balkan history during the two inter-war decades cannot be understood and explained without reference to this heritage.

Footnotes

¹ Heinrich Boll, the Nobel laureate, cit. by Istvan Mócsy, *Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem*, in: *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study of Trianon*, ed. by B. Kiraly, P. Pastor and I. Sanders, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. VI, New York 1982, 491.

² 812,193 Muslims left from 1878–1884 and 202,822 from 1884–1897. The population of Constantinople grew from 391,000 in 1884 to 909,978 in 1913. The estimated number of Muslims who left Bulgaria after 1878 is about 100,000. See: Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. 2 (Twentieth Century), Cambridge 1983, p. 81. Also: John Georgieff, *Ethnic Minorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria*, in: *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*, ed. by G. Klein and M. Reban, East European Monographs, Boulder 1981, 61–62.

³ The Albanian pressure against the Serbs caused their exodus from the Kosovo and Metohija region from 1878 on, especially at the turn of the century (See V. Djuretic' paper in this volume). It is estimated that 200,000 emigrants moved to Bulgaria from 1878 to 1912 (C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, New York 1934, 433). Macedonian sources quote 30,000 emigrants after the unsuccessful uprising in 1903 (*Istorija na Makedonskiot narod*, Institut za nacionalna istorija, Vol. 2, Skopje 1969, 248. See also Duglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897–1913*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1964, 154). According to L. Stavrianos the refugees made half of the Sofia population (*The Balkans Since 1453*, Hinsdale, Illinois 1958, 523). The exodus of Greeks towards the United States reached 300,000 persons in the period 1890–1912 (Eliot Mears, *Greece Today, The Aftermath of the Refugee Impact*, Stanford 1929, 31).

⁴ A. A. Pallis, *Statistical Study of the Racial Migrations in Macedonia and Thrace*, Athens 1925 cit. in: C. A. Macartney, *op. cit.*, 433.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 433.

⁶ *Istorija na Makedonskiot narod*, Vol. 2., 364–365. Petar Stoilov, The Bulgarian Army in the Balkan Wars, in: *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed. by B. Kiraly and D. Djordjevic, Social Science Monograph, Boulder 1987, 44–45. Also: *Dokumenti o spolnoj politici kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914* (Further on: DSPKS), Knj. VI, v. 3 ed. by K. Dzambazovski, Beograd 1983, Doc. № 255, Report from Sofia; Also VI, 1, Doc. 64, Report from Sofia.

⁷ Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey*, London 1939, Appendix I, Table LX, 551. The modern Macedonian historiography quotes 100,000 Macedonians who left the region, without referring to their destination, *Istorija na Makedonskiot narod*, v. 2, 381.

⁸ Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York, 1932, 15.

⁹ DSPKS, Vol. VI, 3, Doc. 269, Jovanovic report 13/26. VIII. 1913. Also Doc. 254, 254, report from Sofia.

¹⁰ DSPKS, VI, 3, 1913, Doc. 194 Report from Salonica 23. VII/5. VIII. 1913.

¹¹ Both 1913 London and Bucharest Peace Treaties dealt only with the question of the prisoners of war, without including the rights of minorities or refugees. See the London Peace Treaty: Martens, *Nouveau recueil des traités*, 3^{me} series 1909–1914, Vol. VIII, 16–19. Also *British Foreign State Papers* (Further on: BFSP), London, 1917, Vol. CVII, 1914, Pt. 1, 656–658. For the Peace Treaty in Bucharest see: BFSP, Vol. CVII, 658–673.

¹² Bulgarian-Turkish Treaty signed in Constantinople 16/29 September 1913, BFSP, Vol. CVII, 706–714. (See the articles VII and VIII). The Greek-Turkish convention was signed in Athens on 1/14 November 1913 (BFSP, CVII, 893–898). Serbia did the same on March 14, 1914. The only one which did not have any convention and no diplomatic relations with Turkey was Montenegro. See: E. CH. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913*, Cambridge 1938; 410, 414–416.

¹³ BFSP, Vol. CVII, Annexe 1, Protocole № 1, 714. See also Ladas, *op. cit.*, 18–20.

¹⁴ Harry Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1968, 60.

¹⁵ Ladas, *op. cit.*, 19–20.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁷ Official Turkish statistics of Muslim emigrants who came to Turkey during the period 1912–1920 quote the number of 413,922. Among them 250,000 moved in 1914 (Ladas, *op. cit.*, 16). Psomiades (*op. cit.*, 62) estimates the number of Greeks deported to Anatolia to 50,000. Sir John Simpson quotes Arnold Toynbee's study *Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 138, and figures obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Refugees of 177,352 Muslim refugees from all the Balkan countries in 1912–1913 (68,947 coming from Greece) and 120,566 (53,718 coming from Greece) during 1914–1915. See Simpson, *op. cit.*, 26.

¹⁸ See the text of communications exchanged between the two governments, Ladas, *op. cit.*, 21–23. Also Macartney, *op. cit.*, 434–435.

¹⁹ *Istoriija na makedonskiot narod*, v. 2, 405. In the Serbian army were drafted 45,000 Macedonians, *Ibid.*, 386.

²⁰ Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1964, 41. Macartney, *op. cit.*, 433. Stelios Nestor, Greek Macedonia and the Convention at Neuilly (1919), in: *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 3, № 1, Thessaloniki 1962, 173.

²¹ Ladas, *op. cit.*, 16.

²² In the 1920's there were in Bulgaria some 40,000 White Russians, in Rumania about 60,000, in Yugoslavia 42,000 and in Turkey 35,000. Their number declined from 138,000 in 1922 to 68,000 in 1930, and 57,600 in 1937. See Simpson, *op. cit.*, 401, 412–13, 419, 561.

²³ Recent historiography extensively dealt with the problem of minorities in Eastern Europe. See: Raymond Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe*, New York, 1923. *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*, ed. by George Klein and Milan Reban, East European Monographs, New York 1981. Stephan Horak, *Eastern European National Minorities 1919–1980: A Handbook*, Colorado 1985. C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, New York 1934. According to these studies Rumania obtained after World War I 1.4 million Hungarians (or 1.9 million according to Hungarian sources), almost 1 million Jews, 720,000 Germans, over half a million Ukrainians, joined by Russians (200,000), Turks and Tatars (175,000–200,000), Bulgarians (130,000–150,000), Gipsies (150,000), Serbs, Czechs and Poles (50,000–60,000 each). Yugoslavia got some 600,000 Germans, almost half a million Hungarians and Albanians (each), with additional Turks, Bulgarians and Rumanians. Bulgaria had some 600,000 Turks, with the addition of Greeks, Jews, Rumanians, Pomaks etc.

²⁴ W. H. Temperley ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. V., London 1921, Minority Treaties, 446–454. See also treaties concluded with all the states concerned: Société des nations, *Recueil des traités et des engagements internationaux enregistrés par le Secrétariat de la Société des nations*, Vol. XXVIII, 1924, 448–454.

²⁵ Horak, *op. cit.*, 8.

²⁶ Andre Arató, Political and Cultural Circumstances of the Hungarians in Bourgeois-democratic Czechoslovakia, in: *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae*, tomus XV, Budapest 1974, 141–166. *Ibid.*, Political Differentiation in the Hungarian Population of Czechoslovakia in the Post World War I Years, *Studia Historica, Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Budapest 1975, 5–31. Istvan Mócsy, Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem, in: *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking – A Case Study of Trianon*, ed. by B. Kiraly, P. Pastor, I. Sanders, War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. VI, New York, 1982, 492–507.

²⁷ Temperley, *op. cit.*, IV, Text of the Military Convention between the Allies and Hungary signed in Belgrade on 13 November 1918, 509–511.

²⁸ *International Studies Conference, Danubian Studies 1, Chronology of Political and Economic Events in the Danubian Basin 1918–1939 – Hungary*, League of Nations 1938, 79.

²⁹ Among them were soldiers returning from the front, prisoners of war etc., Mócsy, *op. cit.*, 494, n. 10.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 495–6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 502.

³² Temperley, *op. cit.*, Text of the Neuilly Treaty, vol. V., 308–357. *BFSP*, Vol. CXII, 1919, 781–895. Both Yugoslavia and Greece retained the right to refuse ipso facto nationality to Bulgarian residents in territories assigned, who became residents after January 1, 1913. (art. 39 and 45 respectively).

³³ *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Geneva, (Further on LNTS), Vol. I, № 1, Sept. 1920, Doc. № 9, 68–72. Also *BFSP*, vol. CXII, 1919, 997–1000.

³⁴ Macartney, *op. cit.*, 440.

³⁵ Concerning the application of the Convention and the exchange of population see: Macartney, *op. cit.*, 434–440; St. Ladas, *op. cit.*, 122–123; J. H. Simpson, *op. cit.*, 440–443. D. Pantzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece*, Paris 1962, 60–61.

³⁶ Simpson, *op. cit.*, 25.

³⁷ Among others the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, Eastern Thrace and the zone around Smyrna, see Art. 27, I (2) and 84–7 (V) of the Treaty. For the Treaty of Sèvres see *BFSP*, Vol. CXIII, 654–776. For the revision of the Treaty see: A. L. Macfie, *The Revision of the Treaty of Sèvres: The First Phase* (Aug. 1920–Sept. 1922), in: *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 24, № 1, Thessaloniki 1983, 57–88.

³⁸ Mears, *op. cit.*, 49; Ladas, *op. cit.*, 17; C. M. Woodhouse, *The Story of Modern Greece*, London 1968, 207–209. Charles Howland, *Greece and Her Refugees*, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1926, 615. A. C. Macartney, *op. cit.*, 443–444.

³⁹ Ladas, *op. cit.*, 336.

⁴⁰ *LNTS*, Vol. XXXII, № 1, 1925, Doc. 807. – Greece and Turkey: Convention Concerning the Exchange of Population, Lausanne Jan. 30, 1923, 77–85.

⁴¹ Macartney, *op. cit.*, 445; Ladas, *op. cit.*, 382.

⁴² *LNTS*, Vol. XXVIII, Doc. 701, Lausanne Peace Treaty, 11–113.

⁴³ The Turks refused to include the Armenians, the Assyro-Chaldeans and Bulgarians into the treaty. Domna Visvizi-Dontas, *The Allied Powers and the Eastern Question 1921–1923*, *Balkan Studies*, vol. 17, № 2, Thessaloniki 1976, 352.

⁴⁴ Ladas, *op. cit.*, 16–17.

⁴⁵ Macartney, *op. cit.*, 433.

⁴⁶ J. K. Hassiotis, *Shared Illusions: Greek-Armenian Co-operation in Asia Minor and the Caucasus (1917–1922)*, in: *Greece and Great Britain in World War I*, Institut for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1985, 139–177.

⁴⁷ Simpson, *op. cit.*, 33, 41–42, 407; J. Georgieff, *op. cit.*, in Klein and Reban eds., *The Politics of Ethnicity*, 65. Also Ath. Angelopoulos, *Population Distribution of Greece Today According to Language, National Consciousness and Religion*, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 20, № 1, Thessaloniki 1979, 126.

⁴⁸ For the results of the exchange of population see: A. Deimeris, *Situation sociale créée en Grèce à la suite de l'échange de population*, Paris 1927. A. A. Pallis, *Statistical Study of the Racial Migrations in Macedonia and Thrace*, Athens 1925. Harry Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase – A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, Thessaloniki 1968. Société des nations, *L'établissement des réfugiés en Grèce*, Genève 1926. Sir John Simpson, *The Refugee Problem* (Chapter II, Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish Refugees, 11–29; Chapter XVII, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia, 400–430), Oxford 1939. Charles Eddy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees*, London 1931. Alexandre Devidji, *L'échange obligatoire des minorités grecques et turques*, Paris 1930. Macartney, *op. cit.*, 445–446; Ladas, *op. cit.*, 438–439.

⁴⁹ The Commission consisted of four members, two appointed by the League of Nations of whom one was a US citizen. Mears, *op. cit.* Appendix A: The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, 291–292.

⁵⁰ The value was based on the 1961 purchasing power, D. Delivanis, *Achievements in the North of Greece (1912–1962)*. *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 3, № 2, Thessaloniki 1962, 260. The support to Greece was also offered by the American Red Cross, the Near East Relief and other philanthropic societies. See Areti Founda-Fergadi, *L'histoire de l'emprunt accordé pour les réfugiés de 1924* in: *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 24, № 1, Thessaloniki 1983, 89.

⁵¹ See Dimitrije Djordjevic, *Agrarian Reforms in Post World War One Balkans – A Comparative Study*, *Balkanica*, vol. XIII–XIV, Belgrade 1982–1983, 262.

⁵² Mears, *op. cit.*, 51. Maria Negrepointi-Delivanis, *Le développement de la Grèce du nord depuis 1912*, Thessaloniki 1962, 27.

⁵³ Mears, *op. cit.*, Appendix C, Statistics of Urban Refugee Settlement, 299–302.

⁵⁴ Maria Delivanis, *op. cit.*, 21.

⁵⁵ Mears, *op. cit.*, Statistics of Rural Settlement (1927), 295.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 297.

⁵⁷ John Bell, *Peasants in Power, Alexandre Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1899–1929*, Princeton 1977, 161, 164–165. Bell estimates the total number of refugees to 400,000.

⁵⁸ Simpson, *op. cit.*, 27–28.

⁵⁹ From 1921 to 1926 some 463 new factories were established giving work to 13,000 workers, Mears, *op. cit.*, 75, 103, 107.

⁶⁰ Mears, *op. cit.*, 266–7; Kofos, *op. cit.*, 47; Maria Delivanis, *op. cit.*, 16–17.

⁶¹ Temperley, *op. cit.*, 454; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 453; Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, 591.

⁶² Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, 592; Horak, *op. cit.*, 2–3.

Veselin Djuretić

Institute for Balkan studies of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts,
Belgrade

THE EXODUS OF THE SERBS FROM KOSOVO IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND ITS POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In March 1981 many Western newspapers reported the outbreak of an Albanian revolt in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. At first there were only short reports about protests by students dissatisfied with their living conditions. By April, however, it became clear that the revolt had grown to much larger proportions. The press then began to comment extensively on the past, present and future of Yugoslav-Albanian or Serb-Albanian relations. With remarkably few exceptions it took the Albanian side and repeated so many controversial and tendentious views and historical untruths that those Serbs who followed the Western press and knew something about what had been going on in Kosovo for many years were frankly bewildered. Had the West forgotten once again the progressive role played by the Serbs for over a century, and particularly in the two world wars? Or were perfidious anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav circles at home and abroad successfully exploiting the ignorance and apathy of the Western press and public opinion?

The most cursory glance at some of the claims which the Western press accepted almost without examination is enough to reveal their highly tendentious nature. Numerous reports claimed that the Serbs had been oppressing the Albanians for centuries. Others, presumably ignorant of the Albanian language, accused them of renaming the Albanians as 'Schiptars'. This Serb oppression, it was claimed, had reached its height during the interwar years, when the Serbs had dominated and exploited all the other peoples of the newly created Yugoslav state, but particularly the Albanians. That, of course, was why the Albanians had so willingly cooperated with the Italian and German occupation forces during the war. After the war, even under the communist flag, the Serbs had again oppressed and exploited the Albanians until at least 1966 and the fall of Alexander Rankovic, the hardline Serb Minister of the Interior.

There was indeed very little new in all of this. Given the sheer disproportion in their numbers, it seemed hardly credible that the Albanians could be oppressing the Serbs. And the West had also come to believe the propaganda of certain anti-Serb nationalist parties and the post-war communist regime that the political system of the inter-war years had been one of 'Serbian hegemony', that the 'First Yugoslavia' had been, in effect, no better than a 'Greater Serbia' in which all non-Serbs had been treated as second class citizens. Given the chance, it was assumed, the Serbs would quickly reassert their former hegemony. That was why, even if there was little evidence of Serbian oppression at the moment, the Serbs had to be stopped.

What such interpretations ignored was the complete lack of evidence of any such inter-war Serbian hegemony. It was certainly true that the Serbs had

been disproportionately represented in the upper reaches of the state apparatus, but this feature was common to a number of other states which had been formed by the unification of new territories with an older and successful state. This had been the case, for example, with Piedmont and Italy, or with Prussia and Germany. More importantly, far from dominating the new state in an economic sense, Serbia had fallen far behind the former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There was even less chance of the Serbs dominating the post-war federalized state. One of the peculiar features of Yugoslavia's federal system, in which the Serbs were divided up among several republics, is that the minority can oppress the majority.

More detailed reports followed of terrorist acts of unprecedented savagery and countless infringements of the law by the local authorities. They were accompanied by pictures and filmreels which presented the world with the truth about what was happening in Kosovo for the first time. Many Europeans were stunned to learn that such primitive, medieval drives were still alive in a corner of their own Continent. At the same time, however, anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav circles continued to sow disinformation and had such success that Serbs began to suspect the existence of a far-reaching plan to destabilize the region.

A number of Western academics also began to offer, often extremely superficial 'expert' analyses of the origins of the Kosovo problem. Two views dominated. The first held that Kosovo and Metohia were the ancient centres of the Serbian state and the treasury of one of Europe's richest national cultures from which the Serbs had been gradually driven after their rebellion against Turkish rule at the end of the seventeenth century at the time of the Austro-Turkish wars. This migration had continued during the following centuries and had been particularly stimulated by the formation of the Albanian nationalist 'Prizren League' in 1878. The second view held that the Albanians were the descendants of the ancient 'Illyrians' who had arrived – or even returned – to land which the Serbs had already vacated. Very few of the adherents of the latter interpretation attempted to examine the origins of this Illyrian civilization, which had supposedly resisted the pressures of the ancient Greek and Roman and the later Serbian medieval civilizations, or to explain why their Albanian heirs had earned only passing references in Byzantine literature during the eleventh century. Nor did they mention that the Illyrian myth had played an important role in the movement for unification of the South Slavs during the first half of the nineteenth century, when it had served as a general name for the various South Slav peoples. Only later had it been taken up by the Albanians as a means of affirming their national continuity and 'historic' claims for the unification of Albania with the Yugoslav or Serbian territories of Kosovo and Metohia, as well as Macedonia and parts of Montenegro.

In contrast to Albanian propaganda, which was supported by the megalomaniac policies of the Albanian state, the Serb response to this deception of world opinion was muted. While this was partly due to the sympathy of the Serbs themselves for their poor and ignorant neighbours, it soon became clear that the multi-national Yugoslav state was quite incapable of defending the interests of the Serb people with the same intensity as Enver

Hodza's radically nationalist Albania promoted Albanian national interests. Elements within the Yugoslav state were indeed far more concerned with the threat of a renewed Serb 'hegemony' than they were with the advances of Albanian nationalism and were even inclined to welcome the latter as an ally in their struggle against the Serbs. Thus, while disinformation about the 'irrepressible spirit of a people freed from the Serb reign of terror' continued to pour from Enver Hodza's propaganda kitchen, official Belgrade failed to point out that what was happening in Kosovo was merely a new stage in the Albanian persecutions of the Serbs which had begun in the middle ages. The pogroms had begun after the battle of Kosovo in 1389, when the Serbian nobility had been virtually extinguished defending Europe from the Islamic invasion, and had continued under Turkish auspices until the liberation of Kosovo and Metohia in the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. Of all this, however, the world remained ignorant. Partly because it was almost inconceivable that less than two million Albanians could persecute the many times more numerous Serbs, the world continued to believe that the source of Serb-Albanian conflict lay in the domineering tendencies of the Serbs. For this there was a ready-made explanation in the myth of 'Greater Serbian hegemonism', which had been invented by Austro-hungarian politicians as a weapon in their struggle against the Yugoslav idea and taken up by a number of non-Serb nationalist parties in the inter-war period. During the 1920's the Comintern had enthusiastically adopted the thesis of 'Greater Serbian hegemony' and ensured its spread to the revolutionary movements of Europe and America, including, naturally, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

1

The subject of this paper is not the long migrations of the Serbs – as far as Trieste, Vienna, Budapest and Moldavia – nor the invasions which uprooted still greater numbers of Serbs and dispersed them throughout Asia Minor, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Rumania, Austria and Hungary. Nor is it concerned with the pogroms of the middle ages in which a leading part was played by Catholicized, Islamicized and Arnauticized Serbs. The Albanian people originates to a great extent from such converted Serbs, and the savagery of individuals removed from one culture and uncertain of their position in their adopted culture has been well-attested by, among other sources, numerous reports written by Austrian, Vatican, Russian, Serbian, Turkish and other eye-witnesses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

We shall concern ourselves with the sad statistics which record that 500,000 Serbs were driven from Serbian territory by Albanian pogroms from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. Reports show that during the 'Great Eastern Crisis' of 1876–1878 and from the beginning of the twentieth century to the Balkan wars of 1912 to 1913 there was a genuine holocaust. Almost 400,000 Serbs migrated from the region in this period, and another 150,000 left the area to the north of the Saar mountain. In Metohia there were 8,600 Serb homes in 1876. By 1912 the

number had shrunk to 1,830. According to one report written in 1883 by the Russian Consul I. S. Jastrebov, 1,500 Serb families left the Pec district alone in a period of only a few years. The Albanian terror was so savage that the Turkish authorities were frequently forced to intervene in order to maintain order. In general, however, they favoured the pogroms which cleared the land of the rebellious Serb element.

In contrast to this tragic experience, the Serbs used their opportunity to liberate themselves in the civilized manner of a great people.

Kosovo and Metohia were liberated in the First Balkan War of 1912. There were no reprisals against the Albanian population whom the Serbs considered had also gained their freedom from Turkish rule. As the commander of the Serbian forces put it: 'We bring you freedom, justice, the honour of our fathers and respect... We will not allow any kind of reprisals... All that is in the past will be forgotten.' Nor were there any attempts to use the victory to forcibly Serbianize, or, indeed, re-Serbianize the region, or to assimilate the Albanians. Although many Arnauts were still aware of their Serb origins, there was no attempt to make them Serbs again. They remained half Serb and half Albanian, caught between two spiritual worlds and, as ever, ready to serve one side or the other with excessive zeal whenever the moment arose. That moment came in the Great War of 1914-1918, when the Albanians and Arnauts became pawns in the Austro-hungarian war against Serbia. In the course of the Serbian army's two month retreat across Albania in the autumn of 1915 150,000 Serbian soldiers died from starvation and as a result of attacks by local people on exhausted stragglers.

In spite of this, however, the victory of Serbia and the Allies and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 was not accompanied by reprisals or attempts to re-Serbianize the area. Some 35,000 people emigrated, but these were mainly rich landowners, Turkish feudalists and others with close economic and emotional ties with the former Turkish Imperial system. The land was divided up between the Serbian and Albanian former serfs and a relatively small number of peasants from poorer parts of the newly united state such as Montenegro, Herzegovina and Lika. Many of the latter settled land which had been entirely vacated or had yet to be cleared for agricultural use. Although there was some discrimination against Albanians the division of land in this area deviated only marginally from the exceptionally egalitarian land policy of the new state. Nor did the later sweeping generalizations about 'Greater Serbian hegemony' take any account of the fact that the people who were being discriminated against had benefitted for centuries from the anti-Serbian policies of the Turkish Empire.

Given that there were thus no efforts to assimilate the Albanians, although the processes of assimilation and homogenization have played a part in the formation of virtually every modern state and there were no solid ethnic arguments against such attempts in this case, and given that the social position of the majority of Albanians actually improved after the liberation from Turkish rule and the Turkish feudal system, it is paradoxical that the Serbs were later to be accused of conducting a ruthless policy of denationalization and economic exploitation of the Albanians of Kosovo and

Metohia. In truth, this myth could never have arisen if the Albanians had been denationalized or placed in an entirely unfavorable economic position.

There was indeed one new reason for the exceptional tolerance of the Serbs for the Albanian minority, which had no parallel anywhere in the Balkans. The creation of the Yugoslav state signalled the end of a distinctive Serb national policy. Its unitarist ideology hindered the consolidation of narrower national identities, and, although other national groups complained that the Serbs were attempting to deprive them of their national identity, it was in fact the Serbs who lost most for the simple reason that they believed most strongly in the 'Yugoslav idea'. Their energies absorbed in the struggle to consolidate the new state, the Serbs had little time to deal with national problems in Kosovo. There was no attempt to take issue with a variety of 'historical' and 'ethnic' myths which had originated during the centuries of Turkish rule or to reassert the Serbian ethnic, cultural and historic roots of the denationalized people of Kosovo and Metohia. The gradual formation of an Albanian national identity at the expense of the Serbs continued without hindrance. This process, paradoxically, was greatly encouraged and drew its greatest strength from myths about historical figures such as Skenderbeg who were actually Serbs. The religious divisions cultivated by the Turkish authorities as a means of controlling the subject Balkan peoples were also left intact. The peoples of the new state belonged to three main religions – Orthodox, Catholic and Moslem – and religious equality was necessarily guaranteed by the Constitution.

Only in the sphere of education and schooling was there a serious break with the Turkish system of deliberately cultivating divisions and national exclusivity. Even in this area, however, the schools advanced only general Yugoslav spiritual and political integration. There was no attempt to impose Serb national ideology on the Albanians or to combat the ideology of the League of Prizren or the 'Kosovo Committee' and other Albanian nationalist organizations. Given the lack of educated Albanian speakers, schooling in the Serbo-Croat language was an objective necessity and not, as was later claimed, an attempt to 'denationalize' the Albanians.

The national life of other, more economically and culturally advanced, Yugoslav peoples like the Croats and the Slovenes developed even more strongly in reaction to the imaginary system of 'Serbian hegemony' and increasingly fettered the ability of the Serbs to resolve relations with other Yugoslav peoples and non-Slavic minorities. The Serbs alone, carried away by the Yugoslav idea, lacked any strong national consciousness and began to lose even that national unity which they had achieved in their long and successful struggle to create an independent Serbian and eventually a larger Yugoslav state. In this imperilled situation they were drawn into the Second World War and a new bloodbath in many ways more tragic than anything which had occurred before.

2

Serbia's losses in the Second World War were greater in relation to the total population than the losses of any other European people except for the

Jews. As in the case of the Jews, these losses were largely the result of genocidal campaigns against innocent non-combattant men, women and children. After the invasion of April 1941, Yugoslavia was divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria and a number of puppet states under German or Italian control (the 'Independent State of Croatia', Montenegro, Albania and Serbia). Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were murdered in the first months of the war alone, the overwhelming majority by Croat 'Ustasha' and Albanian 'Balista' collaborators who sought to create ethnically homogeneous states by simply exterminating the defenceless Serb minorities. Between a million and a million and half Serbs died during the war. The exact number will never be known because the extent of the slaughter was hushed up after the war in the interests of the 'brotherhood and unity' of the Yugoslav peoples. About 500,000 fled to the small, German occupied Serbian state headed by Milan Nedic and Italian controlled Montenegro.

The German and Italian occupiers encouraged the dreams of Albanian nationalists of creating a 'Greater Albania', but were themselves shocked by the brutality with which they set about that task. No sooner had the hugely outnumbered Yugoslav army surrendered than a wave of terror swept down on the defenceless Serbian villages of Kosovo and Metohia. In the Pec district 65 % of Serb homes were burnt to the ground and in other parts as many as 95 %. One eye witness of the massacres in the Istok district wrote, 'Of the once well-populated and advanced villages... there remains only a desert of ashes and ruins.' In a village near Gracanica one man was skinned alive. In the Pec district a woman was made to watch as her children were hanged from an apple tree. In the latter area alone a hundred girls were forcibly taken from their parents to become members of Albanian harems. Most often they were stripped on the spot and dressed in Albanian national costume. Rape and looting were commonplace. Many Serbs were subjected to grotesque humiliations or escaped with their lives only after paying huge ransomes.

The Albanian nationalists devoted special attention to the destruction of Serb churches, graveyards and other memorials to one of Europe's oldest and richest cultures. All the schools in the Istok district were destroyed except for a few retained by the Catholic Arnauts. The same happened in other areas. Several monasteries including St. Marco's in _____ were destroyed and others were seriously damaged. The monastery of St. Decani, one of the major monuments of Serbian and European culture, was only saved from a similar fate by the occupying forces.

The Serbs fled in all directions from the terror, forming endless columns of refugees. Many crossed the Cakor mountains to get to Montenegro. Others headed for Serbia and merged with similar columns of refugees escaping from the Albanian terror in western Macedonia, which was also designated by the occupiers as a part of the new 'Greater Albania', and from the Bulgarian occupiers and their domestic collaborators in the remainder of Macedonia. A witness of the Albanian pogroms in the Gnjilana district of Kosovo reported that, 'Unable to withstand the terror any longer, the villagers of Velebinci, Vlastica, Malaseva, Zegra, Gornja Budrica, Zitnije, Vrbica, Kmetovac and Prilepinci secretly moved out and crossed the nearby

Serbian border'. Virtually every detail of this lengthy account is confirmed by other witnesses. By the end of 1943 there were only two Serb villages in the whole of the Italian occupied zone of Kosovo. The Italian surrender in September 1943 led to a new wave of still more indescribable brutality. No fewer Serbs were driven from the German occupation zone.

Altogether, between 80,000 and 100,000 Serbs were driven from Kosovo and Metohia during the Second World War. Between May 1941 and April 1944 at least 40,000 left the Italian occupation zone. Documents suggest that there were, in addition, another 40,000 Serb refugees in and around Kosovo Mitrovica in February 1944. By the same date no less than 30,000 Serbs had sought permission to leave Kosovo from the German authorities in Pristina. Another 25,000 Serbs fled from the parts of Kosovo occupied by the Bulgarians and 45,000 colonists were driven from Macedonia. Most ended up in Serbia, but one group of about a thousand Serbs was interned in Italian concentration camps in Albania and later transferred to the Italian peninsula.

The end of the Second World War and the victory of the mainly Serb partisans, albeit within the framework of a wider Yugoslav anti-fascist movement, offered a fresh opportunity to establish a national state and a constitution which would finally allow stable social and political development. The opportunity was not taken. Carried away by the wartime ideals of a new and this time socialist Yugoslavia, of which the Serbs were the most passionate advocates, the victors took special pains to destroy all traces of the supposed 'Serbian hegemony' of the past. Carried away by utopian visions of social equality and the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples and non-Slavic minorities, the new authorities destroyed the social, constitutional and even cultural foundations of the 'Old Yugoslavia'. A new federalized state, allegedly based on the Russian model, was created in its place. Formally at least, the Serbs were recognized as one of six equal Yugoslav nations and the Serbian Republic remained the largest of the six new socialist republics. In practice, however, every expression of Serb national identity was treated as an attempt to restore 'Serbian hegemony' and vigorously suppressed. The spiritual disintegration of the Serb nation was stimulated by quite deliberate educational, cultural and economic policies. Gradually, as the federal units became increasingly politically and economically independent, the Serb minorities living outside the borders of Serbia proper were virtually deprived of all national rights.

In Kosovo and Metohia itself this utopian vision was principally propagated by Serbs. Most of the partisans had been Serbs who had come indirectly to accept communist ideals because of their traditional feelings for Orthodox and Slavic 'Mother Russia'. Such ties had been greatly strengthened in consequence of the fact that the Soviet Union had played the major role in the Allied victory as a whole and the liberation of Yugoslavia in particular. In accepting communism, however, these Serbs also accepted the Comintern thesis of 'Serbian hegemony' which the Yugoslav Communist Party had readily adopted as their chief weapon against the previous regime. Having hardened into a dogma during the years of illegal communist activity,

this theory now became the central tenet of the new rulers of the Yugoslav state.

In order to counter the effects of Serbia's previous alleged 'hegemony', Kosovo-Metohia was given wide autonomous powers within the framework of the Serbian republic, but the same principles were not applied in other republics. According to the first postwar census, 15 % of the population of Croatia were Serbs. Albanians (17.12 %) and Turks (8.32 %) accounted for over a quarter of the population of Macedonia. However, only Serbia, where the Albanians accounted for only 8.15 % of the population was required by the federal government to grant such wide autonomy to an important part of its territory. In order to repair the alleged injustices of the 1919 agrarian reform the Albanians were, in effect, allowed to retain most of the land they had taken from Serbs during the war. Most of the Serbs who had been driven from Kosovo in 1941 were prevented from returning and either left without land or resettled in other areas – mainly in Vojvodina. For the sake of national equality and 'brotherhood and unity' the atrocities of the occupation period were conveniently forgotten. Only a few of the most prominent war criminals were tried. Many others soon found a place in local power structures and the security services. This paradox, where known collaborators gained important positions in the revolution against which they had fought until only yesterday was justified by references to the complexity and fluidity of the war, in which many people had changed sides several times.

Serb communists, for most of whom the victory of the revolution meant a sudden rise in status from peasant or worker to local, republican or even federal official, were the most vocal of all in their condemnations of the old regime and its alleged Greater Serbian hegemonism. Carried away by doctrinaire attitudes on the national question and revolutionary atheism, they uprooted the Serbian Orthodox religious associations which had been the chief meeting places of the local Serb community and had played a vital role in their national cohesion. Serbian churches, graveyards and other cultural monuments which had been literally ravaged during the war were left in ruins. Schiptar cultural and religious organizations, by contrast, continued to function without hindrance. The number of Schiptar churches and mosques which had actually risen during the war continued to grow and was soon greater than it had been during the period of Turkish occupation.

The ideological inspiration for such policies was provided by Serbs, but the effect was to completely undermine the cultural and ethnic balance in Kosovo and provide a screen for the realization of truly megalomaniac dreams of Albanian national expansion. Concessions in land policy were followed by other forms of political and economic favoritism at the expense of the Serbs. The actions of Serb communist party and government officials reassured Albanian nationalists that their first fears of retribution had been groundless, but this only emboldened them to take further steps to achieve their expansionist aspirations. The belief that the ideological slumber of the Serbs would last forever led to the revival of acts of violence against the Serbs in Kosovo during the late 1940's and the following decade.

Political favoritism designed to win over the alleged victims of Serbia's mythical pre-war hegemony thus created a political climate in which old enemies who had participated in the wartime persecution of the Serbs felt free to resume their activities. Political upheavals at the federal level such as the break with the Soviet Union (which led to a purge of many of the leading wartime partisans and undermined the Serb element of the party especially) and, even more, the fall of the Serbian Interior Minister, Alexander Rankovic, favoured such a development. Political life at all levels became increasingly dominated by bureaucrats who unquestioningly followed the prevailing, usually anti-Serb, policy in order to further their careers.

The fall of Alexander Rankovic in 1966 marked the beginning of a new stage in the national question in Kosovo in which Albanian national expansion gained virtually an official seal of approval. Rankovic's dismissal was initially justified by allegations that he had been plotting to overthrow the federal leadership and had been having the telephones of Tito and other Yugoslav leaders tapped. Later, however, he was accused of persecuting the Albanians. In particular he was blamed for acts of violence which had occurred during the drive to confiscate illegal arms of 1955-56 and for allegedly fabricating the 'Prizren trial' of Albanian separatists in 1956. The massive witch-hunt of the 'Rankovites' which followed was accordingly accompanied by measures designed to compensate the Schiptars for the alleged persecution. In 1963 the former region of Kosovo and Metohia obtained the status of an autonomous province and in 1968 the second part of its name was dropped on account of its explicitly Serbian origins. Such policies naturally weakened the links between Serbia and Kosovo and contributed to the closer identification of Kosovo's Schiptars with Albania proper. During the Albanian nationalist demonstrations of 1968 the demand for a separate Republic of Kosovo was advanced for the first time.

This pressure on the Serbian and federal leaderships by a new and disciplined nation, fully aware of the political circumstances which gave it many privileges in relation to the Serbs, rapidly bore fruit. A new Constitution introduced in 1974 gave the autonomous province of Kosovo the status of a 'socio-political community in which the working people and citizens enjoy full sovereign rights'. The government of the Republic of Serbia was to be responsible only for areas of policy on which there was common agreement. However, in addition to managing the bulk of their internal affairs, Kosovo and the other autonomous province, Vojvodina, were to have a say in the government of Serbia. This constitutional absurdity was compiled at the federal level. Kosovo nad Vojvodina, although nominally part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, were declared to be constituent elements of the Federation and given virtually equal status with the six republics in all decisionmaking forums.

In this way Yugoslavia's leaders created a constitutional framework for the unfettered development of Albanian nationalism within the Serbian republic. The revival of fears of Greater Serbian hegemonism which resulted from the Rankovic affair exacerbated the indifference of a large part of the Yugoslav public to the growing problems of the Serbs of Kosovo. Internationally, the new policies were interpreted as an 'admission' of the injustices

which had supposedly been committed against the Albanians by Rankovic and the Greater Serbian clique. Those local Serb politicians and officials who still remained from the revolutionary period were largely replaced by Albanians. At the same time, leaders at the federal and even republican level who advocated policies which took at least some account of Serb interests were ruthlessly purged as being 'residues of Greater Serbian nationalism'. Among them were a number of extremely prominent revolutionaries who had only just awakened from a long a-nationalistic sleep. After the purges of the 'Stalinists' in the late 1940's came purges of various 'chauvinists' and 'liberals' from Djilas to Rankovic and, after 1968, Dobrica Cosic. In the early seventies, after dealing with the Croat nationalist 'mass movement', the Yugoslav leadership elected to restore the 'equilibrium' by declaring war on the 'Serbian liberals'. By the time the 1974 Constitution was introduced there was virtually no prominent figure left who dared to represent even a minimum of Serb interests.

The anti-traditional and atheistic drive undermined the cohesion of traditional Serb communities and the more recent Serb immigrants were quickly uprooted. According to the census returns, the Serb population of Kosovo grew from 199,961 in 1948 to 259,819 in 1971 while the number of Schiptars almost doubled from 498,242 to 916,168. In 1948 Serbs made up 23.6% and Montenegrins 3.85% of the total population of Kosovo. By 1971 they accounted for 18.35% and 2.54% respectively. During these years in proportion to their share in the total population nine times more Serbs and thirteen times more Montenegrins migrated from Kosovo than did Schiptars. By the end the Schiptars accounted for 73.66% of the total as against 68.45% in 1948. During the 1980's, however, the situation altered still more rapidly as a result of the sudden increase in the birthrate among Kosovo's Schiptar population. In 1985, for example, the natural rate of increase of the population of Kosovo was 2.48% as against a Yugoslav average of 0.68%. Nor was there any doubt that the enormous rate of increase of the Schiptar population to a considerable extent promoted by aspirations of national expansion at the expense of the Serbs.

The post-war years also saw a steady increase in direct pressure on the Serb and Montenegrin minorities of Kosovo. Thousands migrated as a result of the growing fear and unpleasantness of everyday life. In 1967 the abbot of the monastery of Visoki Dečan wrote, 'The psychological pressure from the Schiptars is here and there worse than during the occupation, but the desire to loot has never left them.' By 1971 a large number of villages and settlements which had formerly had a mixed population were inhabited by Schiptars alone.

The all too obvious indifference of Yugoslav politicians to the continuing persecution of the Serbs in Kosovo suggested the existence of a secret anti-Serb conspiracy. Yugoslav and international public opinion was kept in ignorance of what was happening. A stream of emigrants, many of them destitute, told of the burnings of homes, the destruction of orchards and graves, the poisoning of wells, the blinding of cattle and rape – all common forms of pressure employed by Schiptar nationalists against the Serb population – but their stories were rarely believed. By this time the national and

religious divisions in the Province were already dramatic. Children were kept apart in the schools and Schiptar and Serb youths took their evening strolls on opposite sides of the street. All this was hushed up, partly out of fears that the revelation of the truth would have a still more devastating effect on the 'brotherhood and unity' of the Yugoslav peoples in Kosovo and Yugoslavia as a whole, but also in order to preserve Yugoslavia's international reputation. Both problems were exacerbated by the frequent challenges to the federal leadership and the purges of 'unsuitable' officials which followed. In Kosovo itself the Serbs were increasingly represented – to the extent that they were represented at all – by career politicians with few roots in the community and little feeling for their fellow nationals. Proclaiming internationalist ideals, but as often as not merely to further their careers, they followed the party line without question.

The manner in which the Federation provided financial aid for the development of Kosovo also favoured Albanian nationalism and fueled suspicions of a deliberate anti-Serb conspiracy. Massive financial aid was given to Kosovo by the Federal Development Fund from the end of the 1950's. In the period 1960–65 Kosovo received 22.2% of the total funds devoted to this purpose, and in 1966–70 the proportion rose to 30%. Over the next two five year periods it grew to 33.25% and 37.1%. Since 1981 Kosovo has received over 44% of the money allocated by the Federal Development Fund. Kosovo also received nearly half of the money provided by the Federation for the financing of social programs. Altogether it has been calculated that Kosovo obtained approximately two billion dollars in aid. More important, however, is the fact that the use to which these funds were to be put was not specified. This enabled the local Albanian bureaucracy to finance projects which forwarded Albanian nationalist aspirations and to buy off the opposition of the largely unrepresentative Serb representatives by giving them comfortable positions and material benefits.

Such extensive federal aid a rapid and ill-thought out expansion of the education system which provided the champions of Albanian nationalism with a veritable army of semi-educated and unemployed youths. Founded in 1961, Pristina University had a student population of 50,000 by 1971. A further 85,000 students were attending 104 secondary schools, most of which were entirely new. Kosovo also boasted a new Academy of Science and a string of newly established scientific institutes. However, given the previous absence of any considerable Albanian educated elite, this rapid expansion was possible only on the basis of extremely low academic criteria. In such an environment nationalist ideology flourished and was, in fact, deliberately fostered. Other anti-Serb elements in the Yugoslav Federation contributed to this development by giving Albanian students academic titles on the basis of sub-standard research and, in some cases, voicing open support for the political aims of Albanian students.

3

By the end of the 1970's the Serbs of Kosovo were in a weaker position than ever before. Then, after the mass demonstrations of the spring of 1981,

Albanian nationalists began a new genocidal campaign against the Serbs of Kosovo. For once the attempts of the Yugoslav state leadership to hide what was happening from domestic and international public opinion failed. Official communications initially interpreted the disturbances as a clash between Albanian and Serb nationalism. The blame was later placed on a handful of Albanian conspirators. So widespread was the violence committed against the Serbs, however, that the regime was eventually forced to admit to the existence of an Albanian nationalist 'counter-revolution'.

Despite this apparent change of heart and the undeniable concern of the Yugoslav public which promoted it, little concrete action was taken to discover and punish the real inspirers of the anti-Serb drive, and still less to remove the causes and restore the balance in Kosovo. The 'counter-revolution' continued unabated throughout the 1980's, the Albanian nationalists achieving their basic aim of speeding up the emigration of the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Between 1971 and 1981 their numbers had fallen from 259,819 to 236,667, or from 20.9% to 14.9% of the total population of the province. From 1981 to the beginning of 1988 at least 30,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo. By the latter date the Serbs and Montenegrins accounted for less than 10% of the province's population. No less than seven hundred villages were entirely Albanian.

Once again, after the failure of initial attempts to stem the tide of violence by police methods, the federal and provincial authorities returned to the policy of hushing up what was happening in Kosovo. A number of official representatives explained the all too obvious extremism of Albanian nationalism as a reaction to Serb nationalism or denied that the alarming increase in such crimes as rape and other forms of assault had any nationalist connotations. The sheer extent of the terror was kept a closely guarded secret. One extreme example of this general policy was the case of Djordje Martinovic, a Serb who had a bottle forced blunt end first up his anus by three Albanians in a crude imitation of the medieval Turkish execution process known as 'sticking on the pole'. The subsequent inquest ignored all expert medical opinion and returned the unbelievable verdict that Martinovic's appalling injuries had been self-inflicted. At about the same time Fadilj Hodza, the Albanian former vice-president of the Federal Presidency, told a meeting of a Kosovo veteran's organization that the growing incidence of rapes of Serb women by Albanians had nothing to do with nationalism. He went on to suggest that the state should open up a few kafanas where men could go when they felt the need, which would employ Serb and Montenegrin waitresses, because 'Albanian girls do not do that'.

If the policy of hiding the extent of the terror and denying the essentially nationalistic motivation of many of the crimes was partly influenced by the desire to maintain the illusion of harmonious national relations and Yugoslavia's international reputation, it was gradually becoming clear to the Serbs of Kosovo that the root cause of their problems was to be found in the structure of the Yugoslav state. Its exceptional national diversity and the often irrational fears of a number of other nations of the most numerous and widespread Serbs had created a coalition of interests within the state which regarded the Albanian advance with indifference and even satisfaction. The

post-war political system with its insistence on the political equality of each of the Yugoslav nations and the 1974 Constitution, which effectively deprived Serbia of power over a great part of its territory, had created a situation in which Albanian nationalists could act with impunity while the Serbs, alone of all the Yugoslav peoples, were unable to protect their national interests.

The central role in this silent coalition was played by the Croat nationalists whose nationalism had always been predominantly anti-Serb in character and often verged on paranoia and pathological hatred. Also influential was the marked provincialism of many Slovenes who saw Yugoslavia in purely pragmatic terms as a mere framework for the national development of Slovenia and rejected the sentimental Pan-slavism of the Serbs and some other Yugoslavs. It was far from the case that these essentially petty bourgeois anti-Serb and to some extent anti-Yugoslav tendencies represented the whole of their respective nations, but the working of the Yugoslav political system and the growing autarchy of the republican bureaucracies effectively silenced the many fervent Yugoslavs of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slovenia. Bureaucratic circles protected their positions and extended their hold on power by promoting the old myth of Greater Serbian hegemonism and playing on the growing divisions between the developed north and the under-developed south, Catholic and Orthodox christianity and their supposed west European civilisation and the corresponding stereotype of Balkan primitivism. Depicting the Serbs as crude, undemocratic, domineering and a threat to all, they created a psychological and political framework within which the victims of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo could only be seen as oppressors of the Albanians.

The final link in the chain was provided by the Catholicized and Islamicized Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and other denationalized Serbs in Macedonia and Montenegro who had either forgotten their Serb origins or viewed the light of the Serbs of Kosovo with complete detachment. This process was also encouraged by republican bureaucracies which furthered their interests by emphasizing the differences between the Yugoslav peoples and suppressing the influence of or denationalizing the Serb minorities in their respective republics.

Inevitably, the powerful anti-Serb tendencies within the Yugoslav state were echoed by parts of the foreign press, notably in Germany and Austria, but also in the USA, France and Great Britain, allies in two world wars from whom the Serbs expected greater sympathy. Of the Great Powers, only the Soviet Union did not join the anti-Serbian campaign, and this prompted hopes among the Serbs of Kosovo that the disruption of the traditionally close relations between the Serb and Russian peoples which had occurred under Stalin's rule had finally come to an end. Still more important, however, was the indirect influence exerted by entirely new developments in the Soviet Union. The energetic reforms initiated by Mihail Gorbachov, which, among other things, led to a dramatic opening up of the Soviet press, inspired and impelled other communist governments including that of Yugoslavia to make similar changes. For the first time sections of the Yugoslav press broke free of the old policy of painting a false picture of brotherhood and unity in Kosovo and elsewhere (which had actually done more harm

because it was rarely believed) and began to print the facts about the most intense genocidal campaign seen in Europe since the war.

For the first time since the creation of the new Yugoslavia the Serbs of Serbia proper were able to read the facts about what was happening in Kosovo. Their growing warnings of the threat posed to Yugoslavia's integrity by Albanian nationalism and its hidden allies soon found an echo in other parts of Yugoslavia. Millions of Serbs left in other republics by the post-war federal settlement had suppressed their national feelings or bowed to the denationalization policies of the local bureaucracies. Now, as the dream of socialist brotherhood and unity faded under the blows of the economic crisis and the growing national and political disunity of the Yugoslav state, they found their voice. They were joined by many Catholics and Moslems, who had grown weary of the divisions created by the regional bureaucracies and their corruption. For many of them the plight of the Serbs of Kosovo became a symbol of all that was wrong in Yugoslavia.

The widespread public revolt did not bring any improvement of the situation of the Serbs of Kosovo, but it rapidly exposed the causes of their problems – the inability of the Serbian republic to protect the rights of its own citizens in Kosovo and the ineffectiveness of the federal government's policies towards the province. While the Serbs of Kosovo were left to the tender mercies of the Albanian – dominated provincial bureaucracy, the federal leadership contented itself with making empty resolutions about ending the “counter-revolution” and enabling Serb and Montenegrin emigrants to return and live normally. The Serbs of Kosovo soon saw the impotence of this federal policy as tacit approval of the advance of Albanian nationalism. Finally, however, from the end of 1987, the Serbian leadership began to rebel against the decades of anti-Serbian policies and in particular demanded greater powers to defend the interests of the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo. At last finding support, the Serbs of Kosovo themselves began to push aside the provincial bureaucracy and appeal directly to Belgrade.

Over the past year or more the policy of the Serbian leadership has changed rapidly. Where before it had waited passively for favours from the federal government, it has now begun actively to demand the equality of Serbia with the other republics of Yugoslavia and a constitutional arrangement which would bring an end to the exodus of the Serbs from Kosovo. Not least, it has also begun to challenge the prejudices about “Greater Serbian hegemonism” which have provided the chief ideological justification of the anti-Serb policies of recent decades.

I am convinced, however, that public opinion is far more radical than are Serbia's representatives, above all because of the realization that the Serb national question is not simply an internal matter of the Serbian republic. There is increasing dissatisfaction in most other parts of Yugoslavia with the denationalizing policies pursued by the bureaucracies in order to still further extend their independence and internal homogenization which have led to the massive exodus of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are consequently ever louder demands for a fundamental reorganization of the Yugoslav state which would allow the Serbs and all other peoples

national rights and cultural unity regardless of republican boundaries. These demands also stress the right of the Montenegrins, Macedonians and Moslems to self-determination.

The Serb people has already made considerable progress towards overturning the ideological prejudices of the past and the anti-Serb policies which they promoted, but it cannot be denied that these prejudices are still widely believed in the outside world. The increasingly frequent signs of a more objective attitude among official circles and public opinion in the west and the reforms initiated in the Soviet Union by Mihail Gorbachov nevertheless give rise to hopes that such blatant manipulation of the truth will finally come to an end.

The Serbs of Kosovo and Metohia have ended their long silence with "pilgrimages" to the federal institutions in Belgrade, but they have also made clear their intention of defending themselves if help does not arrive. Such warnings, issued at a time of serious economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia, have been heard far away. They are, in effect, the cry of the oppressed and humiliated, summed up in the words of Njegoš, "Does anyone in the world care enough to help?"

CATTLEBREEDERS' MIGRATIONS IN THE BALKANS THROUGH CENTURIES

For more than a century, the migrations of nomadic and seminomadic cattlebreeders in the Balkan Peninsula have been a topic of interest to scientific circles, anthro-geographers, ethnologists, historians, as well as research workers who studied the economic problems of southeastern Europe. We are concerned, here, with the migratory moves of the Balkan cattlebreeders – wanderings that assumed the pattern of seasonal residential change on the mountain-lowland relation, and vice-versa. This belongs to the category of the vertical nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding.

One of the fathers of the anthro-geographic cattlebreeding migration studies in the Balkan Peninsula is Jovan Cvijić, who defined the subject and the scientific methods necessary for the study of this complex problem. Other researchers, each one from his own scientific and methodological point of view, greatly contributed to setting and resolving various problems in the field of cattlebreeding migrations.

1

The nature of the terrain and various climatic conditions compelled the Balkan man to engage in seasonal migrations with his livestock at an early stage, depending on the season and the vegetation of different regions.

Favorable ecological conditions that prevailed in the Peninsula, like the lush pastures of the mountainous regions, played a crucial role in the existence of cattlebreeders, by guiding their travels and directing their course.

When writing about the life of the Balkan cattlebreeders, Cvijić pointed to the most important part of it – namely, their setting out to the pastures. To this group belong, first of all, the Vlachs and Saracatsans, et al., who lived without permanent abode in their huts (halivas), then come the Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples who were not nomadic cattlebreeders in the strictest sense, because they had permanent settlements in their villages, which they would leave to go out into the mountains.¹ It can be rightfully said that “the economy of migrational cattlebreeding met the needs for living”.²

It is a well known fact that it was the Palaeolithic man who began domesticating animals living in wilderness until then. On both the Adriatic coastline and the Dinaric region this primitive cattlebreeding phase began in the Neolith with a strong influx from the Central Mediterranean, according to archeological finds. This conclusion was drawn by the similarity of cultural finds from Herzegovina (Lisicici) and corresponding material from Sicily.³ Almost all kinds of domesticated animals, but primarily sheep and goat,

could be found in the Balkans later on, in the pile dwelling settlements from the Bronze Age. The inhabitants of pile dwellings are said to have been the earliest shepherds who abided by the nomadic way of life.⁴

We will mention the fact that science has yet to provide the answer to the question where and when cattlebreeding first began. To this rather complex problem, archeologists, ethnologists and historians have continually been striving for new theories that might come close to an answer. They would amount to in brief: whether the primitive hunters from the Stone Age, who followed vast animal herds, constantly struggling with them, came up with the idea of domesticating them, and then raising cattle, or was it the farmer, for whom hunting had been an incidental occupation, who was more likely to think of it.

As for discovering the core of the earliest cattlebreeding, the researchers are searching for it in the Middle East, in the ninth millennium B. C., when the first domesticated sheep began appearing in the Zagros mountain region, in western Iran. As far back as 800 B. C., domesticated sheep and goat were kept in Anatolia, whereas swine and aurochs had yet to be domesticated. However, hunting was carried out in the lowlands abounding in herds of aurochs, stags, wild donkey and fallow deer, and vegetation: no less than 14 cultivated plants were grown, among them spelt, couch grass and peas, as well as wheat and barley.⁵

2

In the Classical World, large states rose, and the management of the city economies within their framework depended on the cattlebreeding and farming areas around them. Classical Antiquity facilitated the development of nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding on a far larger scale than it was possible in prehistoric times. In Homeric times, sheep and goat raising had long formed an important part of Hellenic life. All through Classical Antiquity Aepirus was the Land of Shepherds.⁶

Classical writers may serve as a rich source of information from which to draw conclusions about the migrations of Balkan cattlebreeders on their journey from the summer to the winter pastures. Although the exact accounts are deficient, the marginal notes and descriptions help us put together a valuable mosaic which would give us an insight into the cattlebreeding world of Classical Antiquity.

Climatic conditions of the Greek territory compelled shepherds and their flocks to practise seasonal nomadism in which respect there is no difference whatsoever between ancient and modern times. By way of illustration we shall quote a passage from Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, where a messenger, in the king's presence, hoping to refresh his majesty's servants' memories, says:

"I am sure he knew me when
we lived in Cytheron as neighbors,
he with two flocks and I with one,

and it lasted three whole half-years,
from spring until until Arcturus appears. When
winter came I returned to my stables,
and he to Lance's pens" . . .⁷

Dyon Chrysostomos, a Euboean, shepherd, made a speech in which he described his life in the following manner: "In winter we used to graze our flocks in the lowlands where the pastures were lush and where plenty of green fodder was preserved. In the summer, however, we had the flocks graze in the mountains."⁸

Homer's great work indicates the way cattlebreeding was carried out. Polyphemus's cave gives a good picture of the cattlebreeders's ambiance. Homer depicts the cave, and says that the shelves for drying were full of cheese, while lambs and kids were crowded in their pens, separated and shut according to their kind and age, and in buckets and pails whey was strained. Polyphemus drove a large herd into his cave for milking, leaving the rams out. He then proceeded to milk the sheep and goats, having first put the young under each one. He curdled half the milk and made blocks of cheese which he placed in wickerbaskets to clear them of whey, and put the rest of the milk into vessels, to be partaken of for supper. Polyphemus grazed his flocks on meadows far away, leaving early in the morning and returning in the evening.⁹

Let us take a look at some other examples from the *Odyssey*. After making Odysseus comfortable, Eumaeus, armed with a spear and wrapped in a long, sheepskin cloak, stood night guard in order to defend his herds from wild beasts, plundering warriors and neighboring shepherds. After all, as we know, Achilles's shield showed, among other things, four herdsmen ordering their dogs to drive off two lions that had just seized an ox.¹⁰

Hesiod, too, informs us that the shepherds led a modest life, dwelling in huts made of light material, that had to be repaired every summer. The interior of the hut, was almost covered with sheep and goat skin over the hearth and resting places, a style almost identical to the one used today by the Saracatsans and Vlachs.¹¹

According to Plato, mountain shepherds had no organized state, nor were they literate. They were led by the heads of their families, and tarried in the mountains, dependant on the climatic conditions.¹²

C. Hoeg, an expert on the lives of Balkan cattlebreeders, tried to prove, on the basis of scant classical data, that cattlebreeding nomadism in ancient Greece was highly developed, owing to the relief and climate of the country, the both of which necessitated such a life and economy. And, according to A. Bauermann, "two economic areas, shaped by natural orographic and climatic conditions, could only have become advantageous in Classical Antiquity by means of movable cattlebreeding. Agriculture, including irrigation, could afford to abandon the additional land on the mountains, but cattlebreeding could not. Vast mountain pastures could have been properly exploited only by practising the nomadic cattlebreeding economy, the economy of remote pastures."¹³

The point of issue is what were the forms of life and the economy of shepherds like, and how did they go about their travels to the interior of the Peninsula in those early times?

The fact that the Macedonians were seasonal nomads as well, can be concluded from a passage by Arianus, in his *Anabasis*, which convinces us that shepherds constituted the majority of inhabitants in Macedonia. According to this author, Alexander the Great addressed his soldiers, on one occasion, with the following words: "When you came under Phillip's power, you led a nomadic and miserable life. Most of you dressed in animal skins and grazed sheep in the mountains. You had to fight to protect them. In doing so, you suffered defeats against your neighbors the Illyrians, Triballs and Thraceans. It was he (Phillip) who gave you woolen coats to wear instead of skins, and it was he who brought you down from the mountains and onto the lowlands."¹⁴

Written sources provide meagre information about the tribes from the central parts of the Peninsula – the lives they led and the activities they engaged in pre-Roman times. However, there is a possibility of learning something through indirect ways. F. Papazoglu wrote about the tribes, and remarked that some of them were very mobile. She says that Triballs, together with their families, moved all over Thrace, and for that matter, mostly as shepherds. They did not belong to the category of permanently settled farmers, and were always contending with the Ardiaei for the salt they needed for their cattle.¹⁵

Amianus Marcellanus recorded that, during the Roman conquests, "roaming tribes, wholly ignorant of organized life and law" could be encountered in Thrace.¹⁶ Dardania, a country rich in pastures, was obliged to practise nomadic and semi-nomadic seasonal cattlebreeding for centuries.¹⁷

Strabo considers the Bessi a poor people who lived in huts. He also points out Romans had tried to accustom the Uardiaei to agriculture, since their country did not allow the plowman to settle down on it. Generally speaking, in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula – the one that had been exposed to the long and efficacious process of Romanization – there were numerous vestiges of the nomadic tribes from Classical Antiquity.¹⁸

Classical sources from the Roman times reveal unequivocal evidence of nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding.

In those ancient times, large flocks of sheep moved through Italy using a separate, "shepherds' road". "Tratturo stretches across the whole country like a quiet green river", says an Italian poet. At least 10, but often 200–300m wide shepherds' lanes wound off from the Appenines, across mountains and valleys, to the Apulean Sea. Only grass grew on it, no house could have been built on it, no spade nor plow was allowed to cut through this earth that had been reserved for shepherds since times immemorial, to ensure their long journey passed undisturbed and their sheep grazed in peace. In Abruzzi, the state supervisors, "gurdie Trattorie", saw to it that no one but the shepherds could use the road. Roads like this one existed in Sicily, too, going from the mountains and leading to the sea. They were usually 30m wide and were called "trazzera".¹⁹

When it comes to the economic basis of seasonal nomadism, it should also be mentioned that in Classical times sheep cheese was appreciated far more than cow cheese, concludes Gyoni. In Classical Antiquity, the Balkan Peninsula could boast of established centers for cheese making, such as Cythnos, Cyclades, Crata as well as those in the Boeotia and Dalmatia regions. The cheese from Dardania was also highly priced. From information obtained in "Expositio totius mundi", fourth century A. D., Dardania and Dalmatia exported cheese to other provinces of the Roman Empire.²⁰

In households of the Balkan-Dinaric cattlebreeders, cheese has remained until today "the nourishing food for all household members", says B. Gusic. This non-fat cheese, from the Dinaric highlands, substituted bread in the barren and hungry years, but was also used for everyday food. "Even today, before serving his guests, any dish, Malissor puts slices of cottage cheese on the table, as people do with bread in other places, to remain on the table throughout the meal."²¹

This retrospect on Classical Antiquity revealed vestiges of the nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding as a typical form of and economic and cultural life which had been continuing with stubborn tenacity, for centuries, in the geographic, ethnical and historical regions of the Balkan Peninsula.

On the other hand, city-dwellers of that time poetized, embellished and stylized some aspects of the shepherds' lives from Classical times: like, for instance, melodies played on Pan's pentatonic pipes or the characteristic conception of the Shepherds' god from Greek Arcadia, the one with a goat's head and legs who possessed the features of an animal but embodied lust itself. No nymph was safe with him, and like the Christian devil, he represented the goat's nature in its primitive carnality.²²

3

The movements of nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeders in the course of the Middle Ages were more intense and complex than they were in Classical times. They played a crucial role in the development of the material and spiritual culture of the Balkan peoples during the Middle Ages, especially in establishing ethnogenetic and mutual relationships.

The Slavic conquest of the Balkans brought about changes in the economic and ethnic structures of Southeastern Europe. The penetration of the Slav settlers caused the indigenous population, unless it fell captive to the Slavs, to abandon their fields and villages and set out to the mountains with their cattle and scant household goods. The withdrawal of the cattle and refugees into the mountains was supervised by experienced shepherds well acquainted with the terrain and roads of the mountainous regions.²³ The greater part of today's mountain settlements in Greece were founded during the Slavic dominion on the land. In winter, the flocks could not be sustained in the mountains, and the shepherds were, therefore, obliged to seek a milder climate for their flocks in the valleys. However, they now had to pay the farmers a lease for the winter pastures. So the flock owners built movable huts, made of reeds and straw, on the winter grazings, like the ones that can be seen even today in the regions of southern Greece.²⁴

This new style of living, with movable huts and tents pitched up near the summer or winter pastures, without permanent settlement, with few personal belongings carried on horseback during the seasonal migrations and long journeys in which all members of the household took part, exhibited strong nomadic features. The intensified development of Balkan nomadism in the Middle Ages can be accounted for not only by historical circumstances or favorable ecological conditions, i. e. the abundance of lush pastures in the Balkan mountains that could be used seasonally, but also the specific Byzantine and medieval taxation system. Peasants permanently settled were obliged to pay in kind high taxes to their feudal lords, the owners of the land, and the monasteries and priests as well. Each landed estate enjoyed great freedom in assessing these fines, exploiting the model of the so-called tithe, which often imposed the duty of delivering no less than one fourth of the total harvest.²⁵

The only way of escaping this arbitrary tax system was to be separated from one's real estate which was easy to manage, and therefore, be taxed. However, if one's property consisted of cattle and flocks roaming about remote mountain regions, where life and economy were of a nomadic character, it was difficult to control income, in spite of the fact that the one tenth taxation system was practised with cattle as well.²⁶

For this reason the travels of nomadic and semi-nomadic cattle-breeders were far more intensive in the Middle Ages than they were in the Classical times. Nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding was given a strong impetus in Macedonia, Aepyros, Thessaly, Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. Written sources testify to the fact that throughout the Middle Ages nomadic Vlachs, Saracatsans, Albanians and others, practised seasonal nomadism, which is closely connected to semi-nomadism. In this respect, the first indubitable piece of information can be found in Kekevmenon's *Strategicon* (1075-1085). This Byzantine author, describes, in minute, the details of the Greek, Bulgarian and Thessalian Vlach uprising in 1066, against the exploiting fiscal regime imposed by Czar Constantine X Ducca. Kekevmenon's description is the earliest piece of information on the moves of Vlachs from the mountains to the lowlands, and vice versa, depending on the season. According to his description, Vlachs spent their winters, from October to March, on the Thessaloean plains and on the slopes of Pyndarus. In April, they set out together with their families and flocks northward, covering a considerable distance, so that in June they would find themselves deep in the interior of the Peninsula, on the Sara mountain, or some other Macedonian mountains.²⁷

Other Byzantine sources inform us of the nomadic life of the Balkan Vlachs. A piece of such information has been preserved in Anna Comnena's *Alexaide* (1118-1148). The princess writes of the spring of 1091, when her father was detained in Constantinople, and had a messenger dispatched to Czar Niciphorus, asking him to take measures for the immediate enlisting of new soldiers, from both the Bulgarian and Vlach nomadic tribes. Anna Comnena was well acquainted with the Vlachs. In her day they sold their excellent Vlach cheese and handmade woollen articles, made by Vlach women, on the Constantinople markets.²⁸

The charter issued by Alexeus I Comnenus (from January 1105) and the Metropolitan charter issued at about the same time, gave evidence on the nomadism of the Balkan cattlebreeding Vlachs. As can be seen from these documents, writes M. Gyoni, an extended family unit of Vlach cattlebreeders, comprising several hundreds of families, came to graze their flocks on the pastures of Mount Athos. Vlach girls and women dressed like men, and together with the shepherds tended their flocks. They all lived on the produce of their flocks, and gave their due to the monasteries in kind (cheese, milk, wool). However, very soon, the Vlach shepherds and their flocks were driven out of Mount Athos for ethical reasons.²⁹

M. Gyoni calls to our attention another charter from 1190, issued by Alexis III Angelos, which shows that the Lavra monastery on Mount Athos granted certain privileges to Vlach cattlebreeders, allowing them to graze their flocks on their meadows during the summer, and in the winter, on the pastures in Meglenia, where they were exempt from the taxes.³⁰

All through the Middle Ages, nomadic cattlebreeders roamed through the highlands of the Peninsula with their vast flocks. This wandering population had their flocks graze on the mountains, and down, in the lowlands and sunny valleys, which caused difficulties with the landowners whose lands the cattlebreeders trespassed. Once they had payed their tax of one tenth, the shepherds and their families were free to live and graze their flocks on the pastures. Enormous figures recorded in Byzantine sources concerning the size of the flocks, for instance, the ten thousand sheep that Thomas, chief of the Lycandos village, allegedly gave to Justinian, shows evidence of highly developed cattlebreeding of the time.³¹

Data provided by Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian charters, especially the codex of Czar Dusan, also mention the cattlebreeders' migrations, going from Aepyros and Thessaly in the south, across the central part of the Balkans, and ending north in the Polish Carpathians, in the thirteenth century, on former Hungarian lands in the Seven Cities region (Sedmogradka). During the fourteenth century, in the Carpathians, Vlach cattlebreeders appear as newcomers from the Balkans.³² Written sources from the second half of the fourteenth century testify to Vlach migrations in the eastern Beskidi, who had also come from the Balkan Peninsula.³³

4

The downfall of the medieval states in southeastern Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, and the beginning of the Modern Era, had a favorable effect on nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding. The demand for milk, dairy products, wool and leather supplies for towns and the Ottoman Empire army was so great, that from the very beginning, the policy of low taxation exacted from shepherds, for the right to graze their flocks on winter and summer pastures, and privileges granted to nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeders, acted as an incentive for this line of work. This state of affairs was further promoted by the close interrelatedness of mountainous regions and sunny valleys, which facilitated the migration of nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeders and their livestock from the winter to the summer pastures, and vice versa, even when the grazings were several

hundred kilometers apart. For this reason, nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeding was carried out on such a large scale under Turkish rule. The livelihood was pursued by all Balkan peoples who were proper nomads – the Vlachs, Saracatsans, et. al. and by Serbs, Bulgarians and others who were semi-nomadic cattlebreeders.

In the Balkans, this period is characterized by the growth of estates (čitluci), in the lowlands and valleys, particularly at the decline of Turkish rule. These estates, as will be shown, were conducive to the establishment of the nomadic style of Balkan cattlebreeding. J. Cvijić frequently pointed out that vast stretchers of flat land without forests were especially favorable for the development of estates (čitluci), whereas mountainous regions were unsuitable.³⁴ The largest number of estates were to be found on the plains of Thessaly, in Greece, whereas Salonika, Serez and Drama abounded in fertile valleys in the north. This also holds true for the Maritza valley and the Danube region in Bulgaria, and in Macedonia and Serbia – the Vardar valley and the Skopje and Ovcepolje valleys. This also goes for the southeastern valleys in Albania, specially the Korčani valley.³⁵ All these regions, when transformed into estates, belonged to the feudal and agrarian lords. During the winter months countless flocks and nomadic shepherds would gather on the estates around the Aegean Sea, in the Maritza and Vardar valleys. Turkish feudal estate owners allowed the flocks to graze their lands if the shepherds paid the proportionate rent. These rents filled up the landowners' pockets far more than money obtained from cultivating the land. Over the years, many estate owners completely re-adjusted themselves to the economy of pastures which resulted in the village population migration to the mountains. The gradual withdrawal of the population emptied whole regions in the lowlands, reaching its peak, at the time the estate system, along with the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, had reached its highest point.³⁶ "As a result, these estates were appropriated by nomadic cattlebreeders. The rent they paid them was the only income that the beys could squeeze out of their estates."³⁷ The Ottoman Empire cattlebreeders, unimpeded by territorial boundaries, were allowed to move freely and graze their flocks wherever they found pastures at reasonable prices.³⁸

The moves of nomadic cattlebreeders had caught the attention of various travellers of the time, who left some record of them in their journals. By far the most impressive description was given by Holland, an Englishman, in 1812. On his travels through Greece, he encountered rugged shepherds from Pynдарus who were driving their flocks to the half-deserted Campagna or the shores of the Arta bay. They were innate nomads, accompanied by their wives and children. A long string of sheep, whose pace determined the rate they were going at, was followed by a caravan of horses amounting up to a thousand, all loaded with household goods and tents, and small children places in wicker-baskets. Even the priests followed the column on such journeys.³⁹

5

The gradual fall of the Turkish Empire, and the rise of capitalism, and new social relations, had had a negative effect on nomadic and semi-nomadic

cattlebreeding. The beginning of the nineteenth century saw to the establishment of national states and the formation of state borders on the Balkan Peninsula, thus breaking down the ties between the summer and winter feeds. As a result, the routes followed by the nomadic and semi-nomadic cattlebreeders became shorter. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1912, and the division of its remains into the Balkan states gave the final blow to nomadic cattlebreeding in the Peninsula. Records on this particular period, concerning both our country and other Balkan states, provide ample material for the study of various problems related to this last phase in the movements of Balkan nomadic cattlebreeders.

As can be seen from numerous records of the nineteenth century, cattlebreeders were allowed to pass the customs at the frontier provided they accepted the commitment to pass the same frontier on their way back in the spring (autumn) with the same number of flocks. Later on, the counting of flocks at the frontier was introduced, with the obligatory paying of the taxes. These taxes frequently exceeded their financial means. The most difficult thing for the owners of the flocks was the obligation to take stand with regard to their nationality. The circumstances that led to the decrease in the economy of remote pastures, and to the growth of nomadic living, became almost negligible, with the formation of national states.⁴⁰

We shall conclude this short survey through centuries of the migrating Balkan cattlebreeders by pointing out that, in some countries of South East Europe, industrial growth drew forth much labor from the mountains, thus putting an end to nomadic migrations of cattlebreeders, while restricting semi-nomadic migrations to limited geographic regions of economy. There is opportunity, though rare, of encountering the Saracatsans and Arumanians, the last remnants of the Balkan nomadic cattlebreeders in Greece, whom I had the opportunity of studying at first hand during my fieldwork in Greece.⁴¹

Notes

¹ Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo*, Beograd 1966, 215-216.

² Branimir Gušić, *Ekološki uslovi na prostoru transhumanskog stočarenja na Balkanu* (manuscript).

³ Ibid. i Alojz Benac, »Neolitska naselja u Lisicicima kod Konjica«, *Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja X*, n. s. Sarajevo 1955.

⁴ Alojz Benac, »Način stanovanja u prehistorijskim periodima Bosne i Hercegovine«, *Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja VII* n. s. Sarajevo 1952, 131.

⁵ Hannsferdinand Doeblner, *Jaeger Hirten Bauern*, 1971, 154.

⁶ Carsten Höeg, *Les Saracatsans. Une tribu nomade grecque*. I Etude linguistique précédée d'une notice ethnographique, Paris-Copenhagen, 1925.

⁷ M. Gyoni, *La transhumance des Vlaques balkaniques au Moyen Age*, Byzantinoslavica XII, Prague 1951, 40.

⁸ Ibid., 40.

⁹ H. Doeblner, 151-152.

¹⁰ Arnold Bauermann, *Fernweidewirtschaft in Sudosteuroopa*, Braunschweig 1967, 79.

¹¹ Ibid., 80

¹² Doeblner, 154.

¹³ A. Bauermann, 81.

¹⁴ M. Gyoni, 40.

¹⁵ Fanula Papazoglu, »Srednjobalkanska plemena u predrimsko doba«, *Centar za balkanološka istraživanja ANUBIH, I*, Sarajevo, 361-2.

¹⁶ i ¹⁷ Ibid, 368.

¹⁸ M. Gyoni, 40.

¹⁹ H. Döebler, 177.

²⁰ M. Gyoni, 41.

²¹ B. Gušić.

²² H. Döebler, 175.

²³ A. Bauermann, 85, 86.

²⁴ A. Bauermann, 85, 86.

²⁵ A. Bauermann, 85.

²⁶ Ibid, 86.

²⁷ *Vizantijski izvori za istoriju naroda Jugoslavije III, posebna izdanja Vizantološkog instituta* 10. Beograd 1960, 214.

²⁸ M. Gyoni, 36.

²⁹ Ibid 37.

³⁰ Ibid., 38.

³¹ Ibid., 30.

³³ i ³² W. Antoniewicz-K. Dobrowolski-W. H. Paryski, *Pasterstwo Tatr Polskich i Podhala*, Wroclaw *Warszawa* Krakow 1970, 102-109.

³⁴ J. Cvijić, 208-210.

³⁵ A. Bauermann, 88.

³⁶ Ibid., 89.

³⁷ Ibid., 90.

³⁸ Ibid., 90.

³⁹ Fernand Brandel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Phillippe II*, Paris 1966, 91.

⁴⁰ A. Bauermann, 90.

⁴¹ Dragoslav Antonijević, »Sarakačani«, *Balkanika VI*, Beograd 1975. 201-233.

MIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE BALKANS

Countries belonging to the geographic-historical zone of South East Europe share many common characteristics which together form the basis for the specific discipline known as Balkanology or, more broadly, South East European Studies. A common element is the unwritten or customary law, known also as legal customs. This does not, however, imply, supranational law unification, as it were, nor a general system of folk law. According to a reputed Romanian law historian – Professor Valentin Georgescu, the relative unity of the Balkan area, and for that matter, the whole of South East Europe, is an aspect of a general unity within differences, within composites. The exchange of experiences and achievements in various fields, including law, and, the manifold influences all make the Balkans and South East Europe a specific land and a workshop of culture and civilization.¹

In the field of unwritten, customary law, these reciprocal influences can be seen, first of all, in the characteristic unity of this region, in terms of common institutional bases, which are of both a customary and statutory, or written law nature. The general unity of institutions, ideas and practises, formed by great civilizational unifying trends throughout history, began with Hellenic, Thracian-Illyric and Slavic impacts, and continued with impacts from Rome, Byzantium and Istanbul. The Oecumenical Orthodox Church, and other major historical subjects and forces, both left their imprints on Balkan soil. The beginnings go way back to the Normans and Crusaders, through the Renaissance towards the Age of Enlightenment and on to Nineteenth Century Modernism. Then the West, taken as a body of ideas and conceptions, took over, carrying on through Austria-Hungary, Genoa and Venice, by way of various contacts and encounters, on land and sea, not to mention the significant role of the South East European Diaspora centers.

As part of a vast mosaic of social development, customary, folk, or unwritten law, unlike statutory, i.e. official law, was an expression of genuine creativity, a product of the Balkan peoples, which cannot be overlooked when dealing with migrations throughout history. Throughout this geographic and civilizational region, migrations had been an important factor in the field of customary law, and law in general, setting many similar, and even identical rules. Migrations also helped interweave originally separate legal cultures and practises, and encouraged mutual relations, especially during the Middle Ages, but to a degree in Modern Times as well.

After the fall of the Serbian Princedom in the mid-Balkans, under Turkish rule, after 1450, the State organization was dismembered, followed by the disintegration of the legal system. Oppression and exploitation by the Turkish invaders were to replace this legislature, which was to be attenuated in subsequent periods with the granting of local autonomy that helped establish, though mostly in remote mountain areas, a local self-government.

However, most of the inhabitants' daily activities were regulated by local, customary law. Many rules were set in past practises, and in the former feudal legislation, but others could not be traced, by the historians of law, to their sources. In the course of time, during the Ottoman Empire, the Moslem law influenced the customary law of the subjugated population (*raya*), in some regions more, in others less – for example of the former – Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Mehmed Begović thoroughly treated the subject of Moslem law impact on what is today Yugoslavia, and, in his research, established quite the opposite process, namely, the impact of Serbian medieval codes on Moslem law.²

The Slav émigrés, moving in smaller or larger groups, abided by their old legal customs in the beginning, and remained loyal to their habits and ways of life. This was possible in spite of the comparatively different legal orders found in new territories in the north of the Balkan Peninsula, or in the west along the Adriatic coast. Few reliable historical sources exist, upon which to make a specific study on the real conditions of law and legal practise during the dark periods of Turkish rule, although, hypothetically, most of the local law was of a customary nature – inherited and passed down by tradition. Naturally, this did not include police laws and regulations, nor Turkish customs and regulations, the latter (*danak*), being excessive and frequently giving cause for continuous revolt. In fact, there existed little law altogether, and much oppression. Yet, the body of customary law was sustained by oral tradition and narrated mostly to internal, family and small-economy relations within the boundaries of villages, tribes and *katuns* (i. e. cattlebreeders' settlements in the high mountains), which thus helped retain the national feeling and pride. The Orthodox religion and folk creativity, like poetry and dances, together with unwritten law, had always been part of the Balkan peoples', mostly the Serbs', centuries-old struggle for freedom.

In his report, D. Dragojlović treats the topic of migrations caused by war – besides saving the religious relics from the heterodoxes, which was done mostly by the monks in Serbia monasterial centers, there is evidence of a peculiar "migration" of principal legislative documents, codes, charters and the like. There is, for instance, the case of the well-known legislative monument of the medieval Serbian Empire – the Tsar Dushan Code. This document was discovered years later, in the nineteenth century, some 25 transcripts, in various places of the Balkan Peninsula, and even elsewhere in Europe. This Code had been copied manually from 15th to 17th century, and all the copies were preserved from the enemy by "moving" along with the migrators. Of course, we have no details of this "migration".

Dushan's Code provides a significant indirect source of old customary law rules that prevailed prior to its enactment, in 1349.³

Another relevant element in the sphere of Balkan legal customs in the Middle Ages had been the already mentioned age-long institution of self-government, which was particularly expressed during the Ottoman rule over these areas. The Turks made room for the enforcement of local customary laws by leaving, to the conquered peoples, some autonomy in spheres such as religion, farming, family life planning, inheritance (not entirely, though), village discipline and public order. Thus self-government, along with the

previously mentioned elements, helped sustain the vitality of national feeling of the oppressed population. So customary law had been closely bound to self-government, and, according to Vasa Čubrilović,⁴ was related first to tribal societies, and then, to remote areas enclosed as isolated territories, as well as to the patriarchal order. Customary law in the Balkans – the cradle of European civilization, in the Antiquity, all the way to 19th century, was also prompted by this limited self-government and patriarchal order, but first of all, by the real needs of the people. Parallel to the ancient and novel class societies and states in the Balkan Peninsula, there existed tribal society, with its patriarchal culture and, more or less, classless internal order. The geographic factor, which is not to be overlooked, prevented foreign invaders from establishing full power, and protected the population, thus enabling both self-government and an independent customary law.

After the Turkish invasion, unwritten law developed its own practical forms under the dominion of the oppressive Turkish legislation, and became an achievement of the people, who “carried it” in times of frequent migration.

Another relevant element for our topic is the migratory moves characteristic for the Balkan-cattlebreeders’ mountain economy (which is, to a degree, the topic of D. Antonijević’s report). The seasonal migration in which these cattlebreeders were engaged, meant moving out to the mountains and pastures in the Spring, and returning to the plains in the Fall. This gave rise to a so-called mountain regime, namely, the most elaborate set of unwritten rules regulating economic and social activities and family discipline, and valid for a considerable number of people. It applied mostly to highlanders, i. e. cattlebreeders, who lived in special seasonal settlements – *katuns*, raising their cattle and exploiting various mountain sources (wood, leaves for cattle-food, honey and so on). This was, and in a way still is, a specially organized economic unit of great historical significance for the Slavic, Albanian and Vlachian peoples and ethnic groups, whose main economic basis was in the mountain pastures. These *katuns* and independent villages were granted privileges, first by the Byzantine Empire, and then by other central powers ruling over them, including the Ottoman Empire. The relationship between the *katuns* and villages was regulated by official law until the end of the medieval Serbian and other Slav states, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, but only in relation to the feudal state, its power and authority, whereas the wide field of internal relations was left almost entirely to the people’s practises and customary law.⁵

Instead of a conclusion to this brief report, one can right-fully state that the complex picture of Balkan legal history, as related to migrations during the Middle Ages and Modern Times, cannot be complete without introducing the specific phenomenon of legal customs. This customary law bore witness to the tragic developments and destiny of the Balkan Christian peoples, particularly the Serbs during five centuries of Ottoman rule. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the successful Serbian Uprising and Revolution, and the Greek Uprising against the Turks, new social conditions required the establishment and development of a new legal system to suit the peoples’ needs. The amorphous body of customary law, elaborated through

practise and maintained by tradition, helped in many instances, the drafting of new decrees and statutes for the liberated Balkan countries.

Comparative history of law in the Balkan countries and regions gives evidence of many similar or even identical customary law institutes. This is partly due to the migratory interweavings of peoples, but a common Christian Orthodox basis, and a common folk tradition, as well as the economic basis which was partly determined by the geographic factor, played its part also. The great nineteenth century protagonists of the people's customary law, like Valtazar Bogišić, in the Yugoslav countries, Stefan Bobcev in Bulgaria, and Bogdan Hasdeu in Romania, provide, in their extensive works, many examples to the above respect. The Institute for Balkan Studies in Belgrade initiated a field research to be effected in remote mountain regions of Montenegro, Herzegovina, Macedonia, northern and western Greece, and central Romania, the results of which have been published (many of them in English) in monographic forms, reviews, and reports on domestic and international symposia and conferences. Surprisingly, these reports show that even in the last quarter of the 20th century one is able to find relics of unwritten legal rules in the Balkans which the people tacitly adhere to, nor do statutes, authorities, including the courts, object, since they neither contradict nor collide with the existing legal order or prevailing moral rules. Thus, customary law survived partially, through migrations, until today, although its gradual disappearance is much more visible today with the development of new elements of living.

Notes

¹ V. A. Georgescu, *La coutume en tant que source du droit dans les pays du Sud-Est européen*. General report at the Brussels Congress on custom as a source of law, 1984.

² M. Begović, *Uticaoj šerijatskog prava na pravne običaje u Jugoslaviji*, *Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu*, XXII, 375-381, Sarajevo 1974; »O adetima (pravnim običajima),« *Istorijski časopis*, V, 189-192, Belgrade 1955; »Tragovi našeg srednjovekovnog prava u turskim pravnim spomenicima«, *Istorijski časopis*, III, 67-84, Belgrade 1952.

³ *Zakonik cara Stefana Dušana, studenički, hilendarski, hodoški i bistrički rukopis*; English translation of the Dushan's Code of 1349 done by the author of this report first time in Yugoslav legal-historical literature; 235-262.

⁴ Vasa Čubrilović, *Patrijarhalna društva i njihova običajna prava u Albaniji i Crnoj Gori srednjeg veka Običajno pravo i samouprave na Balkanu i u susjednim zemljama*. Belgrade 1974, 57 and 67.

⁵ The topic of customary law from the nineteenth century to the present was elaborated by the author in the monographic work *Pravni običaji kod Kuća – analiza relikata, metodologija, prilozi za teoriju običajnog prava*, Belgrade 1979.

Elsie Ivancich Dunin
Los Angeles
University of California

MIGRATIONS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY EXPRESSED THROUGH DANCE: A STUDY OF DANCE AMONG SOUTH SLAVS IN CALIFORNIA

This paper discusses dance repertoire participation in dance events that reflect cultural differences of the various generations of South Slav/Americans in Los Angeles and its vicinity. Although my interest as a dance ethnologist is to study dance changes diachronically (through time) as related to culture changes, this paper concentrates upon a synchronic (synchronous occurrences) survey of dance events within a given period, 1974-1975. Data was gathered through participating and observing a large number of dance events sponsored by South Slav community groups in the greater Los Angeles area, and information on the population which participates in these events was acquired through interviews.

At the outset of this project on South Slavic dance outside of Southeast Europe, I began to note information on the dance product, that is, names of dances and an analysis of structural movement characteristics. However, as I attended a large number of South Slav/American dance events in California, I began to realize that the dance event is an extremely vital gathering of South Slavic populations.¹ Furthermore, that the non-partner dancing (identified as *kolo* dancing) is a social and physical integration of a multi-generational population, a population with varied roots in Yugoslavia from different time periods. My methodology changed from not only recording the dances, but observing and recording the event more holistically.

A dance event in this paper is defined as an occasion when social dancing takes place, either as the primary function (*igranka, ples, zabava*, dance party) or in combination with another event such as a dinner with dance following, program of speeches with dance following, performance with dance following. Each event is made up of many parts. For purposes of this study, I noted dance repertoire, music accompaniment for the dancing, who participated in the dancing and who initiated the dancing.

An examination of this data from several dance events that included *kolo* dancing led to an identification of cultural patterns within this non-homogeneous population. In short the synchronic study revealed several patterns which substantiated a culture change between first and later generations.

Brief background information on the South Slavic population in California.

Immigration into California began in the second half of the 1800s, primarily as part of the "gold rush" period.² The majority of the arrivals came from the Adriatic coastal villages of Montenegro, Konavle, and Dubrovnik Littoral, Vis and Brač Islands, the western part of Hercegovina, and from the

southern area of Slovenia, particularly Bela Krajina. The dancing expression in each of these locales differs substantially in movement characteristics and musical accompaniment.³ Each individual came to California with unique local experiences of social events that included dance and music.

Post-World War II migration and immigration into California came from two other sources: 1) First and second generation South Slavs with roots in Lika, Slavonia, and Vojvodina migrated to California from the eastern parts of the United States. They had tended to settle in industrial and mining areas of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Montana. Particularly after World War Two with attractive job opportunities and a milder climate, thousands moved to California. 2) In the same post war period (late 1940s through the 1950s) a large influx of South Slavs displaced during the war years immigrated to the United States, so that this period welcomed immigrants from all areas of Yugoslavia that were not earlier represented in California. In the same post-war period, a large influx of South Slavs displaced during the war years immigrated to the United States. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady flow of both immigration and visitation of relatives from all parts of Yugoslavia. There are no precise population statistics for the South Slavs in Los Angeles or in California. It is only through the community organizations and their events that this mixture of population can be noted.

Presently there are loosely structured communities of immigrant South Slavs and their second to fourth generation descendants throughout California. Families do not tend to live in close proximity to one another, but maintain contact through social events sponsored by churches, clubs, and other organizations. Among themselves they identify their origins by region, such as Bračani, Dubrovčani, Paštrovići, or more broadly as Croats, Montenegrins, or Serbians. To the "American" (meaning, non-Slav), they tend to identify in a still broader sense – as Yugoslavs, Slavs, or Slavonians.⁴

Generation differentiation in this study is based upon place of birth and probable exposure to dancing experiences. A first generation person is defined as one who is born in Yugoslavia (or in the present Yugoslav territory, if born before 1918) and came to the United States after his/her mid-teen years. A second or subsequent generation person is born in the United States of one or both parents who identify with South Slavic culture. Note that a person who is born in Yugoslavia, but was brought to the United States as a very young child (into early teen years) is also considered to be second generation. Therefore only those persons who learned cultural behaviors in Yugoslavia into their mid-teen years are considered to be first generation.

The dancing at a dance event is the only moment that allows for a physical and social interchange among any of these generations or ages. Other social events provide settings where people tend to group into clusters of relatives and/or friends, seated together at dinners, during social drinking, seated next to one another during performances, during church services, or as spectators at games. Even between dances, people are clustered into their individual groupings of relations and friends. The act of dancing allows the

means for an integration that does not occur at any other moment. One may have an acceptable social and physical contact with an unknown person through the action of dancing. Furthermore, there is an implicit understanding that anyone who wants may participate in the dancing. There is freedom of choice to join in the dancing whenever one desires.

A sample survey was taken of dance events that took place at five halls in the greater Los Angeles area, over a given time period from July 1974 through December 1975: Slovene Hall in Fontana, the Yugoslav-American Club Hall in San Pedro, Croatian Hall (Budlong Avenue) in Los Angeles, St. Stevens Serbian Orthodox Church Hall in Alhambra, and Christ the Saviour Serbian Orthodox Church Hall in Arcadia (the Macedonian community did not yet have a regular dance site during this 1974-1975 period). Each of these sites was (and some still are) frequently used for events throughout the year, but only one representative event was selected for comparative data.

Each selected event is an annual occurrence that has been organized at the site for at least a decade. Each event is generally open to the public, with an exception by the Yugoslav-American Club event, that includes only members and their guests. Each event has a broad cross-section of generations and attenders from a wide area of Los Angeles and its vicinity, and each event has an annual attendance of over a hundred persons. Two of the events are sponsored by social organizations: the Yugoslav-American Club and a lodge of the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ). The other three events are sponsored by church organizations: one Croatian Catholic Church, and three Serbian Orthodox Churches.

All these South Slav/American community dance events include a dance inventory of both non-partner and couple dances. The non-partner dancing in closed or circular formations is referred to as *kolo*. Here the dancers are linked with various handholds, usually grasped hands held down at the sides; at shoulder level with the elbows bent diagonally at one's sides; hand clasped behind each other's backs; or hands placed on each other's shoulders. The body movement is concentrated in the legs, with various stepping patterns in repetitive short phrases; the stepping movements progress the dancers in a circular path in counterclockwise and/or clockwise directions. The open circular dance, whose path travels into a particular direction, is "led" by the first dancer in the line.

Many older second generation dancers identify the *kolo* type dance as "Slavonian" (in California, meaning Slavic rather than the regional identity of being from Slavonia), Yugoslav, Croatian, or Serbian, in contrast to partnered dances that are "American", "modern", "latin", or "old time." Every dance event tends to include *kolo* dancing, which differentiates the event from being an "American" or other ethnic group's occasion. Therefore the dancing and its musical accompaniment are South Slavic identity markers.

Each sponsoring group tends to invite musicians based upon an internal preference of dances that that music represents. The musicians are not necessarily from the South Slav community that sponsors the event. The Slovene group invites a "polka band"; the Yugoslav-American Club invites two music groups – one is a "modern" dance band that plays the latest

popular “rock” and “slow” dancing, and the second band plays contemporary Yugoslav songs for “modern” dancing and *kolo* dance music. The St. Anthony Croatian Catholic Church picnic event also includes two orchestras: one is the “modern” dance band, while the second is a tamburitza⁴ band that plays the *kolo* music. This combination of two bands for larger dance events is typical at most South Slavic events, whether Slovene, Croatian, or Serbian. One of the Serbian church sites usually has accordion, drum trap sets, and electric guitar musicians to supply currently popular Serbian dance melodies, while the two other Serbian church sites tend to invite tamburitza orchestras to play for dances and singing. These stringed instruments reflect an older repertoire of dance music and songs popular in the United States since the 1930s and into the 1960s. Tamburitza musicians are invited to play at those Croatian and Serbian sites that have a larger proportion of second to third generation populations.

The tamburitza orchestras provide music for the widest range of individual dances known by name. They have specific melodies and a particular pattern of movements, such as Seljančica, Malo Kolo, Miserlou, Žikino, Kukunješće, Kriči Kriči Tiček, Makedonka, Čuješ Mala, Drmeš iz Zdenčine, Ersko Kolo, Bela Rada, Slavonsko, Šetnja, Moravac, Kolo Kalendara, Sukačica, Makažice, and Niška Banja. (See EVENTS I and IV for listings). This wider selection of dances is performed mainly by the second and third generations. The non-tamburitza groups, that is, the Slovene polka band, the Serbian accordion group, and the “modern” amplified music groups, all play generic dance music — various melodies that rhythmically, and with tempo indicate a certain kind of generic dance, such as:

partner dances — polka, waltz, tango, rock, czardas
non-partner *kolo* dances — *u šest*, *lesnoto*.

However, all three of these bands also included three to four specific melodies that denote specific step patterns. The polka band played Seljančica, Miserlou, and Flying Dutchman (Event III); the Serbian accordion group played Šetnja and Niška Banja (Event II); the Yugoslav/American electronically amplified band played Seljančica, Miserlou, Zaplet, and Hora (Event V).

Recent first generation immigrants (arrivals since the 1960s) participate in these partner and non-partner generic dances. However, they do not participate in the tamburitza accompanied specific dances (such as Seljančica, Malo, Niška Banja, etc.), which are not widely known dances in Yugoslavia. Two of the non-partner generic dances, *u šest* and *lesnoto* are currently popular in Serbia and Macedonia in both urban and rural contexts. Therefore, the recent immigrants, particularly from southern areas of Yugoslavia, very easily fit into these dances, particularly when played by first generation Serbian and Macedonian musicians.

Summary

Overall, dancing is a popular activity, and the South Slav/American dance events are significant moments for an integration of multilevel genera-

tions, ages, and identifications with various geographical/cultural origins. Observing synchronous dance events in the greater Los Angeles area, we see some overall dance behavior patterns. There is a distinction of who participates in what dances, and who leads the dancing. This data reveals groupings according to generations rather than by geographical or cultural origins.

First Generation.

1. Men initiate and lead generic *kolo* dances, such as *lesnoto* and *u šest*.
2. Women participate in dances, but rarely lead or initiate a dance.

Second Generation.

1. Young boys (pre-teens and teen years) do not participate in dances.
2. Young girls join in the dances even if they do not know the movement patterns.
3. Fewer men than women participate in the *kolo* dances.
4. Those men who have learned *kolos* through organized dance classes or have participated in performance dance groups, sometimes lead or initiate *kolo* dances.
5. Women initiate and lead both specific and generic *kolo* dances.

Second and third generation women lead dances whereas the first generation women tend only to participate in dances. Also empirically noted is that second and subsequent generation women take more active roles in the organization of the community's activities than do the first generation females who tend to be passive in such activities.

The tamburitza orchestra repertoire of *kolo* dance music is not generally known by recent first generation immigrants. However, this tamburitza repertoire is known by second and subsequent generations in Los Angeles and by those who have migrated to Los Angeles from other parts of the United States. Therefore we see that there is a difference between the dance repertoire currently popular in Yugoslavia, and the South Slav/American dance repertoire in the United States. Furthermore, the second and subsequent generations know a larger repertoire of specific dances played by the tamburitza orchestras than do the first generation immigrants.

A scrutinizing look at not only what is danced, but also who dances, and to what music, is an important aspect of immigrant cultural studies. In the South Slavic/American communities in California, dancing is a visual and physical manifestation of the bond between different members of the community. And because the more popular dances (such as the *kolo*) are participatory non-partner group dances, they provide a special means for social interchange which does not occur at any other event. In these immigrant communities the role of dancing is a traceable reflector of generational and cultural values.

Notes

¹ For another aspect of the South Slavic dance study in California, see Dunin 1975.

² For additional information on South Slavic immigration in California, particularly see works by Adam Eterovich.

³ Ivan Ivančan has identified similarities in structural dance characteristics that fall into ethnographic and geographical dance zones. The California South Slavic immigrants come from areas within the Adriatic, Dinaric, and Alpine dance zones. See Ivančan 1964, 1976.

⁴ In California, among descendents of early immigrants, Slavonian has a general meaning of "Slavic". The term Slavonian has no reference to the geographical area within today's Yugoslavia.

⁵ Tamburitza is the American spelling of *tamburica*.

Migrations and Cultural Identity Expressed through Dance:
A Study of Dance among South Slavs in California

SOCIAL DANCE EVENTS: Musicians and Dance Repertoire

I. ST. STEVEN'S SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH HALL, 23 June 1974

°Musicians:

Hajduk-Nova Zora Tamburitza Orchestra (*prim, brač, bugarija, čelo, berda*).

°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
csardas	u šest		Seljančica
			Miserlou
			Malo Kolo
			Makedonka
			Čuješ Mala
			Žikino
			Drmeš iz Zdenčine
			Niška Banja
			Kukunješće

II. CHRIST THE SAVIOUR SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH HALL, 24 November 1974

°Musicians:

Lex Ellesin Band (two accordians, bass, electric guitar).

°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
waltzes	lesnoto		Šetnja
polkas	u šest		Niška Banja
tango			
samba			
fox			

III. SLOVENE HALL, 22 February 1975

°Musicians:

Bill Guzel Orchestra (accordion, banjo, drum trap set, saxophone or clarinet).

°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
polkas		Pork Chops	Seljančica

waltzes
tango
mazurka

Flying Miserlou*
Dutchman

IV. CROATIAN HALL (on Budlong Avenue), 14 July 1974

°Musicians:

Yeseta Bros. Tamburitza Orchestra (accordion, *prim*, *brač*, *berda*, *bugarija*, violin).

°°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
waltzes	lesnoto		Seljančica
polkas	syрто**		Miserlou*
			Malo Kolo
			Makedonka
			Čuješ Mala
			Ersko Kolo
			Bela Rada
			Slavonsko
			Kriči Kriči Tiček
			Drmeš iz Zdenčine
			Šetnja
			Moravac
			Kolo Kalendara
			Slavjanka
			Sukačica
			Makažice
			Čačak
			Hora***

°Musicians:

Souder's Orchestra (piano, drum trap set, saxophone, electric guitar).

°°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
“rock”			
“slow dance”			
rhumba			
cha cha cha			
polkas			
waltzes			

V. YUGOSLAV-AMERICAN HALL, 6 December 1975

°Musicians:

American dance band (piano, drum trap set, two saxophones, two electric guitars).

°°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
tango			
fox			
waltz			
polka			
rhumba			
cha cha cha			

°Musicians:

Jadran Orchestra (accordion, drum trap set, two electric guitars, electric piano organ).

°°Dances:

GENERIC		SPECIFIC	
<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>	<i>Partner</i>	<i>Non-partner (kolo)</i>
tango	lesnoto		Seljančica
fox			Miserlou*
waltz			Zaplet
polka			Hora***
rhumba			
cha cha cha			
samba			
“rock”			

* Miserlou is a widely known Greek-American non-partner dance; it is done so regularly at South Slavic dance events, that many second and third generation dancers refer to the dance as a *kolo*.

** In Los Angeles the “syrto” (which is danced to any of numerous Greek melodies) is referred to by many second and third generation dancers as a Greek *kolo*.

*** The Hora is well known as an Israeli or Jewish dance, and is popularly danced by second and third generation youth at non-Slavic dance occasions in the Los Angeles area when the Hava Nagila melody is played. At many South Slavic events (particularly among the second and third generation musicians and dance participants) it is often included with the *kolo* repertoire.

References

- Dunin, Elsie Ivancich, 1975. “Winter Dance Events among South Slavic Immigrants in California.” *Makedonski Folklor* 8 (15–16): 165–175. Skopje: Institutot za Folklor.
- 1981–1982. “Change in South Slav/American Dance.” *Dance Research Journal* 14 (1–2): 59–61. New York: Congress on Research in Dance.
- Eterovich, Adam S. 1975. *A Guide and Bibliography to Research on Yugoslavs in the United States and Canada*. San Francisco: R and E Research Associates.
- 1979. *Croatian Pioneers in America, 1685–1900*. Palo Alto, California, Ragusan Press.
- Ivančan, Ivan. 1964–1965. “Geografska podjela narodnih plesova u Jugoslaviji” [Geographic classification of folk dances in Yugoslavia]. *Narodna Umjetnost* 3: 17–38. Zagreb: Institut za Narodnu Umjetnost.

- 1976. "Folk Dances in Various Regions of Yugoslavia." Walter J. Kolar (editor), *The Folk Arts of Yugoslavia: Papers Presented at a Symposium, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 1976*: 229-240. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Tamburitzan Institute of Folk Arts.

Summary

Migrations and Cultural Identity Expressed through Dance: A Study of Dance among South Slavs in California

The largest number of early South Slav immigrants to California came from the Adriatic coast of Montenegro, Konavle, Dubrovnik Littoral, and from northwestern Hercegovina, islands of Vis and Brač, bringing with them their particular customs and dancing characteristics. Post World War Two emigration from interior areas of Yugoslavia to California plus a migration of South Slavs and their descendants from eastern states of the U.S. to California brought contrasting social event customs, dance and music repertoire, and dance movement characteristics.

This paper discusses social dance events as a bridge to multigenerations of South Slavs (immigrants and their descendants) along with old and newly arrived immigrants. It is evidenced that the dancing action and the choice of dance repertoire reflects both the ethnic identities and layers of generations that coinhabit these events.

MIGRATIONS IN BALKAN HISTORY

Publishers

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA
SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS,
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
PROSVETA, EXPORT-IMPORT AGENCY
BELGRADE

Editor

Ivan Ninić

Cover design

Lidija Taranović

Lay out

Saša Stajić

Proof readers

Merima Stevanović
Nada Obradović

Printed and bound by

Tiskarna Ljudske pravice, Ljubljana, Kopitarjeva 2

Printed in 1,500 copies

1989