



DUŠAN T. BATAKOVIĆ

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SERBIA (1844–1867)

ILIJA GARAŠANIN'S NAČERTANIJE



BELGRADE
2014

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Reviewers

Mihailo Vojvodić, corresponding member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Vojislav Pavlović, Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Slobodan G. Marković, School of Political Sciences, Belgrade

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INTRODUCTION

Načertanije: political programme as a source of ideological discord?

Contemporary analysis of Serbia's foreign policy in the middle of the nineteenth century has remained in the deep shadow of a document written in 1844 in Belgrade, as a result of collaboration between the Serbian influential interior minister and prime minister in various governments of the autonomous Principality of Serbia between 1840 and 1860, Ilija Garašanin, and František Alexander Zach, the official representative of the Paris-based Polish political emigration in Belgrade whose political chief was Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. Prince Czartoryski's interest in Serbia stemmed from the fact that she was the only Slav semi-independent state in Central and South-Eastern Europe in the early 1840's that might facilitate an anti-Russian and anti-Austrian policy in accordance with the wider plans of Prince Czartoryski and his émigrés stationed in the Hôtel Lambert in Paris: their plans with Serbia were related with their ultimate goal of restoring an independent Poland.

Before sending Zach to Belgrade in 1843, Prince Czartoryski submitted to the Serbian government his own proposal for foreign policy to be pursued, *Advices on conduct to be followed by Serbia (Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie)*.¹ On the basis of this strategic document Zach conceived his own proposal relating to Slavic policy of Serbia. Stemming from these two documents, the *Načertanije* of Ilija Garašanin, as its final

¹ Original can be found in the Archives of Czartoryski in Krakow (Biblioteka Czartoryskich w Krakowie), 5404, IV, Serbie, I, 1843, pp. 81–88, a copy pp. 89–98.

result, was published six decades later in Serbia (1906), subtitled by one of its early analysts as the *Programme for Serbia's foreign policy at the end of 1844*. The *Načertanije*, as well as Zach's plan was found in the family archives of Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874).²

The fact that *Načertanije* was drafted as a secret document and intended for internal use only created the air of mystique around it and accounted for later misleading interpretations. It has been believed that only the leading political figures in Serbia and perhaps Montenegro were acquainted with the strategic political designs outlined in the *Načertanije* in the course of almost five decades. Furthermore, the content of the *Načertanije* was kept secret even after Serbia had become a client state of Austria-Hungary in 1881, when its translations reached the archives of both Vienna and Budapest during the 1880s.³ For that reason, the *Načertanije* was often considered to have been of allegedly “subversive nature”, a characteristic of similar secret writings with medium or far-reaching effects. Nevertheless, the analysis of its genesis shows that despite being a confidential memorandum which emerged in the specific political context of the early years of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević's reign (1842–1858), a fairly large circle of political figures and decision-makers was familiar with its content, at least at the time when the document was conceived.⁴

² The Slavic Plan of Serbia is preserved only in its Serbian translation in the Arhiv Srbije (Archives of Serbia), Belgrade, Ilija Garašanin Papers (Fond Ilije Garašanina), while the two other versions of *Načertanije* are available in the National Library of Serbia, Belgrade (Narodna Biblioteka, Beograd, Odeljenje posebnih fondova, R. 343 IIIa and R. 163).

³ German translation in: Haus, -Hof und Staatsarchiv, Wien, XIX/1883 Serbian Reports, *Varia de Serbie* 1883, fol. 11/1–18/8.

⁴ There is a vast scholarly literature on *Načertanije*. The first study was Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Jugoslovenski nacionalni i državni program Kneževine Srbije 1844*, Sremski Karlovci 1931. In the next, more comprehensive analysis Stranjaković provides the original texts of *Načertanije*, Zach's *Plan* and Czartoryski's *Conseils*. The former two texts are printed in parallel in order to point out the similarities and differences between them. See D. Stranjaković, “Kako je postalo Garašaninovo Načertanije”, *Spomenik*, vol. XCI (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1939), pp. 63–113. Differing insights and interpretations can be found in: Vojislav J. Vučković, “Knez Miloš i osnovna politička misao sadržana u Garašaninovom 'Načertaniju'”, *Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo*, vol. I, Belgrade 1954, pp. 44–56; idem, “Prilog proučavanju postanka ‘Načertanija’ (1844) i ‘Osnovnih misli’ (1847)”, *Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo*, vol. VIII-1, Belgrade, 1961, 49–79; Radoslav Perović, “Okolo ‘Načertanija’ iz 1844. godine”, *Istorijski glasnik*, vol. 1, Belgrade 1963, pp. 71–94; Vaclav Začek, “Češko i poljsko učešće u postanku Garašaninova ‘Načertanija’ (1844)”, *Historijski zbornik*, vol. XVI (Zagreb: Povijesno

The *Načertanije* was a foreign policy programme that gave a new dimension to Serbian national aspirations: the bearer of the unification of Serb people would be the Principality of Serbia, organized as a modern European state with developed administrative structures that would conduct and channel national policy in the region. According to the *Načertanije*, the support for Serbian goals should be sought from those powers that, unlike Russia and the Habsburg Empire, were not directly interested in the Eastern Question—Great Britain and France.

The *Načertanije* was the first national programme of the modern, post-Ottoman Serbia and one of the rare written comprehensive political programmes in the Balkans. It was closely related to the political action of Polish émigrés in the Balkans who recognized the potential of the Principality of Serbia as the leading force among South Slavs. Furthermore, most of the related documents that clarify the origins, incentives and immediate sources have become available since the late 1930s. These documents shed light on the motives and general political context of the period

društvo Hrvatske, 1963), pp. 35–56; Dušan T. Bataković, “Načertanije: baština ili hipoteka”, in: *Načertanije Ilije Garašanina*, (Belgrade: Književna fabrika MJV, 1991) pp. 7–12; *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, Vladimir Stojančević, ed. (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1991). On the other hand, Radoš Ljušić, *Knjiga o Načertaniju. Nacionalni i državni program Kneževine Srbije (1844)* (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački grafički zavod, 1993), pp. 24–43, based primarily on the Serbian (i.e. Serbo-Croatian) sources and literature, offers very little in terms of analysis in comparison with the previous interpretations. Cf. also: D. T. Bataković, “Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije. A Reassessment”, *Balkanica*, vol. XXV-1 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 1994), pp. 157–183, with the new English translation of “Načertanije” in appendix; idem, “Načertanije Ilije Garašanina: problemi i značenja”, in: Hans-Georg Fleck & Igor Graovac (eds.), *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara*, vol. 1 (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2000), pp. 109–125. An important contribution to the study of Načertanije and the related foreign policy decisions, based on unpublished Russian sources, is Konstantin V. Nikiforov, *Serbia v seredine XIX v. Načalo deitelnosti po obiedineniu serbskih zemli* (Moskva: Rosijska akademija nauk. Institut slavjanovedenija i balkanistiki, 1995)—there is a Serbian translation: *Srbija sredinom XIX veka. Početak aktivnosti na ujedinjavanju srpskih zemalja* (Pristina: Novi svet 1995). Cf. also a more conceptual, political and sociological study by Edislav Manetović, “Ilija Garašanin. Načertanije and Nationalism”, *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique*, vol. III, (Athens: Institute for Neohellenic Research, 2006), pp. 137–173. Manetović claims that Garašanin’s national ideology was inclusive and relates his policy to “the long-term survival of the state in a hostile international environment [that] required extending Serbia’s borders.” Manetović also stressed that “Garašanin’s nationalism was influenced primarily, albeit not exclusively, by insecurity emanating from a Hobbesian inter-state environment.” (p. 139–140).

when *Načertanije* was conceived. In spite of the rich and convincing documentary basis for a potentially credible historical explanation, this draft programme of Serbian foreign policy remained, for almost a century, the source of various misconceptions and, as was often the case, of deliberate misinterpretation.

However, it should be noted that until the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 there had been neither negative interpretations nor misreading of the general ideas laid out in the *Načertanije*. It was only after the growing Serbo-Croat conflicts within the common Yugoslav state escalated into genocide against the Serbs in 1941 perpetrated by the Pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945) that the contestation of this document began—the *Načertanije* had previously been considered pivotal in the process of creating Yugoslav state. The Nazi-inspired Independent State of Croatia, led by Ustashas, the Croatian fascists, encompassed the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed on the basis of the alleged historical rights. Furthermore, referring to the extreme nationalist nineteenth century theories of Ante Starčević (1823–1896), the Ustashas considered not just the Roman Catholic, but also the entire Muslim population of that province to have been “pure Croats”. The Christian Orthodox Serbs, who constituted a relative majority of Bosnia-Herzegovina population, were exposed to the policy of extermination: the Ustasha formula was to kill one third of the Serbs, convert the second to Roman Catholicism and expel the last third to Serbia.⁵ Such policy explains the Croat nationalist hostility towards the *Načertanije*. According to the prevailing linguistic criteria of the 1840s, the *Načertanije* considered the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina as predominantly Serbian. For that reason, the pro-Nazi Croat interpretation could not but label the *Načertanije* as “Greater Serbian programme”, i.e. the blueprint of “Serbian expansionism” with the strong anti-Croat incentives.⁶

⁵ Dušan T. Bataković, “Le genocide dans l’Etat indépendant croate”, *Herodote*, no 67, Paris: 1991, pp. 70–80, Vladimir Dedijer, *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican. The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs during World War II* (Buffalo & New York: Prometheus Books, 1992); Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Najveci zločini sadašnjice. Patnje i stradanje srpskog naroda u Nezavisnoj državi Hrvatskoj* (Gornji Milanovac & Priština: Dečje Novine & jedinstvo, 1991), passim. For general overview see Jonathan Steinberg, *All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–1943*, (London & New York, 1990).

⁶ The first propaganda articles on “*Načertanije*” in the Nazi-satellite Croatia, brimming with racism against the Serbs, and fiercely criticizing “Greater Serbian expansionism”

In spite of formally scholarly discourse, the debates among historians usually reflected the political, ideological and national stances of its participants. The origins of dispute among numerous scholars and political analysts—as to whether *Načertanije* was an exclusively Serbian (or in a pejorative sense—“Greater Serbian”), or a broader Yugoslav programme—will be discussed in this study. Moreover, separated from the historical context of the 1840's, the *Načertanije* has often been used in various historical periods, after 1941 in particular, as the key to the allegedly incontestable argument that the Serbian “Piedmont-type” policy was permanently “hegemonic” in regard to the South Slav (i.e. Yugoslav) regions.⁷

The displacement of *Načertanije* from the period in which it was conceived and the political framework that dominated Europe, the Balkans and Serbia in the first half of the nineteenth century—while Serbia was still a tiny vassal principality within the Ottoman Empire—considerably contributed to misinterpretation and differing assessments of Garašanin's programme. Instead, *Načertanije* should be observed primarily within the geopolitical reality of the 1840s, in the context of varying degrees of national integration of the Balkan peoples, within the framework of their intertwined knowledge about themselves, bearing in mind the specificities of their positions with regard to the post-revolutionary balance of power established in Metternich's era.

The interdependence of versions and revisions

The primary reason for controversy regarding the *Načertanije* is not related only to the sources of its ideas and its further influence on Serbia's foreign

were the texts published in Vatroslav Murvar's book, *Na izvorima neistina*, vol. I (Zagreb: Mala Knjižnica Matice Hrvatske, 1941), pp. 41–45. These ideas were further developed by Petar Šimunić in a series of articles published by the Ustasha journal *Spremnost*. Šimunić's articles were later re-published in his book *Načertanije. Tajni spis srbske nacionalne i vanjske politike. U prilogu tekst “Načertanija”* (Zagreb: Tipografija, 1944), 116 p.

⁷ Cf. Mirko Valentić, “Konceptija Garašaninovog ‘Načertanija’ (1844)”, *Historijski pregled*, vol. VII, Zagreb 1961, pp. 128–137; Nikša Stančić, “Problem ‘Načertanija’ Ilije Garašanina u našoj historiografiji”, *Historijski zbornik*, vol. XXII–XXIII (1968–1969), Zagreb, 1969 pp. 179–196; Charles Jelavich, “Garašanin's Načertanije und das grosserbische Programme”, *Südostforschungen*, vol. XXVIII, München 1968, pp. 131–147; Paul N. Hehn, “The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism: the 1844 Načertanije of Ilija Garašanin: An Analysis and Translation”, *East European Quarterly* IX (1975), pp. 153–171.

policy, but also to the manner in which it was conceived. All these elements have significantly influenced the interpretation of the *Načertanije*'s genuine meaning. Milan Dj. Milićević was the first author who mentioned *Načertanije* in Serbian literature—he received the text from Aćim Čumić, a friend of Ilija's son Milutin Garašanin. The latter had kept the original manuscript in the family archive. Milićević then wrote in the *Pomenik* (*Memorial*), a collection of portraits of famous Serbs, published in 1888 in the entry dedicated to Garašanin that he had penned a plan for the internal and external politics of Serbia and named it *Načertanije*. Milićević also noticed that, during the reign of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević, Garašanin, while being in power until 1853 had conducted a foreign policy based on the ideas put forward in the *Načertanije*. According to Milićević, Garašanin showed the *Načertanije* to Prince Michael Obrenović during his second reign (1860–1868)—Garašanin was his prime minister and minister for foreign affairs and as such the main policy maker. Prince Michael adopted the *Načertanije* as a starting point for his new foreign policy. In one of the early transcripts of *Načertanije*, written in 1896, the sub-title reads “Introduction at the end of 1844” (*Uvod pri koncu 1844*) with another subtitle, “The Politics of Serbia”.⁸

The next appearance of *Načertanije* in the Serbian public took place in 1906. The renowned historian, Milenko Vukićević, published its full text in Belgrade's prominent scholarly and cultural journal *Delo*. It was Vukićević who subtitled Garašanin's text “The programme for foreign policy of Ilija Garašanin at the end of 1844”.⁹

Three decades later, Dragoslav Stranjaković substituted the words “foreign policy” for “national policy” and added another title—“Garašanin's *Načertanije*”. He also published and analysed in 1939 the Zach plan for Slavic policy of Serbia *Načertanije* and showed that these two documents had been related to each other; in an earlier study, he had produced a detailed analysis of the connections between the *Načertanije* and the *Conseils* of Prince Czartoryski, a memorandum on Serbia's foreign and domestic policy written in 1843. Lacking insight into Zach's *Plan*, Stranjaković initially thought that the *Conseils* had served as the unique

⁸ Milan Dj. Milićević, *Pomenik znamenitih ljudi u srpskoga naroda novijega doba* (Belgrade: Čupićeva zadužbina, 1888), pp. 95–96.

⁹ Milenko Vukićević, “Program spoljne politike Ilije Garašanina na koncu 1844. godine”, *Delo*, vol. XXXVIII (Belgrade, 1906), pp. 321–336.

source of inspiration for the *Načertanije*.¹⁰ The discovery of Zach's text has clearly shown that all three documents are closely inter-related: the *Conseils* of Czartoryski, Zach's *Serbia's Slavic Plan* and the *Načertanije* as its final version. The connection between the *Načertanije* and Prince Czartoryski's *Conseils* is evident, but the similarities between the former document and Zach's plan are striking. For that reason, Vaso Vojvodić renamed the *Načertanije* of Ilija Garašanin into the *Načertanije* of Zach–Garašanin.¹¹

It has been convincingly shown that the similarity between Zach's and Garašanin's texts is considerable in both content and form: out of 5,382 words in the *Načertanije*, 4,454 were reproduced from Zach's *Plan*. That is eighty-four percent of the whole text to be exact, with the other sixteen percent being only partially modified. The chapter IV of the Zach's *Plan* regarding Croatia was completely omitted in Garašanin's version, as well as some ninety percent of the text regarding the Czech Slavs.¹²

Although the changes to the Zach plan made by Garašanin amounted to no more than five percent of the text, they affected its meaning to certain extent; many changes, however, were more of a formal than an essential nature. Certain phrases were often used as synonyms or terms indicating compatible phenomena, parallel processes or kindred ethnic communities. For example, the terms "Slavic", "South Slavic" or "Serbian" did not denote such a degree of difference as they do today, so the Slavs of the Balkans was the same as South Slavs (the Croatian attempts to file themselves under the name of Illyrians failed).

The *Načertanije* as we know it today is undoubtedly an edited version of Zach's *Plan* adapted to meet Serbia's immediate political needs. Certain chapters were omitted or shortened, and certain terms were replaced, reflecting the differences in the still ill-defined understanding of a nation, state and Pan-Slavic ideology during the first half of the nineteenth

¹⁰ Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Jugoslovenski nacionalni i državni program Kneževine Srbije iz 1844. godine* (Sremski Karlovci: Srpska manastirska štamparija, 1931), 29 p. Stranjaković's over-emphasis of Yugoslav dimension in *Načertanije* was criticised by then young historian Jeremija D. Mitrović in: *Glasnik Jugoslovenskog profesorskog društva*, vol. XIX, № 4, Belgrade 1938–1939, pp. 297–300.

¹¹ Vaso Vojvodić, *U duhu Garašaninovih ideja* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1994), pp. 274–275, 358.

¹² Cf. more in: Slobodan G. Marković, "Poreklo i dometi Saveta kneza Čartorijskog, Plana Františka Zaha i Zah-Garašaninovog Načertanija", in: *Dva veka srpske diplomatije* (Institute for Balkan Studies SASA & Institute of European Studies, 2013), pp. 103–135, in particular pp. 114–115.

century. The differences in Garašanin's editing of Zach's *Plan* and partial changes of the initial pan-Slav concept were designed to fit in with the pro-Austrian views of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević and his influential entourage. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that there were at least two variations of the basic ideas from the primary texts—Zach's *Plan* and *Načertanije*. Both versions were drafted by Zach, but their final editing was done by Garašanin before he submitted them to the Serbian Prince and his other Cabinet ministers.

Radoslav Perović has pointed out that the changes in regard to Zach's *Plan* were not necessarily Garašanin's brain-children, although he penned them himself. They could have easily resulted from the remarks and suggestions of Garašanin's closest collaborators, mostly Austrian Serbs, who had in-depth insight into the questions and priorities of Serbian foreign policy. Perović has gone as far as suggesting that *Načertanije* should not be treated as an independent text for Garašanin was not its sole author. According to Perović, apart from being the edition of Zach's *Plan*, *Načertanije* also included the ideas emanating from Garašanin's wider circle of advisors.¹³

Although our knowledge of the readership of Zach's *Plan* and the number of individuals in Garašanin's entourage leaves a lot to be desired, it seems safe to assume that, apart from Garašanin as the minister of internal affairs, his main advisors and confidants, Atanasije Nikolić and Aleksa Janković, must have been familiar with this text. Above all, the text of *Načertanije* was to be officially presented to Prince Alexander Karadjordjević, whose pro-Austrian sympathies were well known to his ministers and advisors. Thus, it seems obvious that the chapters regarding Serbia's secret cooperation with the Austrian Slavs, from the Croats and Czechs to the Slovaks and Serbs of the Military Frontier, Dalmatia and southern Hungary (present day Vojvodina), were omitted or substantially cut down in order to be acceptable to the Serbian prince.

Shifting identities and nation-building

The term "Serb" or "Serbian" was narrower than that of "South Slav", but it was often used in different context in the nineteenth century than it is

¹³ Radoslav Perović, "Oko 'Načertanija' iz 1844. godine", pp. 89–90; S. G. Marković, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

the case today. It did not have a predominantly ethnic or confessional dimension but rather signified, following the model of the German nation, a wider community brought together by medieval and post-medieval political traditions with cultural and popular heritage, such as the tradition of Kosovo epics, and above all, a common vernacular language. In Serbia, a predominantly confessional model of national identity inherited from the medieval times, binding Serbdom exclusively to Christian Orthodox faith, was replaced by a modern secular model during the 1840s. According to this model, all ethno-religious groups which spoke Serbian language and lived outside of the Principality of Serbia were considered to be Serbs in keeping with the school of thought of German and Slovak philologists to whom language constituted the basic feature of a modern nation.

A Roman Catholic Serb from Dubrovnik area, Matija Ban, one of the closest collaborators of Ilija Garašanin, considered the Roman Catholic population of south Dalmatia in general, and that of Dubrovnik in particular, undoubtedly Serbian. On the basis of common language, Serbian identity was also assigned to Muslim Slavs in Bosnia by former Franciscan Toma Kovačević, another close collaborator of Garašanin.¹⁴

Some strong regional identities, like those of Slavonia, Dalmatia and Hercegovina, did not develop into proper national identities during the nation-building process, while terms like *Bošnjak*, or, to some extent, Croat were still far from being completely defined.¹⁵ A Croat nobleman from that period once stressed that he would accept his horse rather than his serf as a member of the Croatian nation.¹⁶ Furthermore, the terms of Illyrians and Illyria, which the Croats of Croatia-Slavonia particularly insisted upon, should have encompassed all South Slavs, but they were not accepted among common people. These terms were considered inaccurate and even subversive as they undermined nascent or already developed national identities. For example, since 1690 the Viennese administration had often labelled Christian Orthodox Serbs “Illyrians” and the “Illyrian na-

¹⁴ Cf. more: Toma Kovačević, *Opis Bosne i Hercegovine*, drugo pregledano i dopunjeno izdanje (Belgrade: Štamparija N. Stefanovića i Druga, 1879), XI+130 p.

¹⁵ Nikša Stančić rightfully stressed that in 1844 “nations in the Slavic South were not yet completely constituted”. Cf. N. Stančić, “Problem ‘Načertanija’ Ilije Garašanina u našoj historiografiji”, p. 195.

¹⁶ Quoted in: Edward Hallet Carr, *Nationalism and after* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 1945), p.3.

tion”, but these terms remained alien to them. Therefore, the application of today’s criteria in defining the modern nations to the circumstances prevailing in the middle of the nineteenth century creates a confusion which could easily slide into misunderstanding or misinterpretation, or could become a tool of biased, one-sided, interpretations.

Modern Serbian identity was based on mixed concepts: strong historical traditions and ethno-religious solidarity were the main ingredients of political heritage. They constituted the stable source of political legitimacy for the common people, encapsulated in popular wide-spread epic ballads, while the cultural, i.e. linguistic identity as a modern foundation of nation-building was familiar only to the rather narrow cultural elite. The first, prevailing concept was much more than what Anthony Smith defined as “ethno-nationalism” which seeks to expand “by including ethnic ‘kinsmen’ outside the present boundaries of the ‘ethno-nation’ and the lands they inhabit or by forming larger ‘ethno-national’ state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states”.¹⁷

The linguistic approach to national identity was a result of the prevailing political thought and related scholarly findings of the early nineteenth century, from Herder to Fichte. According to Fichte’s principle that language makes a nation, Vuk St. Karadžić included among Serbian lands all the Southern Slavic provinces under the Ottoman and Austrian rule in which the Serbian i.e. *štokavian* dialect was spoken. His views, resulting from co-operation with distinguished Slovak and Slovenian linguists (Pavel Šafařík, Bartholomaeus Kopitar, Franz Miklosich), were published a few years after *Načertanije* had been written.¹⁸

Another important question concerns the meaning of the term “Greater Serbia”. In the Serbian language, it signifies a quest for pan-Serbian unification of all predominantly Serb-inhabited lands, and in the nineteenth century it mainly referred to Turkey-in-Europe. Considered a legitimate national claim, in compliance with the best of European values since the Enlightenment, the demands for Serbian unification were deeply rooted

¹⁷ Antony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 89–90.

¹⁸ Vuk St. Karadžić, “Srbi svi i svuda”, in: *Kovčezčić za istoriju jezika i običaja Srba sva tri zakona*, vol. 1, Vienna 1849, pp. 1–27. The renowned Slovene scholar, Franz Miklosich, for example, considered the past of Serbia, Bosnia and Dubrovnik as the integral parts of general Serbian history: *Monumenta Serbica: spectantia historiam Serbiae Bosnae Ragusii* (Graz: Akademische Druck U. Verlagsanstalt, 1964).

in many political plans during the long centuries of the Ottoman rule and extended into the whole nineteenth century. These demands, far from being mere phantasms, referred to the medieval glory of Serbia and were based on the frequent national and social revolts not only in Serbia but also in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Old Serbia, Brda, Rascia and other regions where Serbs lived under the Ottoman rule. The Serbian origins of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina had never been disputed before the Austro-Hungarian occupation of that province in 1878. In his famous study of Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, the British historian, Robert William Seton-Watson (1879–1951), renowned for his sympathies for the Croat and Yugoslav cause offered the following explanation:

“In Herzegovina and Bosnia, to which the revolt [of 1875–78] speedily spread, unrest had been chronic since the beginning of the [nineteenth] century. [...] Of purest Serbian blood, the population was divided between Moslem, Orthodox and Catholic, the big feudal lords having in the first instance accepted Islam to save their lands and having imposed their new religion upon a certain section of their serfs.”¹⁹

It was only after the Treaty of Berlin (1878), when the Dual Monarchy occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina and forced Serbia to become her client state in 1881, that the term “Greater Serbia” or “Greater Serbian” acquired the opposite, rather negative meaning, denoting an obstacle to the expansionist designs of Austria-Hungary at the expense of Turkey-in-Europe. Furthermore, any notion of the extension of Serbia’s borders beyond those established in 1878 was perceived in Vienna as a “Greater Serbian danger” that threatened its own policy of domination in the *Sanjak* of Novi Bazar, Old Serbia, Albania and Macedonian *vilayets* along the way to the ultimate objective—the bay of Salonika. The long decades of relentless anti-Serbian propaganda coming from Vienna gradually became accepted

¹⁹ Robert W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd 1971), p. 17 (the first edition was published in 1935). Furthermore, it is little known that the two petitions signed by more than 1,500 Bosnian Serb leaders and elders and sent to the Russian Emperor, the first on St. Vitus Day (*Vidovdan*), which commemorated the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and the second in March 1878 during the closing phase of the Bosnian insurrection (1875–1878), stated that it was the “lasting desire [...] of the people [to become] a part of the Serbian principality”, stressing the fact that the “inhabitants of these lands all speak Serbian”. Quoted in: D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. History and Politics* (Paris: Dialogue, 1996), p. 60.

by most of the Western correspondents stationed in the Habsburg capital, and the extremely negative, biased Austrian perception of the Serbian question emerged as a permanent stereotype that far transcended the borders of Austria-Hungary. Within the frontiers of Austria-Hungary, the Magyars, and often *Habsburgtreu* nations such as the Croats, embraced this anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslavpropaganda in the pursuit of their own nationalist goals.²⁰

These prejudices against the Serbians were not refuted in European public opinion before the Balkans Wars and the First World War when a number of first-hand French, American and even British accounts dissipated much of Austrian propaganda.

Despite the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the stereotypes regarding the “Greater Serbian danger” continued to intoxicate some of the successor states, including some minorities within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In parallel, these stereotypes were extended through Austro-Marxism into the official ideology of the Communist International in the Stalin-dominated Soviet Union. The notion of “Greater Serbian hegemony”—as formulated by the Stalin-controlled and Moscow-based Comintern in the 1920s and repeated during the 1930s—became a *sine qua non* of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s official policy, prior to and during the Second World War.²¹

As rightfully observed by Slobodan Jovanović, the leading Serbian historian and legal scholar of his time and prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile based in London during the Second World War, the entire post-1945 policy of Tito’s communists was grounded in the prejudice against Serbia inherited from Austria-Hungary:

²⁰ See among others: Ćiro Truhelka, *Hrvatska Bosna. Mi i “oni tamo”* (Sarajevo: Naklada “Hrvatskog dnevnika”, 1907); idem, *Studije o podrijetlu: etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Hercegovine* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1941); among the most influential was Ivo Pilar: L. von Südland [pseud. of Ivo Pilar], *Južnoslavensko pitanje: prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1943, second Croatian edition Varaždin, 1990); This book was first published in German language in Vienna 1918: *Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg. Geschichtliche Darstellung den Gesamt Problems*), reprinted in German again in Zagreb, by Matica Hrvatska in 1944, on 828 pages.

²¹ D. T. Bataković, *Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies* (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1994), pp. 46–52 (on *Načertanije*), pp. 229–236 (On Comintern, Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito’s policy). See also: D. T. Bataković, “The Comintern, The Communist Party Of Yugoslavia And The National Question”, in: *The Balkans in the Cold War*, Vojislav G. Pavlović, ed. (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, SASA, 2011), pp. 61–87.

The most persistently preserved part of the old Austrian propaganda against Serbia is the belief that Serbia has nothing to ask for beyond the borders she acquired in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin. [...] There have even been some Yugoslavs [the advocates of a single Yugoslav nation] who have described our requests that went beyond the borders of 1878 as a sign of Serbian chauvinism—and even our protests against Tito's delimitation of the Serbian federal unit have been ascribed to that chauvinism. According to these and similar views it seems as if the Serbs in Yugoslavia would have to be satisfied with the borders that Austria would have left them if the Yugoslav unification had been carried out under the Habsburg dynasty.²²

In such perspective, the labelling of *Načertanije* as the “Greater Serbian project” in the Tito-led Communist Yugoslavia is hardly surprising. Ideology took precedence over scholarship and despite occasional attempts of Serbian scholars to present the *Načertanije* as a basically pro-Yugoslav project—the Serbian unification having been understood as the first stage of the Yugoslav one—most of the Croat and certain foreign scholars carried on with the stereotyped version of the Austrian-inspired propaganda, which had been developed by Petar Šimunić in the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia in 1944.²³

²² Slobodan Jovanović, *Jedan prilog za proučavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera* (Windsor, Canada: Avala Publishing, 1964), p. 31. Even a brief analysis of J. B. Tito's *Collected Works* clearly shows that the expression ‘the hegemony of the “Greater Serbian bourgeoisie”’ frequently used by Yugoslav communists in the interwar period was often replaced, in the post-1945 period, by the expression “Greater Serbian hegemony” which laid responsibility on the entire Serbian nation. Tito considered the Royal authorities to have been “a handful of Greater Serbian hegemonists led by the king, who ruled Yugoslavia for twenty-two years in their greediness for wealth and who established a regime of policemen and prisons, a regime of social and national slavery.” See J. B. Tito, *Sabrana djela*, vol. V, Belgrade: Komunist, 1979), pp. 50–65. For more details of Tito's position on Serbian question see Milovan Djilas, “Les communistes et la question nationale”, *Le Monde*, Paris, le 30 décembre 1971, p. 4.

²³ One of the most recent examples is a book of Damir Agičić written in the midst of the 1990's war for Yugoslav succession: the lands neighbouring to Serbia are considered as “non-Serbian lands”, Garašanin labelled as the proponent of “Greater Serbian policy”, *Načertanije* as a beginning of “Serbian imperialism”, while Petar Šimunić was praised as a first-rate scholar. These views, thus, coincided with official nationalist policy of Franjo Tuđman, the first president of independent Republic of Croatia since 1992. In his assessment of “Greater Serbian policy” Agičić omitted to mention, same as Šimunić, the Ustaša genocide against the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945). Damir Agičić, *Tajna politika Srbije u XIX. stoljeću* (Zagreb, AG & M, 1994), pp. 17–21, 113.

This study focuses on the origins, implications, and implementation of the foreign policy ideas outlined in the *Načertanije*. It will try to re-examine the dynamics of Serbia's foreign policy during Ilija Garašanin's term in office. Avoiding ideological restraints and national stereotypes, this study will also endeavour to explore the complex political and social developments which shaped the long-term political and diplomatic goals of the Principality of Serbia.



NAČERTANIJE: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The historical context in which *Načertanije* was drafted cannot be understood without a general review of Serbian history and all its historical traditions that were incorporated fully or partially into the political ideology of Serbia. She was restored, although only for a while, as an independent state under Karageorge in 1804–1813 (she officially proclaimed independence in 1807). Following the collapse of the First Serbian Uprising, Serbia was as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire under Prince Miloš Obrenović (1815–1839). Furthermore, *Načertanije* bears the influence of historical circumstances of not just Serbians, the Serbs from Serbia, but also the Serbs living throughout the Western Balkans, in Bosnia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat, Bačka and other Serb-inhabited areas, from Buda in Hungary to Skoplje and Veles in Slavic-inhabited Macedonia.

Serbia's historical traditions have deep roots in her medieval past cherished during the centuries of Ottoman domination, primarily by the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, established in the early thirteenth century and personified in its founder, Archbishop Sava Nemanjić (canonized as St. Sava), and the political and spiritual legacy (preserved in both epic ballads and ecclesiastic traditions) of the medieval state ruled by the Nemanjić dynasty, which reached its peak during the reign of Stefan Uroš IV Nemanjić, better known as Stefan Dušan (1331–1355).¹ The Serb-inhabited lands bore various historic names throughout me-

¹ For a wider, regional perspective see Mihailo J. Dinić, "The Balkans 1018–1499", *Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 520–532.

dieval period as their borders shifted under different realms: Rascia (the core of future Serbia), Bosnia, Hum (future Herzegovina, the Duchy of Saint Sava), Dioclea (future Zeta and afterwards Montenegro), Kosovo, Hvosno (Metohija), Srem (Syrmia), Slavonia (Esclavonia), Dalmatia (up to the Cetina river), Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the Scutari area, including present-day northern Albania, and certain zones of Slavic Macedonia.² It was under the Nemanjić dynasty (1066–1371) that the Serb-inhabited lands, with the exception of most of Bosnia, Srem, Slavonia, and portion of Zeta, were united into a single kingdom and later empire. Medieval Serbia had no permanent capital. However, Ras, Pauni, Nerodimlje, Prizren, Skoplje (today Skopje), Priština, Kruševac, Belgrade and Smederevo were all at times royal, imperial or princely centres, their succession usually marking major geopolitical shifts in Serb history.³

From the early thirteenth century onwards, the spiritual and political centre of medieval Serbia was located in the plains of Kosovo and Hvosno (nowadays Metohija). The seat of the Serbian Archbishopric was relocated from the Žiča monastery in central Serbia to the new complex of churches near the town of Peć in the Hvosno area. In anticipation of Stefan Dušan's proclamation as emperor in 1346, the Archbishopric was elevated to the status of Patriarchate. The Serbian Church, heavily relying on the Eastern Christian ecclesiastic, cultural and legal heritage, developed in the course of time its own spiritual and cultural identity: it was a unique mixture of Byzantine cultural legacy, Mediterranean influences and local Serbian traditions.⁴

The splendour of Serbian medieval culture was based on the growing economic strength, particularly on the large-scale mining of gold and

² For medieval Zeta and Montenegro see Sima M. Ćirković, Ivan Božić, Dimitrije Bogdanović, Vojislav Djurić, *Istorija Crne Gore, knj.2. Od kraja XII do kraja XV vijeka* (Titograd: Redakcija za istoriju Crne Gore, 1970).

³ More in: Stojan Novaković, *Nemanjićke prestonice: Ras, Pauni, Nerodimlja* (Belgrade, Imprimerie nationale du Royaume de Serbie, 1911); Mihailo J. Dinić, *Srpske zemlje u srednjem veku. Istorijско-geografske studije* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1978); Miloš Blagojević, *Srbija u doba Nemanjića, 1168–1371* (Belgrade: Vajat, 1991); Jovanka Kalić, *Srbi u poznom srednjem veku* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1994); Sima M. Ćirković, *The Serbs* (Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

⁴ Vojislav J. Djurić, Sima M. Ćirković, Vojislav Korać, *Le Patriarcat de Peć* (Belgrade & Priština: Jugoslovenska revija & Jedinstvo, 1990). Cf. also *History of Serbian Culture*, Pavle Ivić, ed. (London: Porthill Publishing, 1992).

silver since the late thirteenth century.⁵ The rich and powerful rulers, such as King Milutin (1282–1321) and his son Stefan Dečanski (1321–1331), following the examples of their predecessors, commissioned their royal endowments from Serbian and foreign master-builders and artists. It was that continuous process of building that produced magnificent artistic results in architecture, fresco and icon painting, gold and silver items for decoration. A rich and diversified literature in Old Church Slavonic was another impressive result of Serbian medieval culture.⁶ The Serbian monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija alone had at least 7,500 manuscripts deposited in their libraries.⁷ The monasteries of Peć, Visoki Dečani, Gračanica, and Our Lady of Ljeviška in Prizren were the most important literary centres. The most prolific genres of Serbian medieval literature were hagiography, biographies of the sainted rulers and church dignitaries (bishops, archbishops and patriarchs), *memoria*, *eulogies*, *hymns*, as well as other forms of devotional literature, written in or translated into Old Church Slavonic, i. e. its Serbian version (*srpska redakcija*).⁸ Furthermore, several thousands of new manuscripts and printed books were produced during the following two centuries of the organized activity of the Patriarchate of Peć under the Ottoman rule (1557–1776).⁹

⁵ More in: Desanka Kovačević-Kojić, *La Serbie et les pays serbes: économie urbaine XIVe–XV siècles* (Belgrade: Maison serbe d'Édition & Institut des Études Balkaniques de l'Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 2012).

⁶ Gojko Subotić, *The Sacred Land. The Art of Kosovo* (New York: Monicelli Press, 1998); Branislav Todić, *Serbian Medieval Painting. The Age of King Milutin*, (Belgrade: Draganić, 1999); Marica Šuput, *The Banjska Monastery* (Belgrade: Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments in the Republic of Serbia, 2003). Branislav Todić & Milka Čanak-Medić, *The Dečani Monastery* (Belgrade: Museum of Priština (displaced) & Mnemosyne—Center for the Protection and Natural and Cultural Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija, 2013).

⁷ Djordje Bubalo, *Pragmatic Literacy in Medieval Serbia* (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2014). See also Djordje Sp. Radojičić, *Tvorci i dela stare srpske književnosti* (Titograd: Grafički zavod, 1963).

⁸ Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić, "Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in the Royal Ideology of Medieval Serbia. Continuity and Change", *Balkanica*, vol. XXXVII/2006 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2007).

⁹ In the early 1980s, the Christian Orthodox Serbian monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija had only 359 Serbian manuscripts dating from the medieval and Ottoman periods; 140 of the most precious medieval manuscripts were burnt together with the entire National Library in Belgrade during the indiscriminative Nazi carpet bombing on 6 April 1941. Cf. Dimitrije Bogdanović, "Rukopisno nasleđe Kosova" in: *Zbornik okruglog stola*

The short-lived Empire of Stefan Dušan, the extension of the powerful Kingdom of Serbia, that had previously defeated Bulgaria, absorbed northern Albania and most of the Slav-inhabited Macedonia, was founded in mid-fourteenth century. After having seized the vital territories south of Skoplje and non-Slav Thessaly, Epirus and most of Albania, the large parts of Macedonia including the important city of Serres, the Serbian Empire (1346–1371) covered the vast area stretching from the Sava river in the north to the bay of Corinth in the south, and from western Bulgaria to the port of Durrazo in the Adriatic.¹⁰ Under Stefan Dušan's weak heir, Emperor Uroš I (1355–1371), the last ruler of the Nemanjić dynasty, most of central Serbia with Kosovo came under the control of powerful regional lords which subsequently emerged as virtually independent rulers. After the defeat of Serbian armies, led by Emperor Uroš's co-ruler, King Vukašin, and his brother Uglješa at the Maritsa River in the Serbian part of Macedonia in September 1371, it was Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović (1371–1389), the most distinguished among the remaining Dušan's nobles, who rallied together the rivalling feudal lords from the rest of the Serbian Empire. Having established control over the rich mining areas in his native Kosovo, Prince Lazar undertook political and military preparations for the defense of Serbia against the Ottoman invasion.¹¹

Prince Lazar temporarily halted the Ottoman attacks on Serbia. Prince Lazar became immortalized by the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, when he lost his life at the battlefield together with his opponent, Sultan Murad I, an extraordinary occurrence which reflects the intensity and decisiveness of that clash. Although there was no obvious winner in this immense military conflict that involved at least 30,000 soldiers on both sides, the Battle of Kosovo gained an immediate international fame due to the death of both Serb and Ottoman ruler and its long-term impact on the future of the central Balkans as a whole.¹²

o naučnom istraživanju Kosova, Scientific Conferences, vol. XLII (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences And Arts, , 1988), pp. 73–79.

¹⁰ George S. Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium during the Reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331–1355) and his Successors* (Athens, Kentron Ereinis Bizantiou, 1995).

¹¹ Sima M. Ćirković, "Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo" in: Wayne S. Vuchinich & Thomas A. Emmert, eds., *Kosovo. Legacy of a Medieval Battle* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991), pp. 1–17.

¹² Mihailo J. Dinić, "Dva savremenika o boju na Kosovu" *Glas*, vol. CLXXXII, (Belgrade: Académie royale serbe 1940), pp. 133–148; Sima M. Ćirković ed. *Kosovska bitka*

The son of Prince Lazar, another martyr of the Serbian Orthodox Church, young Prince Stefan Lazarević, accepted vassalage to the Ottomans only a year later. The Principedom of Serbia (1389–1402) and Despotate of Serbia (1402–1459) survived for another eight decades, balancing between the Ottomans and Hungary.¹³ With the fall of Smederevo, Serbia's latest capital on the Danube, in 1459 the remnants of Serbian Despotate were annihilated. Other Serb-inhabited medieval lands, riddled by dynastic rivalries, successively came under the Ottoman rule (Bosnia in 1463, Herzegovina in 1481, and Montenegro in 1499). The Christian Orthodox Serbs remained almost deprived not just of their nobility (a few Serb noblemen survived in southern Hungary and in the mountains of Montenegro), but also of their state and legal framework. The downfall of the Serbian Despotate generated, in turn, a large-scale Serb migration northwards, as recorded by Matthias Corvinus, the Hungarian King, to the regions beyond the reach of the Ottoman conquerors. The successors of the former Despots of Serbia, who were reinstalled as feudal lords within the Hungarian realm, resisted the Ottomans for several decades until the Battle of Mohacs in 1527.¹⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other conquered lands, were divided into administrative units controlled by Ottoman military commanders. A final attempt to free the former Kingdom of Bosnia from the invaders was made by a descendant of the Branković dynasty which succeeded the childless Stefan Lazarević. It was in 1480 that Despot Vuk Grgurević launched a campaign in Bosnia but he did not emerge victorious despite his personal valour. However, Vuk Grgurević has been remembered in the epic tradition to this day as the “Fiery Dragon Vuk” (*Zmaj Ognjeni Vuk*) or *Zmaj Despot Vuk*.¹⁵

u istoriografiji (Belgrade: Istorijski institut 1990); Cf. also: Wayne S. Vucinich & Thomas A. Emmert, (eds.), *Kosovo. Legacy of a Medieval Battle* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 1991); an excellent and very detailed analysis, still the best in the Western world, is written by Thomas A. Emmert: *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389* (Boulder & New York: Columbia University Press 1991).

¹³ For more details see Rade Mihaljčić, *Lazar Hrebeljanović, Istorija, kult, predanje*, in: *Boj na Kosovu*, vol. II (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački grafički zavod, 1989); Jovanka Kalić, *Srbi u poznom srednjem veku*, passim

¹⁴ Momčilo Spremić, *Prekinut uspon. Srpske zemlje u poznom srednjem veku* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2005).

¹⁵ Jelka Redjep, “Vuk Grgurević ili Zmaj despot Vuk”, *Slovenske stidije*, vol. 16 (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1979), pp. 87–114.

Serb-inhabited Bosnia: diversified religious traditions and ethnic structure

Unlike Rascia with Herzegovina (*Hum*), where the organization of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church was consolidated since 1219, under the first Serbian Archbishop Sava Nemanjić, this process was reversed in Bosnia—its tendency was to simplify ecclesiastical rites and reject traditional ecclesiastical institutions. This simplified church (“*crkva bosanska*”) was most probably dominated by the dualist ideology of Bogomils, the heretic sect which originated from Bulgaria. The Bogomils were something of a monastic order, close to Eastern Christianity (originating from the traditions of Christian Orthodox countries). They were persistently persecuted by papal missionaries and the Hungarian landlords who ruled over certain regions of Bosnia.¹⁶ Christianity was spread in Bosnia from two directions. Roman Catholic faith came from the neighbouring Hungary, while the Eastern influences came from Serbia, with which Bosnia shared the same ethnic origins. This is why Byzantine sources described Serbia as two-folded state: christened Serbia (Rascia) and unchristian Serbia (Bosnia). After Serbia had been divided in two separate states in the early thirteenth century, Serbia and Bosnia, there was no widespread and solid religious organization in the latter, except for joint cultural heritage reflected in the use of Cyrillic alphabet and various traditions of Eastern Christianity. Nevertheless, the most of eastern Herzegovina (*Hum*, *Travnija*) remained within the Serbian realm for another century.

Local Bosnian rulers, often Roman Catholics and dualists (Bogomils) simultaneously, bore the title of *ban*, which in itself is an indication of Hungarian political influence. The charters of *Ban Matej Ninoslav* (1233–1250) issued to the Republic of Dubrovnik, testify to the ethnic identity of the population of Bosnia. In these documents, the Roman Catholic citizens of the Republic of Dubrovnik were referred to as *Vlachs* (Latins), and the Bosnian subjects explicitly as Serbs (*Serblji*). The three charters of Matej Ninoslav, written over a period of eighteen years, contained the same term to designate the ethnic affiliation of his subjects.¹⁷ They tally

¹⁶ Franjo Rački, *Borba Južnih Slovena za državnu neovisnost. Bogomili i patareni*, Jov. Radonić, ed. Special Editions, vol. LXXXVII, Social and Historical Writings, no 38, (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1931), pp. 341 passim.

¹⁷ More in: Vladimir Ćorović, *Historija Bosne*, vol. I (Belgrade; Serbian Royal Academy, 1940), pp. 10, 227–229, 338; Sima M. Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države* (Belgrade, Srpska književna zadruga, 1964), pp. 44–49.

with “Einhard’s tidings, that Serbs inhabit a large part of the old region of Dalmatia, as well as statements by (Constantine VII) Porphyrogenitus and the Priest of *Dioclea* (*Letopis popa Dukljanina* or *Barski Rodoslov*) on the community of Bosnia and Rascia under the name of Serbia. Joannēs Kinnamos (Ioanis Cinnami *Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gesta*) stressed that river Drina separates Serbs in Bosnia from those in Serbia.”¹⁸ The community, despite occasional dynastic rivalries, was not only geographic but ethnic as well.

After the death of Ban Ninoslav, Bosnia was divided and subdued, only to re-emerge in the fourteenth century as an independent state under the Kotromanić dynasty. The language and ethnic structure of Bosnia was Serbian as confirmed by the Kotromanićs themselves. The terms *Bošnjanim* and *Bosna* bore both regional and political meaning; they did not denote ethnic affiliation. After the death of the last Nemanjić, Emperor Uroš I (1371), the Bosnian rulers and noblemen from Serbia were engaged in war of succession. The powerful *ban* of Bosnia, Tvrtko I Kotromanić, was crowned with a “double wreath” of Serbia and Bosnia in 1377 in the monastery of Mileševa (then in Herzegovina and now in Serbia), on the grave of St. Sava, the founder of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church. Tvrtko’s royal title bore a distinct ethnic affiliation rarely used among Serbian rulers—the “King of the Serbs, Bosnia and Littoral”. In his charter from 1387, Tvrtko highlighted his ethnic and familial ties with Serbia:

...and then my Lord God dignified me to inherit the throne of my forebears, the lords of Serbia, for those forbears of mine, having reigned in the earthly realm, passed to the heavenly one. And I, seeing the land of my forbears as it was left behind them, without its shepherd, went to the Serbian land wishing and wanting to restore the throne of my fathers. And having gone there, I was crowned with the God-granted wreath, to the kingship of my forefathers, so that I should be Stefan, faithful in Jesus Christ and God-appointed King of the Serbs and Bosnia and the Littoral and the Western Regions. And then with God’s help I have begun to reign and to govern the throne of the Serbian land, wishing to lift up that which fell and to restore that which crumbled...¹⁹

¹⁸ *Vizantijski izvori za istoriju naroda Jugoslavije* vol. IV, (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1971).

¹⁹ Sima M. Ćirković, “The Double Wreath. A Contribution to the History of Bosnian Kingship”, *Balkanica*, vol. XLV (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 2014), p. 108.

The lilies on the blue shield, probably taken over from the Serbian heraldry, and perhaps combined with the heraldry of the ruling Anjou family from southern Italy, were adopted as the dynastic coat of arms of the House of Kotromanić. The alphabet used in court correspondence of the Bosnian kings after 1377 was the Serbian Cyrillic script—diplomatic miniscula—identical to that in Serbia. A similar type of the Serbian Cyrillic script was later used by Franciscans (*fratres minores*).

The first Serbian genealogy in Bosnia, entitled *The Brief History of Serbian Rulers*, was written between 1374 and 1377 in order to attest to the lawful right of the Bosnian ruler, King Tvrtko, to the throne of Serbia based on the close family ties with the Nemanjić dynasty. Subsequently, the genealogy was expanded to include the names of the rulers from the fifteenth and early sixteenth century.

Stefan, the First-Crowned King, had with the daughter of [Byzantine] Emperor Alexius four sons: Radoslav, Vladislav, Stefan [Uroš], Predislav [...] And [...] Uroš, the son of the First-Crowned King Stefan, had a son and named him Bela Uroš. This was the first Uroš, the coarse-voiced king, who had with his wife Jelena, the daughter of the King of Hungary, King Stefan [Dragutin], who held the lands of Srem and Usora [...] and King Stefan [...] who held Srem with his wife Catalena, the daughter of the King of Hungary, had Vladislav, Urošić and Jelisaveta [Elisabeth]. And Jelisaveta gave birth to three sons: Stefan, the ban of Bosnia Inosav [Ninoslav] and Vladislav. And Vladislav had Ban Tvrtko and Vukić [Vuk].²⁰

After the death of the last of the Nemanjićs, the new ruler of central Serbia, Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović (1371–1389), who found himself exposed to frequent Ottoman incursions, did not dispute King Stefan Tvrtko I's title of Serbian King. This was a realistic and pragmatic decision which secured Bosnian aid against the Ottoman invaders in the famous 1389 Battle of Kosovo: King Tvrtko's detachment, led by his most capable commander, *vojvoda* Vlatko Vuković, joined forces with the army of the Prince of Serbia.

After the death of King Stefan Tvrtko I in 1391, Bosnia was, just like Serbia, gradually divided into small statelets ruled over by Serbo-Bosnian regional lords. The vassal status to which Serbia was reduced after the Battle of Kosovo considerably enfeebled the position of the Bosnian kingdom. On his ascension to the throne, King Tvrtko II (1440–1443) was forced to pledge allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan. Furthermore,

²⁰ *Ibid.*

the powerful lords, just like in post-Nemanjić Serbia, curbed the central authority of the crown: Pavle Radenović ruled the area from Vrhbosna (Sarajevo) through the Romanija Mountain to the Drina River and, after having conquered the region ruled by the Sanković family, extended his power to the Adriatic Sea (the Konavli area). The family of Duke Vlatko Vuković, from the influential clan of Kosača, controlled a large part of Hum, while his relative Sandalj Hranić, the son-in-law of Prince Lazar, later ruled over its eastern parts. The region lying between the Neretva and Cetina rivers was controlled by another prominent Serbo-Bosnian family—Radivojević.²¹ The area of present-day eastern Bosnia with the rich silver mine of Srebrenica was incorporated into Despot Stefan Lazarević's lands (1389–1427).

The Branković dynasty that ruled in the Despotate of Serbia after the death of Stefan Lazarević in 1427, held territories west of the Drina—the belt from Srebrenica to Usora with Zvornik and Teočak. The rest of the Bosnian kingdom was riddled with internal crises and faced frequent Ottoman incursions that posed an immediate threat to the whole of the central Balkans. Prior to the collapse of the Serbian Despotate, a desperate attempt was made to re-unite Serbia and Bosnia. After marrying princess Jelena, the daughter of the last despot of Serbia, Lazar Branković, the Prince of Bosnia, Stefan Tomašević, was elected in 1459 “with the concordant will of all Serbs” for the new ruler of Serbia. However, it was too late to save both Serb-inhabited states from the Ottoman conquest.²²

The fall of Serbia in 1459 was followed by the collapse of Bosnia four years later. Herzegovina—named after the title of its powerful Serb ruler *herceg* Stefan Vukčić Kosača—held out until 1482. In an attempt to secure legitimacy for his rule, he assumed the title of “Herzog of St. Sava” in 1448. This title was derived from the German *herzog*, which was something of an equivalent for duke. *Herceg* Stefan Vukčić Kosača erected a Serbian Orthodox monastery in Goražde (1454), and kept at his court both the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan David (1466–1471) from the

²¹ Mihailo Dinić, *Humsko-trebinjska vlastela*, Special Editions of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, vol. CCCXCVII, Department of Social Sciences, no 54 (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1967),

²² D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. History and Politics*, pp. 18–24. See also Mihailo J. Dinić, “Zemlje hercega Svetoga Save”, in: *Srpske zemlje u srednjem veku*, pp. 178–269.

Mileševa monastery and the Bogumil (dualist) representative *gost* Radin.²³ *Herceg* Stefan's successors, his son Vlatko ("By the mercy of God, Herzog of St. Sava") and his brothers, came to blows over the throne of Herzegovina and soon succumbed to the Ottoman power. The last remaining town of the former Herzegovina (Novi, present-day Herceg-Novi in Montenegro) was captured by Ottomans in early 1482.²⁴ The last of the Serbian principalities to fall under the Ottoman rule was Montenegro, under the Crnojević dynasty in 1499.

Under Ottoman domination: Pax Ottomanica vs. Christian rebellions

In the Ottoman-held Serbia, a certain number of former Serb noblemen were incorporated into the Ottoman *timarli sipahi* system (the form of temporary land tenure in which *sipahis*, the Ottoman cavalymen, were granted land for their services) and eventually embraced Islam in order to preserve their landed property and the attendant privileges. Being Christian Orthodox, the majority of common Serbs, both urban and rural, as well as all other non-Muslim ethnic groups ("people of the book"), were officially known as *reaya*—the second-class citizens under the Ottoman Islamic order. Consequently, various forms of religious discrimination became evident in all spheres of everyday life. The Christians did not have the right to repair their churches or ring church bells without a written permission from the Ottoman authorities. It was, however, possible, under specific circumstances, to obtain authorization from the Ottoman administration to rebuild some ruined churches.

The inferior status of the Christian population also brought about economic derogation as most of the Christian Orthodox Serbs were reduced to landless peasants liable to paying feudal taxes to the Muslim holder of a fief. They were, like other Christians in the Ottoman Empire, not just obliged to dress differently and to pay additional tax *in lieu* of military service, but also deprived of some rights such as riding a horse, possessing or carrying arms etc. However, Christian peasants who paid their taxes and fulfilled additional obligations to the state were officially

²³ Sima M. Ćirković, *Herceg Stefan Vukčić Kosača i njegovo doba*, Special editions of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, vol. XXXLIIVI (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1964).

²⁴ Veljan Atanasovski, *Pad Hercegovine* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga & Historical Institute, 1979), pp. 126–138.

protected, while some Serb-inhabited areas that provided auxiliary troops for the Ottoman army (*voynuk, martolos*) or secured bridges, forests and mountain passes received a partial or complete tax exemption as well as a certain degree of local self-government. Of many dues paid in money, labour and kind, the hardest obligation for the Christian Orthodox Serbs was *devşirme*—teenage boys were taken from their parents to be converted to Islam and trained to serve in the *janissary* corps of the Ottoman army or assigned to various services in the administration.²⁵

The most famous case of a Serb *janissary* was that of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (*Mehmed paša Sokolović*), who rose to the highest rank of grand vizier. Many Serbian Orthodox churches were either burned to the ground, desecrated, used as stables for Ottoman garrisons or simply turned into mosques.²⁶ The most monumental endowment of medieval Serbia, the Church of Holy Archangels in the vicinity of Prizren, commissioned by Emperor Stefan Dušan and abandoned in the early sixteenth century, was destroyed in the early seventeenth century while its marbles were used to build a Sinan Pasha mosque in Prizren.²⁷

A renewal of primitive patriarchal forms of living within the new political and social framework was characteristic for the Christian Orthodox Serbs in the rural highlands of Dinaric Alps, including Montenegro, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia. In order to avoid *serf* status many Serbs in these remote mountainous areas became the so-called *Vlachs* (cattle-breeding population), which provided them with more autonomy from the Ottomans who retained full control over arable plains and town-dwelling merchants and artisans.

During the four-century long Ottoman rule (1459–1804), the main guardian of the lost Serb medieval traditions was the Patriarchate of Peć (1557–1766). The theocratic structure of the pluriethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire resulted in categorization of the population according to religious affiliation rather than ethnic origin. The Serbs were

²⁵ Nicholas J. Pappas, “Between Two Empires: Serbian Survival in the Years after Kosovo”, in: *Serbia’s Historical Heritage*, Alex N. Dragnich, ed. (East European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 17–38.

²⁶ Hasan Kaleshi, “Kada je crkva Svete Bogorodice Ljeviške u Prizrenu pretvorena u džamiju”, *Prilozi za književnost, jezik istoriju i folklor*, vol. XXVIII, t. 3–4 (Belgrade: Filološki fakultet, 1962).

²⁷ Cf. more in: Wayne S. Vucinich, *Ottoman Empire: its Record and Legacy* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1965).

thus included in the Christian *millet*, confessional community which was granted self-rule, initially under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople (probably under the local jurisdiction of the Archbishopric of Ohrid), and, from 1577 onwards, under their own ecclesiastical organization. The re-establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church as the Patriarchate of Peć in 1557, supported by Sokollu Mehmed-Pasha, marked the beginning of a vigorous religious renaissance of the Serbian *millet*. The reassembling of the Christian Orthodox Serbs into a single religious community (*millet*) under the central authority of the patriarchs of Peć brought about a tremendous change in their general position within the rigid theocratic structure of the powerful Ottoman Empire. Sokollu Mehmed-Pasha (*Mehmed –paša Sokolović*), the Ottoman vizier of Serbian descent, installed his first cousin Makarije Sokolović (1557–1571) on the Serb patriarchal throne and granted him the same privileges as those enjoyed by the Ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople.²⁸

The former Sokolović was wont to tell foreigners at the Sublime Porte that he was a descendent of Serbian despots. The first patriarch of the restored Serbian Orthodox Church, Makarije Sokolović, and his successors bore the title “Archbishop of Peć and Patriarch of all Serbs”. The inscription on the liturgical book (*Paterikon*) written in Sarajevo in 1564, at the time when “Patriarch Makarije held Serbian rule”, confirms that his authority spread over all the Serbian-inhabited lands, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps with the exception of Makarije Sokolović, Serbian patriarchs were elected at an assembly which was “a wide popular representative body”, in the presence of metropolitans, bishops and other notables.²⁹

The gathering of the Serb Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire into a single religious organization was followed by the revival of the old cults of medieval Serbian saints and the gradual restoration of destroyed or damaged churches and monasteries.³⁰ The renaissance of the restored Serbian Patriarchate revived religious construction. Many Serbian churches and monasteries from Mount Ozren in Bosnia to the town of Trebinje in Herzegovina were reconstructed and painted during

²⁸ Radovan Samardžitch [Radovan Samardžić], *Mehmed Sokolovitch. Le destin d'un Grand Vizir* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1994).

²⁹ For more details see Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve*, vol. I (Belgrade: Beogradski grafički izdavački zavod, 1994).

³⁰ Nikola Banašević, “Le cycle du Kosovo et les chansons de geste”, *Revue des études slaves*, vol. VI, Paris 1926.

the sixteenth century. According to the popular tradition and certain historical sources, they were considered to have been of medieval origin, but most of these churches and monasteries (Zavala, Žitomislčić, Dobrićevo, Paprača, Ozren, Gostović, Vozuća and many others) were built during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, often on the remnants of earlier medieval edifices.³¹

This religious renewal was in particular evident in Kosovo proper which remained to be the cultural and political centre of the Serbian Patriarchate, an area noted for its vast and prosperous church estates, tradition of sophisticated painting, printing and artisanal products. In 1539, Bishop Nikanor of Novo Brdo established the first printing house which produced manuscripts in the Serbian version of Old Church Slavonic language at the Gračanica monastery near Priština.

Since the foundation of *Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fidae* in 1622 various attempts were made by Roman Catholic missionaries to separate the high clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church from its flock.³² Such practice provided additional stimuli for the highest dignitaries of the Patriarchate of Peć to revive the old and create some new religious cults with even greater vigour. In 1642, Patriarch Pajsije Janjevac (1614–1647), a Kosovo Serb from the village of Janjevo, wrote *The Service* and *The Life* of the last Emperor of the House of Nemanjić, the Holy Emperor Uroš I, (Uroš V) reflecting contemporary political situation. Merging popular legends with traditional Orthodox *vitae*, Patriarch Pajsije Janjevac transcended the traditional medieval approach and made common people more familiar with the lost glory of medieval Serbia, strengthening thus both faith and historical memories of his compatriots.³³

Furthermore, Serbian patriarchs had the right to dispose with church property, collect church taxes, decide on heirless property, confirm

³¹ Vladimir Ćorović, *Hercegovački manastiri* (Sarajevo, Zemaljska štamparija, 1911); Svetlana Rakić, *Serbian Icons from Bosnia-Herzegovina: Sixteen to Eighteen Century* (New York: A Pankovich, 2000); Ljiljana Ševco, *Pravoslavne crkve i manastiri u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1878. godine* (Banja Luka: Glas Srpski, 2002).

³² Jovan Radonić *Rimska kurija i južnoslovenske zemlje*, Monographies, vol. CLV, Département des sciences sociales, nouvelle série, vol. 3, Belgrade, Académie serbe des Sciences, 1950, 743 p.

³³ Djoko Slijepčević, "Pajsije, arhiepiskop pečki i patrijarh srpski kao jerarh i književni radnik", *Bogoslovlje*, 2 (1933), pp. 123–144.

all guild regulations, and preside over civil and criminal cases within the self-governing Serbian community. As the head of the Serbian *millet*, the patriarch of Peć became a real *etnarch* of all Christian Orthodox Serbs. Patriarch Makarije Sokolović was succeeded on the throne of the Serbian Church by other members of the Sokolović family—patriarch Antonije (1571–1575), and, alternating one with another, patriarchs Gerasim and Savatije Sokolović (1575–1586/7).³⁴

The Patriarchate of Peć obtained the Sublime Porte's permission to restore fully or partially many demolished or damaged churches and monasteries. Based on the old traditions, the Patriarchate of Peć was largely perceived, especially by the Christian Orthodox Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, as a structural continuation of medieval Serbia and therefore it became instrumental in preserving their religious and ethnic identity through its financial and judicial functions. The jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Peć spread over the imperial frontiers, covering Christian Orthodox Serb population in both Ottoman and Habsburg Empire.³⁵

The self-government of Serbian patriarchal society within the Ottoman system became a telling example of parallel, highly functional, institutional structures. The self-governing church communities (*crkvene opštine*), under the auspices of local bishops, were the pillars of everyday life for rural and urban members of the Serbian *millet*. The patriarchs had legal authority over certain trade guilds in towns, and disputes within the Serbian *millet* were usually settled through the combined application of common law, patriarchal decrees and the Code of Emperor Stefan Dušan (*Dušanov Zakonik*), the most enduring legal document of medieval Serbia, used until the late eighteenth century.

Within these self-governing patriarchal communities, popular culture emerged glorifying the lost Serbian Empire and its heroes. The veneration of the idealized medieval past, in particular the cults of sanctified kings of the Nemanjić dynasty, as well as the holy patriarchs, archbishops and princes became the pillar of Serbian collective identity. These figures were mostly perceived as martyrs for national cause; some of them, after

³⁴ The list of patriarchs of Peć with the precise dates of their rule is given in: D. T. Bataković, ed., *Histoire du peuple serbe* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2005), p. 112 (list made by A. Fotić).

³⁵ Olga Zirojević, *Crkve i manastiri na području Pečke patrijaršije do 1683.godine* (Belgrade, Narodna Knjiga & Historical Institute, 1984).

having been devoted to church or state interests, left their secular positions to be fully dedicated to higher spiritual values. The continuous glorification of the medieval Serbian heritage through religious holidays dedicated to medieval rulers (kings, princes and despots), patriarchs, archbishops and their deeds was often depicted in the widespread epic ballads and it gradually merged with the more recent popular tradition which celebrated the defiance to the Ottoman rule. The Serbian epic poetry sung by local bards among the patriarchal highlanders of Dalmatia, Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia reached audience as far as south Hungary in the north and Kosovo and the Slav-inhabited areas of Macedonia in the south.³⁶ Combined with religious cults of the Patriarchate of Peć, the main heroes of these ballads were most often related to the famous Battle of Kosovo which was seen as the decisive moment of Ottoman penetration in the Serb-inhabited lands in the Western Balkans.³⁷

The increasing religious intolerance provoked a series of popular revolts among Serb Christians against the Ottomans in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Serb insurrections were usually led by the highest dignitaries of the Serbian Patriarchate. They took place in peripheral areas such as Herzegovina, Montenegro, the southern Balkans and Banat at the time when the northernmost frontier of the Ottoman Empire was laid on the Danube.

Some of the Serbian patriarchs of Peć, often cultured monks and able politicians, used to coordinate popular revolts. Patriarch Jovan II Kantul (1592–1614) failed to instigate a major Serb rebellion against the Ottomans while he was seeking for alliance with the Western Christendom. Two Serbian monks, special emissaries of the Patriarch, were dispatched in 1597 to Rome carrying a letter addressed to Pope Clement VII that surveyed Serbian history and stressed that the “tribe of the Nemanjić family is old and good” and that that dynasty ruled not just in Serbia but also over the “Bosnian bans, herzegs and Crnojevićs” (the rulers of Montenegro).

Patriarch Jovan II was the only Serbian *etnarch* who attempted to make alliance with the Western powers. Most of the other patriarchs of

³⁶ *Songs of Serbia*, translated by Kosara M. Gavrilovich, introduction by George Vid Tomashevich (Toronto: Serbian Literary Co., 2002).

³⁷ Nikola Tasić, ed., *Kosovska bitka 1389. i njene posledice (Die Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld 1389 und ihre Folgen)* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991) (bilingual Serbian and German edition); D. T. Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama. A Historical Perspective* (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2013).

Peć were in favour of the closer political and cultural cooperation with Russia. For his anti-Ottoman political activities, Patriarch Jovan II was captured, tortured and assassinated in Constantinople in 1614.³⁸ Another Patriarch of Peć, Gavriilo Rajić (1648–1655/6), met the same tragic fate in 1659 upon his return from Russia where he had asked for financial support from the Emperor Alexei Mikhailovich and Patriarch Nikon of Moscow in order to instigate a new Serb revolt against the Ottomans.

Frequent wars between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires caused forced migrations of the Serbs from Kosovo, Metohija and the adjacent areas later known under the name of Old Serbia—the most massive ones being those of 1690 and 1737 led by Patriarchs Arsenije III Crnojević (1674–1691) and Arsenije IV Jovanović (1726–1748) respectively. These migrations, in turn, cleared the ground for the inflow and settlement of Islamized Albanians from Albania proper. The Muslim Albanians were welcomed by the Ottoman authorities with a view to serving as a reliable militia capable of keeping in check the restless Christian Serbs.³⁹

During the final phase of the war that started with the second siege of Vienna in 1683, tens of thousands of Christian Orthodox Serbs fought in the separate Serb militia (*Militia Rasciana*, *Razische Feld-Miliz*, *Irreguläre Truppen*) on the Habsburg side. After the Habsburg troops had captured Belgrade in 1688, the Christian Serbs joined the advancing Habsburg forces in their campaign in central and southern Serbia. In contrast, the majority of Albanians—as newly-converted Muslims—took the side of the Sultan's army against the military coalition of Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians.⁴⁰

The overall position of the Patriarchate of Peć, a hotbed of successive Serbian rebellions against the Ottomans, was considerably weakened; its highest and most capable clergymen fled with their people to find refuge in the Habsburg realm. The confusion wrought by the 1690 Great

³⁸ Jovan N. Tomić, *Pečki patrijarh Jovan i pokret hrišćana na Balkanskom poluostrvu 1592–1614*, (Zemun: Zadržna štamparija Živkovića i Stojčića, 1903); *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. III-1 (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993), pp. 324–325.

³⁹ Olga Zirojević, *Srbija pod turskom vlašću (1459–1804)* (Novi Pazar: Damad, 1995); D. T. Bataković, “Le passé des territoires. Kosovo-Metohija (XVII^e–XX^e siècles)”, *Balkan Studies*, vol. 38, N^o 2, Thessaloniki 1997, pp. 253–283.

⁴⁰ Rajko L. Veselinović, *Arsenije III Crnojević u istoriji i književnosti*, Special editions, vol. CLI (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1949); Dušan J. Popović, *Velika seoba Srba* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1954).

Serb Migration (*Velika seoba Srba*) and 1739 Second Serb Migration in the Habsburg lands had, in the long run, a major influence on the eventual abolishment of the Serbian Patriarchate on 11 September 1766 by the decree (*berat*) of Sultan Mustafa III.⁴¹ Samuel I, the Christian Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople, frequently restrained the Serbian clergy in their resistance to the growing chaos and violence throughout the declining Ottoman Empire. The Serb bishops were to choose between “death in the monasteries or in exile”, while the rest of Serbian clergy was put under the jurisdiction of the newly appointed Greek bishops.

Furthermore, the widespread, almost chronic, turmoil in the Ottoman Empire from the end of the eighteenth century onwards facilitated the growth of both feudal and tribal anarchy throughout Serbia. It was Muslim Albanian brigands that frequently raided and committed murders and rape of the unarmed civilian population in certain lawless areas. Gangs of outlaws took control over the roads during the war between the Ottomans and Russia (1768–1774), and the complete disorder reigned throughout Serbia.⁴²

While most of Serbia's population remained loyal to their Christian Orthodox faith, Islamization was rife in Bosnia. The vast majority of Bosnian Muslims, from the beys and military commanders to the urban and peasant population were of Slav, i.e. mostly Serbian origin and spoke Serbian language. They used the Cyrillic alphabet, known in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as “Old Serbia”. Only a few learned Muslim Slavs spoke and wrote in Turkish or Arabic. In the 1840s, the French travel writer, Ami Boué, established that a single language—Serbian—was used in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus he referred to Bosnian Muslims as Serbian-Bosnians. What Boué heard in Bosnia was the *štokavian* dialect of Serbian vernacular codified in the early nineteenth century as the standard Serbian language. Nevertheless, the identity of Muslim Slavs was founded on the particular mixture of religious (Islamic), regional (Bosnian) and state (Ottoman) traditions. Notorious for their valour in wars but also for their utmost cruelty toward the Christian serfs, the Bosnian beys used

⁴¹ Radmila Tričković, “Srpska crkva sredinom XVII veka”, *Glas*, vol. 320, Département des sciences historiques N° 2, Belgrade, Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 1980, pp. 61–164; idem, “Ustanci, seobe i stradanja u XVIII veku”, in: *Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1988), pp. 149–169.

⁴² Radmila Tričković, *Beogradski pašaluk, 1689–1739* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2013).

Serbian language as their own and communicated with the Sublime Porte in Cyrillic. Most of them, however, considered themselves as Ottomans, the noble guardians of the Ottoman system in much the same way as the local administrative staff in Tunis in the nineteenth century. The majority population (over eighty per cent), the *serfs*, consisted of Christian Orthodox Serbs. They viewed the local Muslims as the repugnant domestic variant of Ottoman Turks, hateful renegades who entered into administrative system and oppressed the domestic population for the benefit of an alien, infidel ruler. The most famous proverb among the Christian Serbs was the following: “A renegade (*poturica*) is worse than a Turk!”

The Kosovo Covenant

The sacrifice for the national freedom of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and his gallant knight, Miloš Obilić, who slayed the Ottoman Sultan, Murad I, in his tent, became the key event of Serbia’s modern history. It was cherished through the sophisticated mixture of biblical symbolism, religious heritage and popular traditions.⁴³ During the centuries-long Ottoman domination, the sacrifices of Serbs “for the holy cross and golden freedom” made in the Battle of Kosovo and the subsequent hardships acquired legendary proportions and became immortalized in Serbian epic poetry.⁴⁴ The epic ballads thus emerged as a common historical memory, an oral history not just of Serbia but also of the entire Serb nation in both Ottoman and Habsburg Empire.⁴⁵

Passed from one generation to another by gifted bards playing the one-stringed violin known as *gusle* epic poetry sent a powerful emotional and political message. The epic ballads, with the Kosovo covenant as their central theme, immortalized national heroes and rulers, medieval and pre-modern, thus cultivating the spirit of defiance and nurturing the hope of the forthcoming liberation from the Ottoman domination. The epic poems about the Battle of Kosovo and its heroes described the tragic destiny of the last Nemanjićs, the heroism of Prince Lazar and his valiant knight

⁴³ Thomas A. Emmert, “Miloš Obilić and the Hero Myth”, *Serbian Studies. Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies*, vol. 10, Washington D. C., 1996, pp. 149–163.

⁴⁴ Svetozar Koljević, *The Epic in the Making* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Cecil Stewart, *Serbian Legacy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959); Nada Čurčija-Prodanović, *Heroes of Serbia. Folk Ballads Retold* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁴⁵ Radovan Samardžić, *Usmena narodna hronika* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1978), pp. 57–89.

Miloš Obilić, the assassin of Sultan Murad.⁴⁶ The alleged treachery of Vuk Branković, Prince Lazar's son-in-law who had left the battlefield at the decisive moment, became a symbolic justification for the devastating consequences of the Battle of Kosovo, an archetype of discord and unhealthy ambition leading to catastrophe.⁴⁷

According to the epic legend, on the eve of the Battle of Kosovo, Prince Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom over the earthly one, freedom over slavery. This was described in the *Downfall of the Serbian Empire*, considered "perhaps the best-known summing up of the whole Kosovo myth; and Lazar's choice is, of course, 'a repetition and the periphrasis of similar points made in Serbian historical literature in the Middle Ages'"⁴⁸

While the evolving tale of Kosovo and the assassination [of Sultan Murad I] still followed the basic outline of the event as it was recorded in the extant historical sources, over time Miloš [Obilić] also emerged as a completely mythical character in peasant society. For someone who was not even identified in the earliest Serbian sources for the Battle of Kosovo, Miloš eventually became Lazar's son-in-law, one of Serbia's greatest feudal lords, and finally a legendary figure with supernatural powers. Stories of Miloš and his super-natural origin and strength abound in [Vuk St.] Karadžić's collection of popular songs. [...] Miloš, of course, would never lose the supernatural qualities that his unusual lineage produced; and these attributes found their way into numerous folk tales. Nevertheless, given the importance of Miloš's heroic deed on the field of Kosovo and the reality of his tragic end there, even in myth his supernatural dimensions could not save him from his ultimate mortal fate. [...] Miloš as the heroic and even mythic assassin of Murad was not a classic martyr. Such restraints, however, may have been of little concern to the popular imagination in Ottoman Serbia. By the beginning of the nineteenth century a popular cult around Miloš had arisen; and while the monks of Hilandar should have understood their canon law, it appears that the Serbian uprising [of 1804] must have presented an overwhelming inspiration. Bearing a halo and a sword, the Hilandar fresco is accompanied by these words, 'Saint Miloš perished at Kosovo'. Within the course of the nineteenth century he would be remembered as a saint in several other churches in

⁴⁶ For more details see Rade Mihaljčić, *The Battle of Kosovo in History and the Popular Tradition* (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački grafički zavod, 1989), passim.

⁴⁷ Ivan Božić, "Neverstvo Vuka Brankovića" in: Ivan Božić & Vojislav J. Djurić, eds., *Le Prince Lazare* (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1975), pp. 223–242.

⁴⁸ Svetozar Koljević, "The Battle of Kosovo in its Epic Mosaic" in: *Kosovo. Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, p. 128.

Serbia. But the saintly cult would never overshadow the cult of Miloš as hero. Petar II Petrović Njegoš [Prince Bishop of Montenegro and the greatest Serb poet] made sure of that.⁴⁹

The Kosovo-related, Kosovo-inspired (pre-Kosovo, Kosovo and post-Kosovo) cycles of epic ballads gradually became a specific kind of popular, oral chronicle of the entire Serb history, guarding the memory of both national identity and medieval state traditions.⁵⁰ In spite of various factual errors, frequent poetic exaggeration or overestimation of certain events, the epic poetry became the main pillar of Serb collective memory for several centuries:

It gave them the sacred legacy of 'avenging Kosovo', or fighting the Turkish oppressor for the 'venerable Cross and golden freedom.' It gave generations of Serbs personal models of courage. It preached an ethic of justice, duty, sacrifice and patriotism, and a moral philosophy that fused with the Christian teaching of the Church into a national folk religion, the so-called 'Serbian faith.' Finally, Serbian epic poetry was revolutionary in spirit by teaching armed opposition to all oppressive authority.⁵¹

Serbian epic poetry, highly popular among the rural population, was sung, as testified by foreign travellers, not just in Serbia proper but also throughout Serb-inhabited lands, from Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Slavonia to Military Frontier (*Vojna Krajina*), Croatia and Dalmatia, and from Srem, Baranja, Bačka and Banat in southern Hungary to the Slav-inhabited areas of Macedonia.

The liturgical book from a Serbian church in Sarajevo titled *To the Memory of the Serbian Rulers* lists all of them, from Stefan Nemanja to the last of the Brankovićs. In a letter to Patriarch Maksim of Peć, the Serbs from Sarajevo equated themselves with the lands and people "of our own Serbo-Slavic tongue". The Serbs in Sarajevo, and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, celebrated the Day of St. Sava, the most important of the twenty religious holidays in a year. In 1687, Christian Serbs of Sarajevo

⁴⁹ Thomas A. Emmert, "Miloš Obilić and the Hero Myth", passim. On Hilandar: Dušan Korać, "The Athonite Monastery of Chilandar: The Mirror of Serbian History." *Serbian Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1999): 89–101.

⁵⁰ Nikola Banašević, "Le cycle du Kosovo et les chansons de geste", *Revue des études slaves*, vol. VI, Paris 1926, pp. 224–244.

⁵¹ Michael Boro Petrovich, *The History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, vol. I (New York: Harcourt Brace Yovanovich, 1976), p. 16.

asked Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević to send them the Service to the “St. Arsenije the Serb” (a patriarch from fourteenth century), who was, along with St. Sava, revered as their patron (“let St. Arsenije the Serb be our avenger”).

The predominance of religious tradition cherished by the Patriarchate of Peć and epic ballads was visible among Christian Orthodox Serbs throughout Herzegovina and Bosnia. Church tradition centred on the cult of the first Serbian Saint, St Sava, while epic poems evoked the memories of Serbian medieval glory. The remembrance of King Tvrtko’s reign remained dimmed. There were also some customs in Herzegovina that evoked the days of *herceg* Stefan Vukčić Kosača with regard to the adventures ascribed to his family rather than his political legacy. The celebration of the “ancient glory” through political and religious traditions of Herzegovinian and Bosnian Serbs solely referred to the Nemanjić epoch and the Kosovo legend.

The Serb historical traditions, however, did not go unnoticed among erudite scholars from the region and the small, but educated, class of Serbs in late modern period, and particularly during the Enlightenment. It was the Dalmatian Benedictine scholar, Mauro Orbini, the author of *Il Regno degli Slavi* (Pesaro, 1601), who used all available material, including the Renaissance erudite literature, annals, church chronicles and even epic poetry to depict Serbian medieval glory within its wider geopolitical framework. Similar, if not wider in scope, were *The Chronicles* written by Count George Branković (1645–1711) which, in contrast to Orbini, remained unpublished.⁵² This monumental work was extensively used by the next generation of historians devoted to historic monasticism—their representative was Jovan Rajić (1726–1801). He was a learned monk who published the four-volume *History of Serbs* in the late eighteenth century, putting the respective histories of Bulgars, Croats and Serbs into an alphabetic order and in the general framework of history of Slavs in Europe. Relying heavily on Mauro Orbini and Count George Branković, Jovan Rajić contributed to the body of knowledge of Serb history up to the abolishment of the Patriarchate of Peć in 1776, including the history of Serbs in Hungary. His four comprehensive volumes were written in a

⁵² Relja Novaković, *Brankovićev Letopis*, Special editions, vol. CCCCXXXIX, Department of Social Sciences, № 35 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1960), pp. 4–36.

rationalistic manner, but with the integrated elements from epic tradition and ecclesiastical heritage. Serbian historians noted that “as a loyal servant of the noble idea of Enlightenment Jovan Rajić pervaded the entire concept of his History (*Istorija*) with the unshakable faith in the power of scholarship and the blessing of knowledge. [...] Glancing at our entire past from the height of his erudition he proclaimed the ignorance and its consequences—discord, unruliness, and self-love— as the greatest enemies of Serb progress.” Although he did not necessarily voice moralistic judgment, Rajić preferred to address “the jury of readers, which should form their own opinion if they sought for wisdom”. Rajić was the first Serb historian to use primary sources and many forgotten first-hand accounts; however, he could not overcome the lack of sources for certain periods and failed to produce a synthetic work on the Western pattern.⁵³

Despite its shortcomings, Rajić’s *History* was the first modern, widely read and consulted history of Serbs popular in all-Serb-inhabited lands during the Enlightenment and, even more so, after being reprinted in the 1820s, throughout the Romanticism. Its partial translation into Russian language was also important in the perception of various aspects of the little-known and often misinterpreted Serbian past. The German historian, J. C. von Engel, made excerpts from Rajić’s *History* and included them in his writings on the history of Serb-inhabited lands.⁵⁴

The “Kosovo covenant”—the choice of “heavenly kingdom” instead of slavery in the earthly one—remained to be the fulcrum of Serbian patriarchal culture even after the Enlightenment had brought the Serbian elite from the Habsburg Empire under the influence of the modern ideas of nation, natural rights and popular sovereignty.⁵⁵ A prominent anthropologist and geographer, Jovan Cvijić, has explained that the patriarchal culture of

⁵³ For more details see Radovan Samardžić, *Pisci srpske istorije* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1976), pp. 7–27 (on Mauro Orbini), pp. 45–59 (on Jovan Rajić). See also Jovan Radonić, *Srpski istoričar Jovan Rajić*, Special editions, vol. CCIV (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1952).

⁵⁴ J. C. von Engel, “Geschichte von Serwien und Bosnien”, *Geschichte des Ungarischen Reiches and sein Nebenlander*, vol. III, Halle 1801.

⁵⁵ Dimitrije Djordjevic, “Balkan versus European Enlightenment Parallelism and Dissonances”, *East European Quarterly*, vol. IX, № 4, pp. 487–497. More details in: Slavko Gavrilović, *Prilog istoriji trgovine i migracije Balkan-Podunavlje XVIII i XIX stoleća*, Monographs vol. 433 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1969).

the Serb-inhabited areas of Dinaric Alps was completely bound to the medieval traditions in general and the heroes of epic ballads in particular:

Dinaric man burns from a desire to avenge Kosovo [...] where he lost his independence, and to restore the old Serbian empire, about which he constantly dreams, even in the most difficult times when anyone else would despair. [...] He considers himself chosen by God to carry out the national mission. He expresses these eternal thoughts in songs and sayings. [...] He returns to them at every opportunity. [...] Every Dinaric peasant considers the national heroes as his own ancestors. [...] in his thought he participates in their great deeds and in their immeasurable suffering. [...] He knows not only the names of the Kosovo heroes but also what kind of person each one was and what were his virtues and faults. There are even regions in which the people feel the wounds of the Kosovo heroes. For the Dinaric man to kill many Turks [Ottomans] means not only to avenge his ancestors but also to ease their pains which he himself feels.⁵⁶

When the early nineteenth-century versions of epic ballads were written down and published by Vuk St. Karadžić in Vienna in the 1820s and 1830s, they were soon admired by leading authorities in Western Europe and Russia as the most beautiful folk heritage in the whole of Europe, with Homeric strength and lyrical beauty that surpassed all expectations. From the Grimm brothers and Goethe in Germany to Pushkin in Russia, they went as far as learning some Serbian language in order to better understand the hypnotic melodies of these ballads and the stories they were telling. In these ballads, some of the medieval heroes gradually merged with the figures from the early centuries of Ottoman domination (such as Kraljević Marko, the Serbian ruler of Macedonia in the fourteenth century), while the entire Ottoman period was marked by the heroic deeds of numerous, real or legendary, leaders of Serb insurgents, from Bajo Pivljanin (from the Piva region in present day Montenegro) to Karageorge.⁵⁷

Through epic tradition in the rural areas of Dalmatia, Herzegovina, western Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Kosovo the Kosovo legacy re-

⁵⁶ Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1966), p. 361, 368, translated by Thomas A. Emmert. A wider aspect in: J. Cvijić, *La péninsule balkanique. Géographie humaine* (Paris: Alrmin Colin, 1918), the latest edition: J. Cvijić, *La péninsule balkanique. Géographie humaine*, ed. by D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: National Library of Serbia, 2014)

⁵⁷ Duncan Wilson, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864). Literacy, Literature and National Independence in Serbia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 98–113.

mained virile in Serb popular culture: in its printed form it reached the more urban *milieu* in present-day Vojvodina, Slavonia and Military Frontier of Habsburg Empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century.⁵⁸ The Kosovo epics proved to be a prevailing, if not dominant, historical narrative that shaped and fortified modern and contemporary, national and cultural identity.

Petar II Petrović Njegoš, the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, published his epic saga *The Mountain Wreath* (*Gorski Vijenac*) in 1847 and portrayed the modern concept of Kosovo tradition as the pillar of Serb identity.⁵⁹ Following the tradition of Serb epic ballads, Njegoš paid special tribute to the self-sacrificing act of Prince Lazar's valiant knight Miloš Obilić and, in doing so, highlighted the continuous struggle for freedom and national unification. As underscored by Ivo Andrić, a Serb Nobel Laureate for Literature in 1961, in his famous essay *Njegoš as a Tragic Hero of Kosovo Thought*, it was the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro that made a crucial distinction between the depressing realities of Ottoman period, i.e. discrimination against the Serb *reaya* and the chivalrous ideals of Miloš Obilić, who set a shining example of fighting for freedom for the generations to come.⁶⁰

Wars, Rebellions, Resettlements: the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries

Frequent wars, forced migration and recurrent resettlement on the shifting borderland between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires intensified the ties among Serbs in spite of different social and political status that they enjoyed within the two states. On several occasions, the successive Habsburg-Ottoman wars during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century resulted in temporary Habsburg occupation of northern Serbia (1688–1690, 1718–1739, 1787–1790).⁶¹ These developments brought

⁵⁸ *Songs of the Serbian People: from the Collections of Vuk Karadžić* Milne Holton & Vasa D. Mihailovich, eds. (Pittsburg Pa: Pittsburg University Press, 1997).

⁵⁹ Petar II Petrović Njegoš, *The Mountain Wreath*, translated by Vasa D. Mihailovich (Belgrade: Vajat, 1989).

⁶⁰ Ivo Andrić, *Njegoš kao tragični junak kosovske misli* (Podgorica: Unireks, 1996).

⁶¹ See more in: Gligor Stanojević, *Srbija u vreme Bečkog rata 1683–1699* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976),

about a strong sense of autonomy and self-government in northern Serbia, which was guaranteed by both Habsburg and Ottoman authorities in various periods and to different extent. In general, the Habsburg rule in Serbia (1718–1739) introduced modernization and Europeanization, and made ethnic solidarity among the Christian Orthodox Serbs from both empires stronger than in previous periods, in which popular culture, based on Kosovo- and Nemanjić-related epic ballads and religious traditions, had played its part in raising their national awareness.⁶²

In other Serb-inhabited provinces which lay deeper in the territory of the two empires, the Austro-Ottoman wars caused considerable migratory movements: Christian Orthodox Serbs fled from Ottoman vengeance across the Sava River to the Habsburg lands to be permanently settled there as soldiers in the so-called Military Frontier (*Grenzer*, or *Krajišnici*), a long stretch of territory along the Ottoman borders. Migrations had also taken place in the east and the south in the early decades after the Ottoman conquest and later, on a smaller scale, in the direction of Dalmatia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. The new settlements in the Habsburg Military Frontier were founded mostly by Serbs from Ottoman Bosnia. The area between the Una and Kupa rivers was the main battlefield in the early seventeenth century, with the Bosnian Serbs usually crossing over to the Austrian side through it. The Austro-Ottoman war of 1663–1664 and, in particular, the Candian War (1644–1669) between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire precipitated mass population movements. A large number of Serbs from Bosnia fled during the Candian War to Venetian territory in the Dalmatian hinterland, enlisted in the Venetian army and took part in military operations against the Ottoman Turks. These Serbs were known as *Uskoks*.⁶³ On the other side, the settling of Serbs from the Ottoman Bosnia to the Habsburg Empire was of considerable importance in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Many extended Serb families left the eastern and western parts of Bosnia to settle in the region around Karlovac (Karlstadt), the centre of the Austrian Military Frontier (an average extended family usually numbered from twenty to forty members).

⁶² Traian Stoianovich, "Factors in the Decline of Ottoman Society in the Balkans", *Slavic Review*, vol. 4 (1962), pp. 623–632

⁶³ Boško Desnica, *Stojan Janković i uskočka Dalmacija* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadru-ga, 1991).

The number of Serbs settled from the Bosnian Krajina (the region around the town of Banja Luka and between the Una River and the Kozara mountain) to the Military Frontier was so overwhelming that some local landowners demanded from the Court War Council in Vienna in 1688–1689 to stop the uncontrolled migrations. A large number of Serbs led by Metropolitan Atanasije Ljubojević crossed over Dalmatia and the Littoral to Lika (also the area within the Austrian Military Frontier). The advance of the Habsburg armies led by Prince Eugene of Savoy deep into Bosnia ended with the burning down of Sarajevo (1697), which precipitated another exodus of the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox population. Such large migrations encompassed up to hundreds or even thousands of extended families, while minor crossings over during the relative peace time took place all the time. During the last Austro-Ottoman war alone, roughly 15,000 Serbs fled from northern Bosnia to the jurisdiction of the Karlstadt (Karlovac) Generality in the Military Frontier.

The number of Serbs in southern Hungary in the immediate vicinity of Ottoman-held Serbia was further increased after 1690 when the masses of Serbia's population led by Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević (in Church Slavonic: Arsenije III Čarnojević), other church dignitaries and popular leaders crossed over the Sava and Danube rivers into the Habsburg Empire. They were encouraged by Emperor Leopold I's decree granting them special political and religious status.⁶⁴ Tens of thousands of Serbian families from Kosovo, Metohija and other areas of Serbia followed Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević in the Great Serb Migration of 1690.⁶⁵ The south of Hungary in which they settled soon became a new centre of Serbian culture and popular institutions. The new Serb Christian Orthodox churches

⁶⁴ The Serbian privileges in Habsburg Empire granted by Emperor Leopold I (1690, 1691, 1695) were confirmed by the Emperors Joseph I, Charles VI and the Empress Maria-Theresia. More in: Jovan Radonić – Mita Kostić, *Srpske privilegije od 1690 do 1792*. Special editions, vol. CCXXV, Department of Social Sciences, new series, vol. 10 Serbian Academy of Sciences (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1954), pp. 19–45.

⁶⁵ A local church chronicler recorded the following: "In the spring of 1690, the [Serbian] patriarch – Arsenije Crnojević of Peć – summoned a vast number of Serbs, 37,000 families [20 to 40 members on average], and they all set off to join the Imperial [Habsburg] army. In the same war, there was a large-scale looting and dislocation of Christians and plundering of all the Serbian lands. Monasteries, towns and villages were abandoned, and some were burned down." (Ljubomir Stojanović, *Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi* (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1905), vol. III, Nos. 5283 and 5302).

built along the Danube after 1690 stretching all the way to Buda were named after the churches and monasteries left in the Serb settlers' native Metohija and Kosovo.⁶⁶

The 1690 Great Serb Migration (*Velika seoba Srba*) caused a major demographic shift. In Kosovo and Metohija alone, dozens of towns and many villages were abandoned, virtually by all inhabitants. The Serb population, or rather what remained of it after the reprisals of the Ottoman irregular troops, was further decimated by the plague. The physical extermination, along with the mass exodus, the burning and looting of grand monasteries (Patriarchate of Peć, Gračanica and others) and their rich treasuries and libraries, the murder of a large number of monks and clergy, all wreaked havoc in these regions.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, in the following decades, merchants from the Ottoman-held Serbia became increasingly aware of the potential benefits from cultivating vibrant business and political ties with their compatriots living on the opposite bank of the Sava and Danube. In parallel with the rising national awareness among Serbs in the Habsburg Empire, their compatriots from the adjacent and troublesome Ottoman province of Serbia (the *pashalik* of Belgrade) voiced their demands for local autonomy. They were motivated by the traditions established during the Habsburg rule (1718–1739) and the weakening Ottoman authority following the last war between the two Empires.⁶⁸

A relatively strong Serb militia that fought on the Habsburg side as auxiliary units during the last campaign against the Ottomans (1788–1791) proved its military prowess. The leader of Serb volunteers who crossed the frontier from Austrian Banat and operated in central and

⁶⁶ The immigrants from Serbia arrived in southern Hungary (future Vojvodina) as an organized nation, led by its military and religious notables, rather than confused mass of refugees. "All the areas for new settlements were deserted or almost deserted. According to an official report from the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, there were 153 uninhabited and only eleven inhabited villages in the province of Bačka in 1698. Inhabited almost exclusively by Slavic [i.e. Serbian] population [...]" Sreten Vukosavljević, *Istorija seljačkog društva*, vol. I (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1953), pp. 28–31.

⁶⁷ *Velika seoba (1690–1990)*, Ljubisav Andrić, ed. (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1990), including historical data, testimonies, travel-writings and church and popular tradition,

⁶⁸ V. P. Gračev, *Balkanske vladения Osmanskoi imperii na rubezhe XVIII–XIX vv.* (Moskva: Nauka, 1990).

eastern Serbia was Koča Andjelković. In Kruševac (the medieval capital of Prince Lazar), Andjelković planned to proclaim the restoration of the Serbian Empire.⁶⁹ Organized by Austrian officers, roughly 18,000 Serb volunteers (*Freicorps*), recruited among the refugees from central Serbia, gained valuable military experience during this campaign. Their experience would become instrumental to the success of the coming Serbian revolution in 1804.⁷⁰ One of the most capable soldiers was Djordje Petrović from Topola, who would soon emerge as famous Karageorge (*Karadjordje*), the supreme leader of the Serbian revolution. Some 50,000 Serbs who had found refuge in the Habsburg Empire after the Treaty of Sistowa (1791) were an additional asset for the forthcoming Serbian insurrection as they would provide a valuable logistical support. Out of thirty-three petitions submitted by the Serbs from the *pashalik* of Belgrade to the Ottoman Sultan from 1793 to 1806, only five referred to agrarian problems, while the remaining twenty-eight were concerned with the extent of their local autonomy.⁷¹ The growing discontent of Christian Orthodox Serbs with their local governors who infringed on their autonomy confirmed by Sultan Selim III soon sparked a new uprising that would turn into the first modern revolution in the Balkans.⁷²

The Serbian Revolution of 1804

The modern traditions of Serbia were grounded in the national and social revolution (1804–1813) led by Karageorge. During the second phase of her national emancipation under Prince Miloš Obrenović after 1815, Serbia gradually attained the internationally recognized autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire in 1830. It was certainly not a coincidence that the first Balkan revolution at the beginning of the era of nationalism took place in Serbia which was, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

⁶⁹ Dušan Pantelić, *Kočina Krajina*, Special editions, vol. LXXVIII, Social and Historical Writings (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1930), pp. 14–50.

⁷⁰ Gregoire Yakchitch (Grgur Jakšić), *L'Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie (1804–1834)*, (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1917), pp. 10–13.

⁷¹ Dušan Pantelić, *Beogradski pašaluk pred prvi srpski ustanak (1794–1804)*, Special editions, vol. CXLVI (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1949), pp. 38–55.

⁷² Vladimir Ćorović, “Die Entstehung der unabhängigen Balkanstaaten”, *Revue internationale des études balkaniques*, vol. II, Belgrade 1935, pp. 159–160.

northernmost Ottoman province bordering on the Habsburg Empire. The authority of Ottoman governors in Serbia was at its nadir whilst Western influence was considerably stronger than in other provinces of Turkey-in-Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina, even with its two-thirds majority of Christian population (Serb Orthodox and Roman Catholic), was completely dominated by local Muslim beys—the Bosnian Slav landowners who guarded the conservative Ottoman system because of their social status and religious affiliation. In contrast, Serbia had dynamic business ties and important political contacts with the enlightened Habsburg Serbs.⁷³

The Serbian insurrection of 1804 was indeed, despite the collapse of its first phase, an equivalent of the French Revolution for all Slav and Greek Christians in the Balkans. Admired by many Western scholars, intellectuals and political observers, it was rightfully named by Leopold von Ranke “The Serbian Revolution” (*Die Serbische Revolution*).⁷⁴

Serbian notables from the nineteenth-century were aware that Serbia was the main hub of all Serbs although her territory covered just a portion of Serb-inhabited lands. Aleksa Nenadović, one of the most prominent Serbian figures (*knez*), sent his son Matija Nenadović in Sarajevo in 1803 in order to make an agreement with local Serbian merchants and elders about coordination of their military actions. It was hoped that the insurgents from Serbia and Bosnia would “meet in Sarajevo”.

In the earliest phases of Serbian revolution, the revolted peasantry led by their local elders demanded from the Sublime Porte the restoration of their autonomy which had been suppressed by the renegade janissaries. In the next stage, they requested the support for the self-proclaimed Serbian independence from the neighbouring Habsburg Empire and later even the protection of the Russian and French Emperors. However, it was not before long that they became aware of a wider scope of the Serbian question: potentially common struggle with the support of Serbs outside

⁷³ A more detailed account is given in: Dušan T. Bataković, “A Balkan-Size French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Uprising in European perspective”, *Balkanica*, vol. XXXVI (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 2005), pp. 113–128.

⁷⁴ Leopold von Ranke, *Die serbische Revolution* (Hamburg: F. Perthes 1829), 253 p. Second, revised edition L. Ranke, *Serbien und die Türkei in neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1879), XVI+558 p. English translation: *History of Servia and the Servian Revolution* (London: Benn 1848); Andrej Mitrović, “Leopold Ranke o Srpskoj revoluciji 1804. godine” in: *Istorijski značaj srpske revolucije 1804. godine* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1983), pp. 105–118.

Serbia?, the struggle that was to be waged under the supreme command of Karageorge.

As the supreme leader (*vrhovni vožd*) of the Serbian insurrection, Karageorge was seeking support from Saint-Petersburg, Vienna and Paris. He was inclined towards revolutionary solutions combining Jacobin ideas with Napoleonic dictatorial experience.⁷⁵ From 1804 to 1813, when the insurrection was finally crushed by Ottoman troops, the Serbian insurgents liberated most of central Serbia (the *pashalik* of Belgrade)—the area between Belgrade in the north and Niš in the south, the Drina River in the west and the Danube in the east. According to contemporary estimations, this was a densely populated area with less than 500,000 inhabitants living in some 1,800 villages.⁷⁶

The traditional reliance on imperial Russia, as the only Slavic and Christian Orthodox Empire, “The Third Rome”, protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, induced the rebelled Serbs during the session of their National Assembly held in Ostružnica in May 1804 to seek for Russian protection. The Serbian petition was sent to Russian Minister in Constantinople who, in turn, asked his Foreign Minister, Adam Czartoryski, for instructions. Czartoryski considered the insurrection as an important new element in the Eastern Question that might facilitate Russian interests in the Balkans. He believed that due to the stipulations

⁷⁵ In his letter to Napoleon Karageorge outlined the plan for Serbian unification: “Les Serviens [Serbes] assurent Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale que les autres compatriotes habitants de la Bosnie, du Duché de l’Herzégovine et ceux qui vivent dans le Royaume de Hongrie, sans excepter les Bulgares issus, pour ainsi dire, de la même branche, suivront leur exemple au premier geste qu’ils feront. [...] La Servie, la Bosnie, le Duché d’Herzégovine ont les plus heureuses positions. Si, avec de pareils avantages, ces provinces ont le bonheur d’être soutenues et protégées par Sa Majesté, aucune nation au monde ne parviendra à les soumettre. [...] le peuple servien franchira facilement les rives de la Save et de l’Una et pourra, d’une part, opérer sa jonction avec l’armée [française] de Dalmatie. [...] Le colosse hongrois, soutien de l’Autriche tombera rapidement lorsqu’il s’apercevra que l’armée victorieuse de Sa Majesté unie avec les Serviens, l’attaque en Slavonie, Syrmie, dans le Banat, chose qu’il redoute déjà, ayant dans son sein quelques millions de Serviens qui gémissent sous son joug et qui, au premier signe de leurs compatriotes unis aux troupes redoutables de leurs nouveaux alliés, tourneront leurs armes contre leurs oppresseurs.” August Boppe, *Documents inédits sur les relations de la Serbie avec Napoléon Ier (1809–1814)*, (Belgrade: Otadžbina, 1888), pp. 8–10.

⁷⁶ Roughly 40,000 “Turks” (merchants, large landholders and officials, mostly Islamized Slavs, and, in a smaller number, ethnic Albanians) lived in towns. Cf. Dragoslav Janković, *Srpska država prvog ustanka* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1984).

of the 1774 Kutchuk-Kainardji Treaty Russia could not be involved before the insurgents seized Belgrade. However, Czartoryski declined to send arms to them because of the huge distance separating Serbia from Russia and the risk of Habsburg intervention on the side of the Ottomans in case of Russian involvement. Moreover, he thought that Serbs should obtain their military supplies from the Habsburg Empire. Emperor Alexander I supported his views.⁷⁷

Priest Matija Nenadović headed the Serbian delegation sent to Saint-Petersburg. As testified by Matija Nenadović, after being informed in detail on the political and military situation in Serbia, and after they raised the expectations that “Russia, being of the same faith, will save us [Serbs in Serbia] from the Turks“, Count Czartoryski, cautiously replied to the delegation that “Serbia and Russia are very far apart and we are in friendship with Turks”⁷⁸ The Serbian delegation asked for financial aid, weapons, trained military officers and, in particular, the appointment of a Russian consul in Serbia, who would guarantee the peace concluded between the insurgents and the Ottomans. They invoked the autonomy of the Ionian Islands as a model for the future Serbian self-government guaranteed by Russia. The delegates had a meeting with Czartoryski. He advised them to form something of a government and be moderate in their political demands—a solution was to be found within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹ This contact with the Serbs would be an important experience for Czartoryski three decades later when he found himself in Paris as the leader of an anti-Russian Polish émigré political group and once again got involved in Serbian politics.⁸⁰

On return of their delegation to Serbia in 1804, the insurgents accepted Czartoryski’s counsels and established the Governing Council

⁷⁷ *Istorija srpskog naroda*, V-1 (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga 1980), p. 31; on National Assembly held in Ostružnica see Dušan Perović, *Iz istorije Prvog srpskog ustanka* (Belgrade: Slovo ljubve, 1979).

⁷⁸ *The Memoirs of Protá Matija Nenadović*, edited and translated by Lovett F. Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 113–115

⁷⁹ Cf. more in: Lawrence P. Meriage, *Russia and the First Serbian Insurrection* (New York & London: Garland 1987). Related documents available in: *Pervoie serbskoie vostanie 1804–1813 gg. i Rossia*, vol. I. (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 86–87, 91–92.

⁸⁰ More in: Piotr Źurek, *Czarnagorcy i Serbowie w rosyjskiej polityce księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego (1802–1806)* (Krakow: Homini, 2009), pp. 86–96.

(*Praviteljstvujučii Sovjet*). In addition, they abolished the Ottoman feudalism, organized their economy and education, and introduced legislation which was adapted to the permanent war conditions.

Initially perceived as a rebellion for the restoration of the autonomy under the Ottomans, the Serbian revolution turned into a large-scale war of national independence. Having received a request from the Supreme Porte to dispatch Serbian troops for war against Russia in 1807, the local elder, *knez* Sima Marković, the president of the Governing Council, declared:

Serbia considers herself an independent state; she does not accept payment of any tribute nor will she take up arms against her brethren in faith and allies.⁸¹

The Serbian insurgents considered imperial Russia—the traditional and official protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire since the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji—as their natural ally and turned most of their energies to obtain her political backing. The Serbian leaders were confident that with Russian financial and military support (a million rubles, weapons for 50,000 soldiers, 100–200 cannons and several Russian regiments) they could call to arms all their compatriots from Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania (i.e. Old Serbia) and even Dalmatia recently seized by Napoleon and have at least 100,000 new soldiers fighting on the Russian side. For Russia, Serbia's support became a tangible asset and Russian troops that had descended on the Danube entered that country while a diplomatic representative was appointed at Karageorge's headquarters. Russian logistic support proved instrumental to the attainment of Serbian military goals. Relying on Imperial Russia, in turn, deprived Serbia of substantial Austrian and French support. The fate of the Serbian insurrection was thus inextricable from the conflict of Great Powers during the Napoleonic wars in Europe.

While being a Russian foreign minister (1804–1806), Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was involved in solving the Serbian question on several occasions. In his famous memorandum to Emperor, drafted after the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Czartoryski envisaged that in case of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, European borders should be revised in order to

⁸¹ Milenko Vukićević, *Karadjordje*, vol. II. (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1912), p. 476; see also Gedeon Ernest Maretić, *Istorija srpske revolucije* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1987), pp. 143–144.

accommodate the balance of power between Russia and France. Whereas Walachia, Moldavia and Bessarabia would be integrated in Russia, a new Serbo-Greek state would be formed under the aegis of Russia. For that reason in response to the demands of the Serbian Assembly held in Smederevo, Czartoryski suggested to the Russian emperor to provide financial means to the insurgents for the purchase of arms and ammunition in the neighbouring Austria. Czartoryski counted on Montenegrin clans to join, if invited by Russia, to Karageorge's insurgents. In Czartoryski's view, the reinforced Serbian troops would be an obstacle to potential French penetration deeper into the Balkans. After his advice had been accepted by the Emperor, Czartoryski ordered the Russian Minister in Constantinople to intervene at the Sublime Porte and force it to recognize Serbia's internal autonomy and the provision that taxes be paid in a single installment.⁸²

In spite of its modern political and social outlook, the Serbian revolution was strongly influenced by the medieval traditions which propped the national consciousness of the insurgents. They used the medieval coat of arms of the Nemanjić dynasty. In 1805, the Governing Council held its sessions in Smederevo, 'the capital of our despots and emperors', and deliberated below the modern portrait of medieval Serbian Emperor Stefan Dušan.⁸³

Alongside the insistence on historical continuity, Karageorge drew his legitimacy from the modern French-inspired notion of a nation. Karageorge's official letters and proclamations including his correspondence with representatives of the Great Powers bore his signature as the 'Serbian commander'. In a letter authorising the official Serbian delegation to meet with both Habsburg and Russian Emperor in 1806, Karageorge addressed them as possible 'saviours of our nation'. The letter was signed 'in the name of the whole Serbian nation' by 'Karageorge Petrović, the supreme commander of Serbia.'⁸⁴ Furthermore, in a petition sent to the Russian Emperor in 1806, the Serbian leadership, encouraged by the series of

⁸² *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. V-1, pp. 37–38.

⁸³ Vuk Vinaver, "Istorijske tradicije Prvog srpskog ustanka", *Istorijski glasnik*, 1–2, Belgrade 1954, pp. 103–119.

⁸⁴ Radoslav Perović, *Prvi srpski ustanak; Akta i pisma na srpskom jeziku*, vol. I. (1804–1808) (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1978), pp. 124, 125, 149. On Karageorge: *Karadjordje, Život i delo* (Belgrade: Narodno delo, 1923), with contributions of Vladimir Ćorović, Ferdo Šišić and Stanoje Stanojević; Vladimir Ćorović, *Karadjordje i prvi srpski ustanak* (Belgrade, Ed. Zadužbina Ilije Kolarca 1937; Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Karadjordje* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1938); Slobodan Jovanović, *Karadjordje i njegove vojvode*, GLAS SKA

victories against the regular Ottoman troops (the battles of Ivankovac in 1805, Mišar and Deligrad in 1806), and also by the liberation of Belgrade, the strategically most important fortress in the region (January 1807), claimed that if imperial Russia dispatched its troops to the Balkans, 'all Serbs from Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Albania would joyfully unite and, within a brief space of time, create a new 200,000-men-strong army.'⁸⁵

After a series of disappointments with Austrian hesitation and Russian attempts to fully control the Serbian insurrection for their own ends, Karageorge had high hopes of concluding an alliance with France. After having entered Dalmatia and established the Illyrian provinces stretching from Ljubljana in the Slovene Alps to Dubrovnik in the Adriatic, the French saw Bosnia as the key Ottoman province for the transport of their own goods towards Asia Minor during the continental blockade. In this context, Serbia under Russian influence was a possible threat to global French interests. After some serious military reverses in 1809, Karageorge offered French Emperor Napoleon I to take control of Šabac, the strategically important Serbian town on the Bosnian border, and asked him for assistance in negotiating with the Sublime Porte and finding a solution for Serbia's new status.⁸⁶

Through his special envoy in Paris, Captain Rade Vučinić from Karlovac (Karlstadt) in Military Frontier, Karageorge proposed to Napoleon in 1810 the unification of Serbia with Bosnia, Herzegovina, the Illyrian provinces, the Serb-inhabited lands under the Habsburg rule (Banat, Srem, Slavonia) and, if possible, with the kindred Bulgarians into a single large state under the protectorate of French Empire. Emperor Napoleon I could not accept this offer as it would alienate his ally, the Ottoman Empire, but he instructed the French consul in Bucharest to cooperate

(Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1939); *Karadjordje. Dokumenta* vol. I–III, Velibor B. Savić ed. (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje Novine 1988–1989).

⁸⁵ Miroslav Djordjević, *Oslobodilački rat srpskih ustanika 1804–1806* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1967).

⁸⁶ For more details see D. T. Bataković, "La France et la Serbie 1804–1813", *Balkanica*, vol. XXIX, (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1998), pp. 117–157.

with the Serbian insurgents.⁸⁷ This proposal was a clear indication that Karageorge perceived French support as the only means to avoid an exclusive subservience to either Russian or Austrian influence. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded that Napoleon reorganized the French possessions in Dalmatia, Krajina and Slovenia into the Illyrian provinces (1809–1814) in order to keep in check the Serbian insurrection, which was perceived in Paris as an important instrument of Russian influence in the Balkans.⁸⁸

Disappointed with the lack of support from Napoleon, the Serbs were forced to turn to Russia once again. Co-operation with the Habsburgs was no longer an option since the Serbs, mostly for military reasons, remained attached to the Russian campaigns in the Balkans. Abandoned by Russia in the wake of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest, the Serbs were initially willing to accept a semi-independent status similar to that of Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), but eventually rejected anything short of independence: “We do not recognize the clauses of the [Ottoman] treaty with Russia [in Bucharest]. We demand our independent state and we do not accept any other solution.”⁸⁹

Without external support, the Serbian revolution was crushed by the much stronger Ottoman army of Rumelia in the autumn of 1813 and some 100,000 Serbs, including Karageorge and most of the remaining leaders, crossed the Sava and the Danube and took refuge in the Habsburg territory.⁹⁰

The impact on Bosnia, Bulgaria and Greece

The 1804 Serbian insurrection also had a strong impact on Christian Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their number, according to some sta-

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*; for a wider context of Napoleon's policy see Jacques-Olivier Boudon, *La France et l'Europe de Napoléon* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2006).

⁸⁸ Cf. Drago Roksandić, *Vojna Hrvatska La Croatie militaire. Krajiško društvo u Francuskom carstvu (1809–1813)*, vol. I. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1988), pp. 151–153; more in: *Napoleon na Jadranu/Napoléon dans l'Adriatique*, Janez Šumrada, ed. (Koper-Zadar: Založba Annales, 2006).

⁸⁹ S. Hadžihuseinović, *Muvvekit, Tarih-i Bosna*, quoted in: M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I, p. 157.

⁹⁰ M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923. A Study in International Relations* (London & New York: MacMillan & St Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 48–51.

tistics, was probably even higher than that in the rebelled Serbia herself.⁹¹ As early as 1803, secret talks were conducted in Sarajevo about the coordinated uprising of Serbs in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia. In the summer of 1804, songs were sung in Bosnia about the heroic deeds of Karageorge while numerous volunteers, sometimes the entire families, kept crossing into Serbia.⁹² The Christian Orthodox Serbs were predominant population in Bosnia: they were concentrated mostly in the Bosnian Krajina and eastern Bosnia and separated from compact Serbian settlements in eastern Herzegovina by Muslim masses in central and eastern Bosnia.

The resounding victory of 12,000 Serbs against the 20,000-men-strong army of Bosnian beys in the Battle of Mišar in 1806 raised hopes among Serbian peasants in Bosnia that the Ottoman rule might be thrown off. Thrilled with the first major victory of the Serbian *reaya* over Ottoman troops, a Serbian Orthodox priest from the town of Prijedor in north-western Bosnia wrote in 1806:

I was patiently enduring the Turkish [Ottoman] yoke as all the other Orthodox Christians, hoping that Karageorge would liberate us and put us under his protection.⁹³

The Serbian insurrection was, a French traveller noted, the main reason for more determined and effective defense of Serbian peasants against Muslim violence.⁹⁴ A Serbian bard from eastern Bosnia, Filip Višnjić, captured the expectations of the Bosnian Serbs in a contemporary epic song:

Drina water, thou noble boundary / between Bosnia, and between Serbia, soon the time will come / when I shall cross thee and into Bosnia come.⁹⁵

Two successive Serb rebellions broke out in Bosnia, but they were crushed by Bosnian Muslim forces and the regular Ottoman army. The

⁹¹ Milorad Ekmečić quotes certain statistical data that estimated the overall population in Bosnia and Herzegovina at as high as 1,3 million inhabitants. (M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I, p. 77).

⁹² D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. History and Politics*, pp. 42–43.

⁹³ Jovo B. Tošković, *Odnosi između Bosne i Srbije 1804–1806 i boj na Mišaru* (Subotica: Gradska štamparija, 1927), p. 72.

⁹⁴ Midhat Šamić, *Francuski putnici u Bosni i Hercegovini na pragu XIX stoljeća i njihovi utisci o njoj* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1966), p. 206.

⁹⁵ D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina*, p. 45.

first rebellion took place in 1807 in eastern Bosnia, along the Drina River, in the vicinity of Serbia, after Karageorge's insurgents had crossed over. The second one, larger in scope, broke out in the north-western region of Bosnian Krajina in 1809. Its leader was Jovan Jančić, a Serbian gunsmith from Sarajevo, who had been smuggling arms from the Austrian Military Frontier to the Serb-inhabited districts between the Una and Bosnia rivers for three years. Supported by Bishop Benedikt Kraljević, insurgent leader Jovan Jančić was negotiating in parallel with Serbia, the Russians and the French in Dalmatia. Since the ill-prepared revolt was prematurely started in Banja Luka, it soon failed.⁹⁶

Having lost external military support after the 1805 Treaty of Pressburg between Austria and France, the Serbian leadership appealed from their Assembly in Smederevo not just to Serbs, but also to other Balkan Christians to join them in the struggle against Ottomans. There was indeed some turmoil in different regions of Slavic Macedonia. In present-day Bulgaria, particularly in Vidin and Belogradčik, the area on the Danube just across Serbia, with the mixed Serb and Bulgarian population, the proclamation from Smederevo stirred occasional revolts among rather passive agrarian masses which had not rebelled against the Ottomans in the previous centuries. In 1805, Nikotsaras, the leader of Greek *armatolos* [irregular soldiers] prepared his forces to support Karageorge, crossing almost the entire Balkans from Mount Olympus in the mainland Greece to the Danube⁹⁷. In Salonika, French consul reported to Paris in 1806 that many Slav peasants and Greek merchants had been arrested under suspicion of supporting the Serbian insurgents.⁹⁸ The Greek *klephtes* in northern Macedonia and *armatoloi* from central and eastern parts of today's Greece were also encouraged to renew their efforts in organizing resistance to Ottomans.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Vaso Čubrilović, *Prvi srpski ustanak i bosanski Srbi* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1939), pp. 115–125.

⁹⁷ Michel Lascaris, "Le rôle des Grecs dans l'insurrection serbes sous le Karageorge", *Les Balkans*, Paris 1933, pp. 11–12

⁹⁸ Constantinos A. Vacalopoulos, *La Macédoine vue en début du XIX^e siècle par les consuls Européens de Thessalonique* (Thessalonique: Institut des Études balkaniques, 1980), p. 65.

⁹⁹ Dimitrije Djordjevic, "The Impact of the First Serbian Uprising on the Balkan Peoples", in: Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), *The First Serbian Uprising 1804–1813* (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), pp. 368–369.

In parallel, Karageorge armed 5,000 Bulgarians willing to join forces against the Ottomans. In 1807, out of 4,000 Bulgarians that crossed into Serbia, 800 immediately joined the Serbian troops.¹⁰⁰ The insurgents' rank and file also included a number of Greeks, Wallachs and Tzintzars (Hellenized Vlachs), who mostly fought in the Russian army during the Russo-Ottoman War. Bulgarian envoys from Wallachia requested on several occasions Serbian assistance for their plans against the Ottomans. The Serbian example also inspired the future Greek insurgents. The first historian of the Serbian revolution was a Greek author, Triantaphyllos Doukas, who published his epic *History of Slavo-Serbs* in Budapest in 1807. The poetic expression of a Balkan-wide impact of the Serbian Revolution was highlighted in the following verses: "In the army of the Serbian people / Many joined who did not know each other / For from all parts they gathered / Bulgars as many, Vlachs and Greeks..."¹⁰¹

After the first victories of the Serbian insurgents in 1804, Wallachian Prince Constantine Ypsilanti, encouraged by the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Adam Czartoryski, elaborated certain federalist ideas on the creation of a large Christian Balkan state which would be governed by his family. In order to support Karageorge, the Prince of Wallachia was sending weapons, supplies and even a small army unit to Serbia, while most of the Romanian boyars openly expressed their expectations that "Serbia should detach herself from the Ottoman Empire".¹⁰²

Serbian National Ideology: Ambitious pan-Serbian Plans

In contrast to the enlightened Serbs from southern Hungary who advocated a modern approach to the national question, based on the unity of culture and language, the Serbian Orthodox clergy from both Ottoman and Habsburg Empire had a distinctly religious approach to defining national identity. Their obvious choice of an ally was imperial Russia, particularly after the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji with its stipulations for the

¹⁰⁰ Vladimir Stojančević, "Prvi srpski ustanak prema Bugarskoj i Bugarima", *Istorijski glasnik*, vol. 1–2, Belgrade 1954, pp. 121–145.

¹⁰¹ D. Djordjevic, "The Impact of the First Serbian Uprising on the Balkan Peoples", p. 381. See Trandafilu Dukas, *Istorija Slaveno-Srba* (Pančevo: Istorijski arhiv Pančevo, 2004).

¹⁰² V. Georgescu, *Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Principalities (1750–1831)*, (East European Monographs Boulder & New York, 1971), p. 170.

official protection of the Orthodox Christians in Turkey-in-Europe. Their projects for the restoration of a Serbian empire were, in spite of their evoking medieval traditions, based on the extent of territory in both Ottoman and Habsburg Empire that had been until 1776 under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Peć rather than the borders of Stefan Dušan's Empire.

Throughout the eighteenth century, there were various plans for the renewal of Serbian state which relied on the support of either Austria or Russia. The earliest proposal for the restoration of a Serbian state dated from 1736/7 when Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta, the leader of Second Serb Migration, envisaged 'Illyria' (the name of the Roman province that had covered most of the Western Balkans in the first century A.D., often used as a synonym for the Slav i.e. Serbo-Slav Balkans) as a large autonomous state comprising the predominantly Serb-inhabited lands—Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Hercegovina—and northern Albania under the Habsburg rule. Its status would be similar to that of Hungary with its own government, army, nobility, churches and schools. The 'Illyrian-Rascian nation' (i.e. Serbs) would be governed by a patriarch as its 'supreme ruler', while ecclesiastical affairs would remain under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.¹⁰³

One of several projects elaborated in Montenegro, the ambitious plan of Prince-Bishop Vasilije Petrović-Njegoš from 1782 envisaged the restoration of the old Serbian state encompassing Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Upper (Northern) Albania, Dalmatia, Banat and Slavonia.¹⁰⁴ In 1798, Savo Ljubiša, a delegate of Montenegrin Prince-Bishop Petar I, went to Russia to present a project for the formation of the 'Kingdom of Old Rascia' that would be vast enough to provide as many as 200,000 soldiers. This project, Savo Ljubiša stressed, was based on the old plan of Count George Branković from the seventeenth century, but it was further elaborated together with certain Greek prelates.¹⁰⁵ The next proposal for the creation of

¹⁰³ Slavko Gavrilović, "Srpski nacionalni program patrijarha Arsenija IV Jovanovića Šakabente iz 1736/7. godine", *Zbornik za istoriju*, vol. 44 (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1991), pp. 39–48.

¹⁰⁴ Gligor Stanojević, *Mitropolit Vasilije Petrović i njegovo doba* (Belgrade: Historical institute & Narodna knjiga, 1979), pp. 101–111.

¹⁰⁵ Dušan Vuksan, *Petar I Petrović Njegoš i njegovo doba* (Cetinje: Narodna knjiga, 1951), pp. 85–87; S. Gavrilović, *Gradja bečkih arhiva o Prvom srpskom ustanku*, vol. I (1804–1810), (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1985), p. 45.

a large 'Slavic-Serb Empire' under Russian protection and with a Russian prince at its helm was submitted to the Russian court in St. Petersburg in 1803 by Archimandrite of the Morača monastery in Herzegovina (today in Montenegro), Arsenije Gagović, probably in consultation with the highest ranking Serb church dignitary, Metropolitan Stefan Stratimirović of Sremski Karlovci (Karlowitz).¹⁰⁶

Metropolitan Stratimirović sent a confidential memorandum to the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, in June 1804 laying out the ambitious plan for a large Serbian state that would, apart from the Ottoman-held provinces (Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Herzegovina), also encompass the Habsburg-held Srem, Bay of Cattaro (*Boka Kotorska*) and most of Dalmatia up to the town of Šibenik (Sebenico).¹⁰⁷ Such newly established Serbian state would be an independent monarchy with a sovereign from the Russian imperial family. The Bishop of Bačka, Jovan Jovanović, sent a petition to the Russian Metropolitan in 1804 stressing that Serbs, a Christian Orthodox nation with its own traditions, were suffering and expecting some tangible assistance from their Christian Orthodox brethren of Imperial Russia.¹⁰⁸

The political claims of insurgents from Serbia took account of the similar anti-Ottoman revolts of Serb clans in Herzegovina and Montenegro. Since the very beginning, the insurgents coordinated their military actions with the ruler of Montenegro, Prince-Bishop Petar I Petrović-Njegoš, who considered his people as 'part of the Serb nation'.¹⁰⁹ In the wake of the Montenegrin victories over the Ottoman army in 1796 (the battles of Krusi and Martinići), the semi-independent status of Montenegro was strengthened and that province later played significant role in all anti-Ottoman movements. These victories were an early sign of the upcoming Serbian revolution. As soon as January 1804, the Montenegrin Prince-Bishop Petar I informed the Prior of the Visoki Dečani monastery

¹⁰⁶ Dušan Pantelić, *Beogradski pašaluk pred Prvi srpski ustanak*, pp. 367–388.

¹⁰⁷ Stevan Dimitrijević, "Stevana Stratimirovića mitropolita karlovačkog plan za oslobodjenje srpskog naroda" *Bogoslovlje*, 1 (1926), pp. 38–66.

¹⁰⁸ Dimitrije Djordjević, *Révolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques 1804–1914* (Belgrade: Institut d'histoire, 1965), pp. 18–19.

¹⁰⁹ Jevto M. Milović, "Titule vladike Petrovića", *Istorijski zapisi*, vol. LX (1), Titograd 1987, p. 57.

in Metohija that both Montenegrins and Serbians were planning to take up arms against the Ottoman Turks.¹¹⁰

While the tiny Montenegro—squeezed in the mountainous regions and never fully submitted to the Ottomans—remained inactive in the early stage of the insurrection in Serbia due to the interference of Russian emissaries, a series of local rebellions spread in the *Sanjak* of Novi Bazar, a small stretch of territory that separated central Serbia (the *pashalik* of Belgrade) from the highlands of Montenegro. Moreover, the neighbouring Serb clans of Old Herzegovina (the Drobunjaci, Nikšići, Bjelopavlići and Moračani) took up arms as well as some Montenegrin clans (the Kuči and Piperi). In addition, the Roman Catholic highlanders from northern Albania (the Klimenti or the Kelmendi tribe) rebelled in order to gain more autonomy from the central government in Constantinople. In Kosovo, ruled by the iron hand of Muslim Albanian *pashas*, there was unrest among Christian Serbs, and some of them did manage to join the fighting units of Karageorge (for example, Antonije Čolak Simonović). The prominent Serb merchant from Prizren, Andrija, secretly funded the purchase of arms and ammunition, while two of his sons joined Karageorge's combat forces.¹¹¹

A year-long revolt launched against the local Ottoman authorities in 1805 by the Drobunjaci clan of Herzegovina was not pacified before the Turks took a number of hostages from their families.¹¹² In a proclamation sent to the rebelled Serb clans of Herzegovina in 1806, Karageorge invited them to join forces against the Ottomans 'for our holy churches and monasteries, for the freedom of our fatherland'. Furthermore, in his letter to Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petar I Petrović-Njegoš, dispatched in 1806, Karageorge invited valiant Montenegrins to forge a unified Serb state based on the common Orthodox faith and Serb blood, and 'to become one body, one heart, one soul and dear co-citizens.'¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Serafim Ristić, *Dečanski spomenici* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1864), pp. 23–24.

¹¹¹ D. T. Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles* (Belgrade: Plato, 1992), pp. 76–78.

¹¹² Ahmed Aličić, "Ustanak u Drobunjacima 1805. Godine", *Godišnjak društva istoričara BiH*, vol. XIX, Sarajevo 1973, pp. 51–54.

¹¹³ Radoslav Perović, *Prvi srpski ustanak. Akta i pisma na srpskom jeziku*, vol. I, 1804–1808, pp. 175–177.

The Restoration of Serbia: Medieval Inspiration, Modern Demands

The Serbian insurgents demanded the restoration of Serbia in her medieval frontiers. Although its centre was far more southward (in Kosovo and the Skoplje area), Dušan's Empire was a role-model cherished by the main representative of Serbian monastic historicism, Archimandrite Jovan Rajić, whose four-volume *History of Different Slavic Nations, Especially Bulgars, Croats and Serbs*, published in Vienna in 1794–1795, became the gospel of Serb national ideology in the early nineteenth century. An Ottoman official, held in prison in Serbia in 1806, observed:

...As once King [Prince] Lazar went to Kosovo [in 1389 to confront the Ottomans] ... they [the insurgents] will all come to Kosovo again. They are holding the history book [*History* by Jovan Rajić] on the abovementioned King [Prince Lazar] at all times, and he is the great instigator of the rebellion in their minds.¹¹⁴

The lack of strong intellectual leadership among the peasant rebels, whose main ideologist was priest Matija Nenadović—and he mostly relied on medieval ecclesiastical traditions—was somewhat compensated by political support from the enlightened Serbian elite in the neighbouring provinces of the Habsburg Empire. After having convened their Temesvar Diet (*Temišvarski sabor*) in 1790, the Habsburg Serbs considered themselves destined to provide political and intellectual leadership for the entire Serb national movement. Impressed by the enlightened ideas which the French Revolution had spread throughout Europe, they raised the issue of national rights and territorial autonomy, aware of the fact that the Serbs (for whom they used the term *Illyrians* as the Serbs had indeed been officially classified by the imperial government in Vienna for centuries) were yet to become a modern nation. In their petition *Gravamina und Postulata*, the Habsburg Serbs referred to Montesquieu in order to stress that the people was not a distinct nation (*corps de nation*) without territory or territorial autonomy.¹¹⁵ Prior to 1804, the Habsburg Serbs' views of the potential solution for the Serb question combined historicism with

¹¹⁴ Radmila Tričković, "Pismo travničkog vezira iz 1806. godine", *Politika*, Belgrade, 21. 02. 1965.

¹¹⁵ Slavko Gavrilović & Nikola Petrović, eds., *Temišvarski sabor 1790* (Novi Sad & Sremski Karlovci: Matica srpska, 1972), pp. 599–627. Cf. also: "Mémoire d'un serbe de Vienne sur la situation des Serbes de la Hongrie", *Le monde slave*, Avril, Paris 1933, pp. 124–127.

special reference to the medieval tradition of the Nemanjić dynasty with modern principles of natural rights and popular sovereignty.¹¹⁶

Sympathy and enthusiasm for Karageorge's insurrection among Serbs in southern Hungary (today's Vojvodina) was so strong that they caused much concern for the local Austrian authorities. Secret contacts were established between the insurgents and the prosperous Serb merchants and church dignitaries from the adjacent Habsburg provinces; these contacts were crucial for the purchase of weapons and ammunition. Local Habsburg officials noted that the Hungarian Serbs not just welcomed the insurrection but also started to link their own future with possible restoration of Serbia as a sovereign state.¹¹⁷

The leading Serbian intellectual, Dositej Obradović, wrote his solemn *Vostani Serbie (Rise Serbia)* ode that, in time, became an ideological war song of Karageorge's insurgents:

Rise Serbia / our dear mother / to be again what you've once been / Serbian children are weeping for you / who are courageously fighting for you now.¹¹⁸

In the same poem, Obradović underscored that the Serbian insurrection revived the hopes of liberation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and other neighbouring lands.

An influential Serb intellectual from Semlin (Zemun), the nearest Habsburg town to the Serbian border, Gavriilo Kovačević, published a solemn poem about the insurrection, linking it with the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. While referring to the restoration of the medieval Serbian Empire of Stefan Dušan, Serb intellectuals put forward at the same time some new territorial claims based on the modern concept of national identity which rested on language, culture, religion and historical traditions. It was Dositej Obradović, the "Serbian Voltaire" and the first Minister of Education and Culture in the insurgent Serbia, who first considered language as

¹¹⁶ D. Djordjevic, "Balkan versus European Enlightenment. Parallelism and Dissonances", *East European Quarterly*, vol. IX, № 4, pp. 487–497.

¹¹⁷ Aleksa Ivić, *Spisi bečkih arhiva o Prvom srpskom ustanku*, vol. III (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1937), p. 349.

¹¹⁸ Jeremija D. Mitrović, *Istorija Srba*, (Belgrade: Curo, 1994); For the overall influence of the Habsburg Serbs Cf. Ivo Banac, "The Role of Vojvodina in Karadjordje's Revolution", *Südost-Forschungen*, band XL, München 1981, pp. 31–61.

crucial element in the formation of a modern national identity transcending religious affiliation. Obradović stressed that

...the part of the world in which the Serbian language is spoken is no smaller than the French or the English territory, if we disregard very small differences in pronunciation—and similar differences exist in all other languages. [...] When I write of peoples who live in these kingdoms and provinces, I mean those of both Greek and Latin Church and do not exclude even the Turks [Bosnian Muslims] of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inasmuch as religion and faith can be changed, but race and language can never be.¹¹⁹

The leading historians and linguists in Central Europe believed that the Serbs, often called Illyrians, or Slavo-Serbs, were the largest South Slav group covering most of the ancient Roman province of Illyricum in central and western Balkans. Johann Christian von Engel, the leading authority at the turn of the eighteenth century, described the Serbs as a nation whose territory was stretching from Istria and Dalmatia to Slavonia, including Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and some parts of today's Bulgaria, sharing the same language and therefore the same national identity. Considering *kaikavian* as the only genuine Croat dialect, von Engel claimed, quoting Josef Dobrovsky (1774) to that effect, that some renaissance writers had confused Serbian language of Dalmatia with Croatian only by linking their politico-religious similarities. .¹²⁰

On the basis of these assumptions, Count Sava Popović Tekelija, the richest Serb notable from Hungary, published in Vienna (1805) 2,000 copies of the 'Geographic Map of Serbia, Bosnia, Dubrovnik, Montenegro and the bordering regions' with a view to defining the national claims of Serbs. The first 500 copies were sent to the insurgent Serbia. Georgije Mihaljević, another Habsburg Serb intellectual, edited the widely read 'Almanac for every Serb' in 1808, with a portrait of Karageorge at the central place. Furthermore, the baroque portrait of Emperor Stefan Dušan, published somewhere in Hungary, was widely distributed throughout

¹¹⁹ D. Obradovic, "Letter to Haralampije." *The Life and Adventures of Dimitrije Obradovic*. Ed. and transl. by G. R. Noyes. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953), p. 135.

¹²⁰ J. C. von Engel, "Geschichte von Serwien und Bosnien", *Geschichte des Ungarischen Reiches and sein Nebenlander*, vol. III, Halle 1801, pp. 144–145; Cf. also: M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I, pp. 48–49.

Serbia, southern Hungary and Austrian Military Frontier (*Militärgrenze*). The posters of medieval Serbian coats-of-arms taken from the 1741 album *Stematografija* (arranged by Hristifor Žefarović), which also included coats-of-arms from Bosnia, Zeta (Montenegro), Herzegovina and Dalmatia were reprinted and distributed by former Habsburg *Grenzer* officer, Nikola Stamatović.¹²¹

Acting contrary to the traditional view of Russia as Serbian ally, some influential Habsburg Serbs, such as Count Sava Tekelija, appealed to the French and Habsburg rulers to support the restoration of a Serbian state that would constitute the core of a larger political entity. In a memorandum sent to the newly-crowned French Emperor Napoleon I in June 1804, Count Sava Popović Tekelija proposed the creation of the vast Illyrian Kingdom, i. e. a large South Slav state that would, under the auspices of France, encompass most of the Serb- and Slav-inhabited Balkan regions. Count Tekelija submitted a similar, slightly revised, project, to the Habsburg Emperor, Francis I, a year later.¹²²

The Illyrian Kingdom, consisting mostly of the Serbs, would be, according to Tekelija, a major contribution to the long-term stability of the region. Stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, this kingdom would be a solid barrier against both Russian and Austrian pretensions. Europe should, therefore, guarantee ‘the distinguished position and successful continuity’ of a nation which could provide this kind of stability:

Right now—stressed Count Tekelija in his memorandum to Napoleon I—such a nation is rising its head and rejecting the [foreign] yoke never to accept it again [...] It is the Serbian nation, or Serbians, if we take into account only those who live in Serbia [...] When they, supported by Europe, unite into a large Illyrian kingdom that would include Bosnia, Bulgaria, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Dubrovnik and the Serb-inhabited areas of Hungary, along with Serbia, this kingdom will be a powerful barrier against those powers, namely Austria and Russia, that would try to establish their domination in the Balkans.¹²³

¹²¹ Hristifor Žefarović & Toma Mesmer, *Stematografija. Izobraženije oružij Iliričeskih 1741*, Dinko Davidov, ed. (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1972), pp. 5–31.

¹²² Sava Tekelija, *Opisanije života* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1966), pp. 171–187, 379–396.

¹²³ Slavko Gavrilović, *Vojvodina i Srbija*, pp. 20–24.

However, in a similar memorandum addressed to Emperor Frans I in 1805, Count Sava Tekelija mentioned only Imperial Russia as a potential threat to the Balkans. The main obstacle to merging the “Illyrian” provinces into a single state was religious difference and the backwardness of their population. The French example of surpassing religious barriers (during the French Revolution) was therefore, Count Tekelija pointed out, a ray of hope that ‘nationalism will foster unification of the Serbs and weaken religious fanaticism, excluding the religious questions and highlighting only nationalism and fatherland.’¹²⁴

Both main proponents of Serbian Enlightenment, Count Sava Tekelija and Dositej Obradović, adhered to the similar, if not identical, pattern of defining modern national identity. Summarizing the eighteenth century scholarly tradition that equated language with nationality, transcending religious affiliation, Obradović warned about the following phenomenon:

“The Serbs in various kingdoms and provinces are bearing different names: in Serbia they are Serbians, in Bosnia Bosnians, in Dalmatia Dalmatians, in Herzegovina Herzegovinians and in Montenegro Montenegrins. Everywhere they speak the same [language], [they] perfectly and easily understand each other, apart from the small differences in dialects [...] Even the simplest Serb from Banat or Bačka [in today’s Vojvodina] is within his own native language and nation while [he is] in Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, in Croatia, Slavonia or Srem, regardless of whether he belongs to Eastern or Roman [Christian] rite.”¹²⁵

In compliance with the secular approach to defining modern nation, Count Sava Tekelija considered all Serbian-speaking Slav population in the Balkans as Serbs, notwithstanding their religious affiliation. The additional references to the neighbouring provinces of Bulgaria and Albania were probably founded on the ethnic and linguistic kindredness in the case of the former and on the assumption, based on contemporary view, that certain areas of northern Albania (which included the Scutari area

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* See more detail in: Dušan J. Popović, “Sava Tekelija prema Prvom srpskom ustanku”, *Zbornik Matice srpske*, vol. 7, Novi Sad 1954, pp. 118–125; Nikola Radojčić, “Sava Tekelija”, *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XII–XIII (1961–1962), Belgrade 1963; pp. 1–12.

¹²⁵ D. Obradović, *Prvenac* (Belgrade, 1811). See more in: Mita Kostić, *Dositej Obradović u istorijskoj perspektivi XVIII i XIX veka* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1952).

and its wider hinterland) were inhabited by clans of Serb or mixed Serb-Albanian origin.


Thus, both concepts of Serb unification, the religion-centred which was expounded by the Serbian Orthodox clergy in southern Hungary, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the secular one, preached by the enlightened elite of Habsburg Serbs envisaged the territory several times larger than that of the small insurgent Serbia under Karageorge. While the secular concept relied on the support of Western powers, the religious one sought for the protection of imperial Russia. This dichotomy in the development of modern Serbia, which accounted for the frequent oscillations between the East and West, became a major issue in the early 1840s when *Načertanije* was drafted.



The Turkey-in-Europe, 1830




Jovan Rajić (1726–1801)



Sava Tekelija (1761–1842)



Dositej Obradović (1739–1811)



Prota Matija Nenadović (1777–1854)

THE ROOTS OF SERBIAN RUSSOPHILIA

To understand properly the strong bonds which connect Christian Orthodox Serbs with Muscovy and Imperial Russia for several centuries, including the nineteenth century, it is not enough to refer to the common Slavic origins, the Cyrillic script, the Old Church Slavonic language, and the Christian Orthodox faith. Another strong bond was the common Slavo-Byzantine cultural heritage, shared values that shaped the whole of the Byzantine Commonwealth from the tenth to the fifteenth century. Byzantine civilization brought to both Serbia and Russia—the “heirs of the Byzantium”—various cultural and spiritual similarities, from religious affiliation to Orthodox Christianity to Roman-Byzantine law, worldview, feats of art and writing in their own alphabet. These striking similarities regarding *weltanschauung* have gradually brought about shared cultural and spiritual bonds that transcended different political systems during and after the medieval period.⁹⁶



Holy Prince Lazar of Serbia

⁹⁶ Cf. Dmitri Obolensky, “Russia’s Byzantine Heritage”, *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. 1 (1950), pp. 37–63. Different aspects are discussed in *The Structure of Russian History. Interpretative Essays*, Michael Cherniaevsky, ed. (New York: Random House, 1970), passim.

It was not by accident that Serbian Prince Rastko Nemanjić the youngest son of Stefan Nemanja, founder of the Nemanjić dynasty, escaped to Mount Athos and became monk Sava in the Russian monastery of St Panteleimon (Rusik), and managed afterwards to establish a Serbian monastery of Hilandar. Monk Sava Nemanjić in 1219 assumed the title of the first Serbian archbishop and was eventually canonized as St. Sava. Intense cultural exchange between the two countries started from the time of the Serbian medieval Nemanjić dynasty: Stefan Nemanja and King Dragutin (1276–1281) generously donated to the Russian monastery on Mount Athos in Byzantine Greece even when their homeland was under foreign domination. After having conquered most of the Byzantine possessions from the city of Skoplje to the bay of Corinth, including Mount Athos during the 1340s, Emperor Stefan Dušan was one of the *ktetors* (founders) of the Russian monastery of St. Panteleimon on this “holy mountain”. Furthermore, Serbian Prince Lazar, the martyred hero of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, bestowed his estates in Hvosno (Metohija) upon the Rusik monastery, while his widow, Princess Milica Hrebeljanović, despite difficult political circumstances, also did not fail to donate, along with three Serbian dukes, considerable land possessions to St. Panteleimon monastery in 1395.⁹⁷

In return, the Russian Church developed in time a strong attachment to the cults of Serbian saints, including the sanctified rulers from the Nemanjić dynasty. Apart from the cult of Saint Sava, which was cherished in Russia as early as the thirteenth century, the cult of his father Stefan Nemanja (St. Simeon) was firmly established as well. The cult of St. Archbishop Arsenije, and that of the holy king Stefan Dečanski (Stefan Uroš III Nemanjić, known as Stefan of Dečani on account of his endowment, the monastery of Visoki Dečani), had certain importance in the spiritual life of the Russian Church. Whilst the cult of St. Arsenije of Serbia remained popular for almost four centuries (from fifteenth to eighteenth century), the holy king Stefan Dečanski was often presented in the miniatures and frescoes in Russia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁹⁸ Furthermore, it should be noted that the Battle of Kosovo

⁹⁷ *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. II, Jovanka Kalić, ed. (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1982), pp. 43–44, 374–375.

⁹⁸ Sreten Petković, “Život Stefana Dečanskog na minijaturama i freskama XVI i XVII veka”, in *Dečani i vizantijska umetnost sredinom XIV veka*, V. J. Djurić, ed. (Belgrade:

drew a lot of attention of the Russian monks and church dignitaries, while the miniatures of Despot Stefan Lazarević appeared in various Russian manuscripts during the sixteenth century.⁹⁹ These frequent references to Serbian saints, partly popularized by exiled Serbian monks in Russia after the fall of the Serbian Despotate in 1459, proved to be rather influential for several centuries, before other Russian saints became dominant in the everyday spiritual life of the Russian Church.

Serbo-Russian bonds were solidified during the long centuries of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Many Serbian learned monks, icon-painters and scribes found refuge in Russia after 1459 and they were employed in various spiritual and artistic ventures. Even prior to the fall of the Serbian Despotate, the renowned Serbian icon-painters had made icons for the church of the Presentation of Jesus at the Temple in Moscow. An intense cultural exchange followed, and Serbian writers, such as Lav Anikita Filolog, wrote eulogies about Russian saints and boyars. Furthermore, the daughters of several Serbian aristocrats were married into Russian nobility. For example, the maternal grandmother of the first Russian emperor, Ivan IV, was Serbian princess, Ana Jakšić, from the family of exiled Serbian despots in southern Hungary. There were also special ties with the Serbian monastery of Hilandar (Chilandar) on Mount Athos. Ivan IV provided for the establishment of the religious representative (*podvorje*) of the monastery of Hilandar in Moscow in 1558, eight years after the first delegation from this monastery had arrived in the Russian capital. The Serbian monk at Hilandar, Fr. Lazar, born in the town of Novo Brdo in Kosovo, constructed the first mechanical clock on the Kremlin at the beginning of the sixteenth century.¹⁰⁰

When the Serbian church dignitaries started to visit Russia it was already on its way to becoming the “Third Rome”, as it was predicted by monk Filotei of Pskov in 1500–1501 in his epistles to Ivan III: “the present church of the third, new Rome, of Thy sovereign Empire [...] shines in the whole universe more resplendent than the sun and let it be known to thy

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1989), pp. 415–428. Cf. more in: Sreten Petković, *Srpski svetitelji u slikarstvu pravoslavnih naroda* (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 2007), passim.

⁹⁹ Sreten Petković, “Ilustracija života despota Stefana Lazarevića u ruskom rukopisu XVI veka”, *Zbornik za likovne umetnosti*, vol. 18 (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1982), pp. 53–69.

¹⁰⁰ Gordana Tošić & Milutin Tadić, *Hilandarski monah Lazar. Prvi srpski časovničar* (Kragujevac: Kalenić, 2004).

Lordship, o pious Tsar, that all the empires of the Orthodox Christian faith have converged into Thine one Empire [...] Thou art the sole Emperor of the All Christians in the whole universe [...] For two Romes have fallen, the Third stands, and there will be no fourth.” The ecumenical leadership of Moscow in the Christian Orthodox world, including Constantinople and the whole of Balkans, was announced under Tsar Ivan IV, who was “everywhere under the vault of heaven the one Christian Tsar, mounted on the holy throne of God of the holy apostolic Church, in place of the Roman and Constantinopolitan [thrones] in the God-saved city of Moscow”. Due to certain dichotomy between state and church in Imperial Russia, the emperors “never deployed the ‘Third Rome’ argument into their diplomatic armoury: it remained a powerful cultural and religious motif latent in their claim for imperial domination.”¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, even before the Metropolitan in Moscow was elevated to the rank of patriarch and the Patriarchate of Moscow officially established in 1589, the Christian Orthodox Russia had had the sole independent Christian Orthodox Church in the world. On account of its wealth, power and influence it was considered a legitimate successor of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, “the Great Church in [Ottoman] captivity”, which, despite nominally being an Ecumenical patriarchate, was committed to the interests of Greeks and gradually evolved into the Greek national church.¹⁰² Perceived as the the “Third Rome” by Christian Orthodox Slavs in general, and Serbs in particular, the Russian Empire soon became the only source of potential financial and spiritual support for the Christian Orthodox Serbs who found themselves under the foreign rule in the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire and under the dominion of Venice in the Adriatic Littoral.¹⁰³

For the next three centuries, Imperial Russia provided crucial support for funding, restoration and preservation for most of the Serbian

¹⁰¹ Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia. People and Empire, 1552–1917* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997), pp. 6–8, 57.

¹⁰² Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chapters: “The Church under the Ottoman” and “Constantinople and Moscow”.

¹⁰³ Cf. also: Dimitri Strémoukhoff, “Moscow the Third Rome: sources of the Doctrine”, in: *The Structure of Russian History. Interpretative Essays*, pp. 108–125.

Christian churches, monastic brotherhoods, and various endangered bishoprics in the Balkans which were faced with Islamic destruction, Roman Catholic proselytism (i. e. the forced conversion of the Christian Orthodox believers to Roman Catholic rite), pillaging and forced resettlement during the frequent Austro-Ottoman wars. From 1509 onwards, Teofan, the Christian Orthodox Metropolitan of Belgrade, pleaded Russian prince, Basil III Ivanovich, for financial assistance: he stressed that “because of our sins, our Lord has handed the Serbian kingship into foreign hands” and that there is no one left to aid the impoverished and dilapidated Serbian monasteries after “Serbian Despots went to God”. Similar complaints and requests for financial backing came from dozens of Serbian monasteries throughout the Balkans, while several Serbian abbots, such as Fr. Zaharije from the Papraća monastery. Coming from “Serbian land in the area of Bosnia”, as he presented himself, Fr. Zaharije visited Moscow in the late sixteenth century in order to plead for financial aid and liturgical books and church-related materials. The example of the Papraća monastery, the abbots of which continued to visit Russia on a regular basis during the next three centuries (the first in 1585 while the last of their visits to Moscow was in 1906), clearly showed how vital the support of the Patriarchate of Moscow and various Russian rulers was for the very survival of the Serbian Christian shrines. The cult of Russia as the only friendly and protective power of both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian people—the two were equalized by the Patriarchate of Peć during the Ottoman rule—was persistently nourished by Serbian monks, priests and bishops during several centuries, and it acquired in the course of time rather mythical proportions.¹⁰⁴

The restoration of the Serbian Orthodox Church under the name of the Patriarchate of Peć in 1557 marked the renewing of ties with Moscow and the intensification of relations with the Russian Church, with vital support from the Russian rulers, the masters of the “third Rome”. The first Serbian patriarch who sent an official delegation to Moscow was Gerasim Sokolović (1775–1586). In 1585, patriarch Gerasim sent Metropolitan Visarion of Kratovo to ask for financial aid for the monastery of Osogovo

¹⁰⁴ Cf. also Miroslav Jovanović, *Srbi i Rusi, 12–21. vek* (Belgrade: Narodna biblioteka, 2012), passim; additional documentation in: *Srbi o Rusiji i Rusima. Od Elizavete Petrovne do Vladimira Putina, 1750–2010* (Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, Teološki institut & Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011).

(*Osogovski manastir*). Patriarch Pajsije Janjevac (1614–1647) in particular, pleaded for help and regular subsidies to Serbian monasteries. The first of the Romanovs, Mikhail Fedorovich, confirmed the status of *podvorje* to the monastery of Hilandar in 1624, while Abbot Mardarije went to the Russian capital in 1638. Although under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Hilandar at the Mount Athos was the oldest, the richest and the most prestigious amongst Serbian medieval monasteries, and played a pivotal role in maintaining Serbian medieval traditions. Other Serbian monasteries, such as Studenica and Mileševa in Serbia, Piva in Herzegovina, Hopovo in Srem or Pakra in Slavonia frequently sent their representatives to Moscow, as well as to many Russian monasteries. Regular contacts with Russia were established by many other Serbian monasteries, such as Krušedol, Bešenevo and Beočin on Fruška Gora in Srem, and Tronoša in Western Serbia as well. The high patronage of Russian rulers was, however, the main precondition for regular financial subsidies to Serbian churches and monasteries in both the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire. Serbian Metropolitan Simeon of Skoplje pleaded the Russian emperor to issue a charter with golden seal for the Serbian church at the Peć monastery which would be addressed to patriarch Pajsije Janjevac. The Russian Tzar accepted this request and in 1641 issued a solemn, Byzantian-style, imperial charter with a golden seal, which raised high prestige and standing of the main monastery of the Patriarchate and its head.¹⁰⁵

Apart from patriarch Pajsije Janjevac, it was patriarch Gavrilo Rajić (1648–1655) who maintained the closest relations with Russia. Patriarch Gavrilo's emissaries were sent to Moscow on several occasions, while he himself visited the Russian capital in 1655–1656. Solemnly received by Emperor Alexei Mikhailovich, the father of Peter the Great, and patriarch Nikon, Serbian patriarch Gavrilo wanted to remain in Moscow and leave the throne of Saint Sava in Peć. However, upon his return to the Ottoman Empire in 1656, patriarch Gavrilo was arrested and executed for the alleged plotting with the Russians against the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Close ties with Russia and her Church had already been established in the seventeenth century, and the Ottoman authorities considered them to have been not only religious, but also politically

¹⁰⁵ Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve* (Belgrade: Beogradski grafički izdavački zavod, 1991), pp. 374–380.

motivated—the frequent rebellions of the Serbian Christian *reaya* against the sultan's rule were seen as evidence for such assumption. In order to avoid persecution, or help Russia build new religious strongholds in the Balkans, several metropolitans and bishops decided to remain in Russia and accept high positions within the Patriarchate of Moscow.

Russian assistance to Serbian monasteries and churches acquired further importance after 1622 when *Congregatio de propaganda fidae* intensified its efforts to convert Serb Orthodox Christians into Roman Catholic rite (either full conversion to Catholicism or simple recognition of Pope's supremacy), particularly in the western-most Serb-inhabited areas such as Croatia, the Military Frontier and Slavonia with their most important monasteries Lepavina, Marča, Komagovina, and Gomirje. After the revolts of Christian Orthodox Serbs against the attempts at forced conversion to Roman Catholicism had been suppressed in 1672, many delegations from these monasteries were sent to Russia in order to ask for assistance and permission to collect donations throughout Russia. They not just obtained liturgical books, but were also authorised to collect donations every seventh year for their monastic brotherhoods. Some of them were financially supported by Russian metropolitans, bishops, or even empresses, as was the case with Elisabeth Petrovna, the daughter of Peter the Great.

Apart from regular donations which proved vital for the very survival of the Serbian Orthodox Church, particularly after the Patriarchate of Peć had been abolished in 1776, some Serb noblemen went to Russia to spark the interest of Russian rulers in the liberation of the Christian Orthodox population in the Balkans from the Ottoman yoke. Serb delegations such as that led by George Branković, a descendant of the last despots from the late seventeenth century, asked the Russian emperor to organize a kind of a crusade to liberate the subjugated Serb Christians in the Balkans. The emissaries of patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević warned the Russian court of mass destruction of Serbian churches by the Islamic forces of the sultan during the Austro-Ottoman wars. This was followed by the attempts of Roman Catholic *visitators* to convert Orthodox Christian churches into Roman Catholic ones. Arsenije III invited the Russian emperors to send their troops to fight against the Ottomans on the Danube where Serbs, Bulgarians and Moldavians would join them and pave the way for

Russians to Constantinople.¹⁰⁶ The Russian response was encouraging though not concrete: the Serbs and other Balkan Orthodox Christians were promised the continuation of Russian struggle for the unity of the Christian Orthodox faith.¹⁰⁷ On the other side, the Russians valued the information coming from Serbian emissaries on the political situation in both the Ottoman and the Habsburg empire, and they employed various Serbian immigrants as their own intelligence agents in the Balkans (for example, Mihailo Miloradović or Sava Vladislavić Raguzinski). The Serbs were counted on in Russia's larger plans after Peter the Great had decided to build a powerful empire that would stretch from the Baltics to the Black sea and spread southwards at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁸

Different Serb emissaries in Moscow, from church dignitaries to military officers from the Habsburg Military Frontier, demanded from the Russian emperor, Peter the Great, to take Serbs under his auspices and support their struggle for freedom, a venture impossible of attainment without Russian military assistance. From the early eighteenth century all Serbian plans for liberation from the Ottomans were focused exclusively on Russia as the sole Slav and Orthodox empire, and not on the Habsburgs: "Between 1704 and 1710 alone at least four Serbian leaders journeyed to Moscow to knit connections, solicit funds, and at least in one case to offer the service of the Serbs to 'their Orthodox Tsar [...] for in faith and tongue we have no other tsar than God in heaven and on earth the most orthodox tsar Peter.'"¹⁰⁹ This was the result of a bitter disappointment since all the Austro-Ottoman wars failed to benefit the cause of Serbian independence.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Aleksije Jelačić, *Rusija i Balkan. Pregled političkih i kulturnih veza Rusije i balkanskih zemalja 1866–1940* (Belgrade: Francusko-srpska knjižara A. M. Popovića, 1940), pp. 23–24.

¹⁰⁷ Gligor Stanojević, *Srbija u vreme Bečkog rata*, pp. 95–101.

¹⁰⁸ A very useful introduction in: Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism 1856–1870* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 3–15.

¹⁰⁹ B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 45.

¹¹⁰ The selected documents on Serbo-Russian relations from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century are published in *Moskva-Srbija, Beograd-Rusija. Društvene i političke veze, XVI–XVIII vek*, ed. Svetlana Dolgova et al. (Belgrade & Moscow: Arhiv Srbije & Glavnoe arhivnoe upravlenie goroda Moskvi, 2013).

In spite of the fact that Peter the Great abolished the Patriarchate of Moscow and took full control over the Russian Church, his appeal to the Balkan Orthodox Christians from 1711 was welcomed as a long awaited response of Imperial Russia to the repeated pleas of both religious and secular leaders of Christian Orthodox Serbs for military, or at least logistic, assistance to their ambitious plans for liberation from the Ottoman domination.

”Perhaps the most famous Serb in Peter’s Russia was the Herzegovinian Sava Vladislavić, whom Peter eventually honored with the title of Count Raguzinskii (that is, of Ragusa) for his distinguished services to the Russian Crown. It was probably he who framed Peter’s proclamation of 1711 to the Orthodox Slavs of Serbia, Slavonia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina which called upon them to join Russia against their common enemy—the infidel Turk.”¹¹¹

Despite Russia’s defeat in the 1711 war with the Ottomans, the Serbs including those from Dalmatia (bishop Simeon Končarević) and Montenegro (prince-bishops Danilo I and Vasilije Petrović-Njegoš) visited Moscow and obtained substantial financial support.¹¹² For the Serbs from Ottoman Serbia and the Habsburg Military Frontier, south Hungary, Dalmatia and Slavonia, the vital point of communication was the Russian legation in Vienna. Frequent Serbian pleas for subsidies, political advice, or immigration permissions to Russia were submitted on a regular basis.

War that Russia waged against the Ottomans in 1735–1739, and her territorial gains at the Black sea area raised hopes of Balkan Christians in general and the Serbs in particular. Empress Elisabeth was encouraged by her ambassador to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople to further support the Balkan Orthodox Christians:

“All the wretched Christians await liberation by Your Imperial Majesty. A Russian Army has but to appear suddenly on the Danube and in a short time it will be increased tenfold. Let it only carry weapons in reserve. Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slavonia, Dalmatia,

¹¹¹ Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism 1856–1870*, p. 9.

¹¹² *Crna Gora i Rusija, 1711–1917* (Cetinje: Narodni muzej Crne Gore, 1997), catalogue of an exhibition.

Montenegro, Albania, all Greece the islands and Constantinople itself will simultaneously take up the Cross and to the aid of Your Majesty.”¹¹³

The Empress Elisabeth, however, did not share optimism of her ambassador at the Ottoman capital, but, in return she permitted the settlement of experienced Serb military men and their families coming from Habsburg Empire. Two major migrations took place in the first half of the eighteenth century (1751–1753 and 1756–1757), when several thousands of Serbian soldiers from Habsburg Military Frontier, including dozens of distinguished higher officers (Jovan Horvat, Jovan Šević, Rajko Preradović, Jovan Čarnojević, Petar Tekelija and others), dissatisfied with the Habsburg policy, left for Russia in 1724, where they entered into *Serbian Hussar Regiment*, known since the time of Peter the Great.¹¹⁴ The settlement of the skilled Serbian soldiers and their families in imperial Russia was an entirely new phenomenon. In 1753, the second, larger group settled in the so-called New Serbia and Slaviano-Serbia, in present-day eastern Ukraine, between Lugansk and Bahmut which eventually became the province of Novorossia.¹¹⁵ The third wave of Serbian immigrants from Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro came in 1756–1759. The overall number of Serb immigrants reached roughly 10,000 people. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Serb settlers, that continued to settle into Novorossia and other areas under the reign of Catherine the Great, provided Russia with highly skilled military force, including twenty-five generals and seventeen colonels. The Serbian officers fought in many wars on the Russian side, and their successors in military service also participated in the numerous battles against Napoleon.¹¹⁶

The spiritual and political ties with Russia were additionally strengthened when a considerable number of teachers from Russia were sent to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia in the eighteenth century in order to fill the gap in primary and secondary education. Nine Serbian bishops,

¹¹³ Quoted in: Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism 1856–1870*, p. 11.

¹¹⁴ Aleksandar Forišković, *Tekelije. Vojničko plemstvo XVIII veka* (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1985), pp. 286–303.

¹¹⁵ Mita Kostić, “Srpska naselja u Rusiji. Nova Srbija i Slavjanosrbija”, *Srpski etnografski zbornik*, vol. XXVI (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1923), 135 p.

¹¹⁶ See more in: Nikola B. Popović, *Srbija i carska Rusija* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1994), pp. 16–23.

from Bosnia, Serbia and Slavic Macedonia, pleaded for help from Russia in anticipation of the abolishment of the Serbian patriarchate, but they did not receive any response. After the abolishment of Patriarchate of Peć in 1776, Greek prelates were given by Patriarchate of Constantinople most of the bishopric seats. It was then that the role of Russian educators became increasingly important; they maintained the regular use of the Russo-Slavonic language (the russified version of the Old Church Slavonic) in Serbian churches within the former territory of the Patriarchate of Peć.¹¹⁷

Serbian Rusophilia was further boosted with the 1774 Kuchuk Kainardji Treaty that gave to Imperial Russia the official right to spiritual protection the Orthodox Christian population in the Ottoman Empire. This provision was an important lever for the strengthening of Russian influence in the Balkans, and amongst the Serbs in particular. The policy of Catherine II and her ambitious plans for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire under the rule of her grandson arouse Serbian expectations, while various plans for the restoration of Serbian statehood made by Serbian church officials were secretly sent to the Russian court in St. Petersburg.

Catherine the Great, within her political designs, in particular regarding her "Greek Project" of 1782, was ready to sacrifice both Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Habsburgs, in order to achieve her main goal: to put her grandson on the renewed throne of Byzantium. Thus, the ethnic and religious ties of Russians and the Serbs, proved insufficient to the higher imperial ambitions. It was only during the reign of Emperor Alexander I that interest for Balkans Slavs, and in particular for the Serbs of Serbia, rebelled since 1804, was gradually revived. The pro-Russian feelings and high expectations were demonstrated during the Serbian Revolution (1804–1813). The tangible military cooperation between the insurgent Serbia and Russian troops on the Danube was established during the Napoleonic wars. It was after the outbreak of the new war between Russia and the Ottomans in 1807, that Emperor Alexander I provided Serbia with financial support, diplomatic recognition and additional troops for liberated Serbian towns.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ A. P. Bazhova, *Rusko-iūgoslaviānskie otnosheniā vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka* (RAN: Moskva, 1985); *Jugoslovenske zemlje i Rusija u XVIII veku*, Vasa Čubrilović, ed. (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986).

¹¹⁸ *Jugoslovenske zemlje i Rusija tokom Prvog srpskog ustanka, 1804–1813*, Vasa Čubrilović, ed. (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1983).

The Russian support lasted until the Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812. Despite admiration that admiral Chichagov the commander-in chief of the Russian armies on Danube has expressed for the Serbs ("This people is a treasure for us"), Serbia was abandoned: the Emperor Alexander I in his letter to Karageorge stressed the following: "Beloved brother, George Petrović, I exceedingly regret that Russia is now forced to leave Serbia... God grant that Russia may save itself and remain whole—it will not abandon Serbia".¹¹⁹

The provisions of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and the Ottomans regarding Serbian autonomy were eventually achieved in 1830—Principality of Serbia was recognized as an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire and guaranteed by Imperial Russia as the protective power. The decisive Russian support completed the creation of a myth of Russia as the sole friendly and protective power willing to support Serbia's aspirations for independence, the liberation of other Serb-inhabited provinces from Ottoman rule and their unification with Serbia.¹²⁰

Therefore, it was combined effects of ethnic proximity, cultural kinship, Slavic solidarity, common spiritual values shared through church tradition coupled with logistic or tangible support in the struggle for national liberation that in the eyes of most of the Christian Serbs made Russia become, as the older Slavic brother, the natural protector of Serbian religious and national interests and privileged political ally. The enduring cult of Russia has remained central amongst the predominantly Christian Orthodox, patriarchal Serb population dispersed throughout the Western and Central Balkans in the era of national revival from the early nineteenth century onwards. It is hardly surprising then that Russian support—although motivated primarily by imperial political designs regarding the Balkans, Straits and the Mediterranean—was often instrumental in Serbian political agenda, particularly during the international crises related to the Eastern Question.

¹¹⁹ Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism 1856–1870*, p. 14.

¹²⁰ Cf. more in: Nil A. Popov, *Srbija i Rusija. Od Kočine Krajine do Svetoandrejske skupštine*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1870).

SERBIA UNDER PRINCE MILOŠ OBRENOVIĆ: CONSOLIDATION VS. REVOLUTION

The Serbian question and the Congress of Vienna

The 1813 disaster and the fall of the insurgent Serbia discouraged most of its remaining notables. Karageorge escaped to the Habsburg Empire, in the Serb-inhabited Srem, and later found shelter in Imperial Russia. Nevertheless, in August 1814, the Committee of elders which had abandoned exiled Karageorge sent Prota Matija Nenadović to the Russian Emperor at the request of prominent notables from Serbia. Going after Emperor Alexander I, Nenadović arrived in Vienna in October 1814 at the time when the victorious anti-Napoleon coalition was deciding about the new territorial arrangements in Europe. This gathering of the leading statesmen presented an ideal opportunity to draw attention of European diplomacy to the Serbian question.

With the support of Serbian intellectuals from Vienna, Dimitrije Davidović and Dimitrije Frušić, the editors and publishers of the *Srpske Novine (Serbian Gazette)*, Nenadović embarked on a delicate diplomatic mission in European chancelleries to further Serbia's cause. The Count Capodistria, Russian assistant minister of foreign affairs, who had become acquainted with the Serbian question during General Chichagov's campaign on the Danube, proved instrumental in drafting the Serbian demands.¹ Serving at the Russian Embassy in Vienna, Capodistria prepared a

¹ At the meeting with Capodistria, Prota Matija Nenadović informed him that “the Serbian people were now in extreme peril and that the Turks were killing, hanging, impal-

note for the Russian Emperor in March 1812 which suggested that Serbia should have an autonomous status just like Wallachia and Moldavia. Under the strong impression of the sufferings of the re-conquered Serbia at the hands of the Ottomans, Capodistria even proposed to Alexander I in June 1813 to colonise the Serbians along the Dniester River and, in doing so, form something of a military border on the Habsburg pattern. It was due to Capodistria's sympathy and advice that Nenadović and his translators had the opportunity to get in touch with many influential diplomats.²

In January 1815, the Austrian Emperor promised Serbian envoys during their audience to intervene with the Sublime Porte in order to stop the prosecutions of Serbia's population. Prince Hardenberg, the state secretary for Prussia, told them to be patient and also promised an intervention to bring violence to an end. With a circular note of February 1815 Russia officially informed the participants of the Vienna Congress about the distressing situation in Serbia requesting a joint intervention of all the Powers. At the same time Russia broached the problem of the protection of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire which could serve her as a leverage to obtain a dominant position on the Bosphorus.³

Concerned with Russia's potential access to the Mediterranean which might re-open the Eastern question other Great Powers declined the Russian proposal for a diplomatic step in favour of Serbia—the turmoil in that country would lead to the outbreak of the Second Serbian rebellion in April 1815. The British Foreign Office, in particular, had no intention to spoil relations with Turkey on account of Serbia. Lord Castlereagh passed by a Serbian delegate without as much as looking at him, whereas his associates laconically professed that Serbia was too far away from England for them to intervene with the Ottomans on her

ing, enslaving, and plundering, so that they were forced to send me yet another time, the second and last, to entreat for mercy first from the Russian emperor as our protector and then from all the Christian rulers and allies." (Prota Matija Nenadović *The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenandović*, p. 196).

² Irina S. Dostian "Ruskaia politika v serbskom voprose i protojerej Matija Nenadović v period Venskoga kongresa (1814–1815 gg.)", in: *Prota Matija Nenadović i njegovo doba*, Radovan Samardžić, ed. Conférences scientifiques, vol. XXVI, Présidence, vol. 6 (Belgrade : Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 1985), pp. 128–147.

³ A wider perspective on the policy of the Great Powers in Vienna and after in Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored. Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822* (Boston Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

behalf. Napoleon's return from the island of Elbe to France nipped in the bud any interest in Serbia and the rapid close of the Congress put an end to any further work of the small Serbian delegation.⁴

Miloš Obrenović as a Serbian-type grand vizier: autocrat and diplomat

The successor of Karageorge Petrović, Prince Miloš Obrenović, was an astute local elder and a capable diplomat who in time became an Ottoman-type autocratic ruler. In contrast to the revolutionary ways of Karageorge, Prince Miloš adapted his national policy to the new political constellation in Europe shaped by the existence of the Holy Alliance based on the legitimist principles of Austrian Prince Metternich. Denouncing the revolutionary struggle of his predecessor, notwithstanding the brief second insurrection in 1815 that should more properly be seen as the second phase of the continuing Serbian revolution, Prince Miloš opted for the gradual acquisition of privileges with regard to Serbian autonomy. Aware of conservative reaction in Europe, Prince Miloš was careful not to jeopardise a hard-won self-government of Serbia. He even managed to broaden the scope of autonomy by bribing Ottoman *pashas* in Belgrade and Constantinople with the tacit diplomatic support from Russia.⁵

As soon as February 1816, Prince Miloš sent a special emissary to Saint-Petersburg to obtain Russian protection for the fragile self-government of the *pashalik* of Belgrade which had been granted by the Ottoman representative, Marashli Ali Pasha, in October 1815. In the same year, Prince Miloš appointed a special representative in Bucharest who established permanent contact with Russian diplomacy. At the request of Emperor Alexander I, Count Stroganoff, the Russian minister at Constantinople, used to broach the subject of an autonomous status guaranteed to the insurgent Serbia by the provisions of the 1812 Bucharest Treaty before the Sublime Porte. Weary of any kind of potential international guarantee for the status of Serbia, the Ottoman government bestowed a series

⁴ Prota Matija Nenadović *The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenandović*, pp. 196–213 (regarding consultations with the Russian diplomats in Vienna); on dealing with the Austrian emperor (*Ibid.*, pp. 213–223).

⁵ The latest biography of Prince Miloš is Vladimir Stojančević, *Miloš Obrenović i njegova doba* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1966). Cf. also: Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, vol. I (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 1976), pp. 82–120.

of privileges on the Serbs through special decrees (*firmans*) sent to the Ottoman vizier in Belgrade.⁶ These concessions never amounted to more than the Turks found inevitable under the given circumstances but they nevertheless constituted a step-by-step process of emancipation of Serbia from the Ottoman yoke.⁷

In contrast to Karageorge's policy which was seeking the logistic and political support of the neighbouring Habsburg Empire in the initial phase of the Serbian revolution, Prince Miloš was rather reluctant to accept any Austrian involvement in Serbian affairs. Being a Christian empire, the Habsburg Monarchy was perceived as a necessary counter-balance to Ottoman power, and Austrian military commanders and political leaders were considered as the important mediators in advocating Serbian demands before the Sublime Porte. However, the restoration of conservative order in Europe convinced Prince Miloš that the nascent Serbian autonomy might be seen as a danger to the ambitious plans of the Habsburg Empire in the Balkans and Near East. Fearing that Austria might benefit from the regional turmoil provoked by the Greek revolution of 1821, Miloš explained his policy of courting the Ottomans and leaning on Russia:

The Serbs who moved into the lands of the Habsburg Empire long time ago are deprived of all their privileges which they deserved from the former emperors for their precious blood, and they are now fiercely persecuted because of their faith. Apart from what I have just remarked, there is a lot of things which our people have to suffer from the wicked Austrian government, and when you consider all this I think you will agree with me that it is better for our people to endure the former tyrant [the Ottoman Sultan] than to come under the new one and be enslaved by the shackles that the Austrian court are preparing [for them]... Placing my trust in the promises of the sublime Russian monarch, I am free to say that in case the Austrian government sent its army in our lands under any excuse, we would come to an agreement with the Turks and together resist that wicked enemy of our genus.⁸

The Greek revolution of 1821 endangered the lives of the Serbian delegates sent to Constantinople to negotiate about the extension of au-

⁶ Mihailo Gavrilović, *Miloš Obrenović*, vol. I (1813–1820). (Belgrade: Izdanje Zadužbine Ilije M. Kolarca, 1908), pp. 249–250.

⁷ For more details see Mihailo Gavrilović, "Spoljašnja politika Srbije u XIX veku", *Iz nove srpske istorije* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1926), pp. 33–35.

⁸ Vladimir Ćorović, *Velika Srbija* (Belgrade: Narodno delo, 1924), p. 41.

tonomy to the additional six districts of Serbia. Sultan Mahmud II put them in jail fearing that Prince Miloš might join forces with the Greek insurgents. Under Russian pressure, the Serbian Prince eventually declined to support the Greek insurrection: after heavy losses sustained during the 1804–1813 fighting Serbia had neither men nor money to spare. In 1817, Prince Miloš organized the assassination of Karageorge, the founder of modern Serbia and his former commander, in order to appease the Ottoman government.

After secretly returning from Russia—in agreement with the Greek clandestine society *Philiki Hetairia* and Constantine Ypsilanti, Prince of Wallachia—Karageorge intended to foment a new insurrection against the Ottomans in Serbia. This renewed revolution would soon evolve into a joint and coordinated anti-Ottoman military action of Greeks and Serbs throughout the Balkans, from the lower Danube to the south of the Greek mainland. The backing of the Greek revolutionaries for Karageorge was more than offset by the lack of tangible Russian support. The death of Karageorge was perceived throughout the Balkans not only as the death of a genuine Balkan hero, a role-model for other national and military leaders, but also as a great setback for the cause of a wider Balkan insurrection against the Ottoman domination.

Prince Miloš was often accused of betraying the Serbian cause for his own ends that is to say for the sake of retaining supreme power. Indeed, he suppressed every attempt to challenge his unrestricted rule. After having sent the head of the decapitated Karageorge to the Sultan in Constantinople, Prince Miloš not just secured his undisputed autocratic power in Serbia, but also inspired confidence at the Sublime Porte that he was acting as a vigilant servant of Ottoman interests in the troublesome Balkans.⁹

During the 1820s, Prince Miloš was reluctant to engage in open military conflict against the Ottomans for both internal and external policy reasons. Aware of the attitude of Great Powers, he thought that any revolutionary movement or insurrection would be detrimental for Serbia, which was still too politically vulnerable and internally fragile to take the lead in a new large-scale Christian uprising in the Balkans. Cautious, cunning and very pragmatic Prince Miloš expected that the Ottoman power

⁹ Jovan A. Kumanudi, *Srbija i Grčka u XIX veku. Odnosi Karadjordjevi i Miloševi s Grcima 1804–1821* (Belgrade: Dositije Obradović, 1907), p. 47.

would in time diminish on its own to such extent as to enable him to extend his personal influence over the neighbouring Serb-inhabited Ottoman provinces.

In addition, a number of Ottoman garrisons located in the fortresses throughout the Serbian *pashalik* were a further obstacle to any kind of large-scale military action on the part of Serbians. The Serbs from other provinces and Bulgarians could not undertake a major military campaign either. Apart from the lack of ammunition and artillery, Prince Miloš could not embark on a risky military adventure without the strong political backing from the Great Powers, and Russia in particular.

Reluctant to endanger his rule within the autonomous Serbia, Prince Miloš rejected all the calls to join forces with Greek insurgents: a Greek emissary carrying the draft convention of Greek-Serbian military and political cooperation, sent by Alexander Ypsilanti in 1821, was seized by the Ottomans, which was another hindrance to any logistic support from the Serbian side. Considered as the main obstacle to the common Greek-Serbian struggle against the Ottomans, Prince Miloš was highly unpopular among the Greeks. Furthermore, Russia requested from him not to interfere with her war against the Ottomans in 1829, and he promised to settle for the autonomy envisaged by the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest.¹⁰

With Russia's support and avoiding further armed conflicts with the Sultan's troops, Serbia became a vassal principality within the Ottoman Empire in 1830, after the cessation of the Russo-Ottoman war. By the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), Russia became the protector of the Christian population in the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), as well as a right to proceed with the establishment of Serbian autonomy. Russian diplomatic efforts forced the Sublime Porte to fulfil, through the announcement of special decrees signed by the Sultan (*hatt-i-sharifs*), its obligations towards Serbia as stipulated by the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 and confirmed by the Convention of Akkerman of 1826. Three *hatt-i-sharifs* (1829, 1830 and 1833) granted to Serbia resulted in an internationally recognized autonomy, with Russia as the protective power. Serbia was now a semi-independent tributary Principality within the Ottoman Empire. The annual tribute to the Sublime Porte fixed by the 1833

¹⁰ Vladimir Stojančević, "Knez-Miloševa shvatanja srpsko-grčke saradnje protiv Otmanskog carstva", in: *Cooperation between Serbs and Greeks during their Liberation Movement 1804–1830* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979), pp. 89–100.

hatt-i-sharif at 2,300,000 piasters, provided Prince Miloš with financial advantages—the value of Ottoman piasters was constantly declining.¹¹

Prior to the first *hatt-i-sharif* on autonomy in 1830, Miloš Obrenović was recognized by the Sublime Porte as the hereditary prince of Serbia—a special *berat* to that effect was issued in Constantinople. The Serbian Prince mostly obtained his hereditary princely rule by heavily bribing Ottoman *pashas*.¹² In fact, Miloš's absolute rule in Serbia confirmed by the decision of the National Assembly in 1817 was just formally sanctioned by the Ottomans. The assembly of notables elected him hereditary prince once again in 1827 in the wake of the Akkerman Convention.¹³

The establishment of state institutions in the framework of autonomy was uncompleted without an autocephalous status for the Christian Orthodox Church with Serbian metropolitan at its head. The new status was recognised by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1832.¹⁴ In 1833, while the Ottomans were absorbed by the crisis in Egypt, the Serbian Prince managed to include through a mixture of secretly incited local revolts and diplomatic manoeuvres the additional six districts, outside the *pashalik* of Belgrade but formerly part of the territory controlled by Karageorge's insurgents, in the scope of autonomous Serbia. Thus, the territory of the Principality of Serbia expanded from 25,000 in 1815 to 37,841 square kilometres in 1833—it was slightly larger than that of the independent Kingdom of Belgium established in the same period.¹⁵ The incorporation of six additional districts in Serbia in 1833 was a major and

¹¹ Mihailo Gavrilović, *Miloš Obrenović*, vol. III (1827–1835), (Belgrade: Zadužbina Ilije Kolarca, 1912), pp. 156–150; Radoš Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija 1830–1839* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986), pp. 5–20.

¹² Bribery was instrumental for Miloš in obtaining the status of a hereditary ruler. He also promised to pay a tribute roughly amounting to 300,000 piastres or 70,000 golden francs. Cf. Georges Castellan, *La Serbie d'autrefois. Aux origines de la Serbie moderne* (Paris: Armeline, 2005), pp. 31–32.

¹³ Grgur Jakšić & Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1937), pp. 34–35.

¹⁴ Jean Mousset *La Serbie et son Église (1830–1914)* (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1938), pp. 60–66.

¹⁵ Dušan T. Bataković (ed.), *Histoire du peuple serbe* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2005), p. 191. Cf. also Holm Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik Serbiens 1834–1914. Mit europäischen Vergleichsdaten* (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1989).

the last success of Prince Miloš in his foreign policy. Despite the growing opposition among notables, he was at the peak of his power.

Miloš's Serbia was restored in the territory of the mid-fifteenth century Serbian Despotate under the last rulers of the Branković dynasty. It was quite small in comparison with the core areas of medieval Serbia that stretched from Belgrade to Skoplje (Skopje), including Kosovo, Metohija, Zeta and the whole of Old Rascia, with the towns of Niš, Novi Bazar, Pirot, Priština, Prizren, Skoplje and Veles. The restored Serbia was "not in the centre of the historical lands of the medieval monarchy but on one of its newer fringes, particularly in terms of population. This was a region affected by a long period of dislocation and turmoil, characterized by extreme mobility of settlements; its inhabitants had come from all sides in the course of eighteenth century".¹⁶ Indeed, the most part of central Serbia (*Šumadija*), which had been depopulated due to the frequent Austro-Ottoman wars, particularly during the eighteenth century, was fully covered with forest and gradually inhabited by highlanders from Herzegovina and Montenegro as well as settlers from eastern Bosnia, Kosovo and Old Rascia (the former *sanjak* of Novi Bazar).

At the same time, the Muslim population started leaving Serbia after the abolition of Ottoman feudalism in accordance with the clauses of the *hatti-i-sharifs*. Ottoman presence was soon limited only to military garrisons in six strategically important fortresses on the Serbian borders, among which Belgrade was the most prominent. The main social achievement of Prince Miloš was the establishment of legal foundation for a society comprised of free peasants in 1835, a goal that had already been set and partially fulfilled under Karageorge. A free and egalitarian peasant society, without landed aristocracy and with an autonomous Serbian administration, made the Principality of Serbia during the following decades the most attractive destination for Serb rural immigrants—as it had been the case in the eighteenth century. Those were escaping from the increasing feudal abuse of local Muslim beys and Muslim Albanian *pashas* or numerous Albanian outlaws as well as the widespread poverty in the bordering Ottoman-held regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Old Serbia (including the *sanjaks* of Novi Bazar, and Niš, Kosovo, Metohija (the *vilayet* of Priz-

¹⁶ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia. The History behind a Name* (London: Hurst & Co, 2002), p. 38

ren), Skoplje (Uskub), the Veles area and several areas of the Slav-inhabited Macedonia further in the south).

During the years of hunger, Petar I and Petar II Petrović-Njegoš, the Montenegrin Prince-Bishops from Cetinje, asked Prince Miloš to receive new settlers from the rocky highlands of Montenegro.¹⁷ Every immigrant family settled in autonomous Serbia became the owner of a piece of land under forest that was eventually turned into arable land. During the first reign of Prince Miloš (1815–1839), the Serbian population tripled, and the first census of 1834 recorded 678,000 inhabitants—an average household had 6,47 members and 17,9 inhabitants lived on a square kilometres of territory. Just twelve years later, in 1846, the number of Serbian citizens rose to 915,080 out of which only six percent were urban residents.¹⁸

Foreign policy goals

During the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the official representative of Serbia, *Prota* Matija Nenadović, was seeking for assistance to restore Serbian autonomy but he could not achieve much at the time when Great Powers endeavoured to come to terms with the Ottomans. Besides, Prince Miloš was rather weak during the first decade of his rule to conduct an active, semi-independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, relying heavily on bribery of the highest state officials in the Ottoman capital, he extracted many political and economic concessions. His official delegations to the Sublime Porte were relentless in demanding, often through Russian mediation, further privileges regarding the scope of self-government in Serbia.

It was not before 1837 when he came into open conflict with an influential group of notables that demanded the limitation of his absolute power that Prince Miloš tried to conduct foreign policy independently of Russia. Being the only international guarantor of Serbia's autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, Russia did have a tendency to treat the Principality as one of its own provinces. It seemed more difficult to change the Russian consul in Serbia (Gerasim Vaščenko [Vashchenko] was the first one appointed in 1838) than the Serbian Prince: Russian consul "sometimes deliberated in the *Sovjet* and always went through its decisions"; he

¹⁷ Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, *Crnogorsko-srbijanska saradnja 1830–1851* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1951).

¹⁸ D. T. Bataković (ed.), *Histoire du peuple serbe*, pp. 179, 191.

also “paid close attention not just to what passed between various parties in Serbia which themselves reported to him on anything of interest but also to what was going on in Wallachia and the Turkish [Ottoman] and Austrian conterminous provinces.”¹⁹

Political horizons of the Serbian Prince were considerably widened after his official visit to Constantinople in 1835 on which occasion he met the highest-ranking Ottoman officials as well as the representatives of Great Powers which allowed him to learn more about their policies in the Balkans. Sultan Mahmud II received Prince Miloš in a solemn ceremony on 28 August, while the meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarch Constantine and the Patriarch of Jerusalem presented a rare opportunity to discuss religious and political affairs in the Eastern Orthodox Church. The consultations with the Russian Ambassador Buteniev and Austrian *internuncio*, Freiherr von Stürmer, were also of utmost importance. After attending the Russian Ambassador’s reception in honour of Earl of Durham, the newly-nominated British Ambassador in Saint-Petersburg, the Serbian Prince became better acquainted with major topics of European politics and the complicated power relations brought about by the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

Prince Miloš realised in Constantinople that it was in Serbia’s best interest to extract herself from the bilateral framework of Russo-Ottoman relations which had decisive impact on the internal development of the country and place the Serbian question before the concert of Great Powers. It was not long before Russian diplomacy took a dim view of such attitude on the part of Prince. Miloš used to say later: “Since my trip to Constantinople Russia has been my enemy!” He was particularly resentful of Baron Rückmann, Russian General-Consul in Wallachia and Moldavia. The latter was sarcastic about the provisions of the Serbian Constitution and he refused to discuss the Serbian coat of arms, flag and the significance of a hereditary princely title in the Obrenović family. Prince Miloš quickly came to conclusion that Russia was prone not just to restrain his personal rule, but also to use Serbia for her own political plans regarding the Ottoman Empire.²⁰

¹⁹ More details in: Nil Popov, *Srbija i Rusija od Kočine Krajine do Sv. Andrejske Skupštine* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1870).

²⁰ Mihailo Gavrilović, “Počeci diplomatskih odnosa Velike Britanije i Srbije”, in: *Iz nove srpske istorije*, p. 110.

Miloš was equally disinclined to see an Austrian consulate in Belgrade as the first diplomatic representation of a Great Power in Serbia. The Prince tried to discourage Freiherr von Stürmer from opening a consulate by pointing out that such a precedent would lead to the opening of other consulates, most notably those of Britain and France, which, in turn, would facilitate the spreading of democratic and revolutionary ideas among the Serbian people. Austria insisted on her consulate as being, along with Russia, the most interested Power in the status and development of Serbia, but failed to prevent the opening of other consulates through her influence at the Sublime Porte. Russia parried the arrival of the first Austrian consul in Belgrade in 1836 by the establishment of her own consulate in Orsova, in Wallachia—this measure was considered a counterweight to potential spread of Austrian influence in Serbia. Eventually, all interested Powers opened their consulates in Belgrade (Great Britain in 1837, Russia in 1838 and France in 1839). Despite being mistrustful as an old Ottoman *pasha* and concerned about the rivalling interest of different Powers, Prince Miloš gained additional experience in foreign affairs, discussing all the major issues regarding the status and political prospects of Serbia with foreign representatives.

The national goals of Serbian Prince, as the French travellers Count Adolphe de Caramen (in 1829) and Boislecomte (in 1834) described them, were almost the same as those of Karageorge relying on a mixture of historical rights and modern, natural principles, with consideration regarding the predominant influence of three major powers in the Balkans.²¹ After all, Prince Miloš could not have much different ideas than those shared by all leaders from the age of Karageorge as well as the enlightened Serb elite which moved to Serbia from the Habsburg Empire before and after 1815. Serbia's unwavering long-term objective was to restore the Serbian Empire through unification of Serbia with the predominantly Serb-inhabited Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which, apart from certain regions, were not included in the medieval Stefan Dušan's Empire) and the Muslim Albanian-controlled Old Serbia (Kosovo, Metohija, Skoplje, Veles and Tetovo area, the *sanjak* of Novi Bazar, i.e. Old Rascia). On

²¹ Reports of Boislecomte: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (M.A.E.), Paris, Correspondance d'Orient, 1833–1834, t. 22, Boislecomte à Rigny, Belgrade, le 4 Juin 1834; Belgrade, le 5 juin 1834, N^o 97; Belgrade, le 6 juin 1834, N^o 98 (Conversation avec le Prince Milosch et indication de son système et de ses opinions politiques).

some occasions, Prince Miloš referred to unification with Montenegro and the northern parts of Slavic-inhabited Macedonia as well.²²

Apart from Principality of Serbia, there were roughly half a million Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina—a province detached from Rumelia (Turkey-in-Europe) with its separate provincial administration—which constituted forty-eight percent of the overall population. The Serbs were mixed with Muslim Slavs (*Bošnjaci*), often of Serbian origin, and Catholic Slavs, who would be identified as Croats in the decades to come. With more than 100,000 Serbs in Montenegro, renown for being valiant soldiers and genuine Serb patriots, there were hundreds of thousands of Serbs living in Rumelia, particularly in Old Serbia and Slavic Macedonia. They were mixed with Islamized Slavs in Old Rascia, Muslim Albanians in Metohija and Kosovo, and the Ottoman Turks, Christian Orthodox Slavs (still lacking national identity), Hellenized Vlachs (Tzintzars), Greeks, Bulgars and others in Macedonia.²³

The Serbs were spread across various provinces of the Habsburg Empire. In Banat, Bačka and Srem (these three provinces constitute nowadays Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina), there were roughly 300,000 Christian Orthodox Serbs living together with the Germans, Magyars, Vlachs and other minorities. Following the 1848 revolution the Serbs from these parts were the bearers of modern national idea and economic progress. In addition, they provided the first European-educated bureaucrats who entered into the service of the semi-Oriental Principality of Serbia and considerably contributed to its gradual modernization.²⁴ The Serbs from the Military Frontier—approximately 300,000—also had a very strong sense of national identity.²⁵

²² Serbian translation of Boislecomte reports in: Stojan Novaković, "Pisma grofa Boale-Konta de Rinju, ministru inostranih dela u Parizu o tadašnjem stanju u Srbiji", *Spo-menik*, vol. XXIV (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1894), pp. 39–41; Radoš Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*, p. 384.

²³ For an elaborate discussion of migrations and settlements see Jovan Cvijić, *La péninsule balkanique. La géographie humaine* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1918).

²⁴ Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, vol. I., pp. 167–204.

²⁵ Konstantin V. Nikiforov, *Srbija sredinom XIX veka. Početak aktivnosti na ujedinjenju srpskih zemalja* (Pristina: Novi Svet, 1995), p. 19. (Serbian translation of the Russian original: Nikiforov, K. V. *Srbija v seredine XIX v. Nachalo deiatel'nosti po ob'edineniu serb. zemel'*, (Moskva: RAN, 1995).

Another 150,000 Serbs were settled in Croatia-Slavonia province under Hungarian rule. Some 80,000 Serbs in Dalmatia (roughly one-fifth of the overall population) had their own Serb bishop under Napoleon's rule. In the following decades (from 1830s onwards), they were reinforced with another 100,000 urban Serbs of Roman Catholic faith spread from central Dalmatia to Dubrovnik, who embraced Serbian national identity. The most prominent among them were the Roman Catholic Serbs from Dubrovnik, often descendants of genuine Ragusan nobility, such as Prince Medo Pucić, a scholar who published a series of Serbian medieval documents, or members of the distinguished families such as Matija Ban, who moved to Belgrade and became a political activist and prolific writer—his literature earned him a nickname “Serbian Shakespeare” in the 1840s.²⁶ Among the prominent members of the Ragusan nobility, was Antun Sorkočević-Sorgo (1793–1841), the last diplomatic representative of the independent Republic of Dubrovnik in Paris before it was abolished by Napoleon. Well-educated, cosmopolite and renowned scholar—a member of the *French Académie celtique*—he was a friend of many distinguished scholars and artists. Although he was deeply shaken by the disappearance of the Republic of Dubrovnik, Antun Sorkočević-Sorgo returned to Paris, after having been away for a long time, and published his important monograph, an homage, titled *Fragments sur l'histoire de littérature de l'ancienne République de Raguse et sur la langue slave* (Paris, 1839). Sorkočević-Sorgo strongly believed that it was necessary to establish a large Serb state consisting of Dubrovnik, the Bay of Cattaro, Montenegro and Serbia, in the area which shared common ethnic origin and political aspirations to freedom regardless of religious differences—although this proposal had already been rejected at the Vienna Congress of 1815.²⁷

The developing ties between the Serb intellectual elite in Srem, Bačka and Banat and their co-nationals in the Principality of Serbia across Sava and Danube were instrumental in forming the modern national identity of the entire Serb nation. It was in these areas, within the Romanticism movement, through literature, poetry and theatre plays that modern theories of Serbian unification was conceptualized: it offered an overall perspective on the idealized grandeur of Serbian history and its demands for the future of the whole Serbian nation.

²⁶ Lujo Bakotić, *Srbi u Dalmaciji, od pada Mletačke republike do ujedinjenja* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1939).

²⁷ Djordje Živanović, “Od Čartoriskog do Garašanina”, in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, V. Stojančević, ed (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1991), p. 58.

Prince Miloš's initial vision of the future of the Balkans was predicated on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would soon dissolve:

It should once and for good be done with the disintegrating [Ottoman] Empire and let all the nations, who lost their nationality [...] enjoy the life they are entitled to. We should be allowed to liberate ourselves from the Turks [...] The Serbs, Greeks, Albanians and Bulgarians should obtain [the right] to rule the countries they inhabit, and transform Constantinople into a large commercial city under the guarantees of the Great Powers [...] Why submit one nation to [the rule of] another one? It is against the natural order, and nature itself never ceases to demand its rights. As for the partition of [Ottoman] Turkey between the [Great] Powers, the malice would not diminish but get worse and provoke further endless difficulties. As far as I am concerned, I solemnly declare that I cannot, in my life, stand to see my nation fall under [the rule of] another nation by partition. What we really want is independence.²⁸

Furthermore, Prince Miloš often incited local Serbian leaders in the neighbouring areas to start anti-Ottoman uprisings ("thus to liberate yourselves from the [Ottoman] Turkish oppression and unite with us, Serbia, so that we renew the Serbian Kingdom that was destroyed at Kosovo"), but he never provided overt political or military support to a series of local Christian rebellions outside Serbia until the end of his first reign in 1839.²⁹ Nevertheless, he was a useful and often successful mediator in difficult negotiations between the Sublime Porte, the powerful local *pashas* and the rebelled Christian Serbs who rose against the local Ottoman authorities and the growing pressure on agrarian population in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Prince Miloš was popular among Christian Orthodox Serbs in eastern Bosnia and southern Serbia in particular.³⁰

Neither a visionary nor a revolutionary, Prince Miloš constantly encouraged immigration into Serbia from all the neighbouring provinces, from Bosnia to Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia.³¹ At the same time, acting as a protector of the endangered historical heritage and Serb com-

²⁸ Stojan Novaković, "Pisma grofa Boa-le-Konta de Rinji-u, ministru inostranih dela u Parizu o tadašnjem stanju u Srbiji", p. 39.

²⁹ Momčilo Žeravčić, "Planovi kneza Miloša o Bosni, Hercegovini i Crnoj Gori", *Istorijski zapisi*, vol. XI (1-2), Titograd [Podgorica] 1955, pp. 371-377.

³⁰ Vladimir Stojančević, "Politički pogledi kneza Miloša na pitanje oslobodjenja balkanskih naroda od turske vlasti", *Istorijski časopis*, vol. IX-X (1959), pp. 345-362.

³¹ V. Stojachević, "Kosovsko-polimske migracije u Srbiju kneza Miloša" *Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SANU*, vol. 9-10 (1960-1961), pp. 179-198.

munities outside Principality of Serbia, Prince Miloš always responded to numerous appeals to financially support their schools, churches and monasteries. He contributed to the renovation of famous medieval monasteries in Ottoman-controlled regions such as Visoki Dečani in Metohija, Gračanica in Kosovo, Serb monastic communities in Prohor Pčinjski in southern Serbia, Jovan Bigorski in Western Macedonia and Chilandar (*Hilandar*), the twelfth-century endowment of the founder of the Nemanjić dynasty in Mount Athos in Greece.³²

Prince Miloš, just like Karageorge, kept a watchful eye on the prospects for the dissolution of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the consequent expansion of Serbia at the expense of the former Ottoman provinces. However, following the policy of Karageorge, Miloš was fully aware of the utmost importance of the South Slav, i.e. “Illyrian” framework for the ultimate resolution of the Serbian national question. A close associate of the Serbian Prince confided to a foreign diplomat that Miloš had been secretly planning to unite Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Herzegovina, Uskokija [Dalmatian Krajina?], Banat, the Slovenes [Slovenia?], Illyria [Croatia?], Dalmatia, Montenegro and the Albanian mountains into a large Serbia-led South Slav Empire.

At that time, the names like Dalmatia, Croatia or Bulgaria were still geographical terms or distant historical memories; apart from the Christian Orthodox Serbs, there were no other profiled national identities among the predominantly Slav population in the Western Balkans.³³ Nevertheless, despite his success in imposing himself as a defender of Christian Orthodox *reaya*, and Serbian people in the neighbouring Ottoman provinces south of the Serbian border in particular, Prince Miloš was not able to translate his ambitious plans into a viable political doctrine owing to internal and external constraints.

***Internal problems and foreign support:
Great Britain vs. Imperial Russia***

In spite of often generous donations to different demanders for financial aid inside and outside Serbia, the patriarchal despotism of Prince Miloš was becoming increasingly unpopular. Several popular revolts broke out

³² Mita Petrović, *Financije i ustanove obnovljene Srbije do 1842*, vol. I. (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1898), pp. 901–906.

³³ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges* (Paris & La Haye: Mouton & Co, 1961).

as a reaction to the widespread abuse of Miloš's officials, high taxes that made the Serbian Prince one of the richest rulers in Europe, the continuing practice of corvée (*kuluk*) and unregulated legal status of common citizens and regional notables. It was not before having been cornered by the 1835 mass rebellion led by Mileta Radojković that Miloš agreed to promulgate a new constitution that would, apart from the above-mentioned questions, regulate the princely rule, fiscal policy and various aspects of the poorly organized and almost uncontrolled internal administration.

The 1835 Presentation Constitution (*Sretenjski Ustav*), drafted on the pattern of the French constitutional charter of 1814, with some provisions borrowed from the Swiss and Belgian constitutions, was written by Dimitrije Davidović, a liberal intellectual and the private secretary of Prince. It was solemnly proclaimed at the National Assembly in Kragujevac, in the presence of more than 4,000 cheering delegates and some 10,000 spectators. However, due to the reluctance of the Sublime Porte and strong opposition from Russia and Austria which considered this constitution too liberal for the Balkans and potentially revolutionary—a “French plant in Serbian woods”—it was abolished just a hundred days later.

The growing antagonism between Prince Miloš, who strove to preserve his absolute power, and influential notables with oligarchic pretensions, who endeavoured to use the provisions of a new constitution to constrain him, was tearing Serbia apart. The Russian emissaries to Serbia in 1836 (Baron Rückmann) and 1837 (Prince Dolgorukii) tried to force Prince Miloš to accept power-sharing with the notables within the framework of a new constitutional arrangement. The influential group of regional notables soon became known under the French term Constitutionnalists (*Ustavobranitelji*)—Defenders of the Constitution.

Both Russia and Turkey were in favour of the promulgation of a new constitution for Serbia. Facing major internal problems, including the rebellion under Mehmet Ali in Egypt, the Sublime Porte stood to benefit from the considerably weakened position of Serbian Prince. In December 1838, Sultan Mahmud II sided with Miloš's opponents and granted the fourth *hatt-i-sharif* to the Ottoman “province of Serbia” that became known as the “Turkish Constitution”. Used to unlimited power, Prince Miloš was completely shocked by its provisions. Apart from limiting the scope of Serbia's autonomy, the 1838 Constitution obliged Miloš to share

power with the Council consisting of seventeen members nominated for life and replaceable only with the authorization of Constantinople and the consent of Imperial Russia—that country remained to be a sole international guarantor of Serbia's autonomy.³⁴

Facing the growing Russian meddling in the Council and the diminishing of his own influence on both internal and foreign affairs, Prince Miloš started looking for support from Russia's rivals in the Balkans and Near East. Since Austria of Prince Metternich coordinated her efforts with the Russian Emperor, Nicholas I, to protect conservative order in Europe, Prince Miloš sought for the political backing of Great Britain, which became increasingly involved in the Eastern Question. Lord Palmerston strove "to increase British influence in Constantinople and reduce that of Russia. Finally he attempted to keep the centre of diplomatic activity and to devise a new European treaty to replace that of Hunkyar-Iskelesi [Unkiar-Iskelessi Treaty of 1833]."³⁵

It was a British diplomat and adventurer David Urquhart who established the first, and unofficial, contacts with Serbia: "Urquhart, who's extraordinary, megalomaniac character has been analysed in a thumbnail sketch by Sir Charles Webster, started by fighting for the Greeks but soon transferred his affection and interest to the [Ottoman] Turks." In the early 1830s, dynamic and flamboyant Urquhart was frequently travelling throughout the Balkans. Carrying out his semi-official mission for the Foreign Office, he visited Serbia in 1832 and 1833, and met several Serbian officials on these occasions. As soon as 1832, Urquhart underscored the pivotal role of Serbia in the Balkans:

I look upon it [Serbia], along with Greece, as the most important part of Turkey-in-Europe—its political independence, its present and future influence on the masses of Musselmen [Muslims], on its Western [i.e. Bosnia & Herzegovina] and Southern side [Kosovo, Slavic Macedonia] and on the masses of Rayas [*raya*, the Christian population], on its eastern and southern [side], its position between Hungary, Austria

³⁴ M. B. Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, vol. I, pp. 147–153; Radoš Ljušić, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

³⁵ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges*, p. 17.

and Turkey and on the Danube are the most important considerations combined with the spirit of the people and the riches of the soil.³⁶

During his second visit to Serbia, in November 1833, Urquhart had a long series of conversations with Prince Miloš in Kragujevac. They discussed political situation and geopolitical perspectives of Serbia and her future regional role. The Serbian Prince complained to Urquhart that Great Britain did not take any interest in the Serbian question referring to Lord Castlereagh's absence of interest at the Congress of Vienna in 1815—he allegedly said to the Serbian delegates led by Prota Matija Nenadović that Serbia was far away from England. Urquhart reported Miloš's ironical comment: "New Zealand is, I believe, much nearer to England than Servia". The long discussions with Miloš and his closest associates, Dimitrije Davidović and Avram Petronijević, the foreign policy advisor, presented an opportunity for Urquhart to familiarise himself with the complaints regarding Russian influence. Prince Miloš explained why he resolutely refused Russian support for the attainment of a hereditary title: he did not want to place such decision in the hands of an assembly of notables. He firmly believed he was right although the Russian representative called him a *carbonari* and something of a Balkan Bolivar. The Serbian Prince explained to Urquhart in detail his cautious policy during the Greek revolution and the subsequent Russo-Ottoman war: in retrospect, his policy was clearly more successful than that of "different Capodistrias" (an allusion to the former Russian assistant minister and foreign minister of Greek origin who eventually became the first president of the Greek republic) and he obtained a considerable level of independence from the Sublime Porte. At the same time Serbia was not riddled with internal political conflicts like Greece, or pressurised into submission by Great Powers as was the case with Egypt. Miloš also explained that he was not supportive of Bosnian and Albanian rebellions against the Sultan, led by conservative Muslim *beys*; on the contrary, he was instrumental in pro-

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21. Cf. also: David Urquhart, "A Fragment of History of Serbia. Introduction." in *Diplomatic Review*, Pamphlets by Mr. Urquhart (London: J. Maynard, 1843), p. IV. Biligual English-Serbian edition: David Urquhart, *A Fragment of the History of Serbia 1843* Branislav Vuković, ed. (Belgrade: Archives of Serbia, 1989), pp. 12–106 (in English). A recent analysis on Urquhart dealing with Serbia in: Jelena Paunović Štermenski, *Urkvartovo vidjenje međunarodnog položaja Srbije* (Belgrade: Akademska misao, 2007).

viding logistic assistance to the Ottomans in their suppression.³⁷ Prince Miloš never neglected his personal interests, but he was adamant that Serbia's autonomy was far from being a result of just another local uprising, but rather a part of a wider national mission. The main obstacle to the full accomplishment of that mission, Prince Miloš stressed, were Russian interests in the Balkans and the frequent anti-Christian revolts of the conservative Ottoman *pashas* in the bordering provinces, Bosnia and Albania in particular.³⁸

Explaining his proposals for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, Urquhart pointed out that he considered Serbia the main stronghold in the region and highlighted Prince Miloš's influence on the Christian Orthodox population in the neighbouring areas of Turkey-in-Europe, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina and Old Serbia which had already formed significant political and cultural bonds with the Principality of Serbia.³⁹

In addition, Urquhart proposed and almost convinced the Serbian Prince to import weapons from Britain through the seaport of Trieste, discussed the opportunities for the potential navigation on the Danube through Serbia and seemed to have gained confidence of the cunning and usually distrustful Prince Miloš, eager to establish closer political ties with London. The former was overwhelmed by "so intimate a degree of confidence in a stranger whose only recommendation was his being an Englishman and his being the first European stranger who had taken an interest in them (the Serbs)."⁴⁰ In his report to Lord Palmerston, Urquhart claimed that Serbia was exercising considerable influence on Turkey-in-Europe, and "elaborated this to his patron, Sir Herbert Taylor, William IV's private secretary, writing that Serbia was now withdrawn from Russian influence and deeply interested in supporting the supremacy of the Porte as

³⁷ Quoted in: Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I. (Belgrade: Prosveta 1989), pp. 224–225. More elaborated analysis in: M. Ekmečić, "Evropska pozadina Načertanija Ilije Garašanina 1844", *Dijalog prošlosti i sadašnjosti* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2002), pp. 95–135.

³⁸ Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I. p. 225.

³⁹ Cf. more in: Čedomilj Mijatović, "Knez Miloš i pukovnik Hodžes. Gradja za istoriju prve vladavine kneza Miloša", *Spomenik*, vol. XVIII (Beograde: Serbian Royal Academy, 1892), pp. 71–73.

⁴⁰ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges*, pp. 22–23.

being the best guarantee of its national individuality against both Russia and Austria”.⁴¹

It was in July 1836 that Baron Ponsonby, the British Minister in Constantinople, reported on Russian intrigues in Serbia and suggested the appointment of a British consul in the Serbian capital. Ponsonby was alarmed by the possibility of Russia's promoting disorder throughout Turkey-in-Europe. If the majority Christian Orthodox population revolted that could bring about Russia's intervention on their behalf in her capacity of the official protector of this religious group. It remains unclear whether Urquhart, who had the ear of both Ambassador Ponsonby and Lord Palmerston, was the first person to put forward the idea of a British consulate in Belgrade which would serve as a watching tower over Russian dealings in Turkey-in-Europe. Be that as it may, the first British consul in Serbia, Colonel Hodges, was appointed in January 1837. The British expected that Serbia would become a barrier to the growing Russian influence in the Balkans and facilitate the increase of British trade in the region.⁴²

Colonel Hodges was initially instructed by his Foreign Minister to concentrate on trade and business relations with Serbia and not to meddle directly in the internal policy of autonomous principality “unless called upon by the Prince to do so.”⁴³ However, his commercial mission soon turned into a political one. As soon as July 1837 Prince Miloš complained to Hodges about the aggressive Russian policy towards Serbia and asked for British support. Having assessed the overall situation in Serbia, the latter proposed to London to fully support the Prince in his struggle against Russian predominance in both internal and external policy. London was sympathetic to Miloš, despite his autocratic credentials, because of his firm stance against local oligarchs (“Boyards of Serbia”) who were completely swayed by Russian representatives. Miloš's opponents from the ranks of notables reported to Russian diplomats in Orşova in Wallachia

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24 On relations between Urquhart and Palmerston see R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe 1789–1914. A Survey of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 255–257; on Ponsonby and Urquhart, pp. 185–188.

⁴² Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839*, pp. 22–25; see more in: Webster K. Charles, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841. Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*, vol. I–II (London: G. Bell, 1951, 1969).

⁴³ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges*, p. 46.

on a regular basis about Prince's marked rapprochement with Britain. Emperor Nicholas I sent his aide-de-camp Prince Dolgorukii to re-open the constitutional question in Serbia and, in doing so, restrain Miloš's power from which Russian influence would emerge stronger. Colonel Hodges was instrumental in providing Prince Miloš with the whole project of legal and administrative reforms (the abolishment of *corvée*, guarantees for personal and property security) which eventually led to the failure of Prince Dolgorukii's mission. However, Miloš's legislature, long overdue, was introduced too late as he had lost popular support by that time.

Contrary to Prince Miloš who took British advice from 1837 onwards, the opposition among notables was completely under the Russian thumb. Embittered by Prince's attitude, the Russian envoy Prince Dolgorukii warned him in a threatening tone that he had established intolerably close and confidential relations with the Power considered to be an enemy of Russia. In his report to Count Nesselrode, the Russian Vice-Chancellor, Prince Dolgorukii emphasised that the opposition to Prince Miloš from the ranks of notables deserved greater support not just because it was Russophile, but also because it was devoid of any French-style revolutionary ideas.⁴⁴ Encouraged by the failure of the Russian envoy's mission Hodges reported to Ponsonby in Constantinople:

I have the proud satisfaction of assuring you that I see British influence rapidly gaining ground in Servia and indeed I am led to believe with a little exertion Russian influence would if not entirely superseded, be at least crippled throughout European Turkey.⁴⁵

In a conversation with Colonel Hodges, Prince Miloš was adamant that he would not allow the Russians to command in Serbia as they did in Wallachia and Moldavia. He went as far as expressing his willingness to finance the resistance of Wallachian Prince to the growing Russian influence. Following Dolgorukii's mission Prince Miloš appears to have lost any concern for and his customary caution in his relations with Russia, the protecting Power and arbiter in the internal and foreign affairs of his country. Miloš's rapprochement with Britain alienated him from Russia, but British support was not as strong as he expected. For example, in early

⁴⁴ Radoš Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839)*. p. 375.

⁴⁵ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges*, p. 63.

1938, Bartholomeo Cunibert, Prince's medical doctor from Piedmont and his confidential intermediary, suggested to Colonel Hodges that Britain should support the passing of Belgrade to Serbia as opposed to Russian proposal that envisaged the full Ottoman control over that town.⁴⁶ Although Prince Miloš was willing to pay a considerable amount of money to Ottomans for obtaining Belgrade, the lukewarm British support did not produce any tangible result at the Sublime Porte.

Habsburg Monarchy's cautious policy towards Serbia—the relations with Prince Miloš were somewhat tense—favoured the growing number of his opponents, who envisaged potential cooperation with the Austrians against their autocratic ruler. Prince Metternich pursued the cautious policy of “pro-Russian neutrality” towards Serbia, fearing that British influence might provoke internal turmoil in the country and serve as a pretext for Russian intervention. The spreading of Russian influence south of the Danube was, in view of Austrian and British diplomacy, the dangerous harbinger of a potential descent of Russian troops, in case of major upheaval in Serbia, on that country and perhaps through Montenegro on the Adriatic coast!⁴⁷

Prince Miloš ignored Hodges' advice to come to terms with Austria pointing out the insincerity of Metternich's policy and his intention to control Serbia's internal development. Instead, he suggested that Britain should lend a helping hand in Paris so that a French consul could be appointed in Serbia. The Serbian Prince seems to have believed that with British and French support he could acquire a full independence for his country in the foreseeable future. The British Consul, however, could not even prevent Prince's downfall despite his repeated efforts to obtain greater support for the latter in London and Vienna. Since his recommendations fell on deaf ears in London, Hodges' influence on Prince Miloš and his immediate entourage was limited. The Consul even admonished Miloš not to give vent overtly to his animosity to the Russian Consul as any public renouncement of Russian protection would bring an end to

⁴⁶ More in: Barthélémy Sylvestre Cunibert, *Essai historique sur les révolutions et l'indépendance de la Serbie depuis 1804 jusqu'à 1850* (Leipzig: A. K. Brockhaus, 1850). Cf. also Milivoje Pajović, “Doktor Kunibert i pukovnik Hodžes”, *Zapisi. Godišnjak Istorijskog arhiva Požarevac*, no 2 (2013), pp. 121–130.

⁴⁷ Mihailo Gavrilović, “Počeci diplomatskih odnosa Velike Britanije i Srbije”, pp. 136–137.

his rule. Hodges reminded him of the case of Poland which had been sacrificed to Russia despite the public opinion in England and France that had rooted for an intervention to aid the Poles. The Serbian delegation in Constantinople, which was sent there through the mediation of Hodges and Ponsonby, met with the strong opposition from the Russian Ambassador Buteniev: "I know well what you are doing! I have heard in Vienna and here what you are doing to involve England in your affairs. Russia alone as the protecting Power has the right to interfere with your affairs."⁴⁸

The growing Russian influence isolated Prince Miloš on both internal and international scene, and he became aware that no tangible support would come from London. Politics in Serbia became completely dominated by the Constitutionals who had full logistical support of their Russian protectors, particularly Gerasim Vaščenko, the Russian Consul-General in Belgrade from 1838 onwards. Nevertheless, Colonel Hodges remained faithful to Prince Miloš to the very end of his first reign in 1839, feeling responsible for pushing him too far in his anti-Russian policy. Unwilling to share power with Constitutionals, Prince Miloš abdicated and left Serbia that year to spend the next two decades in exile in Wallachia and Austria.

At the height of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, British diplomacy was encouraging Prince Miloš to renew his ties with Constantinople in order to counter-balance Russian influence. After Russian domination in the Ottoman policy had been secured by the Unkiar-Iskelessi Treaty of 1833, the Serbian Prince temporarily obtained further support from Austria as the only statesman in the Balkans capable of calming down the restless Serb population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Old Serbia. Austria was interested in keeping Serbia free of any liberal and dangerous ideas that might turn that principality into revolutionary nest in the immediate vicinity of the Habsburg Empire, a stronghold of conservative, anti-revolutionary order.⁴⁹

The promotion of Colonel Hodges into the rank of Consul-General covering, apart from Serbia, Rumelia and Bosnia was perceived by the Austrian Consul as a potential endorsement of British tacit support for Miloš's ambitious national aims to extend his power to Bosnia and Old

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 156–158.

⁴⁹ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: the Mission of Colonel Hodges*, p. 179.

Serbia.⁵⁰ Thus, it was at least five years before the famous *Načertanije* was drafted under the auspices of Ilija Garašanin that Prince Miloš had planned to unite much of Rumelia (Bosnia, Montenegro, Old Serbia, Slavic Macedonia, Bulgaria) with Serbia and revive the old Serbian Empire under his own rule. His policy of carving up Turkey-in-Europe, which he considered an imminent development, ran contrary to Russian policy after the 1833 Unkiar-Iskelessi Treaty that favoured the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Prince Miloš saw his ambitious foreign policy as a means to achieve his objectives in domestic policy: he would counter-balance Russian domination in Serbia and strengthen his position against the oligarchic group of notables known as the Constitutionalists.

In spite of the failure of Colonel Hodges' mission, the interest for Serbia was kept alive by David Urquhart due to his involvement with the Eastern question. In his probably last visit to Serbia in 1837, after having been dismissed as a secretary of the British Embassy in Constantinople, Urquhart met again with Prince Miloš and discussed the position of Serbia in the Near Eastern Crisis. Furthermore, through the review *The Portfolio* published occasionally in 1830s and 1840s in London, Urquhart kept writing about Serbia and her geopolitical importance among the Balkan Slavs with a view to suppressing the predominant Russian influence in the Balkans and Near East.⁵¹ Some of his ideas were later adopted by Prince Adam Czartoryski, the leader of the Polish emigration which gathered together at the Hôtel Lambert in Paris. The excerpts from Urquhart's report to Lord Palmerston written in December 1833 on Prince Miloš's views of potential support that France and Britain could provide against Russian preponderance in Serbia and the Balkans were found among the private papers of Count Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. This particular report was

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵¹ Urquhart's papers, including copies of *Portfolio. Diplomatic Review* published in 1835–1836 and 1843–1844 (the Portfolio New Series) are kept in the Balliol College Archives and Manuscripts, Oxford (Papers of David Urquhart: VIII Periodicals). Cf. Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie, № 5404 IV, "On the Consequences to Europe of a, Legal Elections' in Serbia", D. Urquhart, W. Zamoyski, 20. 05. 1843, pp. 151–161. See more in: Jelena Milojković-Djurić, "David Urquhart's. Perceptions of the Eastern Question. The Affairs of Serbia", *Balkanica*, vol. XLV (2014), pp. 203–219.

probably used as a starting point in drafting the policy of Polish émigrés towards Serbia a decade later, in 1843.⁵²

The interference of British officials in Serbian politics, first through the semi-official missions of David Urquhart and then by the first British Consul-General in Belgrade, paved the way to arising the Foreign Office's interest in Serbia's affairs. By combined action of British and French diplomacy this interest was soon translated into practical engagement into the Balkans and the Near Eastern crisis in 1840's: the new channel of influence at the Sublime Porte and its tributary principalities in the Balkan peninsula was dynamic policy of Polish agents stationed in the Balkans and Constantinople, led by Prince Czartoryski from Paris. Furthermore, the Serbian question was placed in a broader diplomatic context: rather than remaining a matter of trilateral relations between Russia, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, it now drew attention of Britain and France as well and thus became a topic of European politics.


⁵² Words of Prince Miloš "Extracted from a Report on Serbia of D. Urquhart Esquire", December 21, 1833, Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie, 5404 IV. Milorad Ekmečić (*Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I, pp. 224–225) stressed that the documents regarding the preparation of *Načertanije* had been found in the same dossier.



Karageorge Petrović (1762–1817)
Supreme Leader (*vrhovni vožd*) of Serbia
(1804–1813)



Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860)
Prince of Serbia (1815–1839,
1858–1860)



David Urquhart (1805–1877)



Tsar Nicholas I of Russia (1825–1855)



Michał Czajkowski (1804–1886)

SERBIA, THE GREAT POWERS AND THE POLISH EMIGRATION

National Policy of Prince Michael Obrenović and Russian Support (1839–1842)

The crisis that led to the abdication of Prince Miloš Obrenović in 1839 was, from the Russian perspective, a danger signal for imperial diplomacy in St. Petersburg: Russia needed to engage more actively in Serbia to counteract the attempts to open the door to the influence of other Great Powers, even as far off from Serbia as Great Britain. After the death of Prince Miloš's older son, the ailing Prince Milan, on 8 July 1839 after less than a month on the throne, his younger brother, Michael Obrenović, became the ruler of Serbia. He was politically much more to the taste of the Russian Imperial court: apart from being a Russophile, the young Prince did not try too hard to conceal his anti-Ottoman position. Michael was unable, however, to get rid of his father's negative legacy and to put an end to the rivalry between the Prince and the notables from the Council. This heterogeneous group of Council members included regional notables from the time of Prince Miloš's reign, wealthy merchants and high-ranking civil servants. All of them had been fighting against legal insecurity and economic monopoly enjoyed by Prince Miloš and his trading partners. The so-called Turkish Constitution, the fourth *hatti-i-sharif* issued by the Sultan in 1838 and read out in Belgrade in early 1839 provided a firm legal basis for the main demand of the Council, which had been sanctioned by the Sublime Porte and accepted by Russian diplomacy: power-sharing between the Council and Prince of Serbia, the new one included.

It took whole nine months before the Sublime Porte assented to the election of the new Prince. In the meantime, power in Serbia was *de facto* exercised by the three-member Regency appointed to assist the fatally ill Prince Milan. All three were Council members: Miloš's brother Jevrem Obrenović and the two most influential Constitutionals, Toma Vučić-Perišić, the leader of the notables who had fought against the Ottomans back in 1815, and Avram Petronijević, a mannerly official who had been personal secretary to Prince Miloš, led several of his deputations to Constantinople and served as his *predstavnik*, equal in rank to prime minister. While awaiting assent from the Sublime Porte abroad, young Prince Michael, with little experience in life and statesmanship, was unable to prevent the Regency from fortifying their political position in Serbia, where he found, upon his return in March 1840, two fiercely opposed sides: one supporting Toma Vučić-Perišić, the other supporting the Obrenović dynasty.¹

Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević were officially appointed by the Sultan as advisors to the minor Prince until his coming of age. This appointment caused much protest in the pro-Obrenović camp and deepened political divisions among the common people. The Obrenovićs succeeded in imposing their three demands: 1) that Vučić-Perišić and Petronijević be removed from the Prince's entourage; 2) that the ex-Prince Miloš be allowed to return to the country; and 3) that the seat of the government be relocated from Belgrade to the former capital, Kragujevac. Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević stepped down under pressure, but their opponents (including the Prince's two uncles, Jevrem and Jovan Obrenović) pressed further, calling for them to be tried for abuse of power during their one-year service as Regents. Anxious that a court composed of pro-Obrenović judges would rule too harshly, the leaders of the Constitutionals fled to Belgrade Fortress on 23 July 1840 to seek protection from the Ottoman authorities.

As the crisis escalated, the Ottoman government sent its envoy to Serbia, the imperial commissioner Mussa Effendi. The adamant position of the supporters of the dynasty, expressed at the sessions of the National Assembly overseen by the followers of the young Prince, was condensed in the demand for bringing seven prominent Constitutionals to trial

¹ M. B. Petrović, *History of Modern Serbia*, vol. I, pp. 160–163. For more details see R. Ljušić, *Prvo namesništvo, 1839–1840*, (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1995).

on suspicion of having abused power and persecuted political opponents. Apart from Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević, these were Stojan Simić, Stefan Tenka Stefanović, Prota Matija Nenadović, Lazar Teodorović and Milutin Garašanin. However, both the Ottomans and the Austrians backed the Constitutionalists, who, unlike the Russophile Prince Michael, were obedient to the Sublime Porte. As all attempts at reconciliation failed, the suspected persons, as many as thirty-eight of them, left Serbia under the protection of the Ottoman commissioner on 17 October 1840. Apart from those who left for Austria, the Sultan's envoy left some of the exiles in Vidin, a border town on the Bulgarian frontier, while the most prominent of Serbian Constitutionalists (T. Vučić-Perišić, A. Petronijević, M. Garašanin with his two sons, Ilija and Luka Garašanin, St. Simić, M. Nenadović, S. Stefanović and L. Teodorović) were "invited" (i.e. sent to exile) to Constantinople.²

Prince Michael's pro-active national policy concerning the Serbs in the neighbouring areas, however, was supported by Russian diplomacy on various levels. The Sultan's *Tanzimat* reforms, designed to transform the theocratic empire into a modern state, had little, if any, effect on the legal status, protection of life, property, social position and daily life of the Serb Christian population throughout Turkey-in-Europe. Referring to the Christian Serb population with the status of *reaya* in the areas which remained under direct Ottoman rule after the establishment of the Principality and bordering on Serbia, the French Consul in Belgrade, De Codriska, observed in May 1842, after the quelling of the Niš uprising in spring 1841, that a part of the Serbian people "has to bear the yoke which the cruelty, depravity and greed of a handful of Turks make harder to bear day by day, while in the neighbourhood the other part of the same people enjoy the fruits of their labour peacefully, without fearing for their own and their children's safety, under the protection of a national government".³ Such a position of the Serb Christian peasant *reaya* in Bosnia, Herzegovina, the former *Sanjak* of Novi Bazar and Old Serbia as a whole, essentially unchanged since the Serbian revolution of 1804 despite various reforms undertaken by the Sublime Porte, made the Principality of Serbia an ap-

² More in: Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Vučičeva buna*, Special editions, vol. 112, Social and historical writings, № 46 (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1936), pp. 13–29.

³ Quoted in: V. J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju* (1842–1843), (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1957), p. 21.

pealing model of liberty and civil rights. Hence the population of those areas looked up to Serbia expecting her government to support them financially and otherwise, with weapons and experienced guerrilla leaders, and to provide for refugees during Christian Serb rebellions or in case of their suppression. Prince Michael could not turn a deaf ear to the appeals of the fellow Serbs from the neighbouring Ottoman areas.⁴

Only a few days after the departure of Mussa Efendi and the exiled Constitutionals from Belgrade, in October 1840, Prince Michael instructed Serbia's envoy extraordinary in Constantinople, Jovan German, to hand over to the Russian diplomat Titov a detailed report on the numerous acts of violence perpetrated by the Ottomans against Christian Serbs in the *Pashalik* of Niš, i.e. in eleven villages in the districts (*nahis*) of Leskovac and Prokuplje. The report was to be submitted, through Russian diplomatic mediation, to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, along with the notice that the violence of the local Ottoman authorities and domestic Turks might lead the native Serb Christian population to "the point of extreme despair".⁵

Soon afterwards, the local Serb leaders from the Niš, Pirot, Leskovac and Prokuplje districts (Fr. Djordje Stanković, Stamenko Cakić, Koca Cvetković, Stanko Atanacković and others) were making arrangements with local authorities in Serbia for fomenting an uprising in May 1841. The delivery of substantial amounts of ammunition and gunpowder from Kragujevac to the would-be insurgents could not have been done without the tacit approval of the Serbian authorities. In the autumn of 1840, the head of local administration in Aleksinac, the southernmost city of the Principality, urged the future leaders of the Niš rebellion to remain peaceful until the arrival of Baron Lieven in Kragujevac. In February 1841, he again called for patience until a meeting with Baron Lieven, the emissary of the Russian Court, was arranged.

The long expected meeting with Baron Lieven, the extraordinary emissary of the Russian emperor to Serbia, took place in March 1841, a few weeks before the outbreak of the Niš uprising. On his way from Constantinople to Belgrade, the Baron made a stop in Kragujevac where he

⁴ More in: Vladimir Stojančević, *Južnoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu od Jedrenskog mira 1829. do Pariskog kongresa 1856. godine* (Belgrade: PTT, 1971), pp. 146–168, 191–202.

⁵ Vojislav J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju (1842–1843)*, p. 22.

met with a delegation consisting of eight conspirators from the Niš and Leskovac areas and encouraged them in their intention to rise up in rebellion. In parallel, a wider circle of conspirators, including Vaso Kepa from Herzegovina, was in constant contact with the Russian Consul in Belgrade Vaščenko while planning an uprising which was supposed to encompass an area from the town of Niš to the Timok River in Eastern Serbia and possibly even the more remote Serbian-inhabited parts of Old Serbia with Novi Bazar as its headquarters. Vaso Kepa asked Alfred Marey, the Chargé d'Affaires of the French Consulate in Belgrade, for money, weapons, artillery specialists and at least twenty Polish officers experienced in insurgent warfare. But Marey believed that Kepa's request veiled a Russian-planned manoeuvre aimed at shifting the responsibility for the upcoming Serb rebellion to France while concealing the role of the Russian Consul in Belgrade. Since Prince Michael himself placed great trust in Vaščenko at the time and was under his predominant influence, it seems unlikely that he would have taken major decisions without conferring with the diplomatic representative of the protective Power.⁶

The Niš rebellion broke out earlier than planned, in April 1841, after the preparations for it had been discovered by the Ottomans. In his public statement of 22 April 1841, Prince Michael announced that the Christian Serbs from the *Pashalik* of Niš had risen up in rebellion "against the local Turks [i.e. Ottomans] whom they call *zulumčari* [pillagers]". Inadequately trained for guerrilla warfare and poorly organized, the insurgents suffered a series of defeats and the rebellion was crushed in blood after no longer than three weeks.⁷ Some 1,400 Serb families from Niš, Pirot, Leskovac and other revolted areas fled to Principality of Serbia, and the Prince, in spite of repeated demands by the Ottomans, delayed their repatriation. The local Ottoman governor (*muhafis*) of Niš, Mustafa Pasha, accused the Prince of having backed the Serb rebellion and of having sent as many as a thousand cavalrymen to its aid. A large Ottoman army concentrating in the vicinity of Niš after the defeat of the rebellion gave rise to speculations that an attack on Serbia was imminent in order to depose Prince Michael and bring the exiled Constitutionalists to power. Prince Michael publicly and defiantly expressed his readiness to defend Principality of Serbia with

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–24.

⁷ Sevdelin Andrejević, *Niške bune: oslobodilački pokreti od 1832. do 1843. godine* (Niš: Prosveta, 2003)

50,000 troops. The crisis on the Serbian southern border, however, ended without armed conflict, but the Sublime Porte at Constantinople became more determined to remove the anti-Ottoman and Russophile Michael Obrenović from his position in Serbia.⁸

Serbia and the Polish emigration

In the Ottoman capital, the Constitutionals soon came in contact with other political exiles, notably the Poles who were in the process of establishing an unofficial diplomatic mission at Constantinople. After the definite collapse of the Polish Insurrection in 1831, the conservative wing of the Polish emigration was led by Prince Adam Czartoryski, formerly Russian foreign minister and, from December 1830 to August 1831, the head of the temporarily restored Polish state. Prince Czartoryski and thousands of Polish exiles had settled in Paris under the protection of the French government. The Hôtel Lambert on the île Saint-Louis behind the cathedral of Notre-Dame was the headquarters of the “Bureau des Affaires Polonaises”, the unofficial ministry for foreign affairs of the partitioned and subjugated Poland.⁹

Pursuing an anti-Russian policy, Prince Czartoryski developed a strategic plan for cooperation with the enemies of Russia and Austria, the arch-enemies of the Polish independence. The Czartoryski plan included the establishment of a network of diplomatic missions in different countries: at first in Great Britain and Italy and then in the Ottoman Empire and the autonomous Principality of Serbia. His activity was met with approval from the Sublime Porte, where the influence of Russia was so strong after the Unkyar-Iskelessi Treaty that the Ottoman Empire seemed to be turning into Russian protectorate.¹⁰ A few Polish emissaries from Czartoryski's Parisian headquarters were sent to Constantinople to examine the

⁸ V. J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju (1842–1843)*, pp. 23–25.

⁹ Cf. more in: Marian Kukeil, *Czartoryski and the European Unity, 1770–1861* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 209–222, 233–248, On ideological divisions among Polish emigration see: L. B. Namier, “1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals”, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, London 1944, pp. 160–163 (for the period before 1848).

¹⁰ Marcell Handelman, “La question d’Orient et la politique yougoslave du prince Czartoryski apres 1840”, *Sciences et travaux de l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, Paris 1929, pp. 6–10.

potentials for starting the more active Polish political campaign in the Balkans, including not only autonomous Serbia but also Bulgaria. The Polish emissaries were instructed to establish good relations with the Sublime Porte and to collaborate actively with every political or ethnic group in the Balkans that could serve their main goal: containment of Russian and Austrian influence on the peninsula.¹¹

The activities of the Polish emigration headquartered in Paris were usually financed by the French government, which used its diplomatic network to assist them in propagating the idea of national liberation among the subjugated Slavic peoples. This idea was seen as a convenient vehicle for the struggle against the dominance of the Russian and Habsburg empires in South-East Europe. Compatibility between Czartoryski's policy and British goals in Europe, particularly as regards the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, ensured the support of British diplomacy, notably of its diplomatic representatives at Constantinople. To cover the costs of their mission in the Ottoman Empire, the Polish representatives obtained 10,000 francs from the French Ministry in 1843–1844 and 28,000 francs in 1847. The Poles also received substantial financial support from the British Foreign Office through the agency of an association led by Lord Dudley Stuart.¹²

The idea of using the Balkans as a new stronghold for thwarting Russia's influence was not alien to the Poles. Initially, in 1833, a Polish agent, Janusz Woronicz, was sent to the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to see if it would be possible to win over the local notables for the Polish anti-Russian plans. Woronicz failed to win tangible support there, but he drew attention of the Parisian headquarters to an anti-Russian faction in Serbia and to Bulgaria. At a meeting with Ion Campineanu in Bucharest, Woronicz had been informed about considerable influence of Prince Miloš Obrenović in the neighbouring provinces

¹¹ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, no 5404 IV, Serbie, report of M. Czajkowski on Serbia, 1843, pp. 268–272 instructions by Czartoryski, pp. 279–283; Czajkowski on political situation in Serbia, pp. 352–359. More in: Antoni Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach: Hotel Lambert a kryzys serbski 1840–1844*, (Krakow: Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, 1993), pp. 21–26.

¹² M. Handelsman, "La politique yougoslave du prince Czartoryski entre 1840 et 1848, I. Organisation", in: *Bulletin International de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres*, no 8, Cracovie 1929, pp. 107–111.

of the Ottoman Empire. It was said with obvious exaggeration that the ruler of autonomous Serbia “is not far from assuming the role of the legendary emperor of Serbia, Stefan Dušan”.¹³

Two members of the Polish emigration gained a first-hand insight into the situation in Serbia during their brief stay in Belgrade as early as the 1830s. In the summer of 1840, A. Wereszynski reported to Czartoryski on his passage through the Principality of Serbia. About a year later, Adam Lyszczynski arrived in Serbia with a British passport under the name of Dr Lynch. After the collapse of the Polish uprising in 1831, Lyszczynski had completed the studies of medicine and served as a physician with the East India Company. He had met with leading Serb intellectuals in Pest including Teodor Pavlović. He came to Belgrade from London with recommendations and also visited Kragujevac. His report titled *Remarks on Serbia and Serbs* shows that he made out that the small, predominantly rural Principality with a population of 800,000 depended little on Constantinople, but he did not believe that the activity of Polish agents could bear much fruit because the Serbs, with their low level of education and strong attachment to Russia, with which they shared the same faith, would change their allegiance only if this tie of friendship with Russia became a peril. Since the two Poles had divergent views of the political outlook and national potentials of Serbia, Czartoryski turned to an adventurous member of the Old Serbian Vasojević clan (in present-day Montenegro), Nikola Vasojević. The latter deluded Czartoryski with fantastic plans for an anti-Ottoman isurrection spreading from his own native region to Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁴

Another Polish agent, Michał Czajkowski, Prince Czartoryski’s chief diplomatic agent for South-East Europe, sent to Sublime Porte by an understanding” with French Minister of Foreign Affairs François Guizot and Ottoman Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha, revived interest in Serbia. During his residence in Constantinople, from August 1841 to July 1843, Czajkowski made a wide circle of acquaintances and, agile as he was, considerably enhanced the reputation of Polish emigration in the eyes of Ottoman officials.¹⁵ Therefore, the exiled Serbian Constitutionalists found in

¹³ A. Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach: Hotel Lambert a kryzys serbski 1840–1844*, pp. 6–9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 59–72.

¹⁵ Czajkowski [Czajkowski], also known as Sadyk Pasha “was a soldier, novelist and politician; versatile, enterprising, and inspiring. From Ukrainian descent, with Cossack tra-

him an advocate of their cause and reliable ally in Constantinople. It was through him that they established contact with leading political figures in the Ottoman capital, including the ambassadors of France and Britain. He had been introduced to Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević by Vukašin Radišić, a secretary to Serbian diplomatic representative to the Sublime Porte (*kapučehaja*). Radišić supplied Czajkowski with a lot of important information about political situation in Serbia, professing himself as a supporter of South-Slav unity under the leadership of Prince Miloš or Prince Michael Obrenović, and not of the Russian Emperor who was of German origin. He emphasized that the Serbs “know that Poland is working for Slavdom in the West. We [the Serbs] are fond of Poland because she wants education and freedom”, and singled out the importance of the chair for Slavic literatures in Paris, at Collège de France, held by famous Polish poet and scholar Adam Mickiewicz.¹⁶

As early as 27 September 1841 Czajkowski informed Prince Czartorski about the leading political figures in Serbia which might be of significant weight for the Polish emigration's Balkan policy. Placing the exiled Prince Miloš on the top of his list, Czajkowski laid emphasis on his grand plans. Quoting the secretary of the Serbian Legation in Constantinople, he said that it had been “Miloš's long-standing intention to unite Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Herzegovina, Uskokija, the Banat, Slovaks [Slavonia or Slovenia?], Illyria, Dalmatia, Montenegro and Albanian mountains and create a Yugoslav empire, since he has been long raising money for that purpose”.¹⁷

Having established close relations with Michał Czajkowski, Vučić-Perišić and his followers complained to Polish agent about pressures exerted by Russian diplomacy which sided with Prince Michael Obrenović in the dispute over the constitutional issue. One of the first things Czajkows-

dition, he had a Cossack temperament, being impetuous and audacious. In a surprisingly short time he won popularity and influence with the Turks; this was due not only to his personality, but even more to Prince's Adam policy, of which he was spokesman and agent.” (M. Kukiel, *op. cit.*, p. 245.)

¹⁶ For more details see Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, “O početku jugoslovenske politike Adama Čartoriskog (1841–1843)”, *Zbornik za istoriju*, vol. 9 (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1974), pp. 34–37.

¹⁷ A. Cetnarowicz, “Fürst Miloš Obrenović in den ersten Konzeptionen des Balkanpolitik des Hôtel Lambert”, *Osterreichische Osthefte*, vol. 31, Wien 1989, pp. 69–70.

ki suggested to the exiled Constitutionalist leaders was not to seek support for their cause from the Russian government under any circumstances, but “to take advice from no one but their own sound reason and patriotism, and to seek no assistance against the Prince [Michael Obrenović] committed to Russia and Austria except in their good cause and in agreement with the Sublime Porte”.¹⁸ Czajkowski was no doubt convincing in his effort to depict the magnitude of a danger threatening Serbia from the harmful influence of Austria and Russia.¹⁹

Once he got to know the Constitutionalists better, Czajkowski was impressed with them and went as far in his report to Czartoryski as likening Vučić to the leader of the Polish uprising Chłopicki: “Vučić is a man of valiant heart and a brave soldier, he is held in high esteem in Serbia, second only to Prince Miloš.” The main Polish agent in Constantinople also noted the exceptional diplomatic skills of Avram Petronijević. He believed that these two men were the true leaders of the Serbian people and predicted for them an important role in Serbia’s and wider Balkan policy. He described the Serbs as “the only people of South Slavdom who has in it what it takes to place itself at the head of the Slavic peoples [in the Balkans] and gather them around it”, and Serbia as having “aristocratic reasoning and conduct, which the other peoples do not have at all. Political vim and vigour is with them.”²⁰ The Bulgarians, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Albanians all looked to Serbia and expected her political support; Serbia would be the most important “field for our [Polish] work precisely because her door opens most readily to us”.²¹

Czajkowski made an action plan for the Polish emigration to pursue in Serbia with the support of the Constitutionalists exiled in Constantinople. He thought that the Constitutionalists should return home with the exception of those few for whom the return would entail a real risk.

¹⁸ Grgur Jakšić & Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813. do 1858. godine* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1937), p. 89.

¹⁹ More in: D. Stranjaković, *Vlada Ustavobranitelja 1842–1853* (Belgrade: Narodna štamparija, 1932), pp. 35–48.

²⁰ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, “O početku jugoslovenske politike Adama Čartoriskog (1841–1843)”, p. 38. Cf. also Radomir J. Popović, *Avram Petronijević 1791–1852* (Belgrade: Freska, 2012), pp. 141–142.

²¹ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, “O početku jugoslovenske politike Adama Čartoriskog (1841–1843)”, pp. 38–40.

He even believed that they should establish contact with ex-Prince Miloš Obrenović and try to restore him to power.²² For a long time Czajkowski hoped that the quarrelling parties, the supporters of the Obrenović dynasty and of the Constitutionalists, would reconcile so as to put up resistance to Russian dominance in the Balkans under the leadership of Miloš or Michael and with the assistance of Western powers. Apart from reporting regularly to Prince Czartoryski, Czajkowski made his views known to the French and British ambassadors in Constantinople and, despite their reserved stance, sought to convince them that Serbia, through the mediation of Polish agents and with support from both Paris and London, could play an important role in the Balkans in curbing the growing Russian influence in Turkey-in-Europe.²³

To Czajkowski's mind, the preservation of Ottoman suzerainty over Serbia was a *sine qua non* because it provided the time for Serbia to consolidate, grow stronger and carefully prepare her struggle for full independence at a time when the Ottoman central authority declined still further. Serbia's loyalty to the Sublime Porte was also needed to appease Great Britain and France, the two Powers which were resolutely in favour of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Another reason for the preservation of it, particularly important to the Poles, was their expectation that Ottoman Turkey would be an ally of the future Polish insurgents.

The plans of the Polish agents delayed the emergence of a new Slav state centred on Serbia on the Balkan ruins of the Ottoman Empire to a much later stage. The Polish assessment, shared by the Constitutionalists, was that any attempt at undermining the internal stability of the Ottoman Empire in the existing circumstances (1842–43) would benefit Russia alone. Czajkowski's advice to the Serbs was to seek for further rights by peaceful means and gradually, without being subservient, but also to put up an armed resistance in the event of an Ottoman attack and to call the neighbouring Ottoman provinces to join them in their resistance: "Put-

²² Djordje Živanović, "Mihail Čajkovski o knezu Milošu", *Kovčević. Prilozi za gradju o Dositeju i Vuku*, vol. 22/23 (1985–1986), pp. 83–95. Czajkowski has published in 1837 an article on Prince Miloš in France: "La Servie et le prince Milosch" *Revue du Nord*, vol. V (1837), pp. 233–242.

²³ A. Cetnarowicz, "Fürst Miloš Obrenović in den ersten Konzeptionen des Balkanpolitik des Hotel Lambert", pp. 71–77.

ting Turkey and not Moscow first becomes a way to take over the Slavs morally—their struggle for independence speeds up and helps our [Polish] struggle.”²⁴

Despite Czajkowski’s pro-Ottoman policy and his well-spoken advice concerning the necessity of making concessions to the Christian population of Turkey-in-Europe, which the French ambassador Bourqueney routinely relayed to the Sublime Porte, Ottoman officials did not put much trust in the long-term plans of Polish agents.

The election of Alexander Karadjordjević as Prince of Serbia in June 1842 was seen by the Hôtel Lambert as the first significant success regarding the Serbian question. Czajkowski’s report to Czartoryski in early September summed it up as follows: “There has emerged for the first time in the Slavic lands so overt and so lasting an opposition to Moscow [...] we have made friends there where little or nothing has been known about the Poles, we have shown a sign of life and political strength to the whole world.” Yet, in view of Austria’s and Russia’s repeated accusations that the Polish emigration was conducting dangerous “revolutionary propaganda” in the Balkans, the French and British Foreign Ministers, Guizot and Lord Aberdeen, were increasingly reserved. The heads of French and British diplomacy were of the opinion that the Poles had imprudently promised Serbia the support of London and Paris. There was no willingness in France, and still less in Britain, to spoil relations with Austria and Russia over the Serbian question.²⁵

The Vučić Rebellion and the First Polish Representative in Belgrade (1842)

Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević (who was fluent in Turkish) were received by Grand Vizier, Rauf Pasha, as early as the beginning of 1841. They were promised political support for returning to Serbia on condition that they should reverse Prince Michael’s anti-Ottoman policy.

²⁴ See an elaborate analysis in Anton Cetnarowicz, “Udio i uloga Hotela Lambert u političkoj srpskoj krizi 1842–1843. godine”, *Historijski zbornik*, vol. XLIII/1 (Zagreb, 1990), pp. 271–279.

²⁵ Suzanne Champonnois, “Collaboration franco-polonaise pour une politique chez les Slaves du Sud 1840–1850”, *Relations franco-yougoslaves* (Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 1990), pp. 94–109.

Prince Michael was indeed perceived in Constantinople as a major threat to the Ottomans due to his political and financial backing for the two uprisings of Serbs in Serbia's immediate neighbourhood: in the Serb-inhabited *Pashalik* of Niš and the areas with Serbian Christian majority in eastern Bosnia.

In the summer of 1841, Toma Vučić-Perišić, as he stated himself much later, was notified by Mustafa Pasha that the Sultan had decided to have the Obrenović dynasty driven out of Serbia and that Vučić had been chosen to carry out that decision. Apart from him, only Avram Petronijević and Ilija Garašanin were familiar with this until the *coup d'état* in 1842.²⁶ At the same time, Russian and Austrian diplomacy also sought to ensure the return of the exiled Constitutionalists in order to pacify the situation in Serbia. In spite of this intervention in their favour from three sides, it was the agile Polish agent Czajkowski who continued to assert himself as a counselor and confidential intermediary between Vučić-Perišić and Petronijević and the Sublime Porte.

The Russian imperial envoy to Serbia, Baron Lieven, eventually crushed Prince Michael's opposition and, on 17 April 1841, the young Prince proclaimed amnesty for all the exiled Constitutionalists except for Vučić-Perišić, Milutin Garašanin and Stojan Simić. The exiles arrived in Belgrade in the middle of December 1841, but not before the special Ottoman emissary, Emin Pasha, had come to Belgrade.²⁷ Pardoned by the Prince's subsequent decision, Vučić-Perišić and Milutin Garašanin returned in April 1842. Along with them, Ludwik Zwierkowski, the first Polish representative assigned to Serbia, also arrived in Belgrade. Formerly secretary of Prince Czartoryski, Zwierkowski was better known under his French pseudonym Louis Lenoir. Zwierkowski remained inconspicuous for quite a while for both Austrian and Russian Consulates: he lived in Avram Petronijević's mansion in Belgrade and pretended to work as professor of the French language. In Serbian capital, Zwierkowski strongly advised Avram Petronijević to "establish secret contact with Western powers in order to win them over for his side and to thwart Russian influence

²⁶ Vučić-Perišić gave this statement at a Council meeting in 1858. For more details see Jevrem Grujić, *Zapisi Jevrema Grujića. Pred Svetoandrejsku skupštinu* vol. I, (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1922), pp. 130–131.

²⁷ K. V. Nikiforov, *Srbija sredinom XIX veka. Početak aktivnosti na ujedinjenju srpskih zemalja*, pp. 26–28

on the Slavic-Danubian tribes". The usually cautious Avram Petronijević, Serbian Prime Minister from September 1842 until October 1843, agreed to this proposal with a view to obtaining further support against Prince Michael Obrenović, and the Polish agent promptly reported the news to Czartoryski in Paris.²⁸

In the meantime, the Vučić Rebellion (*Vučičeva buna*) broke out: Prince Michael, facing opposition from the supporters of his exiled father as well as from Constitutionalists, was more vulnerable than before. The young Prince refused the request of the Ottoman governor of Belgrade to appoint Constitutionalists to all ministries, even after the Council had backed this demand unanimously. Nevertheless, it was Prince's decision to raise taxes from five to six *talers*, a measure that hit hard the predominantly peasant population, that triggered the rebellion. The leader of the rebellion, Toma Vučić-Perišić, took this opportunity and invited peasants to oppose the increase of the taxes. With support from a number of rebellious districts, he advanced from Smederevo and reached Kragujevac, the stronghold of the Prince's regime. The regular troops equipped with artillery joined the rebellion. Vučić-Perišić's forces then dispersed as many as 15,000 supporters of Prince Michael, forcing them into a disorderly retreat under artillery fire. Facing disaster, Prince Michael crossed the Sava River and went in exile just like his father Miloš several years earlier. However, Prince Michael did not follow the customary practice of seeking protection from the Ottoman *Pasha* of Belgrade, but chose to leave the country on his own volition; the Ottomans interpreted the Prince's decision as relieving them of all obligations towards him.²⁹

In spite of their apparent victory, the Constitutionalists were yet to secure legitimacy for their regime, and that depended on the suzerain power, the Ottoman Empire, and the protective power, the Imperial Russia. Consular representatives of Great Powers first presented a joint demarche

²⁸ M. Handelsman, "Pierwsza stała misja polska w Belgradzie w XIX. wieku", in: *Šišićev zbornik* Grga Novak, ed. (Zagreb: C. Albrecht, 1929) pp. 521–536; R. J. Popović, Avram Petronijević 1791–1852, pp. 162–167. Leonoir also proposed to Petronijević that Serbia should be proclaimed Kingdom under the protection of the Great Powers but this idea, quite unrealistic was not acceptable for both Paris and London (R. J. Popović, *Avram Petronijević 1791–1852*, pp. 162–163).

²⁹ Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Vučičeva buna*, pp. 52–58; R. J. Popović, *Toma Vučić-Perišić*, pp. 139–146.

to the Ottoman commander of Belgrade, and then, in the presence of the special envoy of the Sublime Porte, Shekib Effendi, filed the demarche protesting against "the movement of Vučić and Petronijević against lawful authority". The Russian Consul, on the other hand, insisted on Russia's leading role: he stated that he would thenceforth communicate only with Khiamil Pasha, the governor of Belgrade, as a representative of the legitimate, Ottoman authority in Serbia. Defending Toma Vučić-Perišić's actions, Khiamil Pasha rejected the joint demarche of Western Powers, warning the French, Austrian and British Consuls that the representative of the protective Power, Russian Consul Vaščenko, alone was entitled to interfere with Serbia's internal affairs; the representatives of other Great Powers were no more than "commercial agents".³⁰

Zwierkowski's presence in Belgrade in the spring of 1843, when he was identified by local Austrian informers as a Polish agent conspiring against the Habsburg and Russian Empires, seems to have become a burden for the Serbian officials who sought the support of both France and Britain in solving the Serbian issue before the Sublime Porte in Constantinople. Zwierkowski's advice to Constitutionalists, as well as the additional information provided from the Ottoman capital, was evidently useful for the Belgrade government and most often compatible with the regular reports coming from the Serbian representative in Constantinople Simić. After being discovered as a Polish agent, Zwierkowski was recalled from Belgrade in March 1843. Nevertheless, Polish agents exaggerated Prince Czartoryski's influence in London and Paris. Furthermore, after the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, had informed London of his negative opinion of the current Serbian government in March 1843, Lord Aberdeen was quick to demand re-election of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević from the Sublime Porte, as well as the removal of the Obrenović dynasty. British diplomacy was not willing to allow Polish emigrants to take credit at the Sublime Porte as being the main mediators in the sanctioning of the dynasty change in Serbia.³¹

In spite of all shortcomings, the role of the Polish emigration in settling the crisis in Serbia in 1842/3 made a rather strong impression on the Serbian political elite. In particular, the Polish agents in Constantinople

³⁰ Konstantin V. Nikiforov, *Srbija sredinom XIX veka. Početak aktivnosti na ujedinjenju srpskih zemalja*, pp. 21–22.

³¹ V. J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju (1842–1843)*, pp. 102–103.

were fairly successful in their persistent lobbying for Serbia among the influential representatives of France and Great Britain. The most important component in their policy in Serbia was that Polish representatives had managed to convince the Serbian Constitutionalists that their influence on the cabinets in London and Paris, as well as the Sublime Porte, was significant. Once they stepped out of the narrow confines of Balkan politics formulated in the Russo-Ottoman-Habsburg triangle, Constitutionalists began to get a clearer picture of the position and potential of the small Serbian principality: they appreciated the impact of the Serbian question not only on a regional scale but also within complex international relations in Europe.

Unlike Prince Miloš Obrenović, whose dealings with the British in a bid to obtain backing for his anti-Russian policy left him with the bitter feeling of disappointment, the Constitutionalists had nothing but a positive experience in their dealings with the Polish agents in the Balkans during the crisis which ensued after Vučić's rebellion in 1842. They were suggested to contact the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, a lecturer at the Collège de France in Paris—and the first person who began to acquaint the French public with Slavic history and culture, the early decades of the nineteenth century included—to provide them with an advice on organizing public education in accordance with Serbia's resources. Czajkowski promptly suggested that French textbooks be sent to Belgrade for translation so as to preclude the influence of Ján Kollár and Pavel Šafárik, Slovak cultural revivalists and Pan-Slavists, on Serbia's cultural development because they were pro-Russian.³²

*Advice on Conduct to be followed by Serbia (1843):
Prince Czartoryski's *Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie**

During the crisis of the early 1840s, Serbia showed, although still a small tributary principality of the Ottoman Empire, that it could play an important role in the Balkans. After having been presented for decades mostly in an uncomplimentary light, as a potentially revolutionary country, particularly in St. Petersburg and Vienna, Serbia was perceived by the Polish emigration in an entirely new and positive dimension. This new perception of Serbia—for the most part congruous with historical traditions and

³² More in: Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, *Mickjević i Jugosloveni* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1987).

national aspirations of the Serbian people who saw the restored Principality of Serbia as the focal point for national rallying in the future—was evidenced in Prince Czartoryski's proposals for a strategy of Serbia's foreign policy. Hardly any other writing in the modern history of Serbia was as influential in shaping Belgrade's foreign and domestic policy priorities and in setting strategic directions of expansion in the immediate and near future as Czartoryski's *Advice* to Serbia.³³

A friend of Czartoryski and frequent visitor of Hôtel Lambert in Paris was the last diplomatic representative of the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Ante Sorkočević-Sorgo who probably often discussed the Serbian issue with the leader of the Polish emigration. Sorkočević shared his extensive knowledge on South Slavs with Polish patriots who honoured him by appointing him member of the Polish Literary Society in Paris for his extensive historical knowledge and political expertise. Furthermore, some of Czartoryski's first-hand information on the situation in Serbia was provided by Dimitrije Crnobarac, a Serbian government's scholarship holder in Paris and emissary of the Constitutionalist government and Stojan Simić, the Foreign Minister. The Bavarian daily *Allgemeine Zeitung* reported from London in March 1843 that Dimitrije Crnobarac was in Paris as an official emissary of the Serbian government at the headquarters of Prince Czartoryski in Hôtel Lambert.³⁴ It is likely that it was Stojan Simić who relayed through the agency of Crnobarac Czartoryski's promise of French political and diplomatic support to the Constitutionals, the assistance of military officers, engineers, ammunition manufacture instructors and call for Slavic solidarity.³⁵

³³ Henryk Batowski, "Un precuteur de l'union balkanique: Le prince Adam Czartoryski", *Revue internationale des Etudes balkaniques*, vol. 3. (Belgrade: Institut Balkanique, 1936), pp. 149–156.

³⁴ *Die Allgemeine Zeitung*, Augsburg, 11 March 1843; V. J. Vučković, *Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju (1842–1843)*, p. 103.

³⁵ The additional source of information about the situation in Montenegro and the neighbouring areas of Old Serbia for Czartoryski's *Conseils* was an adventurer born in present-day Montenegro, Nikola Vasojević (1797–1844), a member of the Serb Vasojević clan. After his wanderings around Turkey-in-Europe, this colourful character, a surveyor and later a Russian army officer, arrived in Montenegro from Scutari in 1837, whence he tried in vain to cross over to Serbia. At one point, he served as the unofficial consular representative of Great Britain in Novi Bazar assigned with the task of watching over developments in Bosnia, Herzegovina and northern Albania. In 1840, he met Czartoryski in

Pointing out the interdependence of foreign and domestic policies, Czartoryski advised the Constitutionalists' government to focus their domestic policy on establishing a system of rigorous justice and conciliatory moderation in order to consolidate the strength of the people and efface the effects of political divisions opened up in the recent past. Good governance could help bring people to accept and respect current authorities and avoid new divisions.³⁶ In Czartoryski view, there were certain priorities concerning internal development:

1) The first priority was the establishment of a native dynasty with a hereditary right to the throne in order to prevent intrigues such as those that produced damaging consequences in Poland.

2) To introduce uniformity and order in the administration of the country, make it equitable, and ensure a strict supervision over public servants to prevent them from abusing power and corruption, as it was a common case with the Ottoman administration. Public interest should be strictly respected and held above any other particular interest and party rivalries.

3) Czartoryski lay particular emphasis on the role of education and the founding of schools; the Serbian Society of Letters (*Društvo srpske slovesnosti*) founded in 1841—the germ of the future Royal Academy of Sciences—should be helped in propagating the type of reading that was likely to awaken the national and Slavic consciousness of the people in order to unite intellectually the Serbs living under different imperial systems. Also, literary magazines with a wisely directed political orientation would be immensely useful.

Paris and the two men established close association. Vasojević presented to Czartoryski a ludicrous project of creating a state composed of Montenegro and Serbia, named Holmia (after Hum/Zachlunia, the old name of eastern Herzegovina) and ruled by Vasojević himself. Having assured the experienced Czartoryski that this state would be a foothold of France and Great Britain in a strategically sensitive region, Vasojević stretched his ambitions beyond the Serb tribes in the north of present-day Montenegro (Herzegovina at the time) and nominated himself to replace the young ruler of Montenegro, Petar II Petrović Njegoš, using the money and weapons that Czartoryski would supply. Czartoryski and Czajkowski did raise the money, but both Vasojević and the money disappeared somewhere in Italy. He suddenly reappeared in Montenegro and was killed in a private brawl in 1844. Cf. more in: Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, *Srbijansko-crnogorska saradnja (1830–1851)*, Special editions, vol. CCLXXII (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1957), pp. 28–63.

³⁶ Marceli Handelsman, *Czartoryski, Nicholas I^{er} et la question du Proche Orient* (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1934), pp. 30–34.

4) The country should be militarily organized to the maximal extent possible, following modern and well-proven European examples, such as the French National Guard or the Prussian *Landswehr*. The existing anti-Ottoman rebel groups could be placed under control of the Serbian government and subject to occasional military drill, constituting a mobile force prepared to be rapidly engaged. Czartoryski thought it vital to establish arms and gunpowder factories and a cannon foundry, which would be run by Poles who held French passports. An officers' school, evasively named "Polytechnic", should be founded in Kragujevac rather than Belgrade to provide modern military training for young men who would be able to lead the future Serbian army.

5) It was vital to Serbia's progress to improve her industry with the aid of foreign experts, inspectors, miners and chemists, whom would be recruited, for obvious reasons, among Poles rather than Germans and other nationalities.

6) By establishing a reliable police force, rebuilding the roads and providing safe accommodation in towns, the country should be made accessible to foreigners interested in trading. Serbia should attract rich English and French merchants and embark on establishing a central bank with their support. Self-evidently, this should not include Austrian merchants or anyone else who has business interests in the neighbouring Habsburg Monarchy.

7) Czartoryski holds that Serbia should pay much more attention to the clergy, to their education and the selection of competent and virtuous persons for high posts in the ecclesiastical hierarchy because an enlightened national clergy would be instrumental to the present and future of the country. While fortifying and protecting its own national church in this way, the Serbian government should also show the highest level of religious tolerance for other faiths, which would earn it everybody's sympathies. In addition, a Catholic church organization of some sort would be beneficial for Serbia as it would give the friendly France certain political leverage, since that country was the legal protector of Catholicism in the Ottoman Empire. Once in Serbia, French missionaries could also establish themselves in Bosnia and gradually oust the Austrian Catholic clergy.³⁷

Apart from a few suggestions specifically designed to suit the local situation, Czartoryski's advice as regards Serbia's domestic policy conformed to the established European practice, French one in particular.

³⁷ Cf. the whole text of Czartoryski's *Conseils* in French original in Dragoslav Stranjaković, "Kako je nastalo Garašaninovo 'Načertanije', *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije*, vol. XCI, pp. 105–115, as well as in the *Documents* section of this book.

As for foreign policy, however, he was much more inventive and concrete. He recommended a reserved stance towards the Great Powers and a sustained effort to avoid their interference in Serbia's internal affairs. Czartoryski's platform consisted of the following points:

1) As for Serbia's conduct towards the suzerain power, the Ottoman Empire, Czartoryski suggested that she should express respect, good will and submission, though not a cowardly and crawling but dignified and loyal submission. Serbia should cleverly use the existing Ottoman framework to organize support and aid to other Slavs in Turkey-in-Europe. Once she had secured considerable influence among the Serbs and other Slavs, Serbia would be ready and able to bide her time until the opportunity for action arose among the Slavs. Until then, the survival of the Ottoman Empire should be upheld, because it was aware of its weakness and distrustful of other Great Powers. Therefore, Serbia could negotiate with the Sublime Porte and attain a number of objectives: extension of her autonomous rights, extension of her borders in the direction of Montenegro and Herzegovina, ensuring a free trade route to the Adriatic Sea, dislocation of the Ottoman garrison from the fortress of Belgrade etc.

2) As for Imperial Russia, Czartoryski suggested that Serbia should act with due consideration for the protective Power since she was able to put pressure to bear on the Sublime Porte. Serbia should, however, do her best not to let Russia interfere in her internal affairs, i.e. to cross the line of protecting the autonomy of the Principality.

3) In her relations with the Habsburg Monarchy, Serbia should act with much caution and dissimulation so as not to provoke Vienna's reaction, because Austria was an enemy of the Slavic peoples and could not be trusted.

4) France had no diplomatic right to act officially in Serbia, but she might want to act semiofficially and extend advice through the Poles, and she would not refuse to support Serbia before the Sublime Porte and other governments. Serbia should send her young men to pursue their studies in France (a few of them had already been in Paris), and contribute to furthering commercial relations between the two countries.

5) Great Britain, like France, had no diplomatic rights in Serbia. Belgrade might be able to count on London's support if it proved itself prepared to vehemently defend its cause. However, for all its inactivity, the French government's policy had more sympathies and noble ideas than the British, always led by economic interest—for that reason, Serbia should try to attract Britain by securing a free trade route to the Adriatic coast.

6) As for other Great Powers, Czartoryski mused, Prussia had lately also come to show more interest in the Slavic peoples, but her intentions were not quite clear. Therefore, one should seek to profit from her actions and secure her support against Austria and her plans for the Slavic world.

7) An essential element in this general framework for Serbia's foreign policy was her activity regarding the Slavic population in her neighbourhood: "Serbia should make a plan of foreign policy for the future. She has to strive to become larger if she wishes not to lose her existence amidst the developments that threaten the Ottoman Empire. For that reason Serbia should sustain her influence among the Slavs who should be united with Serbia in the future and among those whose emancipation she should support. Serbia is surrounded by kindred peoples, some of whom are under Ottoman rule while others are under Habsburg rule. It seems that she can influence the former through civilization and education, which they want to improve, and the latter by offering proofs of her strength and wisdom, but most of all through a sense of shared nationality, of mutual and paternal care." While awaiting the anticipated change, Serbia had to work on "developing Slavic nationalities, making an effort to attract and rally around herself as soon as possible the independent tribes of Karadagh [today in northern Montenegro] and, if possible, even the Montenegrins, on the unification with whom she can work even under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire."

In Czartoryski's view, the most difficult but also the most important undertaking was Serbia's activism among the Serbs in Hungary and elsewhere under the Habsburg rule. He warned against those who might act in the interest of Vienna to obstruct Serbia's effort to maintain influence among the Serbs and other Slavs. "Serbia should tie this population of fellow nationals to herself, win their sympathies, and reap whatever benefit she can from it. Serbs should also strive to establish friendly relations with other Slavs: Illyrians, Dalmatians, Croats and with the manpower of "the seventeen Slavic regiments" where Christian Orthodox Serbs make up half, or even most of the population, within the Military Frontier of the Habsburg Empire.

To be able to count with more certainty on the military potential of the Military Frontier, Serbia should ensure the necessary counterbalance to Austria. In this respect, Serbia should spare no effort to come to terms with the Hungarians: "It may well be impossible to achieve, but it is

certainly very desirable. Otherwise, one should get used to seeing Hungarians as the most dangerous enemy and prepare for a fight with them that will come sooner or later; yet the hope of a possible reconciliation should be given up only in the last resort. This should be reiterated ceaselessly, under cover of shared enmity towards Austria and Russia. There are things that one should not admit even to oneself until the forced to do so. The Bulgarians, Bosnians and Herzegovinians should be the object of Serbia's uttermost perseverance and conciliation. These seem to be Serbia's main tasks in her foreign policy."³⁸

This general but well thought-through plan for Serbia's strategic activity in the Balkans and on a broader international scene was based on two essential premises: geopolitical prerequisites and national aspirations. In contrast to Czartoryski's lucid judgement—in terms of geopolitical determinants of the *longue durée*—of the danger for Serbia stemming from her interests conflicting with those of Austria and, to certain extent, Russia (even though Russia was a threat to Polish more than to Serbian interests), his views on the strength of the national factor was insufficiently elaborated. Since the real strength could not be properly assessed, his observations were confined to general expectations from a fast-track awakening of the national feeling among the Balkan Christians. Prince Czartoryski conceded that his text was merely a "quick sketch" and that it required "long elaboration" and, most of all, a "more thorough study of local circumstances" to become a complete and viable geopolitical project. He believed it vital for Serbia to play a more active role in regional politics: instead of remaining inactive in her present condition, she needed to improve her external and internal situation in anticipation of events of great importance which would put an end to her ephemeral existence; only then would she be able to radiate the Serbian spirit beyond the borders currently assigned to her.³⁹

Impressed with this document, Avram Petronijević and Toma Vučić-Perišić asked Czartoryski as early as February 1843 to accept to act as a lobbyist for Serbia's interests before the governments of France and Great Britain. Czartoryski confirmed his acceptance in a letter to the leading Constitutionlists of 27 March and promptly assigned to his cousin,

³⁸ M. Handelsman, "La Question d'Orient et la politique yougoslave du prince Czartoryski apres 1840", *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, novembre-décembre 1929, pp. 17–26.

³⁹ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, "O početku jugoslovenske politike Adama Čartorijskog", pp.44–46.

Władysław Zamoyski, the task of representing Serbian interests in London, while he would do the same in Paris.⁴⁰

The *Conseils* reached the leaders of the Constitutionalists, and Zwierkowski reported to Czartoryski that Ilija Garašanin, the Interior Minister put together, after having been acquainted with the *Conseils*, a circular letter to county authorities in early March 1843 asking them to propagate the national policy in accordance with the newly-adopted Constitutionalists ideas. Carrying out national policy in the form of instructions, sent from the narrow circle of central authority to local authorities in the Principality, was certainly an important novelty.

In August 1843, Czartoryski was informed from Belgrade and Constantinople that all the Constitutionalists leaders and Prince Alexander were very pleased with the advice extended in his memorandum and expected it to be translated into a tangible political support from both London and Paris.⁴¹

Zamoyski indeed kept lobbying for Serbian interests in London, where Serbia's regional potential was not much appreciated and where she was primarily seen as an obstacle to Russia's complete domination over Turkey-in-Europe. Czartoryski sought—in Paris rather than in London—to draw attention to Serbia's potentials. In parallel, he was providing the Constitutionalists with practical advice on how to administer the Principality and what stance to take towards the Great Powers.⁴²

The Poles relentlessly lobbied—Czartoryski in Paris, Władysław Zamoyski in London, Michal Czajkowski in Constantinople and Ludwik Zwierkowski in Belgrade—among French and British officials for Serbia so as to prepare her for the forthcoming great tasks. Czartoryski saw a broad campaign in support of Serbia and the Balkan Slavs as a prerequisite for the restoration of Poland according to the national principle. In that connection, he outlined three possible ways of progressing towards national freedom, sovereignty and, eventually, independence:

⁴⁰ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie, № 5404 IV, W. Zamoyski to Lord H. T. Palmerston, 17. July 1843, p. 259.

⁴¹ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie № 5404 IV, W. Zamoyski, "La Serbie en 1843", pp. 48–71.

⁴² Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie, № 5404 IV, A. Czartoryski to F. Guizot, on situation in Serbia and the Balkans, 1845, pp. 474–475.

1) The destruction of the Ottoman Empire with the support of a ruthless Russian emperor and then, the destruction or partitioning of the Habsburg Empire as well. In the event of such outcome, the main beneficiary would be Russian Tsar who would inevitably become a dictator of not only Europe, but also of the whole world.

2) The procurement of protectorate or suzerainty of the Sublime Porte over all the Balkan Slavs, but in such manner that would extend the existence of the Ottoman Turkey and not harm Austrian interests. In return, the Sublime Porte would let the Slavs gradually develop their national individuality and prosper politically, morally and materially. In Czartoryski's view, this would guarantee the stability in Europe.

3) If the Slavs undertook political or military action by themselves lacking external support, then the Habsburg and Russian empires would inevitably intervene in any internal crisis.⁴³

Hence, Czartoryski saw the second, or middle, path as the best one for Serbia to follow. This path, he believed, should be supported by Britain and France because it was in many ways compatible with their own interests in South-East Europe.

A Permanent Mission: František Zach Goes to Belgrade

After the settlement of the princship question and the return of the two main leaders of the Constitutionalists, Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević, Prince Czartoryski, decided to establish a permanent diplomatic mission of the Polish emigration in Belgrade in order to be able to proceed to concrete work in the Principality of Serbia. The first resident agent was František A. Zach, a Czech native of Olomouc, Moravia. Zach had pursued his university studies in Brno and Vienna, where he had come into contact with Polish patriots. Convinced that the Poles were predestined to play a key role in the forthcoming revival of Slavdom, he had joined the Polish insurgents in 1830/1 and fought in the same unit in which Czajkowski had served. Banished by Austrian authorities for his participation in the Polish insurrection, Zach arrived in France in 1832. He had met Czartoryski there and, on his recommendation, remained working as a librarian in the Royal Library in Fontainebleau for almost five years. In 1836, Zach returned to Vienna where he became friends with

⁴³ *Ibid.*

a number of young Slav patriots with whom he made ambitious plans for the brighter future of their oppressed nationalities. Upon his return to Paris in 1840, he showed much interest in the Serbian and South-Slav question. Czartoryski held him in high esteem for his abilities, dedication to the Slavic cause (interests in the Slavs of Central and South-East Europe, i.e. beyond Russia which was a multinational empire), diplomatic skills and knowledge of most Slavic languages.

Czartoryski nominated Zach for a permanent Polish agent in Belgrade in 1843 on account, to a large extent, of his known anti-Austrian and anti-Russian attitude. Before his nomination was accepted, Zach had submitted an extensive memorandum on the goals of the Polish mission to Serbia.⁴⁴ Zach believed that Serbia, apart from maintaining a stable alliance with the Poles, should establish close ties with France on account of the compatibility of their goals. In France, the traditional protector of Christians in the Near East, Serbia would find stronger diplomatic support and understanding than in Britain, which tended to go along with Austria's views on Slavic issues in Turkey-in-Europe. Unification of the Balkan Slavs was contrary to Austrian interests and compatible with those of France. Since the Habsburg Empire was the main market for Serbian products, on one hand, and controlled militarily the Danube and other strategic areas in Serbia's neighbourhood on the other, an open confrontation with Vienna should be avoided at all costs in present circumstances, as Zach suggested.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, Serbie, N^o 5390 IV, F. Zach: "Comment j'entends ma mission dans les pays slaves de la Turquie" août 1843, pp. 9–28. (Cf. the English translation in the *Documents* sections of this book); for a short biography of Zach see Vaclav Žaček, "Uloga Františka Zaha u Srbiji. Kratak pregled životne monografije", in *Glas*, vol. CCXC, Classe des sciences historiques, N^o 1, Belgrade: Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 1974, pp. 153–196.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* In the French original Zach underlined the following: "Quant aux Slaves de la Hongrie un grand rapprochement entre eux et les Serbes est désirable. Le centre d'action qui jusqu'à présent se trouvait à Agram [Zagreb] va-t-il peu à peu transporter à Belgrade? Nous le présumons et s'il en était ainsi, les Slaves méridionaux de l'Autriche devraient en prendre leur parti, J'essayerai d'arranger une entrevue avec quelques hommes marquants de la Slavonie et la Croatie autrichienne, pour y faire valoir les changements arrivés en Serbie et leurs suites probables, dont il doit résulter une union entre les Slaves méridionaux de l'Autriche. Cependant, je sens la nécessité de mettre la plus grande circonspection dans mes rapports avec les Slaves autrichiens, pour ne pas éveiller les soupçons du

Zach also believed that the more Serbia resisted the influence of Russia—which held a “sad fate” in store for Serbia and other Slavic peoples—the greater support she would receive from France, Britain and, possibly, Austria. In his view, the declining Ottoman Empire should not be succeeded by a single state of the Balkan Slavs, since that solution would only serve Russia’s interests. Mostly following the policy laid out in Czartoryski’s *Conseils*, Zach’s memorandum analysed under what conditions Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Turkish Croatia and Montenegro could unite—he estimated that Bulgaria, with her distinctive features, would hardly join a common state. Zach envisaged the creation of a common Orthodox Church which, along with racial and linguistic kinship, would provide another bond between Serbs and kindred Slavs. He did not deem necessary the introduction of the French code of law in Serbia (which was done nonetheless in 1844), but rather advocated an efficient and competent administration, a professional bureaucracy and a church operating under state control.

Zach’s first memorandum on his future mission to Serbia was, in fact, a somewhat lengthier elaboration of the issues outlined in Czartoryski’s *Conseils* with a few additional ideas which had probably been already discussed in various assessments of the Serbian question made by Polish emigration. Therefore, Zach’s claim to originality of his analysis of situation and political prospects in Serbia are not convincing.

Although Władysław Zamoyski preferred a Pole to a Czech in the post in Belgrade, Prince Czartoryski eventually opted for Zach: he thought that a Czech would be less suspicious to Russian and Austrian agents and hence would have more room for manoeuvre. The general instructions of the Hôtel Lambert included the following: upon determining the situation on the ground, the agent should persistently encourage Serbian officials to rely on their own resources and resist foreign pressures. The Polish emigration was supposed to lobby friendly powers for Serbian interests, arrange for a foreign loan for major government projects, assist in the event of war and even, if need be, send over their officers as military advisors. Serbia was expected to send her diplomatic agent to Paris and to negotiate, with the aid of Polish agents, with the Bishop of Montenegro,

Cabinet de Vienne, car il tournerait derechef du côté de la Russie. Il ne faut pas blesser l’Autriche dans ce moment.”


the fellow Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Albanians, the Bulgarians and the Slavs in the Habsburg Empire. The instructions contained some unrealistic suggestions, reflecting exaggerated expectations from a revolutionary upheaval. For example, the Serbian government was supposed to establish and maintain contact with the Don region and Ukraine, within the Russian Empire, in order to form a Cossack unit in Serbia which, in the event of war, would serve as a “Polish legion”. In the event of war, Serbia was also supposed to win over and stir to rebellion the neighbouring Slavs and to undertake military operations outside of her own territory as soon as possible.

Although the original plan was for Zach to go to Serbia together with five Polish military officers, he arrived in Belgrade alone. Czajkowski gave him the following instructions: to extend advice to the Serbian government and to draw its attention to the Slavs in Austria. Due to ethnic kinship, and with the aid of a well-devised agitation for national cause, they might join the Serbians and create a powerful Serbian kingdom with which the other Slavic tribes in Turkey-in-Europe would also unite. Zach was instructed to advise Belgrade to demonstrate loyalty to the Sublime Porte, since there was no real threat to the Serbian cause coming from that side.

Following Czajkowski's directives, Zach first met Ilija Garašanin with whom he had been instructed to become the best of friends. Zach stayed in Belgrade from October 1843 until the 1848 Revolution, and his activity there and the reports he sent to Czartoryski raised the prestige of the Hôtel Lambert in the eyes of officials in London, Paris and Constantinople. After his success in extending the scope of Western influence in Serbia independently of both Austria and Russia, Czartoryski was frequently approached by French and British officials as if he had been a monarch able to instigate a rebellion of the Balkan Slavs rallied around Serbia at a favourable moment. On the other hand, his *Conseils*—which Zach further elaborated and sought to put into practice in Belgrade—were of major significance for the Serbian political leaders of the Constitutionalists' regime. Intent on modernising the Principality and preparing it for further territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey-in-Europe, the Constitutionalists appreciated the new possibilities opened to Serbia by Czartoryski and took—the young statesman Ilija Garašanin most of all—an entirely new perspective of Serbian foreign policy in the years and decades to come. In that sense, Czartoryski's *Conseils* were an important and unavoidable source of Garašanin's *Načertanije*, drawn up with Zach's assistance only a year later.



Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861)



František Zach (1807–1892)



Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)

CONCEIVING *NAČERTANIJE*: ZACH AND GARAŠANIN 1844

František Zach and Ilija Garašanin indeed became close collaborators soon after they had met in Belgrade. A Pan-Slavist of the Western type, Zach did not share the mysticism of Russian Slavophiles who associated the Russian genius with Orthodox Christianity. Zach was convinced in the superiority of a Western-style education and Enlightenment, in modern European institutions such as those established in France and Britain. Nevertheless, he believed in the “genius of Slavdom” like all romanticists, and above all in the popular spirit of Central and South-East European Slavs. Zach perceived the Poles exiled in France as the driving force of modernization in the Slavic world, belated in its progress to modern civilization and the Principality of Serbia as rallying point for the South Slavs. He saw Russia as an imperial power that aspired to subjugate others, and the Habsburg Monarchy as an oppressive power that stifled the progress of Central and South-East European Slavs.

On the other hand, Ilija Garašanin belonged to the younger generation of the Serbian Constitutionalists. With a few exceptions, the Constitutionalists were men of modest education lacking a broader understanding of the geopolitical determinants which influenced Balkan and Serbian politics within Turkey-in-Europe. A son of one of the leaders of the Constitutionalists, Ilija Garašanin was educated firstly by foreign teachers in Serbia and then he completed his modest schooling during four years at the Greek secondary school in Zemun (Semlin) and a few courses in a German school in Orahovica, both in the neighbouring areas of the Habsburg Empire. Although far from complete, the education received in

the Habsburg Monarchy was sufficient for Garašanin—who continued to expand his knowledge in both history and politics—to become reputed as a relatively learned civil servant open for Western-type ideas and institutional solutions. Garašanin could read and write in Greek and German, and, being bright, was quick to acquire new knowledge and skills.

As a result, Ilija Garašanin climbed the political ladder of the Constitutionalists' hierarchy at a relatively fast pace. In addition to his hard work, wit and open mind, his political ascent was facilitated by the fact that the burgeoning Serbian society desperately needed agile young men who would be better qualified for running affairs of state than the dominant but usually semi-literate or illiterate popular leaders from the peasant ranks of insurgent Serbia (often village elders). Garašanin also combined the qualities of a member of a distinguished Serbian family with foreign education: a true son of the homeland with the work habits of a Westerner, he was quite atypical phenomenon in contemporary Serbia. During the regime of the Constitutionalists (1842–58), the administration was dominated by the unpopular bureaucrats derogatorily dubbed *Nemačkari* (Germans), the Habsburg Serbs who had immigrated from the neighbouring Serb-inhabited areas of Austria in pursuit of better job opportunities. Unlike them, who tended to look down both on the bulk of the rural population and the thin urban middle class in Belgrade and Serbia, Garašanin understood the people he sprang from and was willing to learn and benefit not only from the administrative practices of adjacent Austria, but also of other Western countries. To young Garašanin, whose gift of statesmanship was recognized early on, contacts with the representatives of the Polish emigration and constant communication and correspondence with foreign consuls brought the experience needed for running Serbia's domestic and foreign affairs.

Ilija Garašanin was born in the village of Garaši near Kragujevac in 1812 in the family of Milutin Savić, a high-ranking local official in the administrative system established under the autocratic rule of Prince Miloš Obrenović. In the course of time, a sobriquet derived from the name of the family's native village became their proper surname, Garašanin (i.e. from Garaši). As early as 1834 young Garašanin was appointed a customs officer near Belgrade by Prince Miloš's decree. Three years later he became the commander of the military police and the youngest member of the State Council. As evidenced by his promotion to the high rank of colo-

nel, Prince Miloš placed great confidence in him and raised him above all other political figures of his generation. In 1840, the conflict with Prince Michael forced Ilija Garašanin, his father Milutin and his brother Luka, supporters of the Constitutionalists, as well as several other notables, into temporary exile in Constantinople. Upon their return to Serbia, Ilija's brother and father were killed in a small-scale civil war triggered by Vučić's rebellion in 1842.

After the victory of the Constitutionalists, Ilija Garašanin became the youngest member of the State Council and Deputy Interior Minister. Appointed Minister of the Interior Affairs shortly afterwards (1843–52), Garašanin had under his jurisdiction not only the police, but also a few existing military units, the economy, transportation, and the health and postal services because the management of those affairs was not yet divided into different governmental departments. As the Minister of Interior Affairs, suppressing frequent anti-government conspiracies, Garašanin introduced severe punishment against conspirators and their accomplices, and managed in the period of several years to impose strict legal order on the often disorganized Serbian society.

After nine years at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Garašanin was appointed Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (September 1852—March 1853). After nine months in office, he was removed at the request of the Russian special envoy, Prince Menshikov. Garašanin was re-appointed Minister of Interior Affairs in April 1858. He stayed in office until January 1859, when Prince Alexander Karadjordjević had already been deposed and Miloš Obrenović re-elected for Prince of Serbia by the National Assembly (*Svetoandrejska skupština*). Garašanin again became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the second reign of Prince Michael Obrenović (1860–1868). Garašanin remained in office from 1861 to 1867, a year before the assassination of Prince Michael, and then withdrew completely from politics and died in 1874.¹

¹ The best biography of Garašanin in Serbian language is that by renown historian Dragoslav Stranjaković (1901–1966). It was mostly written during the Nazi occupation of Serbia in 1941–1944 and completed in 1949, but published only recently: Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin* (Kragujevac: Jefimija, 2005), 579 p. The manuscript of this book is kept among the papers of D. Stranjaković in the Archives of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ASANU) in Belgrade. The only biography in English is written by David Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismarck* (Boulder & New York: Columbia

Most of his contemporaries perceived Garašanin as a cold, strong-minded and incorruptible person completely dedicated to the ambitious political and national goals of the Principality of Serbia. In critical situations, he frequently discharged the duties of a prime minister or foreign minister even when he did not hold either of these portfolios. The long absence from Serbia of the leading Constitutionalists, Toma Vučić-Perišić and Avram Petronijević, the undefined position of the new prince, Alexander Karadjordjević, the poor inter-departmental, and Garašanin's own energetic style of leadership, made his Interior Affairs ministry the locus of decision-making in all matters of national importance. In December 1843, Zach reported that "the Foreign Ministry [of Serbia] dares do nothing" and remarked that the "Finance Minister is pro-Russian, and the Minister of Education and Justice is zero. Fortunately, the Prince [Alexander] listens to Garašanin".²

In time, Garašanin became much respected and had an unprecedented authority amongst not only foreign representatives, but also his own bureaucrats and common people. Jevrem Grujić, one of the Paris-trained Serbian liberals, noted that Garašanin was a God-given person to be the ruler of Serbia, while Zach described him as an "extraordinary administrator, a cautious and very serious man".³

Polish agents and his own associates perceived Garašanin as a major political figure in Serbia, bold, rational, uncorrupt and utterly patriotic. Zach himself was overwhelmed with his trust and friendship: Garašanin, wrote Zach to Czartoryski, "spoke to me so intimately and sincerely that my heart beat wildly with joy." Michal Czajkowski described Garašanin "as a very capable and energetic individual [...] one of the most active leaders in Serbia, an ardent patriot and a person who values order [...] He will not obey Russia and will defend the rights and freedom of his country."⁴

University Press, 1985), 453 p. The proceedings of the international conference held in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts on 9 and 10 December 1987 were published in 1991: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, Vladimir Stojančević, ed., Scientific Conferences, vol. LIV, Department of Historical Sciences, no. 16 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1991), 460 p.

² D. MacKenzie. *Ilija Garašanin*, p. 50.

³ V. Žaček, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁴ V. Žaček (ed.), *Bosna u tajnim spisima*, p. 22; David MacKenzie, "Ilija Garašanin: Man and Statesman", in: *Serbs and Russians*, East European Monographs (Boulder & New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 77.

Because of confidential nature of the Polish mission to Serbia Garašanin thought it necessary to establish and maintain close personal contact with Zach. In the course of time, this contact grew into a relationship of mutual trust and respect. Their collaboration focused on plans for realising Serbian aspirations beyond the Principality of Serbia and for developing a foreign policy doctrine which would provide a framework for accomplishing the ambitious project of Serbian and South-Slavic unification. The central ideas of Czartoryski's *Conseils*, above all the shifting of reliance towards France and Great Britain and the organisation of propaganda activity in Serbia's neighbourhood, were further elaborated by Zach. The plans of this Czech patriot and ardent Pan-Slavist in the service of Hôtel Lambert, always ready for revolutionary action, were even more ambitious than Garašanin's rational and balanced approach.⁵

As soon as January 1844, Zach reported to Czajkowski that Garašanin had asked him to draw up a plan for Serbia's Slavic policy:

My frequent conversations with Mr Ilija [Garašanin] about the Slavs of Turkey have given me the opportunity to explain to him little by little my views about those peoples. I have just agreed to prepare a plan for him about the manner of acting toward the Slavs, since he realizes it is already time to deal with this formally, or so to speak systematically. I am working conscientiously on this and will communicate to you a translation of my proposal. Let me express to you my joy at the minister's confidence. He told me: 'I am asking the same thing from several of my friends, so that we will be enlightened on this question. Then we will see who will win out.'⁶

For all his enormous working energy and his desire to improve his political skills and knowledge, Garašanin had not yet made it his routine to keep abreast of the developments in Serbia's immediate neighbourhood. Zach was staggered at both how ill-informed the Serbian Minister was and at the lack of systematic monitoring of the situation in the neighbouring areas which were of strategic importance to Serbia's security. Zach was especially astonished at the lack of interest in what was going on in Montenegro, another Serb principality and Serbia's only undisputable ally in pursuit of national projects. However, Montenegro and Serbia did not share a border. They were separated by a narrow strip of land, the

⁵ Zach's reports to Czartoryski on Serbia 1843–1844 are available in a book of documents bounded under the title "H. A. C. Zach, Serbie 1843–1844", vol. I 5390 in: Archives of Czartoryski. Krakow. № 5390 IV, 538 p.

⁶ Quoted from D. MacKenzie, *Ilija Garašanin*, p. 50.

Rascia area (*Raška oblast*), i.e. the former *sanjak* of Novi Bazar, a corridor linking the northernmost Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Ottoman-held Kosovo and the rest of Turkey-in-Europe. Therefore, Zach urged Garašanin to send an envoy to Montenegro as soon as possible: “You do not even know what is going on on your frontier.”⁷

A glance at the map of the Balkans at the time Zach drew up his ambitious plan for Garašanin shows that these ambitions went far beyond Serbia’s actual military and political capacities. Tiny in comparison with the two huge empires that locked her in from all sides, the Habsburg and the Ottoman, Serbia did not have a degree of autonomy which would allow her to make plans for the years or decades to come. All towns in borderland areas, including the capital Belgrade, were garrisoned by rather strong Ottoman troops. Numerous Ottoman Muslim civilians resided in Belgrade and other garrisoned towns (Šabac, Soko, Smederevo, Kladovo, Užice etc.) and had their trade and other businesses. Their interests were supported by the *Pasha* of Belgrade, the highest representative of Ottoman central authority in Serbia. The Sultan’s flags were flying on the Fortress of Belgrade and the Ottomans had considerable influence on the everyday life of the tiny Serbian capital. Garašanin and Zach used to meet in downtown Belgrade at a place that was only a few hundred metres away from the entrance to the Ottoman-held fortress. Serbia’s fragile autonomy, marked by a strong influence of Imperial Russia, her protective Power before the Sublime Porte, was made even frailer due to Constantinople’s direct interference with Serbia’s internal affairs at the turbulent time of the dynastic change on the throne in 1842. Apart from her weak international position and dependence on Great Powers, Serbia had neither a regular army nor institutions capable of backing up an ambitious foreign policy.

Garašanin’s frame of mind in respect to the potentials of the South Slav co-operation could also be gauged from the presence in Belgrade of Stjepan Car and Pavao Čavlović, Croat patriots belonging to the Illyrian movement of Ljudevit Gaj. Garašanin was supportive of them and conferred with them frequently about the possible modes of Serbo-Croat co-operation. In February 1844, Zach reported that his text “which contains a plan for Serbia’s foreign policy is almost completed. It only takes a chap-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p 51.

ter on Croatia and Illyrianism to get it completed.”⁸ Zach also discussed the South Slav question and potential cooperation with the idealistically-minded Croats from Ljudevit Gaj’s circle of supporters and admirers stationed in Belgrade. It seems highly likely that the extensive chapter on cooperation with Croatia and the Illyrian movement was added to Zach’s plan for Serbia’s Slavic policy at the instigation of Gaj and his representatives in Belgrade.

Unlike Serbia, with her developing administration and sound core of government system setting the country on the path to independence, the Croatian cultural revivalists had neither institutional support nor stronger backing from the tiny Croatian elite still loyal to the Hungarian Crown and the House of Habsburg. Probably the best assessment of the general weakness of Croat national identity was voiced in 1843 by Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, one of the most eminent scholars and politicians. His profound dissatisfaction with low level of Croat national consciousness which he associated with the lack of standard language was to be overcome by the adoption of “Illyrian štokavština” (i.e. Serbian vernacular derived from the štokavian dialect of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić) instead of genuine “Croat kajkavština”:

“We [the Croats] are a little bit Latins, a little bit Germans, a little bit Italians, a little bit Hungarians and a little bit Slavs and overall (to tell the truth) we are nothing! The dead Roman language (i. e. Latin) and the modern Hungarian, Italian and German are our tutors...”⁹

Furthermore, there was no tangible support for Gaj’s enlightened ideas among the rural masses either. Regional names and local identities that Roman Catholic Croats shared with Christian Orthodox Serbs predominated in what is nowadays Croatia: Slavonians, Dalmatians, Likans, Croats here and there in the districts around Zagreb; in the Military Frontier, both Serbs and Croats called themselves simply “Frontiersmen” (*Krajišnici*). The Roman Catholic body of population did not have a common modern language or strong feeling of Slavic unity. Their common denominator was the adherence to the pope and its Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the Croat patriots around Gaj forged a new general name, “Illyrians”, expecting that it would in time become acceptable to all

⁸ Vaclav Žaček, “Češko i poljsko učešće u postanku Garašaninovog Načertanija”, *Historijski zbornik*, vol. 1–4 (Zagreb 1963), pp. 42–44.

⁹ Quoted in: Jaroslav Šidak et al., *Hrvatski narodni preporod. Ilirski pokret* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga-Stvarnost, 1990), p. 145

South Slavs. However, such a vague concept of Illyriandom, lacking any specific ethnic or national designation, was unacceptable to the Serbs in Serbia and elsewhere where modern Serbian identity had already taken shape during the previous century and before and after the 1804 Serbian revolution. Given the Serbian consciousness in Bosnia, the Military Frontier, southern Hungary (future Vojvodina), Montenegro and *Brda* (Highlands), Herzegovina, the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro), Dalmatia and most of Old Serbia, Illyrianism was considered not just too vague but also potentially disruptive of Serbian national identity and unity. Still partitioned by local traditions, the Serbs were united by the common Kosovo legacy and rather strong church tradition dating back to the cult of Saint Sava and the sainted rulers from the Nemanjić, Lazarević and Branković dynasties that were venerated within the Serbian Orthodox Church and its bishoprics, before and after its abolishment in 1776. The Illyrian movement from the 1840s failed to assert itself not just among Serbs, but also among other South Slav peoples. However, it proved to be a suitable framework for the upcoming Croat national integration.¹⁰

The fact that Serbs constituted the majority of the population in Herzegovina and Bosnia, the Military Frontier (the South Slav part), Banat, Srem and parts of Slavonia, and the minority in Dalmatia and Croatia, was the starting point of all Serbian plans. There was no national movement in Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia or Slavonia analogous to that of Serbia and Serbs either in content or intensity. The religious difference was of major importance. In Bosnia, for example, the agrarian rebellions of the Christian Orthodox Serbs, mostly serfs on the feudal estates of local Muslim beys, were of twofold nature—social and religious. For Bosnian Serbs, most of the native Muslim Slavs were no different from the Ottoman Turks who had been oppressing them for centuries. In contrast, the mutinies of local Muslim beys against the enlightened reforms of the Sublime Porte in the first half of the nineteenth century were motivated by social reasons alone—the struggle for preservation of their feudal privileges.¹¹

¹⁰ Elinor Murray Despalatovic, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement*, East European Monographs (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1975), pp. 135–143; Dimitrije Djordjevic, “The idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century”, in: *The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1918*, D. Djordjevic, ed. (Santa-Barbara & Oxford: Clio Books, 1980), pp. 7–10.

¹¹ D. Stranjaković, “Buna hrišćana u Bosni 1834”, *Godišnjica Nikole Čupića*, vol. 40, Belgrade 1931, pp. 215–220.

Zach thus suggested in his Slavic plan for Serbia—the original is not preserved in Czartoryski's archive in Krakow, it has survived only in a Serbian translation in the Garašanin family archive—that Serbian foreign policy should rely on the Slavs in the adjacent areas (by which he meant above all the ethnic Serbs outside Serbia) and aspire to create a large Slav state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Since the only and undesirable alternative to such development was a division of Serbian lands between the Russian and the Habsburg Empire, the foreign policy imperative was a proactive approach to the Serb and Slavic population in the region. In pursuing this policy, Serbia should—as Prince Czartoryski had already suggested—rely on France and Britain, the two Great Powers which opposed further expansion of Russian and Austrian influence in the Balkans and the strengthening of their position in Europe. To fit Serbian aspirations into the prevailing political pattern of the period—Prince Metternich's principle of legitimism—Zach emphasised that Serbia had to invoke her own legitimist credentials and demand the restoration of the fourteenth-century Empire of Stefan Dušan. In Zach's view, any hint to revolutionary origins of modern Serbia stemming either from the pre-1815 revolutionary France or the 1804 Serbian revolution under Karageorge should be carefully avoided in a Europe dominated by the conservative ideology of Holy Alliance.

According to Zach's plan for "The Slavic Policy of Serbia", the *conditio sine qua non* for any undertaking was the most detailed insight into the situation in the neighbouring South-Slavic areas where the Serbs made up a considerable number or even majority of the population. The absence of the term "Serbian", subsumed under the general term "Slavic", was typical of the period: the entire European literature in French, German, English and other languages, including Russian, described the Serbs and those peoples they lived mixed with across the western Balkans as the "Slavs of Turkey" (*Slaves de Turquie*).¹² Only more thorough analyses in travel accounts or studies resulting from serious scholarly expeditions differentiat-

¹² Cyprien Robert, *Les Slaves de Turquie. Serbes, Monténégrins, Bosniaques, Albanais et Bulgares: leurs ressources, leurs tendances et leurs progrès politiques*, 2 vols. (Paris: L. Passard, Jules Labitte, 1844); second edition: Edition de 1844 précédée d'une introduction nouvelle sur leur situation pendant et depuis leurs insurrections de 1849 à 1851, 2 vols. Paris: Passard, 1852; [Milovan] Iankovitch et [Ephraïm] Grouitch, *Slaves du Sud. Peuple serbe avec les Croates et les Bulgares. Aperçu de leur vie historique, politique et sociale* (Paris:

ed between one Slavic people and another. With a view to Oriental medley and the linguistic and ethnic kinship between the Bulgarians, Serbs and Muslim Slavs in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, those differences were not considered important enough as to require any further subdivision of the general term “Slavs of Turkey” (*Slaves de Turquie* in French language), with the partial exception of Serbia which had already acquired a certain degree of political legitimacy and national identity.¹³

Unlike the Slavs of Turkey-in-Europe who were most often treated as a single group albeit with different regional and religious identities, scholarly and travel literature described most often the South-Slavs from the Habsburg Monarchy as Austrian Slavs. The Austrian Slavs living along the eastern Adriatic coast from Trieste to Ulcinj (Dulcigno) were usually known under the general name of “Dalmatians” or the “Slavs of Dalmatia”. On the other hand, the interior of the Balkans, up to its fringe areas along the Sava and the Danube Basin were called “Illyria” after the short-lived Napoleon-s *Provinces Illyriennes*.¹⁴ From another historical perspective, Dalmatia itself was also considered to belong to Illyria, not so much because it had been included in Napoleon’s Illyrian Provinces after the fall of the Republic of Venice, but rather because of the erudite tradition of naming the area between the Adriatic Sea and the Danube after the ancient province of the Roman Empire.¹⁵

Librairie de A. Franck, 1853); Joseph Reitzenheim, *La Pologne parmi les Slaves et ses rapports avec la question d’Orient* (Paris: Ledoyen, 1854).

¹³ A rare exception was an essay written by a Polish émigré agent about the Serbian question within the framework of the larger Eastern question: Ludwik Szafraniec Bystrzonowski, *Sur la Serbie dans ses rapports européens avec la question d’Orient* (Paris: Aymot, 1845), VII+180 p. Cf. more: Suzanne Champonnois, “Ludwik Bystrzonowski, l’Hotel Lambert et la diplomatie française dans les Balkans (1840–1849)”, in: *Les relations entre la France et les pays yougoslaves du dix-huitième au vingtième siècle* (Ljubljana: Centre Charles Nodier, 1987) pp. 53–60.

¹⁴ Fran Zwitter, *Les provinces illyriennes, cinq études*, édition conçue et préparée par Alain Jejcic (collaboration de Janez Šumrada et Peter Vodopivec; préface de Michel Kerautret), Collection de l’Institut Napoléon, (Paris: Éd SPM, 2001).

¹⁵ The first French scholar who precisely described Serb-inhabited provinces around Serbia as Serbian one was: Jean-Henri Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Les Serbes de Turquie. Études historiques, statistiques et politiques sur la Principauté de Serbie, le Monténégro et les pays adjacents serbes* (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865).

What Zach saw as Serbia's foremost task was indeed important: to gain insight into the political and social situation in the neighbouring provinces of the Ottoman Empire—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Old Serbia (the latter, together with a part of the Adriatic hinterland, was frequently designated as Northern Albania)—and in the Habsburg provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. Sending a single agent to each of those provinces could not obviously be taken as a serious and systematic operation, but it reflected the real scale of propaganda activity that Serbia was able to support in 1844 and the following years.; Nevertheless, it served a useful purpose of getting insight into the situation on the ground and, if possible, recruiting supporters.

As for Bulgaria, Zach was frustrated with the fact that the population there harboured Russophile feelings and placed their hopes of liberation in Russia. Bulgaria's proximity to the Ottoman capital and other strategic considerations required that the bulk of Ottoman troops, virtually half of the entire army, be stationed in Rumelia. Although the Bulgarians expected liberation to come from Russia (as it did happen a few decades later), Zach remained consistently anti-Russian in his approach: he claimed that they would find the Russian yoke even harder to bear than the Ottoman one. Zach compared the situation in Bulgaria (under Russian influence) with the previous state of affairs in Serbia under Prince Michael Obrenović who had been an instrument of Russian influence in the Balkans. Zach thus believed that now, with the Constitutionalist regime of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević which refused to be an instrument of Russian politics, Russia would try to turn the Balkan Slavs, the Bulgarians included, away from the Principality of Serbia. Zach had no doubt whatsoever that Imperial Russia, despite her temporary withdrawal from Serbia following the re-election of Alexander Karadjordjević for Prince, would resume her effort to regain influence in Serbia and that the small Principality would not be allowed to "put forward conditions" to the Russian Empire. To wrest the Bulgarians from the Russian arms and win them over to her side, Zach suggested that Serbia should launch a broad political and educational action: she should seek to suppress the Greek influence within the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, print books in Bulgarian language in Serbia, provide aid for youth education in Bulgaria etc. Zach's ambitious plans for Bulgaria required financial means as well as trained agents and teachers that Serbia did not have in sufficient number for her

own needs, let alone for action in Bulgaria. Thus, Zach's suggestions relating to Bulgaria were more of a general idea than a feasible plan. A more active policy towards Bulgaria would not become possible for another twenty years until the second reign of Prince Michael, when Garašanin served as his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1861–1867).

Zach devoted the third part of his "Plan" to Serbia's approach to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Old Serbia, the regions in which he believed Serbia could exert the strongest influence on account of their shared national identity and linguistic and ethnic kinship (primarily in the case of the Muslim and Catholic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Zach was not unaware of the fact that since Karageorge's insurrection the Christian Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina had repeatedly revolted against the Ottomans, looking to Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Montenegro for liberation. These hopes were particularly raised high in the wake of the spectacular Serbian victory at the battle of Ivankovac in 1805 over the regular Ottoman army and over the numerically superior Bosnian bey troops at the battle of Mišar in 1806. As a prerequisite for Serbia's growing and, eventually, predominant influence in these regions, Zach emphasized the following:

1) Freedom of religion, necessary for all Christians, and, in time, probably for the adherents of the Muslim faith.

2) The hereditary succession of a Serbian Prince in a common state comprised of the Principality and other regions, including Montenegro where, unlike the provinces under direct Ottoman rule, the Prince-Bishop of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty ruled over the *de facto* semi-independent principality with his tiny capital in Cetinje without formal recognition from the Sublime Porte. A continuity of monarchical authority in Serbia was thus imperative for the envisaged union of Serbia and the Slav population in Turkey-in-Europe.

3) Serbia's imposition as a guarantor and protector of all Ottoman Slavs.

In Zach's view, the foremost objective of Serbian foreign policy should be Bosnia and Herzegovina. The goal should be to introduce the administration similar to that in autonomous Serbia. The Serbian government should employ and train a number of inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina for public service. Zach also suggested the printing and distribution of various publications, books and pamphlets in both scripts, Cyrillic and Latin. He favoured the establishing of closer contacts with Bosnian

Franciscans, who were influential among the “Latins” (i.e. local Roman Catholic Slavs), because they were likely to be enthusiastic about unification with Serbia. In this regard, a teacher of Latin should begin instruction at the Lyceum in Belgrade so that the spiritual needs of the Roman Catholics in Serbia would be met. Serbia should also work, through Montenegro and the Roman Catholic northern Albania—Czartoryski had already farsightedly advised so—towards gaining access to the Adriatic Sea. This would put an end to Serbia’s complete economic dependence on Austria. To this end, Serbia should extend annual financial aid to the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro.

Zach devoted a separate chapter to relations with Croatia. The Belgrade-based Polish agent of Hôtel Lambert was in direct contact with the representatives of the Illyrian movement who, having been temporarily persecuted in Austria (1843–1845), found refuge in Serbia’s capital. After his frequent discussions with Stjepan Car and Pavao Čavlović, Zach formed an idealized notion of the nature and importance of the whole Illyrian movement. The basic principles of the Illyrian program were something that Zach could easily understand as they were very similar to analogous ideological patterns within the nascent national movements of the Czechs and Slovaks, and to some extent, even the Poles.¹⁶ Apparently carried away with the idealistic enthusiasm of the members of the Illyrian movement Zach envisioned a common state of Serbs and Croats. Zach, however, did not support the idea of an ephemeral Illyrian state, but rather designated a prospective common South-Slav state, which would also incorporate the Croats, as the “Serbian or Serbo-Slavic Empire”.

Chapter on Croatia in Zach’s Plan

The section of Zach’s *Plan* devoted to Croatia was—there is a general agreement on this in historiography—its weakest section: it did not reflect the actual situation in that province or realistically present the possibilities of collaboration with Serbia. It primarily conveyed the Illyrian perspective on cooperation with Serbia which must have been suggested to Zach, who had no real insight into the Hungarian province of Croatia-Slavonia, by a group of Illyrians with whom he maintained contact.

¹⁶ For similar patterns of national ideologies in nineteenth-century Eastern-Central Europe see Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Upon his arrival in Belgrade, Zach established contact with three “precious” men, as he reported to Czartoryski, who supplied him with information about the Croatian matters, i.e. Illyrian movement. On the top of his list was Stevan Hrkalović, born in Croatia, who enjoyed the trust of influential Constitutionalists, including Avram Petronijević, Ilija Garašanin and Stojan Simić. Zach’s second source of information was Janko Šafarik, the learned Slovak philologist and literature professor residing in Belgrade. The third was Miloš Popović, an Austrian Serb, the editor of the *Srpske novine*, the official newspaper of the Principality, whom Zach described as being sympathetic to the Illyrians and their ideology but lacking political influence in Serbia. Zach uncritically accepted Hrkalović’s claim that the Illyrian party was eagerly, and allegedly successfully, campaigning for political unification of the South Slavs, just as he accepted Miloš Popović’s assessment that the Serbs in both Austria and Turkey-in-Europe rejected Illyrianism as a Roman Catholic ideology and were only willing to espouse the idea of a restored Serbian empire.¹⁷

Zach adopted the view that the Serbs were not going to embrace the Illyrian ideology, but he considered that Belgrade would not be able to offer any better concept than Illyrianism. With its pan-Slavic overtone and readiness to modify its ideology, Illyrianism seemed to him as more promising for the future. But Zach did not realise that Illyrian ideology, however broadly formulated, was the idealistic projection of an “imagined community”; in practical terms, it was the framework of rather narrower, Croat, integration which saw all Roman Catholic Slavs speaking the štokavian (*štokavski*) dialect in Illyria, i.e. the western Balkans, as members of the Croat nation. Furthermore, the Illyrians were not nearly as influential as they would have Zach believe. The Polish agent in Belgrade, however, was receptive to what Croat patriots told him and they remained his sole source of information regarding the situation among non-Serb South Slavs in the Habsburg realm. Obviously, Zach had no way of checking the real scope and effect of their activities on the ground and among common people. Having been acquainted with Ljudevit Gaj since 1837, he attached great importance to his policy. In January 1844, Zach wrote to Gaj about the need for Serbo-Croat collaboration in respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina and its unification with Serbia.

¹⁷ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, “O nastanku *Načertanija* 1844. godine”, in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, pp. 34–36.

Shortly afterwards, in February 1844, Zach met Gaj's special envoy, Stjepan Car in Belgrade. The Croatian emissary relayed his leader's views: 1) that the Illyrian movement (which included a few Serbs) understood the need for South-Slavic gathering together but was not strong enough to confront Austria; 2) that the Illyrian movement was widely spread in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and the Military Frontier; 3) that it could not encompass all South Slavs because its Illyrian name was not acceptable to all of them; and 4) that the Illyrians, in order to facilitate collaboration and unity, intended to focus on propaganda in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which provided a hinterland for Croatia and the Military Frontier, so as to set the stage for the Frontier regiments to march on Vienna at some point in the future.

The only realistic claim was the confession that Illyranism had no impact beyond Croatia-Slavonia. In fact, it influenced a rather small portion of the enlightened Roman Catholic elite even in that province, perhaps less than five percent of the overall population. The rest of the people remained attached to the Habsburg Crown and the Hungarian state traditions.

The Illyrians accepted Zach's proposal for collaboration with the Polish emigration in the Balkans. The Polish agent also enthusiastically accepted their proposals not realising that they were divorced from reality. Zach suggested the following course of action:

1) Working towards South-Slavic political unity under the sceptre of the Karadjordjević dynasty with a view to creating a modern state based on the rule of law.

2) Cautious and gradual transformation of the most of Turkey-in-Europe into a Slavic state.

3) A diplomatic representation of all South Slavs by the restored Serbia.

4) Bosnia-Herzegovina's unification with Serbia

5) Policy of harmonious cooperation between Serbs and Croats.

6) The Croats should prepare the Roman Catholic and the Serbs the Orthodox population of Bosnia for unification with Serbia, while both Belgrade and Zagreb should endeavor to win the sympathies of Muslim population.

7) Serbo-Croat policy should be completely independent of Austria and Russia, and assistance, whenever needed, should be sought from France and Britain.

8) Belgrade should be the centre of Slavic action, the venue for influential persons to meet, confer and contact Serbian officials.

9) Financial support should be extended to the supporters in the Military Frontier.

After Stjepan Car had accepted the proposal on behalf of the Illyrian movement, Zach gave him some practical instructions, money and the assignment to visit the Military Frontier and report to him on the situation there and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸

Enthusiastic on account of the Illyrians' consent to cooperate, Zach decided, without consulting Garašanin, to add an extensive section to his *Plan*: "Serbia's relation to Croatia".

Ilija Garašanin, unlike František Zach, was quite familiar with the policy and intentions of the Illyrians and aware of their repeated efforts to establish themselves in Serbia. The Illyrians requested financial and political support from the Serbian government for the printing of their ideological writings and the work of their club. Garašanin supported the Pan-Slav Club in Belgrade when it published its pro-Yugoslav newspaper *Branislav* in 1844–45.¹⁹ Garašanin's support of collaboration with the Croats, despite his reservations regarding their independence from Vienna, was manifested in his financial aid to Ljudevit Gaj in 1846–47. This caused a protest from the members of the Serbian intelligentsia freshly arrived from Austria, including the prominent Constitutionalists Atanasije Nikolić, the most reputed economist among the ruling elite, and Jovan Sterija Popović, the most prominent intellectual, minister, educational reformer, famous dramatist and founder of the Serbian Society of Letters.²⁰

¹⁸ For more details see Lj. Durković-Jakšić, "O nastanku 'Načertanija' 1844. godine", in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, pp. 19–43 with earlier bibliography.

¹⁹ Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, *Branislav: prvi jugoslovenski ilegalni list 1844–1845*. (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1968). Cf. also Damir Agičić, "Historiografija o Ilirskom 'Branislavu' (1844–45)", *Historijski zbornik*, vol. LXIII (1990), pp. 385–395.

²⁰ Vasilije Krestić, "Garašanin i Hrvati", in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, p. 283; Cf. also Jaroslav Šidak, "Hotel Lambert i Hrvati", *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoleća* (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povijest 1973), 167–177.

Furthermore, Ilija Garašanin was quite aware that some Illyrians hosted in Belgrade as well as the leaders of the movement in Zagreb were neither sincere friends of Serbia as they pretended to be nor supporters of the anti-Austrian orientation propagated by Zach as the key political tenet of Polish emigration led by Prince Czartoryski. Garašanin suspected, and with good reason, that some Croat Illyrians from Zagreb, even some of the most prominent ones such as Ljudevit Gaj, actually served Austrian interests in the Balkans, upheld the Roman Catholic clergy's policy towards the Christian Orthodox or religiously mixed areas (Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, the south of Turkey-in-Europe) and even received financial recompensation for their confidential reports on Serbia's political plans to Prince Metternich. For that reason, Garašanin was careful not to reveal an anti-Austrian course to Prince Metternich's confidants and struck out the entire chapter on Croatia from the revised version of Zach's *Plan*. In addition, it was rather unrealistic to expect the downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1844 and to submit an anti-Austrian plan to Prince Alexander Karadjordjević, the overtly pro-Austrian ruler of Serbia.

The omission of the chapter on Croatia did not, however, diminish Garašanin's determination to support collaboration between the Serbs and Croats on each occasion that promised political benefit to both peoples. During the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 Garašanin sent to Zagreb his closest associate, Matija Ban, who met not only Gaj, but also *Ban* (Governor) Josip Jelačić. The most renowned Croat historian of the first half of the twentieth century, Ferdo Šišić, emphasised that "the policy of the Serbian minister Garašanin was the major factor that in 1848 brought the Croats and Serbs together into a common front against Hungarians". In particular, Šišić ascribed all the statements about the national unity between the Croats and Serbs made by Josip Jelačić before the Croatian Diet (*Hrvatski sabor*) to the direct influence of Ilija Garašanin.²¹

During the 1860s, Garašanin, in his capacity as Prince Michael's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, had harmonious relations with Bishop of Djakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the leader of the influential Popular Party in Croatia-Slavonia. Garašanin proposed a collaborative effort of Serbia and Croatia-Slavonia for the creation of a common Yugoslav state

²¹ Ferdo Šišić, *Jugoslovenska misao* (Belgrade: Balkanski institut, 1937), pp. 108–109. See also Zach's report on Croatia in 1847: Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, № 5394 II, F. Zach, "Quelques considerations sur les affaires de Croatie", 1847, pp. 283–286.

which would be “independent both of Austria and of Turkey”.²² With the assistance of Antonije Orešković, Serbian liaison officer between Belgrade and Zagreb, Garašanin drew up a programme of Yugoslav policy for the purpose of launching an action in collaboration with Strossmayer’s Party “for the liberation of all Christians moaning under the [Ottoman] Turkish yoke” and setting the stage for “the unification of all Yugoslav tribes”.²³

Being a genuine Czech patriot, Zach also suggested, that Serbia should make alliance with the Czechs and Slovaks, an altogether unrealistic notion given that these Slavs were separated from Serbia and the surrounding South-Slav provinces by the mass of German and Hungarian-speaking population in Habsburg-dominated central Europe. Equally ambitious was his proposal for an alliance between Belgrade and the Serbs of Southern Hungary (Banat, Bačka, Srem). When Zach was preparing his ambitious plan for Serbia’s Slavic policy, Novi Sad was more important centre of Serbian culture than Belgrade. The Serb-inhabited provinces in the south of Hungary were the nursery of qualified cadres, economic, military and cultural elites, administrative personnel, schooling system and other institutions of the fledgling Principality of Serbia. However, Prince Metternich kept the entire Habsburg Monarchy under his stern military and police control and Zach’s suggestion was difficult, if not impossible, to realise. Neither Zach nor Garašanin could predict that the revolution which would erupt in Vienna in 1848 would radically change the position of Christian Orthodox Serbs in the Danube Basin and inspire their closer ties with autonomous Serbia. What was vital to Zach in 1844, however, was to engage as many Serbs as possible in collaboration with Serbia so that the process of wresting the Habsburg Serbs from Austria’s influence could make at least a modest start.

What was Garašanin’s reaction to Zach’s plan? Except for a few objections Garašanin shared most of Zach’s enthusiasm for a pro-active regional policy aimed at spreading Belgrade’s influence on the population of, primarily, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Old Serbia. The population of those regions had gravitated towards Serbia for decades. The wave of immigrants had long been flowing into Serbia from those regions fleeing from the persecution of the abusive and corrupt Ottoman authorities,

²² V. J. Vučković, *Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859–1874* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1965), pp. 223–224.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 283–284.

feudal servitude, oppression by outlawed Muslim Albanians (*zulüm*) or famine (Montenegro and Herzegovina). Both Zach and Garašanin held that Serbia should meet two essential requirements: to improve, step by step, her material and cultural situation on the model of developed European countries and, at the same time, to pursue her national policy in Turkey-in-Europe based on the principle of nationality. Zach's broader Slavic agenda, encompassing the Habsburg-dominated lands was reduced in Garašanin's revised version to the extent conforming with achievable goals, given the regional Realpolitik, rather than wishful thinking.

Unlike Zach, a romantically-minded Czech revolutionary, Garašanin was a rational politician who carefully weighed the pros and cons for any undertaking in domestic and foreign policy. The ambitious foreign policy plans made in 1844 were not accompanied by modernization which Zach optimistically expected to be carried out quickly and efficiently. The regime of Constitutionalsists struggled to reform semi-oriental Serbia and embarked on the long-term process of modernization and Europeanization with modest means at its disposal. The results achieved in the course of the 1840s were modest but significant compared to the previous decade. The lack of well-developed infrastructure and trained personnel for public administration and other government and cultural institutions, modest military capacities and the shortage of enlightened reforms gave little prospect that Serbia would be able to carry out the ambitious agenda of the Polish agents in the Balkans.

The lack of trained personnel led the Serbian government in 1839 to start granting scholarships to gifted young men, usually twelve a year, for university studies abroad, mostly in France and Germany. By the end of the Constitutionalsists regime in 1858 Serbia had nearly 200 persons with university degree; they were the bearers of West European ideas. Since the Serbian egalitarian society was responsive to French doctrines, the most influential among them were the French alumni, popularly called "Parisians".²⁴ Technical intelligentsia usually pursued their studies in German-speaking countries, while the humanities-studying majority was educated in Paris and other French universities. It was in Paris that some of

²⁴ D. T. Bataković, "French Influence in Serbia 1835–1914. Four Generations of 'Parisians'", *Balkanica*, vol. XLI (2010) (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, SASA, 2011), pp. 93–130; Cf. more in: D. T. Bataković, *Les sources françaises de la démocratie serbe, 1804–1914* (Paris: CNRS, 2013).

them attended the lectures on Slavs given at the *Collège de France* by Adam Mickiewicz, a close friend of Prince Czartoryski's.²⁵

Yet, the educational system in Serbia was still substandard: the number of elementary schools rose from only twenty two in 1835 to 343 in 1858. Secondary education was provided in publicly funded four-grade gymnasia. Under the law of 1844 their curricula gradually expanded from classical subjects to other humanities. However, the body of knowledge of Serbian history and literary tradition as well as natural sciences such as physics was still quite inadequate. The Lyceum founded in 1838 on the model of the French *grande école* was the embryo of Belgrade University. In 1844, the departments of philosophy and law were introduced.²⁶ The first scholarly society, which subsequently developed into the Serbian Royal Academy, was founded in Belgrade in 1841 under the auspices of Prince Michael—the Serbian Society of Letters (*Društvo srpske slovesnosti*). Under the chairmanship of Jovan Sterija Popović, the leading Serbian author of the period and minister in several governments, this society started to publish in 1847 the *Glasnik* (Herald), the “first scholarly journal”, and the “Sources for modern Serbian history” in 1848.²⁷ Moreover, the founding of the National Museum in 1844 and the National Library in 1832 (modernised in 1853) created the conditions for the scholarly studies of not only Serbia, but also of the adjacent Serbian lands, which turned out to be the primary goal of the nascent Serbian science, and humanities in particular. In addition to bureaucrats from the Serb-inhabited areas of Austria (Srem, Banat, Bačka, Baranja, Slavonia, the Military Frontier), many writers, teachers or engineers settled in Serbia which added more diversity to intellectual life. A smaller portion of the Serbian intelligentsia, mostly clergymen, were sent to pursue their education in Russia, while Great Britain was completely out of the sight of the emerging Serbian elite.

²⁵ Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić. “Saradnja Jugoslovena i Poljaka u Parizu 1848–1849. godine”, *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XIX (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1972), pp. 185–237.

²⁶ Milenko Karanovich, *The development of Education in Serbia and Emergence of its Intelligensia (1838–1858)*, East European Monographs (Boulder & New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 119–145.

²⁷ For more details see Yvonne Castellan, *La culture serbe au seuil de l'indépendance (1800–1840)*, (Paris: PUF 1967); Vladimir Grujić, *Školsko reformatorski rad Jovana St. Popovića u Srbiji 1840–1848*. Special editions, vol. 258 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences, 1956); related documents are given in Branko Peruničić (ed.), *Društvo srpske slovesnosti 1841–1864* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1973).

The foreign policy doctrine of gradual increase of Serbian influence into the neighbouring provinces of the Ottoman Empire required military reorganization. A standing army was formed in 1845; it was rather small because of Serbia's international limitations and her modest finances. The Interior Ministry, i.e. Ilija Garašanin was in charge of this "garrison army" which consisted of two infantry battalions divided into four companies, one cavalry squadron and one artillery battery with no more than six guns. A gun foundry was established in Kragujevac in 1848, and a year later, the first artillery school was founded.

Serbia's overall capabilities were obviously quite modest despite certain diplomatic weight of the Serbian Question in the Eastern Crisis of 1842–43 and the Polish emigration's great expectations from her political development in the near future.

The essential feature of Zach's project was that it narrowed down Czartoryski's broadly defined Slavic framework to a South-Slavic one. Zach believed that the European part of the Ottoman Empire was soon going to become a free and independent Slavic state. In his vision, such a state would be centred on Serbia and named the "Serbo-Slavic Empire". Having carefully studied Zach's project, Garašanin took over a great deal of it. For that reason, certain scholars have made it customary to refer to his famous document written in 1844 as "Zach-Garašanin *Načertanije*".²⁸ Guided by Serbia's immediate political needs, Garašanin shortened some parts and expanded or retitled others, and produced the so-called "Programme of Serbia's foreign and national policy", much better known as *Načertanije* (Draft). Just like Zach, Garašanin had no doubt that the Ottoman Empire, or more precisely Turkey-in-Europe, would be divided either between Great Powers or Balkan nations. Since the latter possibility would be opposed by Austria, which could not allow the rise of nation-states in her Balkan neighbourhood, Serbia had to rely on France and Britain as both Zach and Czartoryski had suggested.

Unlike Zach, however, Garašanin did not write off Russia as a potential ally in achieving Serbia's long-term foreign policy goals. Concurring with Zach's negative assessment of Russia, Garašanin was prepared keep his distance from St. Petersburg as long as Serbia's protective pow-

²⁸ Cf. the latest contribution by Slobodan G. Marković, "Poreklo i dometi Saveta kneza Čartorijskog, Plana Františka Zaha i Zah-Garašaninovog Načertanija", in: *Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije*, pp. 103–135.

er pursued the policy that was alienating the Serbian and other Balkan peoples. Nevertheless, Garašanin believed that “with no one else’s assistance would Serbia achieve her goals as easily as with Russia’s”. But he also thought that in that case Russia would have to agree to Serbia’s conditions instead of putting forward her own: “It is [all] clearly about Russia’s securing territorial enlargement of the Principality [of Serbia] and giving up her alliance with Austria.” The negative experience from previous years, when Serbia had been required to submit to the will of her protective Power, led Garašanin to express his hope that “for once, Russia will treat Serbia with sincerity”; therefore, it was more than necessary to remind Russia of “how beneficial to Serbia that would be”.

Another of Garašanin’s important modifications concerned Zach’s South-Slavic plan. Zach primarily insisted on Slavdom, then on Yugoslavism and, lastly, on Serbdom. As Dimitrije Djordjević emphasised, Garašanin reversed this order and started from Serbdom as the main precondition for the next phase, and then proceeded to Yugoslavism and Slavdom.²⁹ There were many reasons behind this reversal. The nineteenth-century restoration of Serbia was rooted in the tradition of medieval statehood. Historicism is obvious in Garašanin’s views as well: “the present will not be without connection with the past; it will constitute the integral and entire Serbdom; its ties of kinship and its state life stand under the protection of the sacred historical right.” The nineteenth-century process of building a modern state with its native dynasty, administration, legislature and other state and national attributes could only boost the Serbian idea. Hence the focus of Serbia’s state policy was on the unification of Serbdom, first of all that part which was under the declining Ottoman rule.

Garašanin was aware that the resettlements of Serb Christian Orthodox population across the vast Ottoman and Habsburg empires during the long centuries of foreign domination, coupled with conversion to Islam and Roman Catholicism under Austria and Venice, had created a diversity in the peripheral areas inhabited by Serbs, and that this diversity and mixture required that the Yugoslav dimension not be excluded from the future unification around Serbia. Since the Serbs from Serbia were the first of all South Slavs to have formed an autonomous state, their country

²⁹ Dimitrije Djordjević, *Revolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques* (Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 1962), pp. 93–98.

was entitled to lead the way. The unification of Serbs would lead towards the unification of all South Slavs. "Serbia is the natural guardian of all South Slavs," Garašanin wrote, "and their relationship is reciprocal: she will take their liberation upon herself, and they will recognize her role as leader." However, the transformation of Serbian programme into South-Slav one entailed a difficulty which Garašanin, a champion of *Realpolitik*, could not fail to take into account.

South-Slav unification would require not only the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which would make Serbian unification possible, but also something that he found unrealistic: the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy. For that reason, Garašanin's programme anticipated only the consequences which would be brought about by the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and which fitted with the Serbian concept of unification between Serbia and Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia and Montenegro which would ensure an access to the Adriatic Sea. This does not mean that Garašanin had doubts about the need for a pan-Balkan solidarity and collaboration as the only way of obtaining freedom and independence for the Balkan peoples. Garašanin also appreciated the necessity of co-operating with those European Powers, France above all, which could be expected to espouse nationality cause and support Serbia on grounds of her thwarting further Austrian and Russian penetration in the Balkans.

The substance of the 1844 "Programme of Serbia's foreign and national policy" boiled down to the premise that, in order to preserve her independence, Serbia had to restore her former medieval empire. It should be noted, however, that Garašanin's notion of Serbian medieval empire did not correspond to that of the fourteenth century Stefan Dušan's realm. Garašanin did not think of most of Albania or Greek-inhabited Epirus and Thessaly but rather referred to those territories populated by Serbs in which the Kosovo legacy had been for centuries the pillar of their identity. Serbia would grow stronger as Ottoman Turkey was growing weaker, liberating Bosnia-Herzegovina, uniting with Montenegro and gaining an access to the Adriatic Sea through Old Serbia and a stretch of northern Albania. This could be accomplished by relying on the Serbs outside Serbia; as for the other South Slavs, not differentiated into separate nations as yet, such as Croats and Slovenes, it was desirable to establish closer collaboration with them too.

Conversely, Garašanin completely omitted Zach's chapter on cooperation with Croatia as politically too risky, unrealistic and unduly optimistic. Since he was careful not to hurt Zach's feelings, Garašanin did not omit the proposal for collaboration with Czechs and Slovaks, but he reduced it to a reasonable scale. As for the Serbs in southern Hungary, he concurred with the necessity to intensify contacts with the local Serbian leaders and to arrange for closer political and cultural collaboration through publishing articles which would promote Serbia's interests and joint plans for the future.

Garašanin believed—and he would be proven right in time—that Serbia, small as she was in 1844, had neither the strength nor the capacity to wage war with two powerful empires by herself, not even in the event of broader revolutionary upheavals in the region. With six strong Ottoman garrisons stationed in the fortresses along the borders of the Principality and facing a constant threat that Austria might occupy Belgrade in the event of any revolutionary turmoil in Serbia or any attempt to spark unrest on the other side of the border on the Sava and Danube rivers, Garašanin had no other option than to scale-down his plans to what was a realistic proposition. Garašanin aimed at the formation of a viable state. Therefore, he reduced his foreign policy goals to the liberation of Serbs and other kindred groups within the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, it took another two decades for Serbia, and many difficulties and diplomatic efforts, to finally get rid of the remaining six Ottoman garrisons in 1867.

The revolutionary political climate in Europe during the late 1840s had its impact on the Balkan peoples—their elites were swayed to revolutionary mood stemming from the widespread and common yearning for liberation from foreign domination, for the opportunity to build their independent national and cultural identities. From Greece in the south to Serbia in the north, secret patriotic societies of smaller or greater significance sprang into life and their activities spilled into the areas under direct Ottoman rule.

In 1844, a group of Serbian intellectuals which enjoyed Garašanin's support founded a secret society in Belgrade under the name "Democratic Pan-Slavic Club". Its membership included a few Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Czechs who saw Belgrade as a pivot for future action. This pan-Slavic society of European orientation was financially backed by the Constitutionalists government with a view to wresting Serbia from her unenvi-

able position between the hammer of Austria and the anvil of Russia and turning her towards broader Balkan and Slavic policy. Garašanin's agents became more active in their intelligence-gathering missions across the Serb and other South-Slav Ottoman provinces, propagating a common struggle for liberation and recruiting supporters.³⁰

The Serbian government remained in constant contact with the Illyrian movement in Croatia. Its leader, Ljudevit Gaj, visited Belgrade three times in 1846–47, but Garašanin did not place much trust in him, rightly suspecting that Gaj reported on his activities in Serbia to the Vienna government.³¹ When the Illyrian name was banned in Croatia, the movement shifted some of its activities to Belgrade, where the *Branislav* journal was printed and the programmatic pamphlet titled “What the Illyrians' intentions are” was published. On Czartoryski's and Zach's advice, the connections between the two Serb principalities, Serbia and Montenegro, were intensified: Belgrade sent financial aid to the Prince-Bishop in Cetinje in 1844, while poor families from Montenegro were allowed to settle in Serbia. The Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1830–1851), one of the greatest Serb poets and a champion of both Serbian unification and union between South Slavs, was in regular contact with Garašanin, through the special envoy Matija Ban who was sent to Cetinje in 1848–1849. Petar II and Garašanin developed mutual trust and close cooperation: while Garašanin admired Prince-Bishops poetry and efforts to modernize his undeveloped principality, Petar II statesmanship of Garašanin held in high esteem: “There is no Serb that Serbdom loves and respects [more] than you, and there is no Serb that loves and respects you more than I do.”³²

For all its pan-Slavic clamour, Zach's plan was designed to promote the needs and strategic projects of the Poles in pursuit of their own inde-

³⁰ D. Stranjaković, *Srbija, Pijemont Južnih Slovena, 1842–1853* (Belgrade: Narodna štamparija 1932), pp. 6–14; idem, *Srbija. Privlačno središte Jugoslovena (1844–1848)* (Belgrade: Smiljevo, 1940), 19 p.

³¹ Vladimir Ćorović, “Jedan memorandum Ljudevita Gaja o prilikama o Srbiji iz 1846. godine”, *Spomenik*, vol. LXII (Belgrade, Serbian Royal Academy, 1925), pp. 71–77; M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918*, vol. I, pp. 479–480; Vasilije Dj. Krestić, “Garašanin i Hrvati”, in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, pp. 280–282.

³² Quoted in: D. T. Bataković (ed.), *Histoire du peuple serbe* (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 2005), p. 219. Cf. Bogdan Lj. Popović, “Dva Njegoševa pisma Garašaninu”, *Književnost*, vol. 103: 5–6 (1998), pp. 990–993.

pendence, with Serbia featuring as something of a counterbalance to Austria. In Garašanin's version of Zach's plan, the proposals of the Polish agent were conformed to Serbia's interests. The resulting text was no more than the draft of a programme envisioning a union of South Slavs which was yet to be accomplished, depending on the geopolitical situation. It was for that reason that Garašanin consistently replaced the terms "Slav" and "South-Slav" with the term "Serbian". Contrary to frequent misinterpretation, this was not a mere expression of Garašanin's narrow-mindedness or allegedly zealous adherence to Serbian nationalism. It was rather an expression of his distrust of not clearly defined concepts. In Garašanin's view, the focus of Serbia's politics within the framework of Turkey-in-Europe was to attract all surrounding "Serbian peoples". It should be noted that the Serbs accounted for the majority of Slavic population in Serbia's immediate neighbourhood—in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Old Serbia in the 1840s. With the exception of a few districts in central Bosnia, western Herzegovina or certain areas of Kosovo and Metohija, they made up the relative or absolute majority of the population. Serbian identity had already been formed, at least among the elite stratum of secular and religious leaders. Not even Garašanin's Roman Catholic associates such as Matija Ban in Belgrade or Toma Kovačević in Bosnia ever questioned their common national identity with the Serbs.

Garašanin's action, albeit too bureaucratically structured and conspiratorially carried out, brought some fruit because it found responsive public in the neighbouring provinces. Some of the people there were typical Serbian patriots, priests, community and village elders; some were Serbo-Slavs, unreservedly sympathetic to Serbia; some were Slavs, mostly Roman Catholics who hoped for support from Serbia; and there was a number of sub-varieties of Illyrian-Slavic sentiment which do not lend themselves to modern-day concepts of national identity. The Bosnian Franciscans, persecuted by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (*Congregatio de propaganda fide*) in Vatican, received substantial support for their activity from the Serbian government through secret channels. Sloser connections were established with the Military Frontier which, as Czartoryski had emphasized, was an inexhaustible source of Serbian soldiers and patriots, although still loyal to the Habsburg Crown. Closer contacts were also made with religious and patriotic circles in Bulgaria. Such systematically structured national activism, based on the principles laid out in *Načertanije*, helped create a new vision of Serbia's future, closely

associated with the neighbouring provinces and dependent on productive collaboration with other Serbs and other ethnically kindred populations.

A number of analyses of *Načertanije* hold it against Garašanin that by espousing Czartoryski's and Zach's idea about the restoration of Stefan Dušan's medieval empire he slipped into unrealistic national romanticism. However, if invoking medieval glory and legitimacy is seen as a political necessity to clear Serbia of any potential accusation of fomenting revolutionary activities (as often stressed by Prince Metternich), the territorial aspect of Serbian unification championed by Garašanin appears in a completely different light. In fact, Garašanin never made claims to Thessaly, Greek Macedonia, central and southern Albania, the Chalcidice and the large parts of present-day Bulgaria, all of which had been incorporated into Stefan Dušan's short-lived empire of "Serbs and Greeks" in the middle of the fourteenth century. Garašanin's guiding principle was that of nationality as postulated by the French-inspired doctrines. In keeping with this, he considered the "Serbian lands" to have been, not without foundation, those areas associated with the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church at the time of the restored Patriarchate of Peć (1557–1776), but also, and above all, the territories referred to in the Serbian epic tradition, particularly that pertaining to the Kosovo legacy. For the nineteenth century Serbs, Prince Lazar, Miloš Obilić and other Kosovo valiant heroes, as well as the subsequent rebels against Ottoman oppression, were not a matter of distant past but rather a corner stone of national imagery—a living source of inspiration that shaped their aspirations and conduct in present.

The boundaries of Garašanin's unified Serbia, therefore, were those framed by the genuine Serbian Kosovo tradition which was as present in Knin, Karlovac, Srpske Moravice, Banjaluka, Mostar, Ozren, Semberija and Trebinje as it was in Dubrovnik, Cetinje and Kotor (Cattaro), reaching as far as Ulcinj (Dulcigno) and Skadar (Scutari). There was an important exception to such delineation of the lands earmarked for a unified Serbia. Although the Kosovo legacy was much alive throughout Dalmatia, Military Frontier (*Vojna Krajina*), Slavonia and future Vojvodina, Garašanin was careful not to encompass the Habsburg-controlled lands for the simple reason he found it to be beyond the realm of pragmatic policy-making. The unification of Serbs within the Ottoman Empire, which alone seemed realistic to Garašanin at the time he was drawing up his *Načertanije*, was an inclusive national programme, based on geopolitical realities and certainly not the project of a "Greater Serbia".



Alexander Karadjordjević (1806-1885)
Prince of Serbia (1842-1858)



Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1813-1851)
Prince-Bishop of Montenegro
(1831-1851)



Matija Ban
(1818-1903)



Toma Vučić Perišić
(1787-1859)



Avram Petronijević
(1791-1852)

“NAČERTANIJE” IN ACTION (1844–1867): FOREIGN POLICY UNDER GARAŠANIN

Internal strife and foreign policy (1844–1848)

With Serbian politics wavering between pro-Russian and pro-Austrian orientation, the first years after the drawing up of *Načertanije* did not provide a favourable setting for putting it into practice. Serbia experienced a few abortive rebellions and coups (in 1844 and 1846), which were suspected to have been hatched by the exiled ex-Prince Miloš Obrenović and the Metternich regime. The internal political division in pro-Ottoman, pro-Russian and pro-Austrian factions was further aggravated by Garašanin himself because of his advocacy of Serbia's reliance on Paris—it caused him to be seen as the leader of a pro-French faction. Officially, the foreign policy of the Constitutionalist regime was pro-Ottoman, and increasingly so after the meeting between Prince Alexander Karadjordjević and the Sultan in the Bulgarian town of Kazanlak in May 1846. The Prince's exaggerated subservience to the Sultan on that occasion embittered some of the leading Constitutionalist and contributed to the renewal of the pro-Russian course. Splitting from Toma Vučić-Perišić, the influential diplomat Avram Petronijević eventually sided with Prince's pro-Ottoman course. In addition, František Zach encouraged the Prince to stick to his pro-Ottoman policy, assuring him of the support of both France and the Sublime Porte against any Russian manoeuvring.¹

¹ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, № 5391 IV, F. Zach, “Rapport sur la situation des affaires politiques en Serbie au moment de l'arrivée de M. M Wuczić [Toma Vučić Perišić]

The Sublime Porte was satisfied with the conduct of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević. He was the only Serbian ruler who consistently pursued an anti-Russian foreign policy. Apart from the Ottoman Empire, he wanted to have yet another Great Power on his side so as to resist Russia's growing pressure. Following Czajkowski's instructions from Constantinople, Zach advised Prince to maintain his anti-Russian course, but he also cautioned him not to be deluded by Austria's false-hearted friendship. The Habsburg Monarchy's long-term interest in the Balkans was incompatible with that of Serbia. Zach advised the Prince not to rely on only one power, especially not on Russia and Austria: "Both Miloš and Michael made that mistake, one relying on Austria, the other on Russia, and both of them went down."² Austria's benevolent attitude towards Prince was designed to signal that she might come to his aid at a critical moment. The Prince hoped that the Vienna government could help him secure the right of hereditary succession for the Karadjordjević dynasty. Austrian influence on Prince grew exponentially after 1846. It was *nemačkari*, the Serbs from the Austrian provinces of Banat, Bačka, Slavonia and Srem who had moved to Serbia and, unfamiliar with the political mentality of Serbs in Serbia, run affairs in a bureaucratic manner and supported the increasing reliance on Habsburg Monarchy, who were denounced for such political course.³

Under Prince Alexander—both during Garašanin's ministerial term and after his removal from office in 1853 at the request of Russia on account of his pro-French foreign policy—the Russian consuls acted as advisors to the opposition rather than diplomatic representatives of the protective Power because the pro-Russian party remained in minority despite Toma Vučić-Perišić's support. Prince Alexander held to his pro-Ottoman policy relying on Austria, which lessened his standing with the people, while his excessive dependence on the court camarilla, made up mostly of his wife's family members (the Nenadovići) in the latter phase

et Petroniewicz [Avram Petronijević]⁴; № 5393, Zach's reports on Serbia 1845–1846, pp. 167–168, 611–614, 631–634; K. V. Nikiforov, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–68.

² G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine*, p. 110.

³ On *Nemačkari* see more in: Petar V. Krestić, "Political and Social Rivalries in Nineteenth-century Serbia: *Švabe* or *Nemačkari*," *Balkanica*, vol. XLI, pp. 73–92.

of his reign, had disastrous political consequences for the weak-willed and hesitant ruler.⁴

The pro-Russian faction in Serbia was somewhat strengthened after the lifting of the embargo on the delivery of a large shipment of Russian weapons commissioned at the time of Prince Michael. The Serbian Orthodox Church received a Russian donation consisting of liturgical books, and six Serbian youths were admitted to the seminaries in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Moscow. The Russian Consul in Serbia, Danilevskii, was of the opinion that such help should be extended to "cut off the Serbian people safely from the influence that surreptitiously spreads Catholicism from Austria". In reaction to the honours conferred upon Prince Alexander by the Sultan, the Russian imperial government awarded the Prince the Order of St. Anna in 1846. The gradual normalization of Serbo-Russian relations aroused French and British concerns, while Austrian General Ungerhoffer reported fretfully, and somewhat exaggeratedly, that "Russia has again come to hold the first place in Serbia".⁵

An obstacle to the restoration of Russian influence, however, was Ilija Garašanin himself, who stuck to the principles laid down in *Načertanije*.⁶ Beleaguered by the predominantly pro-Russian opposition, insecure on the throne and faced with strong resistance from the Serbian elites, Prince Alexander was increasingly looking to Vienna. In 1847, he dismissed several influential pro-Russian ministers and even rejected the proposal from Athens to open a Greek consulate in Belgrade fearing that it might become an instrument in Russia's hands. Prince Alexander's anti-Russian policy led to sharp political polarization in Serbia: reliant on Constantinople and Vienna, Prince was pitted against the pro-Russian opposition coordinated by the Russian Consul in Belgrade and joined by Vučić Perišić. Russia remained traditionally popular among the mass of the people. The vast Orthodox Slav Empire was still perceived as Serbia's only reliable protector among the Great Powers. In contrast, Austria sought to find a foothold for her influence in the Serbian Court and dynasty

⁴ Nebojša Jovanović, *Knez Aleksandar Karadjordjević (1896–1885). Biografija* (Belgrade: Albatros Plus, 2010), pp. 78–108, 267–295.

⁵ K. V. Nikiforov, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–67, quotation, p. 67.

⁶ Garašanin's published correspondence reveals many interesting aspects of the political strife in the late 1840s. (Grgur Jakšić, *Prepiska Ilije Garašanina 1839–1849*. Gradja, vol. I. (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Science, 1950).

upholding the principle of legitimacy. Vienna stuck to this principle even after the overthrow of the House of Karadjordjević and the return of the Obrenović dynasty in 1858.

A broad national action in the neighbouring Ottoman provinces envisaged by Garašanin and Zach was almost paralysed during the 1840s by political frictions on the domestic scene, but that did not stop Garašanin from dispatching agents to those provinces in 1845. He assigned them the tasks laid down in *Načertanije*:

- 1) to scout out the local political situation, identify different political currents, canvass the population and pinpoint their main needs;
- 2) to scout out the overall military situation and the spirit and armament of the local population;
- 3) to make a list and personal files of the leading persons, including the enemies of the Principality of Serbia;
- 4) to canvass opinion on Serbia, both the expectations from and possible fears of her.

By 1846 Garašanin's agents had already established closer contact with influential local leaders and notables in the Serb-majority areas of Turkey-in-Europe—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia and Montenegro.⁷

Garašanin's particular concern was to win over the cooperation of the Roman Catholic population of Bosnia in order to erode the influence Austria had over them. As a result, the Franciscans in Bosnia, a moderate Roman Catholic order, received tangible support from Serbia for their struggle against the unpopular Bishop Rafo Barišić which ended in his resignation in 1846.⁸ Several influential Franciscans of South-Slavic orientation visited Belgrade and kept contact with Garašanin's agent, Tomo Kovačević, an ex-Franciscan and, from 1842 onwards, an employee of the Serbian Foreign Ministry. Bosnian Franciscans were financially

⁷ D. Stranjaković, *Jugoslavenski nacionalni program*, p. 21.

⁸ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, № 5392 II, F. Zach, "Copie de la lettre adressée au frères franciscains de la Bosnie", le 10 décembre 1842, pp. 145–148; № 53994 II, F. Zach, "Quelques observations sur la Marche des affaires de Bosnie", 1847, pp. 287–293. On the Barišić affair see: Ilija Kecmanović, *Barišićeva afera. Prilog proučavanju istorije Bosne i Hercegovine u prvoj polovini XIX vijeka* (Sarajevo: Naučno društvo NR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1954).

supported by and closely collaborated with Garašanin's agents or they themselves gathered intelligence for Belgrade.⁹

Close collaboration was also established with Montenegro. On Zach's advice, Stevan Hrkalović, a Serb and formerly Austrian officer serving in the Military Frontier, now an employee of the Serbian government, was sent on a special mission to Prince-Bishop, Petar II Petrović Njegoš. The ruler of Montenegro received an aid of 10,000 ducats for the weapons needed to recapture two isles in Lake Scutari from the Ottomans. The anti-Russian activity of Polish emigration in a completely Russophile Montenegro, however, proved to be ineffective. All attempts of Hôtel Lambert to alienate the small Serb principality in the hinterland of the Bay of Cattaro from Russia, perceived as its traditional, almost mythically popular protector, ended in dismal failure.¹⁰

As part of the plans for the common future of Serbia and Montenegro, the project of gaining an outlet to the Adriatic Sea at the town of Ulcinj (Dulcigno), drawn up already by Prince Czartoryski, was made public in 1847 in the Belgrade newspaper *Novine srpske* (Serbian Gazette). The author of the article, Aleksandar Vasojević, was the son of the adventurer Nikola Vasojević who had corresponded with Czartoryski for years on the idea of creating a separate state in the "Brda" (Highlands) centred on the Vasojević clan. The article laid out the route to the Adriatic Sea: the section running from Belgrade to Raška via Kragujevac was supposed to be built by Serbia, while the rest of it, leading to Ulcinj and Scutari, would supposedly be funded by Ottoman authorities.¹¹

Garašanin's sustained effort to establish a wide-ranging network of agents and influence in the region that was considered to be a Serbian sphere of influence also involved northern Albania. Contact was established with the Roman Catholic Albanian Malissori and Mirdite clans, and their representatives came to Belgrade to negotiate about collaboration with Matija Ban, a Dubrovnik area-born Serb, former Franciscan, and

⁹ Vladimir Stojančević, "Da li je bilo političke akcije Srbije u Bosni za oslobađanje od turske vlasti pre Garašaninovog *Načertanija*?", *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XIX (1972), pp. 165–184.

¹⁰ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, *Srbijansko-crnogorska saradnja*, pp. 76–78. On Stevan Hrkalović, idem, "O Stevanu Hrkaloviću", *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XVI-XVII (1967–1968), (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1970), pp. 109–132.

¹¹ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, *Srbijansko-crnogorska saradnja*, pp. 81–83.

Garašanin's right hand in the matters of cross-border activities. At the same time, support was extended to the national emancipation of the Bulgarians. Polish agents had already been kindling Bulgarian national consciousness, using the popular discontent with the Greek clergy and the exclusive use of Greek as liturgical language to encourage them to turn to the Catholic Church. The support to the Bulgarians, which under Garašanin was mostly limited to the field of culture and education, bore fruit, because a group of agents of the Serbian government engaged in the struggle against Ottoman domination would be formed from the ranks of the supported Bulgarian teachers, merchants and priests.¹²

In Belgrade, a predominantly South-Slavic club assembling the proponents of Slavic unity had been active under the patronage of Matija Ban from 1844 onwards. Some of its members were the Slovak Janko Šafařík, the Croats Pavao Čavlović, and the former Bosnian Franciscan, Tomo Kovačević, a few Serbs from Austria such as Stevan Hrkalović and Miloš Popović, and a Belgrader, Milan Davidović. They, Matija Ban wrote, "have sworn to make Serbia the leader of all South Slavs. For it is bad for the Serbs from the Principality to confine their patriotism to the borders of their state, and [for] the Austrian Serbs, to their [Habsburg empire], and know nothing about the other South Slavs and do not care to know. The horizons of the Serbian people need to be broadened in that sense." The club operated with Garašanin's approval and Prince Alexander's sympathies, and apart from the group of Serbs from Austria and Bosnian Franciscans, it included a few Bulgarians. The "Pan-Slavic" club, as Austrian agents described it, advocated cultural activism and the awakening of national consciousness and Slavic solidarity among the youth through the agency of press, booklets and theatrical performances.

Zach went to great lengths to arrange for a visit of Ljudevit Gaj, the leader of the Croatian Illyrians, to Belgrade. At his three meetings with Serbian officials, Gaj presented his views on South-Slavic collaboration. His first meeting with Prince Alexander, Garašanin and Petronijević in Kragujevac in 1846 convinced Gaj that the collaboration—which the Illyrians had mostly associated with Prince Michael Obrenović—was possible with the Constitutionalists as well. Moreover, he received

¹² Kliment Džambazovski, "Shvatanje Ilije Garašanina o saradnji s Bugarima za oslobodjenje od turske vlasti", in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, pp. 319–330.

financial support for his plans. While he was still in Belgrade, Ljudevit Gaj wrote, in collaboration with Zach, a report for the Vienna government, which had consented to his trip in the first place. But Gaj was not much trusted in the circle of Habsburg Serbs around Prince Alexander: they saw him as an Austrian spy in the service of Habsburg interests.¹³ The germ of the ideology of Austro-Slavism, the purpose of which would be to tie the Serbs in the Principality of Serbia to the Habsburg Monarchy, with the aid of the Croatian Illyrians, met no response in Belgrade; on the contrary, it fuelled further suspicions and reservations about the Illyrians playing a double game. Austro-Slavism was perceived as an ideology contrary to the vital interests of Serbia and the Serbian predominately Christian Orthodox people in general, which aspired for unification with Serbia, and not for unification under the Habsburg sceptre. The issue of settling the status of Roman Catholics in Serbia, and the involvement of some Illyrians in it, sparked inter-religious suspicions: it was feared that the much more powerful Roman Catholic Church might pursue the policy of proselytism and spreading Austrian influence. For that reason, the Serbian government denied Gaj, on the occasion of his third and last visit to Belgrade in 1847, the financial support he requested for starting a newspaper in Zagreb which was supposed to be printed in Cyrillic script.¹⁴

Serbia and the Revolutionary Turmoil (1848–1849)

When the revolution of 1848 shook up the foundations of the Habsburg Monarchy, particularly in Hungary, Garašanin started to consider the possibility of an uprising that would not be confined to Turkey-in-Europe, but rather aimed at the liberation of the Serb provinces in both the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire and their unification with Serbia. Fearing that the revolution might spill over into the Ottoman European provinces, Russia advised the Serbian government that “the Prince and the leadership should not take part in the designs of the Austrian Slavs or in the unrest in Bosnia which may be expected to ensue”. French diplomacy also believed that Serbia might take advantage of the 1848 Revolution to dislodge the

¹³ Jaroslav Šidak, “‘Tajna politika’ Lj. Gaja i postanak njegovih ’memoranduma’ knezu Metternichu 1846–1847”, in: *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoljeća*, pp. 195–220.

¹⁴ Lj. Durković-Jakšić, “Gajev pokušaj da izdaje ‘Narodne novine’ ćirilicom”, *Istorijski časopis*, vol. IV (1952–1953) (Belgrade: Istorijiski Institut, 1954), pp. 95–128.

Ottomans from Serbia (pursuant to the terms of the 1833 *Hatt-i sherif*) and unite with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus endeavoured to discourage her from taking any steps in that direction. Serbia was advised to refrain from interfering with the issue of Austrian Serbs because their struggle for autonomy would only benefit “Russian pan-Slavism” and its aspiration to create a new Serbian duchy (*Vojvodina*) on the Danube that would be completely dependent on Russia.

In the struggle for fundamental national rights, which were demanded as a minimum of human and civil rights by all European nations in 1848, the Serbs in southern Hungary were bound to come into conflict with the Hungarians. They were not treated as a minority, but as an ethnic group that formed an integral part of the Hungarian “political nation”, i.e. of the Hungarian nation. The refusal of the leadership of the Hungarian revolution to provide for the Serbs the same rights they asked for themselves from Vienna (the Serbs also demanded the right to use their language and the autonomy of ecclesiastical assemblies) gave an impetus to the extension of the Serbian national programme.

The May Assembly of the Austrian Serbs held in Sremski Karlovci in 1848 put forward two central demands: firstly, the creation of the “Serbian Vojvodina” (Serbian Duchy) as an autonomous region (Srem, Banat, Bačka with Baranja, including the parts of the Military Frontier in these provinces) within the Kingdom of Hungary and under the Habsburg Crown; and secondly, the restoration of the Serbian Patriarchate considering that the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy enjoyed special status reconfirmed by imperial privileges on a regular basis from 1690 onwards. The Metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci was elevated to the status of a Serbian patriarch while Stevan Šupljikac, a Military Frontier officer, was elected for duke of the Serbian Duchy. The Serbian Vojvodina entered political alliance with the Zagreb-based Croatian movement and the Austrian officer, Josip Jelačić, was invested as *Ban* of Croatia by the Serbian Patriarch, Josif Rajačić, in lieu of the absent Bishop of Zagreb.¹⁵

The Hungarian government responded to the demands of the May Assembly of the Vojvodina Serbs by force of arms. The Serbo-Hungarian conflict was fought, with varying fortunes, around Szenttamás

¹⁵ D. Stranjaković, *La Collaboration des Croates et des Serbes en 1848–49* (Paris: Hermann, 1935), 12 p.

(subsequently renamed Srbobran [Serbian Shield] because of the Serbs' resolute resistance), Titel, Vršac and Bečkerek. For the Serbian side, the struggle was of emancipatory nature. On the whole, however, the conflict fought in ethnically mixed regions was somewhat of a civil war with its attendant reprisals against civilians taken by both sides. Challenged by the Hungarian revolution, the government in Vienna followed the suggestions of the Habsburg administration of the Military Frontier and the Austrian Consul in Belgrade and backed the aspirations of the Austrian Serbs by recognizing, albeit for tactical purposes, the proclaimed Serbian Vojvodina as an autonomous region under the Habsburg realm.

Although the strong social aspect of the Hungarian revolution was a matter of some concern to the Constitutionals, at one point the revolution did *de facto* efface the centuries-old border between the Ottoman Empire (and the autonomous Principality of Serbia) and the Habsburg Monarchy along the Sava and Danube rivers. Serbia was swept by national ferment and there was a general eagerness to help the fellow co-nationals in Serbian Vojvodina. Hosts of people offered their civilian or military services to the Serbian Main Committee in Vojvodina; the Constitutionals sent a delegation to the May Assembly; and General Stevan Knićanin, a prominent figure of the Constitutionals regime, and his 8,000-strong volunteer force were given permission to cross the border and join the Serbian fighters.¹⁶

The support to the freshly-proclaimed Serbian Vojvodina and the volunteers dispatched to join the struggle against the assimilatory aspirations of Hungarian nationalists added to the prestige of Serbia among the Serbs not only in the Danube Basin, but also in the Military Frontier and in Croatia-Slavonia. Closer ties were established and an agreement concluded between the two Serb principalities, Serbia and Montenegro. Belgrade's vision expanded to encompass the neighbouring peoples: the idea of a union between Bulgaria and Serbia was mooted for the first time.¹⁷

The Serbian government, in which Garašanin was still the most influential figure, was cautious because the outcome of the Austro-

¹⁶ Slavko Gavrilović, "Srbi u revoluciji 1848–1849", *Istraživanja*, Novi Sad, 1976, 231–294.

¹⁷ More details are given in the still valuable monograph: Dragoljub Pavlović, *Srbija i srpski pokret u južnoj Ugarskoj 1848. i 1849.* (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1904).

Hungarian conflict was uncertain and because of Russia's open opposition to any revolutionary action. The political weight of Serbia, however, was growing beyond her actual potential. The French Consul described the situation as follows: "Serbia is the focal point of independence for the South Slavs. The Yugoslav future depends on her. The eyes of all Slavs of Turkey, Austria and, to an extent, Poland are turned to her." Increasingly relying on France in his policy of emancipation from Austria and Russia, Garašanin sought to avoid further conflict with the Hungarians. He wanted to prevent their revolution turning into conflict with the Serbs rather than a struggle against Austria. On the eve of St. Peter's Day Assembly (*Petrovska skupština*) in 1848 held in Belgrade, France lobbied through Zwierkowski, who was a temporary replacement for Zach in Belgrade, for the ousting of Russian influence. It was feared that Serbia might come under the protectorate of Russia just as Wallachia had. Garašanin could not deny unofficial support to the Serbian movement in its armed conflict with the Hungarians. He was aware that Austrian diplomacy was playing a double game with the Serbian Vojvodina and rightly believed that Vienna's endorsement of Serbian demands would only last until the revolution had been suppressed. Therefore, Garašanin advised the Patriarch Josif Rajačić, the spiritual and political leader of the Serbs of Vojvodina, to try to reach an understanding with the Hungarians. Seeking to facilitate a Hungaro-Italian alliance against Austria, Garašanin even agreed to the opening of the consulate of the Kingdom of Sardinia in Belgrade (1849–50).¹⁸

During 1848 Prince Czartoryski was trying in vain to mobilise Hungarians to cooperate with the Serbs and other national and ethnic groups in Hungary in order to form a common block of resistance against the dominating Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. At the instigation of the Polish emigration and France, Garašanin had talks with the emissary of the Hungarian government, Gyula Andrásy, which were attended by a Croat representative, Dragojlo Kušlan from Zagreb. Even after the Russian intervention in Hungary had quelled the revolution in 1849 and put an end to the Serbo-Hungarian talks on the redefining of the status of the Serb provinces in Panonia, Garašanin did not sever his ties with

¹⁸ The consulate of Sardinia was closed down in 1850, a year after the collapse of the Hungarian revolution.

Hungarians and hospitably received political émigrés from subjugated Hungary in Belgrade.¹⁹

Garašanin's animosity against the Austrians in the revolutionary turmoil of 1848–1849 was without doubt consistent with and within the scope of the ideas expounded in *Načertanije*. However, he never believed that the Hungarians could defeat the Austrians, particularly after the Habsburgs had obtained the backing of Russia. Furthermore, Garašanin was dissatisfied with the Austrian victories over the rebelled Hungarians, apart from the cases when these victories were lessening the Hungarian pressure on the Serbs in Vojvodina.²⁰

The support extended to the Serbian movement in Vojvodina against the Hungarian policy of assimilation could have left the impression that Garašanin abandoned the ideas laid down in *Načertanije* since he appeared to have acted in the interest of the Habsburg Monarchy. Garašanin resolutely refuted such a view by claiming that he was forced into such political position in the unexpectedly complex circumstances during and after the 1848 Revolution. Furthermore, Garašanin refused to receive an Austrian decoration, emphasising that the support of the Serbs from Serbia to the fellow Serbs in Vojvodina was above all motivated by national solidarity. For Serbia, her overall influence north of her borders on the Sava and the Danube in the Habsburg-held provinces inhabited by Serbs had a strong moral and cultural significance. For the first time since 1813 Serbia had affected events beyond the restraining boundaries of an Ottoman *pashalik*, pursuing a national policy and asserting herself as an important political factor in the Serb-inhabited provinces in southern Hungary under Habsburg realm. The Serbs of the Danube basin now easily crossed the imperial borders and became more closely connected, and their cooperation and exchange in all areas of life was incomparably more intense than before 1848. As a result, the idea of a union of Serbs grew considerably stronger. Although they lived in different empires, it

¹⁹ G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine*, pp. 123–128. Cf. also: Slavko Gavrilović, "Ilija Garašanin i Madjari revolucionarne 1848/49 godine. Prema objavljenoj Garašaninovoj prepisci" in: *Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874)*, pp. 209–224.

²⁰ S. Gavrilović, "Ilija Garašanin i Madjari revolucionarne 1848/49 godine. Prema objavljenoj Garašaninovoj prepisci", p. 222.

was believed that Serbs in both Serbia and Vojvodina could not but share the same national destiny.²¹

Considering that the geopolitical situation had changed radically by the 1848 Revolution, Garašanin set out with more energy and enthusiasm to put the ideas of *Načertanije* into practice. His main goal remained the unification of the Serbian provinces of Turkey-in-Europe with Serbia. Following Garašanin's instructions, Konstantin Nikolajević, a Serbian representative in Constantinople, drew up a memorandum in March 1848 known as the project of a "Serbian Vice-Kingdom" ("United Serbian Provinces"): it envisaged the unification of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Old Serbia with Serbia into a "single Serbian state" within the Ottoman Empire; it would have its "head of state and independent state administration" and enjoy the same rights as the Principality of Serbia; it would have the right to pass its own Constitution and to have its army; it would provide for religious freedom; it would communicate with Ottoman central authorities through its representative in Constantinople. Nikolajević's utterly utopian project, which might be seen as an attempt to verify publicly the ideas contained in the secret document *Načertanije*, was expectedly rejected by both the Sultan and Austrian diplomatic representatives. Nikolajević's argument that the project was justified by the need to thwart Russia's plans for the division of the Ottoman Empire was discarded as irrelevant.²²

In March 1849, Garašanin, in collaboration with Jovan Marinović, Tomo Kovačević and Matija Ban, drew up an action plan titled "Rules of political propaganda to be carried out in the Ottoman Slavic lands" (*Ustav političke propagande imajući se voditi u zemljama slaveno-turskim*), the purpose of which was to facilitate a "wide-ranging and simultaneous rise to arms" of the oppressed people. The area covered by the plan comprised Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, northern Albania (Mirdites and Mallisori areas), western Bulgaria and, in the territory under the

²¹ G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine*, pp. 128–139.

²² There are two versions of this project in the Archives of Serbia, Papers of Ilija Garašanin: no 1847 and 1849. The document was first published by Milorad Ekmečić. Cf. M. Ekmečić, "Garašanin, Čartorijski i Madjari 1848–1849. godine" in: *Srpsko-madžarski odnosi i saradnja 1848–1867* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1987), pp. 29–32. See also Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, № 5418 IV, 1846, Correspondance of M. Czajkowski, pp. 67–70, 237–239, 389–300; 5387 III, 1848, pp. 8–10, 106–107.

Habsburg rule, Dalmatia and the Military Frontier in Croatia-Slavonia. The whole area was divided into the southern and northern sectors, which were further subdivided into "sections", "districts" and "places" (towns and villages). The hierarchical structure was headed by Ilija Garašanin, assisted by Jovan Marinović, and variously titled persons were responsible for each territorial unit. "Rules of guerrilla warfare" were translated from Polish language by Matija Ban and printed in Belgrade at the expense of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević. It was through this secret activities that a government-funded propaganda campaign was launched.²³

Between 1849, when the Hungarian revolution was quelled with Russia's help, and 1853, when Garašanin, labelled as a dangerous Francophile of anti-Russian orientation, was dismissed from office at the express request of Russia, the established network of Serbia's supporters was highly active in Turkey-in-Europe, including Bulgaria, the borderland areas of which had a mixed Serbian-Bulgarian population. Secret centres were established in a large number of places, and trusted persons were deployed along the border to ensure safe channels for transferring agents, communication and intelligence gathering. In 1850, a Serbian "agent" (the head of a "section") was seated in the Bulgarian town of Vidin, which had a large Serbian community, and the heads of "districts" were located at Berkovica, Lom Palanka, Sofia and four other places. Although a general uprising against the Ottoman rule was not yet on the cards, supporters were actively recruited, weapons collected and fighting units secretly organised. Garašanin's plan envisaged that the recruited supporters organised in their military formations would, after having been called upon from Belgrade, rise to arms across Turkey-in-Europe, opening several fronts simultaneously. However, the stabilisation of the situation in the Habsburg Monarchy and in Europe in general led in 1851 to the decision to shelve the plans for uprising.

Serbia and the French Balkan policy

Urged by the Polish emigration, French diplomacy sought to continue its support to Garašanin's plans as regards Turkey-in-Europe. French confidence in Serbia rested on the fact that she alone among the Slav

²³ D. Stranjaković, *Politička propaganda Srbije u jugoslovenskim pokrajinama 1848–1858* (Belgrade: Štamparija Drag. Gregorića, 1936), pp. 5–21.

peoples in the Balkans had a legitimate government. Serbia was considered a focal point for a gathering that might be even broader than that laid down by Garašanin in his *Načertanije*.²⁴ The French government sent a memorandum to one of its diplomats in Constantinople, which contained the following assessments: “Among the population of Turkey, Serbia holds the first place. By her geographical and political position, by the warlike character of her populace and by her historic monuments, Serbia is destined to become the core of a new state composed of the Turkish Slavs, Slovenes, Croats, population of Carniola, etc. (Austrian subjects). The sense of such future of Serbia is general and profound in all of these populaces; if one remembers that Croatia, annexed to the Hungarian crown [in 1102], has recently begun to vacillate in terms of nationality in the Serbian direction and that she [Serbia] exerts a powerful influence on other Slavic lands in Austria, such as Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks etc., who, not without reason, see their own liberation in the establishing of a Slavic state, one will easily understand the importance of Serbia in the movement of the Slavic peoples of Turkey.” The French government substantiated these assessments by claiming that “Serbia exerts a strong influence on the Illyrian provinces in Austria, such as Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, the regions that supply Austria with up to 60,000 most warlike infantrymen. Serbia awakens the spirit of nationality and the desire for liberation in them, and can give a strong impetus to the liberation of Galicia. The position of Dalmatia in the Italian war of independence proves this truth. Serbia’s predominant influence is even stronger in Bulgaria.”²⁵

Furthermore, the Polish agent L. Bystrzonowski, in a letter to Quai d’Orsay sent from Sremski Karlovci during the 1848 Revolution (22 November 1848), concluded the following:

“La lutte des Croates est assez obscure, celles de Serbie est franchement nationale...Les Serbes ont encore cette avantage que c’est un peuple purement démocratique; pas de noblesse et de clergé riche et corrompus, l’intelligence q’accompagne ordinairement l’aisance donne droit et moyen d’arriver a tout. Dans toutes les combinaisons, la nationalité serbe doit être

²⁴ For more see Vasilj Popović, *Politika Francuske i Austrije na Balkanu u vreme Napoleona III* (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1925), pp. 48–56.

²⁵ G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine*, pp. 130–131.

encourager car elle sera un membre excessivement utile et important pour la civilisation.”²⁶

Therefore, Garašanin's propaganda activity in Turkey-in-Europe fitted well into France's broader policy in the region, given that she championed the principle of nationality on which Serbia also insisted as the basis for Serb unification. Yet, France seems to have prodded Garašanin, perhaps to ambitiously, towards a broader South-Slav policy. On one occasion in 1849, the French Consul told Garašanin that Serbia was the “focal point for South Slav independence” on which the Yugoslav future depended: Serbia was the only legitimate Slav government in Europe and all the Slavs in Austria and Turkey, and even in Poland, to certain extent, looked to her for salvation. Garašanin stated to a French military envoy from Constantinople that Serbia expected her progress to go hand in hand with the progress of the Slavs in Turkey: “We want our people to progress, and if the Sublime Porte is not willing to do that for us peacefully, then we shall use all sorts of means.” He confided that Serbia had thirty-one guns and would cast more in order to have two artillery batteries and that she was able to muster 150,000 or perhaps even 200,000 good soldiers in the event of a broader conflict. Various political options considered in Belgrade involved the separation of Vojvodina from Austria and its unification with Serbia, which was a proposal made by the Austrian Serbs in August 1848, as well as the project of a Serbian Vice-Kingdom, which Garašanin preferred and fastidiously worked on with the representatives of the Polish emigration in Constantinople.²⁷

Garašanin found it particularly important to foster religious tolerance among the Balkan Slavs, and his agents were instructed to “ensure that the ill-feeling that exists between the Serbs of the Eastern and of the Western [Christian] confession is eradicated” and “that the Muslims are equal to the Christians in every respect”. It was considered necessary to demonstrate in Bosnia-Herzegovina that “no force of events has ever been or will be able to separate one people [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] from another [in Serbia], the people which must be considered as being one and

²⁶ Suzanne Champonnois, “Ludwik Bystrzonowski, l'Hotel Lambert et la diplomatie française dans les Balkans (1840–1849)”, p. 56.

²⁷ Archives of Czartoryski, Krakow, № 5404 IV A. J. Czartoryski on the situation in the Balkans after the Hungarian revolution 1849, pp. 529–533. G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine*, p. 133.

belonging to a single family not only by its position and its history, but also by its name and its language”.²⁸

Garašanin's inclination towards France as a friendly power whose political goals in the Balkans were in many ways compatible with those of Serbia materialised into his visit to Paris in spring 1852. On that occasion, he had two important meetings with Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, the President of the French Second Republic (and later Emperor Napoleon III), and made contact with other influential French statesmen.

In May 1852, Garašanin met with the French Foreign Minister Turgot and his assistant Thouvenel as well as the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Lavallette, who happened to be in Paris at the time. He paid courtesy calls on both the Ottoman and Russian Ambassador to France and also met the leader of the Polish emigration, Czartoryski, whose *Conseils* and agents in Serbia and Constantinople, as well as his diplomatic mediation in London and Paris had been very useful to him, especially between 1842 and 1848. Garašanin informed his French collocutors that Serbia had been stepping up the training of administrative cadre in France, Prussia and Austria, that a military school had been established and its top-class cadets would be sent to France for specialisation, and that Serbia had been preparing an ambitious project to ensure a trade route to the Adriatic Sea. He assured them that, with more trust on the part of the Sublime Porte, much progress could be made because Serbia would ensure that “Russian and anyone else’s plans in this region are done away with completely and soon”. As for Serbia’s influence among the Balkan Christians, Garašanin stressed that the latter should be aware of the benefit they would have from Serbia in the near future and had better learn that their liberation depended on themselves, and not on any policy of Russia or Austria. Garašanin also told French President, Louis-Napoleon, that Serbian influence among the Balkan Christians, which had often been a matter of criticism coming from Russia and Austria, was in fact a means to oust these two powers from Turkey-in-Europe.²⁹

Garašanin was held in high esteem in France as the best and ablest Serbian politician. Turgot and Thouvenel assured him that his every

²⁸ G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *op. cit.*, 133–134; D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 243–245.

²⁹ G. Jakšić, “Sastanak Ilije Garašanina i Luja Napoleona”, *Politika*, Belgrade, 6–9 January 1934, p. 9.

letter would be carefully read and brought to Louis-Napoleon's notice. They made clear to Garašanin that France had no interest of her own in Turkey-in-Europe and stated that "it is our pleasure to see your future fortified and secured from Turkey which is already melting away and from Austria and Russia which are intent on establishing their dominance there. You can make a state independently of your protective power and of anyone's influence [...]"³⁰ Garašanin enquired about the possibility of a peaceful separation of Bosnia from the Ottoman Empire and unification with Serbia, but he was only assured that Paris would support Serbia's emancipation from Russian protection and dependence on the Porte. Louis-Napoleon, for his part, professed:

It is my great pleasure to be notified that Serbia follows a mode of governance which leads her to a good future and I can assure You that France will support more than ever the intentions of Your Prince and government in all that may lead Your people towards the position of independence.³¹

After Garašanin's downfall in March 1853 due to strong Russian pressure, France chose not to extend any tangible support to Serbia and focused her efforts on separating Serbia from Russia and keeping her neutral in the forthcoming Crimean War (1853–56).³² Garašanin remained, however, perturbed about the potential increasing Austrian hostility: "Serbia must always regard Austria as bitter poison from which if Serbia is not preserved she may be poisoned fatally. Austria can never aid Serbia to progress but must rather oppose her as much as possible. That is her natural policy. Having so many Serbs and other Slavs who border on us, Austria is bound to fear Serbia's advancement."³³

In spite of his strong attachment to French policy in the Balkans, Garašanin did not follow it blindly; he criticised some of the Quai d'Orsay's decisions and was particularly dissatisfied with the 1856 Treaty

³⁰ D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, p. 245.

³¹ G. Jakšić & D. Stranjaković, *Srbija od 1813 do 1858. godine* pp. 147–148. For more details see Ljiljana Aleksić, "Francuski uticaji u spoljašnjoj i unutrašnjoj politici Srbije za vreme Krimskog rata (1853–1856)", *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XI (1960), 55–87.

³² D. T. Bataković, "La Serbie au temps du Traité de Paris : un pas vers l'Europe", in: G. Amiel, E. Nathan et G.-H. Soutou, eds., *Le Congrès de Paris (1856). Un événement fondateur* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang & Direction des Archives, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2009), pp. 133–150.

³³ D. Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismark*, p. 143.

of Paris which transferred the protection of Serbia from one Great Power, Russia, to all European Great Powers, thus providing Austria with further opportunities to interfere with Serbia's internal affairs. Garašanin even feared that Serbia could be reduced to an Austrian protectorate in case of the pending international conflict. In this connection, he was particularly weary of the attitude to be taken by Prince Alexander who was completely under the spell of his Austrian Serb advisors, *Nemačkari*: "The Prince has yielded wholly to the influence of Austria and the Germans [*Nemačkari*] and with them [...] believes that he can direct the fate of the Serbian people. [...] Through these two foreign sources, the Prince seeks to protect and demonstrate his rights."³⁴

During his second visit to Paris in 1855, Garašanin went as far as submitting a memorandum to the French government proposing the substitution of the undoubtedly pro-Austrian Prince Alexander Karadjordjević for a foreign prince or a Serbian politician of the people's choosing. The Serbian question was again on the agenda at the Quai d'Orsay during Garašanin's third visit to Paris in 1857. On the eve of the St Andrew's Day Assembly in 1858, the French diplomats held Garašanin to have been the most serious candidate for a new ruler of Serbia. In November 1861, Garašanin's envoys negotiated in Paris about the purchase of arms, and Foreign Minister Thouvenel enquired if Serbia would instigate a rebellion in Turkey-in-Europe in the spring with the support of Balkan Christians. The French Minister also enquired if "Serbia and Montenegro will form a federation or a larger state will be formed in the south which will then be joined by other peoples of Turkey-in-Europe".³⁵

In the summer of 1862, Garašanin's envoy, Miloje Lešjanin, a high official in the Foreign Ministry, was on the mission to Paris which followed the Ottoman bombardment of Belgrade. He was entrusted with a task to find out if France would extend not only diplomatic, but also military aid in the event of further escalation. Thouvenel replied that French troops could not be "sent by balloon", that France was exhausted by the previous wars in Italy and that it was now up to Russia to be Serbia's main support in having her demands to the Sublime Porte fulfilled. Thouvenel warned Serbia against making a serious mistake of resolving the issues

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³⁵ D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 244–247.

with the Ottomans by force of arms because it would expose her to public condemnation throughout Europe. The French Foreign Minister talked in the same vain to the Greek envoy in Paris, Botsaris, remarking that the liberation from the Ottomans would not be possible until both Serbia and Greece were politically and militarily prepared and reached an agreement with other Balkan Christians. Lešjanin was of opinion that Thouvenel had tacitly complied with “the principle of non-interference” on the part of Great Powers in case of the conclusion of a Balkan alliance and large-scale uprising of the Balkan Christians against the Ottomans.³⁶

Garašanin's anti-Austrian and pro-Balkan Policy

Although Garašanin was accused in 1848 of pursuing a policy which was grist for Austria's mill, he showed clearly, in several critical situations that arose after 1848–49, that in line with the principles laid down in the *Načertanije* he still perceived the Habsburg Empire as the main enemy of Serbia and Serb interests in the Balkans. When on the eve of and during the Crimean War Austria threatened to invade Serbia and capture Belgrade in response to Serbia's practicing military manoeuvres and the increasing arming of troops, Garašanin blamed the Austrian government's threats for forcing Serbia to prepare herself for defence. Despite the advice from the French and British Consulates, Garašanin steadfastly justified Serbia's right to protect her vital interests: he claimed that the Principality had been poorly armed before *Die Monarchie's* had made its threats and that the menacing deployment of considerable Austrian troops along the border had compelled the Serbian government to step up its preparations for defensive purposes. When Austria joined the Western Powers in the Crimean War, accusing Serbia of not being distanced enough from Russia, Garašanin wisely concluded that France and Britain were “more concerned about whether we are loyal to the Porte than whether we have given in to Austria”. If there was any question as to who the Serbs' loyalties lay with, Garašanin wrote to the envoy in Constantinople, then the Serbs prefer the Ottomans to any other master.³⁷

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću*, vol. I (from 29 March 1848 to 31 December 1858), ed. by St. Lovčević (Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1931), pp. 120–125, 196–198, 202–205.

Vienna had never forgiven Garašanin for having refused an Austrian decoration and for having allowed the passage through Serbia of Polish and Italian legions, Lajos Kossuth's wife and many émigrés who had fought against Austria. The Austrian government denounced Garašanin as a revolutionary dangerous to the peace in the Balkans. Under the pro-Austrian Prince Alexander, Austria depicted Garašanin as Russia's most formidable opponent in Serbia, and during the second reign of Prince Michael she described him to western governments as Russophile. Vienna saw Garašanin as a friend of Lajos Kossuth, a supporter of Hungarian political plans for the Balkans and Serbo-Hungarian cooperation at the expense of Austrian interests. During his visit to Vienna in 1851, Garašanin was received by the Foreign Minister, Prince of Schwarzenberg, who did not fail to remind him of his assistance to Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries. While passing through Austria on his way to Swiss spas or Paris, which he visited three times, Garašanin was more than once subjected to humiliating search of personal belongings by the police, but he endured these slights with stoic dignity.³⁸

In 1854, the Austrian Consul in Belgrade reported that Garašanin plotted with the Hungarian emigration against the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. The Consul claimed that the Ottomans, in their short-sightedness, were helping Garašanin and his essentially revolutionary plans because of the fear that Serbia might come under the exclusive influence of Austria. For that reason, Vienna, prevented Garašanin from representing Serbia at an international conference in 1855. Garašanin, for his part, stated that the Austrian Consul would not consider his job in Serbia done until he had all Serbs of some political weight eliminated from office.³⁹ During the St Andrew's Day Assembly in December 1858, Austria spared no effort to prevent Garašanin, seen as a friend of France, and Toma Vučić-Perišić, considered a friend of Russia, from replacing the deposed Prince Alexander Karadjordjević.⁴⁰

Upon his return to power (1861–67), Garašanin resumed his efforts to establish good relations and basis for cooperation with the Hungarians with a view to counterbalancing the increasing Austrian pressure on Serbia.

³⁸ D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 233–235.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 234–236.

⁴⁰ Vasilj Popović, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–111.

Hungarian politicians needed Serbia to mediate in their dispute with the Serbs of Vojvodina, but they feared the success of Serbia in the event of a conflict with the Ottomans. It was believed in Pest that such success would have dangerous implications for Hungarian interests not only in Vojvodina, but also in other Serb-inhabited areas which had been looking to Serbia for the attainment of national unity. In his negotiations with the Hungarians, Garašanin took a very cautious stance. He was aware that while they were clamouring for their national rights and political equality with Vienna, the Hungarians forced centralized administration and Magyarization on other nationalities in Hungary, including the Serbs.⁴¹

Garašanin's Balkan policy was entirely focused on facilitating a joint anti-Ottoman effort of the Balkan independent and autonomous states and national movements within Turkey-in-Europe. For Garašanin, the question was not how long the Ottoman Empire would last, but rather when the Balkan Christians would unite, because "From that moment, [Ottoman] Turkey would no longer exist in the Balkans". Until then, Garašanin felt, the Balkan countries should assist each other at times of crisis. Their mutual agreement was a fundamental factor in their common resistance. In Garašanin's words, oozing with over-confidence, "We should never let an enemy attack us [Balkan states] one by one, because even [Ottoman] Turkey on its own would then crush us with its might."

According to Garašanin, the Balkans had to stand its ground against the attack of any Great Power. Therefore, France was of particular importance to him since it did not have any pretensions to spreading her sphere of influence in the Balkans. Throughout his career as a statesman, Garašanin was primarily fearful of Austria and Russia, and sought to procure their guarantees that they would not meddle in the affairs of the Balkans during and after the final showdown with the Ottoman Empire and remain neutral. Garašanin was, however, aware of the somewhat utopian nature of this request, but he hoped that Great Powers' rivalries would cancel out their respective influences and spare the Balkans of their full-scale confrontation at the time of Turkey-in-Europe's partition amongst the Balkan states and nations. The strong and independent South-Eastern Europe with firmly established borders between the countries, with access to the seas and enough fertile land for self-sufficient economic development

⁴¹ D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 235–237.

would considerably consolidate the political situation and provide for peace and long-term stability in the previously volatile Balkans.⁴²

Following the collapse of the Metternich regime in 1848, Garašanin ceased to invoke the historical right of Serbia to restore her independence, as it was the case with *Načertanije*, but rather insisted on the French principle of nationality. The inspiration for Garašanin's Balkan policy, in spite of the internal weakness of Serbia and the lack of tangible external support, stemmed from the Austro-Sardinian war in 1859 in which Piedmont became a leading force in the struggle for Italian unification. In a memorandum submitted to the Prince, something of a blueprint for his policy after 1861, Garašanin underlined the following:

We should prepare secretly areas around Serbia for an imminent movement against [Ottoman] Turkey, chiefly by gathering them under our leadership and by creating calm. We should send agents to ascertain the status of Ottoman forces everywhere around Serbia as far as Sofia. [...] We must as soon as possible depart from the uncertainty in which we now find ourselves regarding external events generally. This policy needs to be determined precisely and we need to operate steadfastly and always consistently. [...] In order for the government to act properly and consistently, it must first of all decide which goal it wishes to achieve, then the means by which it will move toward that goal. That goal can be no other than to destroy Ottoman Turkey and expand the frontiers of Serbia.⁴³

Along with Vučić-Perišić, Garašanin was instrumental in deposing Prince Alexander Karadjordjević in 1858 and restoring the Obrenović dynasty. The old Prince Miloš died in 1860 and was succeeded by his son Michael. After his nearly twenty years of exile, Michael had grown from oriental prince to an enlightened European statesman committed to the idea of unification of the Serbian and South-Slavic lands under the leadership of the Obrenović dynasty. The preparations for a joint Christian uprising in Turkey-in-Europe, the motivating force of the foreign policy of the Principality of Serbia between 1860 and 1867, were once again in the hands of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ilija Garašanin. In addition to *Načertanije*, he was now also guided by some other, more

⁴² D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 239–248. See more in: Radoš Ljušić, “Ilija Garašanin on Serbia's Statehood”, *Balkanica*, XXXIX (2008), Belgrade 2009, pp. 131–174.

⁴³ D. Mackenzie, “Ilija Garašanin, Serbia's National Leader” in: *Serbs and Russians*, pp. 99–100.

ambitious, ideas which had seemed politically unfeasible to him in 1844: “the Balkans to the Balkan peoples”, with a Balkan alliance as the main instrument for realisation of such idea and “Serbia [as] the pivot of the Yugoslav movement”. Both ideas had a bearing on Garašanin’s policy regarding not only the Italo-Hungarian plans for the Balkans, but also the Russian Slavophiles’ aspirations to galvanise the Balkan Slavs through the ideology of pan-Slavism. In 1866, Garašanin expressly stated to the French Consul in Belgrade that “we are not Russians, as I hear we are accused of being in Paris, we are Serbs and wish to remain so; we have always pursued a national policy; but to achieve the goal we have set ourselves we have to use every means.”⁴⁴

Garašanin considered, somewhat naively, that the agreements between the Slav peoples—primarily between the Serbs and Bulgarians—would not be difficult to achieve in the framework of a confederation in which “everyone is the master in his own home, and in the common state both the Serbian and the Bulgarian people are strong and equal”. For Greece, he foresaw the creation of a defensive alliance with the Serbo-Bulgarian confederation, while it was in the vital interest of all three nations that Romania joined this alliance. During the negotiations with Greece, Serbia assumed a characteristic attitude of Bulgarian older and protective brother. This would prove to be a major miscalculation, since from the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate as an autonomous church organization in 1870 onwards, a few years after the creation of the Balkan alliance forged by Garašanin in 1866–68, the Bulgarians, supported by Russia and Austria, lay claims on all the regions of Macedonia that Belgrade considered indisputably Serbian territory and vital to the relations with Greece and an outlet to the Aegean sea through the allied Greece.

The Law on the National Army passed under Prince Michael in 1861 was intended to prepare Serbia for her ambitious foreign policy. All men aged between twenty and fifty years were enlisted for military service, but their training was carried out on municipal level, and only on Sundays and holidays, due to the lack of financial means and training camp facilities. Five command centres were established, each with its headquarters and professional officers; other officers were selected from the ranks of veteran soldiers and able individuals and appointed by local authorities. The soldiers had to fend for the clothing, footwear and food

⁴⁴ D. Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin*, pp. 253–254.

themselves; the authorities only provided training and weapons. The law made it possible for Serbia to mobilise an army of more than 50,000 men in a short period of time. In April 1862, the Army Ministry was founded and entrusted to Major Hyppolite Mondain, a French engineer officer who had been invited to Serbia to help organize her army.⁴⁵

In 1866, the Serbian army consisted of sixteen brigades, and fourteen artillery batteries with four guns each. In 1863 and 1866, the government purchased 86,000 rifles from Russia. Yet, the army was more impressive in terms of its numerical strength than combat capability. There was a lack of proper training, modern weapons and professional officers. The Artillery School founded in 1850 was able to produce about a dozen officers a year, while 1,800 was deemed necessary. Medical, supply and intelligence services were not established. The manoeuvres carried out in 1866 and 1868 showed that the army had manpower but it was a far cry from a modern European-type armed force. For all its serious shortcomings, the army rekindled the fighting spirit among the people and added to Serbia's prestige abroad.⁴⁶

After having for years considered Russia an obstacle to the achievement of the Serbian broader national goals, as highlighted in the *Načertanije*, Garašanin now endeavoured to restore closer ties between Belgrade and St. Petersburg. Following its crushing defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russia was again an avid supporter of the anti-Ottoman movements of Balkan Christians, in order to re-establish the lost influence in Serbia. In 1862, Garašanin sent Serbian Assistant Minister of Justice to Russia in order to obtain a favourable loan and rifles for Serbia: with 300,000 ducats and 30,000 muskets sold to Serbia, the ambitious plans of Prince Michael Obrenović for war against the Ottomans were translated into military planning.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ In 1853–54, the French government entrusted Hyppolite Mondain with a task of examining Serbian defence capabilities during the Crimean crisis. Mondain who became a close friend of Garašanin remained a French officer during his service in Serbia as Minister of War (1862–65). See Života Djordjević, *Srpska narodna vojska. Studije o uredjenju narodne vojske Srbije, 1861–1864* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1984), pp. 223–248.

⁴⁶ Draga Vuksanović-Anić, *Stvaranje moderne srpske vojske: francuski uticaji na njeno formiranje* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga & Vojnoizdavački novinski centar, 1993), pp. 44–60.

⁴⁷ The shipment of 39,200 rifles from Russia through Romania proved to be rather difficult task later in 1862 (D. Mackenzie, "Ilija Garašanin, Serbia's National leader", p. 101).

Political propaganda throughout Turkey-in-Europe was resumed and further stimulated. In early 1862, Garašanin set up the “Serbian Committee” for national propaganda which was chaired by Lazar Arsenijević Batalaka and answerable only to Garašanin.⁴⁸ Its purpose was to mobilise the Christians in Old Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, northern Albania and Bulgaria for a general uprising against the Ottomans and, as a further step, to spread propaganda to the Habsburg-held regions of Vojvodina, the Military Frontier, Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. Several proposals regarding the organisation of an uprising in Turkey-in-Europe submitted to the Serbian government in early 1862 mostly envisaged collaboration with the similar national Greek movements in Thessaly, Epirus, Thrace and Macedonia, and insurgents in Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁹

It was also in 1862 that a volunteer corps of 200 men from various Yugoslav lands in the Balkans was organised in Valjevo, a small town in western Serbia. The organisation of a “Bulgarian legion” was entrusted to the Bulgarian émigré Georgi Rakovski. According to the “Plan for the liberation of Bulgaria” drawn up in December 1861, the legion was supposed to cross over into Bulgaria at a given moment and instigate a rebellion. To this end, the “Bulgarian Interim Head Office”, a committee chaired by Rakovski, was set up in Belgrade in June 1862. Once the Bulgarian legion ignited Bulgaria and the Yugoslav corps did the same in Bosnia, Serbia would step in. Atanasije Nikolić advocated a Serbo-Greek alliance with a view to relieving the Ottoman pressure from Serbia which would allow her to fulfil “the task of unfurling the flag of freedom in Bulgaria and [...] to move into Bosnia.”⁵⁰ The preparations, encouraged by the effect that the Polish insurrection had in the Balkans, continued well into 1863.

Nevertheless, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a central place in all the Serbian plans. Agitation in those regions was mostly carried out by Christian Orthodox Serbs—who made up at least half the total

⁴⁸ The members of this committee were František Zach, a Polish agent in Belgrade until 1848 and afterwards a colonel in the Serbian army and director of the Artillery school, and Atanasije Nikolić, the retired Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs. The latter was responsible for both political and propaganda action.

⁴⁹ *Srbija i oslobodilački pokreti na Balkanu 1856–1866*, vol. I (1856–1866), V. Krestić & R. Ljušić, eds., Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost srpskog naroda, vol. XXXII (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1983), pp. 273–274.

⁵⁰ D. Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin*, p. 250.

population—and their popular leaders: teachers, priests and peasant elders. This agitation and preparation for a general struggle against social and national oppression under the Ottomans was especially encouraged by the news of the Christian Greek uprising in Crete in 1866. The Serbian public called its political leaders to spring into action and join forces with the Cretan rebels. The main committee for the coordination of a future revolt was established in Sarajevo in late 1866. The Serbian subcommittees were set up in towns, districts and villages throughout Bosnia, while a series of smaller Serb revolts were continuously brewing in eastern Herzegovina. The preparations for a Christian uprising amounted to making lists of people, selecting military leaders and collecting weapons. The appointed commanders were sent to Serbia for training; in early 1868, there were about a hundred of them in Serbia. In Herzegovina, the Serbian cause was actively supported by many distinguished local figures. The main political agent was the Archimandrite Seraphim Perović: his correspondence was maintained through the Russian Consulate in Mostar.⁵¹ In January 1867, Perović reported that France supported the unification of Crete with Greece. Encouraged by the news, the Serbian government considered the triggering of an uprising in Bosnia. At a cabinet meeting held in late February 1867, the decision was made to start an open war against the Ottomans and simultaneously spark a revolt in that province. Garašanin's man of confidence, Captain Antonije Orešković, developed a detailed action plan for Bosnia, envisaging the incursion of units from Serbia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, and a volunteer unit of Serbs from the Lika area in Military Frontier. Simultaneously, the Serbian government endeavoured to obtain the cession of Bosnia to Serbia under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Garašanin conducted diplomatic negotiations about this issue with the new Hungarian Prime Minister, Andrásy.⁵²

All these plans were resolutely opposed on the part of Vienna: Bosnia could be either Austrian or Ottoman possession. In early March 1867, under the pretext of Serbia's threatening attitude, the Vienna government concentrated troops along the southern border prepared to march into Bosnia and Herzegovina at the first sign of Serbian movement across the Drina River. Austria's threatening behaviour made any further Serbian

⁵¹ After having been discovered by the Ottomans in 1870, Serpahim Perović was deported to northern Africa, where his life was saved by the Greek Consul in Tripoli.

⁵² G. Jakšić & V. J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika kneza Mihaila 1860–1868. Prvi balkanski savez* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1962), pp.456–460.

action impossible and the Belgrade government was forced to keep a low profile. This coincided with the agreement between Russia and France to give up plans for the territorial enlargement of Greece. The opening of the Eastern question in the Balkans was put off once again.

With a rare tenacity, Garašanin continued to build the Balkan alliance between Montenegro, Greece, Romania and the Bulgarian revolutionaries. Unlike Prince Michael Obrenović, he was not discouraged when Great Powers single-handedly or together sought to curb the ambitious plans of Serbia in the Balkans. In November 1866, Garašanin's envoy, Jovan Marinović, passed on the message to Prince Gorchakoff in St. Petersburg that following the successful campaign against the Ottomans Serbia planned to keep for herself Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, and a portion of northern Albania.⁵³

Since mid-1860s Ilija Garašanin gradually expanded his plans which had hitherto concerned solely Turkey-in-Europe so as to include the South-Slav provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy. National action in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought Garašanin once more into closer contact with the broader Yugoslav question. Austria's defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866 and the ensuing crisis over her internal organisation induced Serbian statesmen to take the possibility of creating a common South-Slav state into consideration. Believing that the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy was now not so improbable as at the time of the drafting of *Načertanije*, Garašanin anticipated the emergence of three national states: Hungarian, Czech and South-Slav one. These could enter a confederation which could soon be joined by the Slavs from Turkey-in-Europe since the Ottoman Empire was not expected to outlast the Habsburg Monarchy for too long. Garašanin's grand vision was evidenced in a memorandum he sent to France in November 1866. The forthcoming disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, Garašanin asseverated. If the Western Powers tried to thwart the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, Russia would use it for her own purposes. It was a major mistake to think that the Balkan Christians would agree to being added to Austria, the gradual dissolution of which they had been observing since 1848. The Slavs in Austria wanted to prevent the hegemony of Germans and Hungarians; they would soon seek to form their own federation. Instead of working for

⁵³ G. Jakšić & V. J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika kneza Mihaila 1860–1868. Prvi balkanski savez.*, pp. 375–386.

the benefit of Austria, the Western Powers should endorse the creation of a large federation stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea which, with its population of forty million, would be a counterweight to Germany and Russia. It would be created gradually starting with a confederation of South Slavs, Greeks and Romanians to be subsequently joined by Czechs and Poles. The foundations for this confederation should be laid in the Balkans and in the eastern part of Austria.⁵⁴

In spite of all military preparations, observation posts throughout Turkey-in-Europe and intense negotiations with the Balkan states and their national movements, Garašanin remained very cautious and realistic in planning his next foreign policy steps. The impression that he was anxious to enter the war with the Ottomans stemming from the thorough preparations made was far from accurate. Garašanin remained focused on Turkey-in Europe, but rejected the possibility of entering the war against the Austrians during the Austro-Prussian War. For Garašanin, the precondition for a war against the Habsburg Empire was unification of the Serb-inhabited lands within Turkey-in-Europe, which would make Serbia a strong and sustainable state capable of confronting Vienna with a view to creating a common Yugoslav state with the Croats and Serbs from the Habsburg provinces.⁵⁵

Garašanin's efforts regarding a broader Yugoslav movement went through Croatian Bishop J. J. Strossmayer and his People's Party. In his capacity of Vicar Apostolic of Serbia, Strossmayer made several visits to Belgrade and he was cordially received. His People's Party advocated Croatia's independence of Hungary at the time of the Monarchy's transition to dualism in 1867. In the summer of 1866, Garašanin proposed through the agency of Antonije Orešković a "common action between the Triune Kingdom [the fictional creation consisting of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia which reflected the political aspirations of Croat patriots⁵⁶] and Serbia for the creation of a Yugoslav state independent of both Austria and Turkey".⁵⁷

⁵⁴ See more in: Dimitrije Djordjević, "Prospects for the Federation of South-East Europe in the 1860s and 1870s", *Balkanica*, vol. I (1970), pp. 119–146.

⁵⁵ See also Slobodan Jovanović, "Spoljašnja politika Ilije Garašanina", *Srpski književni glasnik*, Belgrade, 1931, pp. 422–431.

⁵⁶ In reality, Croatia and Slavonia were provinces of Hungary (Transleithania), while Dalmatia was a *Kronland* within Austrian part (Cisleithania) of the Habsburg Monarchy.

⁵⁷ G. Jakšić & V. J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika kneza Mihaila 1860–1868. Prvi balkanski savez*, pp. 356–363, 494–504.

Opposed to the dualist structure of the Habsburg Monarchy, the People's Party was very satisfied to count on Serbia's support, and Strossmayer accepted Garašanin's proposal. In early September 1866, the agreement was reached on the principles of collaboration: the liberation of Slavs living under the Ottoman and Austrian rule; the creation of a Yugoslav state; an alliance with the neighbouring Balkan peoples. In early 1867, Garašanin drew up a programme of common policy of Serbs and Croats, which Bishop Strossmayer received in March. The programme envisaged joint work for the liberation of Christians in Turkey-in-Europe and the unification of "all Yugoslavs into a single federal state", the internal organization of which would be determined consensually upon liberation. The movement would be led by Belgrade and Zagreb as its two pivots. Given that Serbia had its own independent government and organised army, she should be the locus of diplomatic and military activities which Zagreb would assist. The liberation movement should start in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1867. A provisional government which would be formed in that province at the very onset of the uprising would summon the Assembly and proclaim unification with Serbia. The rebel detachments would be prepared in Serbia, Montenegro, Slavonia and Dalmatia. For that purpose, the main committee would be set up in Zagreb to organise provision of supplies for the units from Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.⁵⁸

The leadership of the People's Party agreed to such programme and, in May 1867, formed the Main Committee in Zagreb and appointed an associate of Strossmayer, Matija Mrazović, at its head—who had already visited Belgrade in April. The proclamation of the Croatian Diet in May 1867 that "the Triune Kingdom recognizes the Serbian people living in it as a people identical and equal in rights to the Croat people" was along the lines of the agreed policy. Although still a dependent province within Hungary and lacking military potential and diplomatic impact (apart from Strossmayer's personal reputation), Croatia was, at the insistence of Garašanin, accepted in Serbia as an equal partner, which would contribute to achieving the unification of Serbs in Turkey-in-Europe within a Yugoslav state and laying sound foundations for a new Yugoslav nation.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Vasilije Krestić, *Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja u drugoj polovini XIX veka* (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988), pp. 288–292.

⁵⁹ Petar Korunić, *Jugoslavizam i federalizam u hrvatskom nacionalnom preporodu, 1835–1875* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), pp. 134–139.

A circular letter of the “Belgrade Central Committee on the Unification of All South Slavs to committees abroad” sent in March 1867 revealed Belgrade’s position regarding the organisation of a future Yugoslav state. It would encompass all the Ottoman and Austrian provinces in which the “Yugoslavs” made up the majority of population: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, northern Albania, Old Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, a large part of Rumelia, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, southern Styria and Carinthia. The centralized functions of the envisaged state would be national defence, finance, trade, legislation and foreign policy.

The foreign policy of Serbia in the Garašanin era can be divided in two distinct phases: the decade (1843–1853) under the rule of the pro-Austrian Prince Alexander Karadjordjević which saw Garašanin’s tenure of different state offices, and under the rule of the Russophile Prince Michael Obrenović when he was both Premier and Foreign Minister (1861–1867). Throughout this period Garašanin was balancing between different political options which dominated the European and Balkan political scene from the 1848 Revolution through the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Austro Prussian War of 1866 to the formation of the first Balkan Alliance (1866–1868).

Garašanin remained prudent and bold in pursuing realistic political objectives which amounted to large-scale anti-Ottoman activities, primarily by establishing a network of confidants and agents throughout Turkey-in-Europe that would serve for the purpose of fomenting an insurrection against Ottoman rule. His expectations regarding potential external support, from Paris in particular, proved to be exaggerated given the wavering support of Napoleon III, rarely in compliance with his proclaimed policy of supporting the cause of oppressed nationalities in Europe. Furthermore, Garašanin was forced in the ever-changing circumstances to adapt his initial political designs which relied on potential French and British support and consequently mitigate his anti-Austrian and, to lesser extent, anti-Russian course.

In a memorandum sent to Napoleon III in 1866, Garašanin stressed the following:

“Lorsqu’en 1848 personne ne se doutait ni de la puissance de l’Autriche ni de l’attachement de ses peuples pour la dynastie, la Monarchie se vit soudainement bouleversée par tant de révolutions à la fois et réduite à une telle faiblesse qu’elle aurait inmanquablement succombée sans l’aide des Croates dans un premier temps et plus tard celle de la Russie [...].”

Non, il est impossible dans ce siècle d'unification nationale de consolider d'une manière durable l'Empire autrichien, cette étrange agglomération non pas de peuples mais de fragments de différentes nations. Il n'y a pas de système capable de les satisfaire de manière à leur ôter toute envie de séparation. Chacune de ces individualités nationales veut recomposer son passé historique, ce qui signifie une parfaite indépendance, acceptant seulement pour le moment le chef qu'elles se trouvent avoir en commun. Or, l'Autriche ne saurait y consentir sans renoncer au rang de grande puissance et se suicider."⁶⁰

In order to avoid Russian policy of dividing the Balkan Slavs into several separate states Garašanin proposed their unification:

“L'union de tous les Slaves du Sud dans un seul Etat est une condition indispensable pour la réussite de tout ce projet tendant à enfermer dans de justes limites les ambitions de la Russie et de la Prusse et d'instaurer ainsi un véritable équilibre en Europe.”⁶¹

Balancing between the Pan-Slav policy of Hôtel Lambert with its exclusively anti-Austrian and anti-Russian aims, and Russian policy that wanted to keep Serbia under her wing, Garašanin was only partially willing to accept these often unrealistic political agendas which far surpassed the real capacities of Serbia's foreign policy. Adapting the overambitious strategic planning of the Polish emigration—Czartoryski's *Counsels* and Zach's plan were the case in point—Garašanin embraced only those pragmatic and realistic elements that were suited to the rather weak military and administrative potentials of autonomous Serbia in mid-nineteenth century. Serbia's increasing strength in the 1860s was, in his view, supposed to be further augmented by a broader Balkan alliance that would enable Serbia to expand her borders into the Serb-inhabited areas of Turkey-in-Europe. Furthermore, the prospects of Yugoslav unification, which would be opened after the demise of the Habsburg Monarchy, loomed large as the next phase of Serbia's Piedmont-type policy.

⁶⁰ Vojislav J. Vučković (éd.), *Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburske monarhije 1859–1874*, doc. N^o 118, pp. 230–231, Memorandum of Garašanin to Napoléon III, Belgrade, le 22 septembre 1866.


⁶¹ *Ibid.*




Mihailo Obrenović (1823–1868)
Prince of Serbia (1839–1842, 1860–1868)



Napoleon III, Emperor of France
(1852–1870)



Bishop J. J. Strossmayer (1815–1905)



Antonije Orešković (1829–1906)

DECONSTRUCTION OF A MYTH: *NAČERTANIJE* AND ITS AFTERMATH

The over-ambitious pan-Slav project of František Zach was eventually modified by Ilija Garašanin to form a more realistic and attainable plan, in accordance with Serbia's modest demographic and military potential, limited international experience, humble administrative capacities and prevailing geopolitical realities. Seeking for the unification of the predominantly Serb-inhabited lands under the Ottoman rule (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Old Serbia), Garašanin's plan, rather inclusive than exclusive, was adapted to the international situation of 1844.¹ The initial political incentive for a wider Slav policy of Serbia that came from the Paris-based Polish emigration in the early 1840s was an important step towards broadening political and cultural cooperation with the neighbouring provinces of Turkey-in Europe and the Habsburg Monarchy. This included a wide-ranging action not only amongst the Serbian population, but also among other kindred peoples such as Croats and Bulgarians. The political awakening and internal modernisation of Serbia, strongly supported by Prince Czartoryski and his agents, brought Serbia's officials into direct contact with both French and

¹ As stressed by John Lampe, the *Načertanije* invoked both the romantic nationalism of the Serbs standing alone and the Realpolitik needed to navigate among the Great Powers: "[...] Garašanin saw the inherent danger of overdependence on Habsburg trade to much smaller Serbia's survival, particularly if Vienna managed to use that leverage politically. Anticipating the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, he sought to deny the Balkans to both Russian and Austrian domination." John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 52.

British diplomacy. The Principality of Serbia thus broke the constraints of the usual diplomatic relations within a triangle of which the three points were the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg empires.

In spite of the fact that there were no tangible results in terms of territorial enlargement and joint anti-Ottoman efforts as proposed by Polish representatives and envisaged in the *Načertanije*, the international position of the Principality of Serbia was improved. This progress was gradual. Her military support to the defence of the Serbs of Vojvodina in 1848–1849 made Serbia an important factor in the region. Then followed two major steps towards attaining greater autonomy paving the way to independence: the extension of exclusively Russian guarantees for Serbia's autonomy to that of six European Powers at the Congress of Paris in 1856, and the withdrawal of Ottoman garrisons from the six border fortresses, including Belgrade, in April 1867. Furthermore, Serbia's influence in the bordering provinces of both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy became evident, with tangible political weight, in particular after 1861.

From the middle of the-1840s onwards, the cross-border activity envisaged in the *Načertanije* entered an increasingly dynamic phase, especially during the revolution of 1848–1849 which spurred the waves of national upheaval and shook the foundations of the Habsburg feudal legitimacy. Although the cooperation with the Polish émigrés from Hôtel Lambert in Paris lost much of its intensity after 1849, it had a long-term impact on Garašanin's foreign policy: the ideas outlined in "Serbia's Slavic Plan" and *Načertanije* were gradually transformed during the next two decades into a wider Yugoslav, i.e. South Slav programme. Aware of the strength of the Habsburg Monarchy, Garašanin left the plans for a Yugoslav union, no more than political fantasy in 1844, for the next phase. However, Garašanin earmarked Austria as Serbia's main political foe, and he was confident of the inevitability of the Empire's gradual demise, without which the Serbian unification would be impossible, even in the distant future. Indeed, when the first opportunity for the dissolution of Austria emerged (1866), Garašanin stressed in a letter to Napoleon III that the Habsburg Empire was a strange agglomeration of peoples that should be recomposed according to the nationality principle.²

² Cf. *Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburske monarhije 1859–1874*), doc. № 118, pp. 230–231, Memorandum of Garašanin to Napoléon III, Belgrade,

Familiar with the content of *Načertanije*, Prince Michael Obrenović consistently supported Garašanin's efforts to stir up a general uprising of Christians in the Ottoman provinces while in parallel preparing for the joint struggle with Austrian Slavs, above all the Austrian Serbs and kindred Austrian Croats, whose political representatives closely collaborated with both the Serbian prince and Ilija Garašanin during the 1860s.

Furthermore, various interpretations of Serbia's foreign policy in the middle of the nineteenth century have often omitted that during his tireless efforts for building the formation of the First Balkan alliance, Garašanin did not exclude the creation of a single state of South Slavs, and not only with the Croats but also with the Bulgarians—a Serbo-Bulgarian confederation would serve as a basis for further political regrouping with the South Slavs who remained under foreign rule. These plans were further developed when the very survival of the Habsburg Empire, defeated by Prussia in 1866, was at stake.

European and Balkan scholars, experts and travellers considered the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an apple of discord between the Serbs and the Austrians (including Croats) after 1848, as Serbian lands inhabited by Serbs of the Christian Orthodox and Islamic faith, with a Roman Catholic minority, all speaking the Serbian *štokavian* dialect; it was only after 1878 that most of the Roman Catholic population, previously known as "Latins", gradually developed a distinct Croatian identity. According to the prevailing scholarly knowledge of distinguished linguists, historians and ethnographers, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was, if not entirely identified as Serbian, often designated as the Slavs of Turkey. Moreover, unlike the fully-fledged Serbian, the national movements of other South Slav peoples were still in infancy, and that made the Serbian national identity fully recognisable.

Prince Michael Obrenović was assassinated in 1868 and Ilija Garašanin died in 1874, but their plans and ideas, constantly revised and adapted to the prevailing political circumstances, continued to inspire the foreign policy of Serbia. During the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878) and the Serbo-Turkish wars (1876, 1877–1878), the ideas outlined in *Načertanije* inspired ardent hopes of liberation—Bosnia-Herzegovina and Old Serbia were in the focus of Serbia's attention.

le 22 septembre 1866; Dimitrije Djordjević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1989), p. 99.

Even after Garašanin's death Bishop Strossmayer of Djakovo fully supported Serbia's claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Old Serbia. In his correspondence with the former British Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, Strossmayer advocated the solutions agreed upon with Garašanin on several occasions during the Eastern Crisis. On 1 October 1876 in the midst of the First Serbo-Turkish War, Strossmayer, as a lawful Bishop of Bosnia, proposed the following:

“The Servians [Serbians, Serbs] are a warlike and very enterprising race, full of vitality. It would be a just reward of their sanguinary sacrifices in a sacred cause, to put the autonomy of Bosnia under the protection of their energy and their fifty years' experience.”³

Two years later, at the last stage of the Second Serbo-Turkish War, Bishop Strossmayer pointed out to Gladstone the legitimacy of Serbia's aspirations to Old Serbia:

“[...] it would be very desirable that all Old Servia [Old Serbia, i.e. *vilayet* of Kosovo) should be handed over to them. I do not know how far at present they have victoriously penetrated by force of arms; but this I know for certain, that the Serbs will only be permanently pacified and deprived of every excuse for revolting when they are assigned Pristina in the south, then Ipek (or Petsch) in a westerly direction, then further south, Prizren [...] Each of these towns has for the Serbs a dear and sacred memory. For instance, Prizren was long the residence of their kings. Ipek [Peć] was long the seat of their supreme Church authority, their patriarch and the famous monastery. No people on earth easily forgets such precious traditions. Every Serb carries them in his heart and also in his mouth, in the shape of splendid popular songs.”⁴

According to the stipulations of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, however, the final distribution of Ottoman territories was unfavourable to Serbia. Her advance into Old Serbia was checked, while Bosnia-Herzegovina was, despite the repeated demands of Serbian insurgents to join Serbia and Montenegro occupied by Austria-Hungary. Abandoned by Russia, Serbia was forced to give up her aspirations to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Prince Milan Obrenović eventually turned to Austria-Hungary in 1881, signing the Secret Convention that gave Vienna an effective control over the for-

³ R. W. Seaton-Watson, *The Sothern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable, 1911), p. 420.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 434–435.

eign policy of Belgrade until 1903. Among those who accepted the role of Serbia as a client state of the Dual Monarchy was Ilija Garašanin's son, Milutin Garašanin, the leader of the Austrophile Progressive Party, very close to the Palace and the two last rulers of the Obrenović dynasty. Thus, the programme of foreign policy formulated in 1844 was a starting point for the development of Serbia's state and national strategy and it gradually evolved into a larger Yugoslav programme which was abandoned in 1881, when Serbia accepted her dependence on the Dual Monarchy.

The return of the Karadjordjević dynasty to the Serbian throne in 1903 entailed the disruption of the highly unpopular pro-Austrian policy of the last rulers of the House of Obrenović, kings Milan and Alexander. The policy outlined in *Načertanije* was only partially revived and it influenced Serbia's foreign policy until the First World War and the creation of the common Yugoslav state in December 1918. After 1903, Serbia abandoned her anti-Russian course initially prescribed by *Načertanije* and opted for a political reliance on the Franco-Russian alliance which later included Great Britain as well. The anti-Austrian course restored Serbia's independent foreign policy: the struggle against the Dual Monarchy's hegemony in the Balkans which threatened to strangle Serbia both economically and politically was waged with the support of the Entente Powers.

Misconceptions and misinterpretations

In the interwar period, most historians, Serbs and Croats alike, often liberal supporters of the Yugoslav ideology, defined the *Načertanije* as the first progressive step towards Yugoslav unity. The first markedly negative assessment was that of an extreme Croat nationalist, Petar Šimunić in 1944 under the regime of the Nazi satellite Independent State of Croatia (NDH).

In the opinion of the Croat historian Mirko Valentić, expressed in his preface to the second edition of Petar Šimunić's study on *Načertanije* published in Zagreb in 1992 it "remains even today a standard work for understanding Serbo-Croatian relations". It should be noted that this second edition with new Valentić's preface was also published at the troubled times of civil war—this time it were the wars for Yugoslav succession, central to which was the armed conflict between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995). Not surprisingly then, the revival of Šimunić's nationalist thesis and Valentić's enthusi-

astic endorsement of it reflected the propagandist warfare of the Croat side which utilised the extremely biased historical interpretations of the past for the express purpose of vindicating Croatia's official standpoint. It was but a repetition of the old Ustashi-sponsored propaganda. Referring to the "Greater Serbian conception" of Garašanin's *Načertanije*, Valentić evoked his conversation with another, much more renowned, Croat historian, Jaroslav Šidak, who had been a regular contributor to Ustasha publications during the Second World War.⁵ "According to Jaroslav Šidak," Valentić stressed, "the circles of Croat intellectuals gathered around the Croatian Lexicographic Institute and the major project of the 'Croatian Encyclopaedia' [also published under the Ustasha regime in the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia] accepted Petar Šimunić as a very objective and reliable author."⁶ In the political climate of the Ustasas' Independent State of Croatia, Šimunić's reputation seems to have been further enhanced by his ultranationalist considerations about the mentality of Serbs laid down in a pamphlet published in 1944: *The building of the Serb Mentality – a Few Examples from the Past Century*.⁷

Rejecting, just like Šimunić, the earlier positive assessments of the strategic Yugoslav orientation of Garašanin's *Načertanije*, —an orientation which had to be preceded by the unification of the Serbs under Ottoman rule as expounded by the distinguished Croat historians Ferdo Šišić and Viktor Novak—Valentić argued that Šimunić "deals conceptually and compositionally with the fundamental problem of Serbo-Croatian relations, i.e. the Greater Serbian ideology as an insurmountable obstacle to all attempts at cooperation between Zagreb's and Belgrade's political, economic and cultural circles since the middle of the twentieth century. To his reader,

⁵ In the Croatian Encyclopaedia in 1942, Šidak labelled *Načertanije* as "Greater Serbian" project. See Jaroslav Šidak, "Czartoryski i Hrvati", in: *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. IV, Zagreb 1942, pp. 174–175.

⁶ Jaroslav Šidak afterwards wrote an article on Polish emigration and the Croats in 1943 (published in French 1947, and in Serbo-Croatian in 1948) where he labelled *Načertanije* as a "Greater Serbian" political programme. (J. Šidak, "Hotel Lambert i Hrvati", in: *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti*, pp. 167–168). Much later Šidak was quoting official dogma taken from historian Vasa Čubrilović, Tito's long-time minister, that *Načertanije*, in many ways was a "Greater Serbian" project for Yugoslav unification. (J. Šidak et al., *Hrvatski narodni preporod. Ilirski pokret*, p. 151).

⁷ Mirko Valentić, "Predgovor Drugom izdanju" in: Petar Šimunić, *Načertanije. Tajni spis srpske nacionalne i vanjske politike* (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), pp. I-IV.

Šimunić offers extensive information about the genesis of the Greater Serbian aggression against all non-Serb lands and peoples programmatically laid out in the 'Načertanije' in 1844 as the most frequently mentioned writing of nineteenth-century Serbian political thought.⁸ What inspired Šimunić, and half a century later his apologist Valentić, to ascribe the alleged Greater Serbian dimension to Garašanin's *Načertanije* can be seen from their criticism of Šišić and Novak as being "Yugoslav oriented". Šimunić reproached them for having left out "the most important places which clearly betray the Greater Serbian idea and pretensions to the Croatian state and ethnic space, and to Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular".⁹

This was, no doubt, an attempt to legitimise a *fait accompli*—the forcible incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Independent State of Croatia carried out in April 1941 followed by the genocide unparalleled in the history of the Balkans: mass killings, persecution and the brutal slaughtering of hundreds of thousands of the Christian Orthodox Serb population in concentration camps, particularly in Jasenovac, which did not lag behind the infamous Nazi camps.¹⁰ In fact, even some representatives of the Third Reich expressed their indignation at the bestial methods of the torturing and slaughtering of Serbian children, women and elders, and alongside them the members of the Jewish and Romani communities.¹¹

This die-hard misreading of *Načertanije* remains a major issue which, to an extent, eludes rational explanation. How can it be that Šimunić's interpretation of *Načertanije*—kept alive by the works of Croat historians in the period of communism and utilised as Croat nationalist propaganda

⁸ M. Valentić, *op. cit.*, p. II.

⁹ P. Šimunić, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

¹⁰ For a detailed historical analysis see Marco Aurellio Rivelli, *Un génocide occulté. État Indépendant de Croatie 1941–1945* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1999). For a wider aspect: Johnatan Steinberg, *All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–1945* (London & New York: Routledge, 1990). Informative is Raphael Israeli, *The Death Camps of Croatia. Visions and Revisions, 1941–1945* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2013).

¹¹ Edmond Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941–1945. A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres*. Translated from the French by Louis Perkins. (Chicago: Institute for Balkan Affaires, 1962). The best works of Croatian historiography remain Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i NDH* (Zagreb: Globus-Školska knjiga, 1977) and Bogdan Krizman, *Pavelić između Hitlera i Musolinija* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983).

in the early 1990s—has not only survived to this day, but also become the accepted interpretation of the alleged roots of Serbian aggression in the mainstream Western historiography?¹² Part of an answer certainly lay in considerable contribution that has been made by Croat historians working in the West and Croat-American scholars susceptible to Šimunić's perspective.¹³ The last politicized interpretation of Serbia's foreign policy with *Načertanije* as its long-term guidelines was provided by Damir Agičić, who despite some serious research, only repeated biased interpretations of Šimunić and Šidak on Garašanin's foreign and national policy, based on alleged Croatian "historical rights" on Bosnia-Herzegovina, conceptualized by Ante Starčević in the late nineteenth century. Starčević's nationalist concept of Croatianhood was embraced by the Ustasha movement before and during the Second World War and partially revitalized during the civil war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. One of Agičić's main conclusions was aimed to "justify" Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s by Garašanin's allegedly expansionist policy:

"[...] Greater Serbian character of the secret policy conducted by the Serbian political leadership since the mid-nineteenth century is entirely clear when one knows that the ultimate goal was expanding Serbia's borders, imposing the Serbian dynasty, its legal and political system. Serbia largely succeeded in its intentions after the First World War. Serbia tried to achieve something similar later, and is currently still trying to achieve the same goal."¹⁴

As a matter of fact, the *Načertanije* cannot be understood outside the context of Garašanin's endeavours for Balkan and Yugoslav unity (1844–1867) and the ideas typical of his time. The Serb insurgents in Bosnia, who proclaimed unification with Serbia three times, in 1876, 1877 and 1878, or the people who decided in 42 out of 54 districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to unite directly and unconditionally with the Kingdom of Serbia in late November 1918, could hardly have known anything about *Načertanije*.¹⁵

¹² Wolf Dietrich Beschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830–1914. Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie* (Munich: R. Oldenburg, 1980), pp. 63–65.

¹³ Charles Jelavich, "Garašanin's *Načertanije* und das grosserbische Program", *Südost Forschungen*, band XXVII (Munich: R. Oldenburg, 1968), pp. 131–147; Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 82–84.

¹⁴ D. Agičić, *Tajna politika Srbije u XIX stoljeću*, p. 111.

¹⁵ D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. History and Politics*, pp. 56–63, 90–91.

Neither did the Serbs who proclaimed their own entity, Republika Srpska, within Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 in an attempt to protect their own interests amidst the violent disintegration of communist Yugoslavia.¹⁶ The attempt of the Prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia at The Hague to brand the *Načertanije* as an ideological source of “Serbian aggression” had little, if any, success. The convincing historical explanations presented by the historian Čedomir Popov, Professor from the University of Novi Sad, in December 2004 rebutted the testimonies of some “expert” witnesses and the Prosecution entirely dropped this line of argument.¹⁷

Since Garašanin's *Načertanije* was first published in 1906 its alleged Greater Serbian character has been a matter of consensus only among Croat nationalists, Croat fascists and Yugoslav and Croat communists. It would perhaps be interesting to explore how this blatantly nationalist reading of a middle of the nineteenth-century document has come to be threaded through the whole modern history of the Serbian nation only to be recently incorporated, through the mediation of Croat official war propagandists¹⁸ and some German historians, into world-wide historiography.

¹⁶ A group of cultural activists from Belgrade that was received by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević on the eve to the 1991 civil war has told me how shocked they were by that conversation. Among many Serbian writers and politicians from the nineteenth and early twentieth century that the delegation mentioned, Milošević, a hard-line, poorly educated, communist apparatchik, was unable to recognise the names of the most important Serbian statesmen such as Ilija Garašanin, Jovan Ristić, Milovan Dj. Milovanović or Stojan Novaković. He only seemed to have indentified with certainty who Nikola Pašić was.

¹⁷ Cf. more in: S. G. Marković, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁸ *Izvori velikosrpske agresije: rasprave, dokumenti, kartografski prikazi*, Bože Čović, ed. (Zagreb: August Cesarec & Školska knjiga, 1991), pp. 17, 58–61. English edition: *Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews*, B. Čović ed. (Zagreb: Centar za strane jezike & AGM, 1993). One of the authors of this book is Mirko Valentić. The French version of this propaganda book with minor adaptations was published under a different title and with different authors: *Le nettoyage ethnique. Une idéologie serbe*, Mirko Grmek, Marc Djidara, Neven Simac, eds. (Paris: Fayard, 1993), pp 57–80. For a critical review see D. T. Bataković, “Le nettoyage ethnique sous la loupe de l'historien. Une lecture du livre de M. Grmek, M. Gjidara, N. Simac, 'Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe' (Paris, Fayard 1993, 340 p.)”, *Raison garder*, no. 10–11 (1996), pp. 11–25. Cf. for example Holm Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens: 19.-21. Jahrhundert* (Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau, 2007); Marcus Tanner, *Croatia. A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 103.



Turkey-in-Europe, 1856



Residence of the Prince, Belgrade

D O C U M E N T S

le Prince Adam Czartoryski

CONSEILS SUR LA CONDUITE A SUIVRE PAR LA SERBIE

JANVIER 1843

L'état actuel de la Serbie exige que sa politique prenne pour règle :
LA l'extérieur, d'observer tous les ménagement possibles à l'égard d'autres puissances sans cependant leur permettre d'empiéter sur les droits de la Nation serbe et de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du pays.

A l'intérieur, d'user d'énergie et de sagesse pour organiser et consolider la force de la Nation, par une stricte justice et une conciliante modération, opérer l'union s'efforçant d'effacer le passé et de faire aimer et respecter le gouvernement actuel. Sur ces bases la conduite politique à tenir serait : A l'égard de la Turquie, qui est puissance suzeraine, respect, bon vouloir et soumission, non une soumission lâche et rampante, mais digne et loyale. Il faut se dire qu'il est très avantageux pour la Serbie de pouvoir s'organiser elle-même et d'aider à la civilisation des population slaves voisine à l'ombre de la Porte. Les autres puissances intéressées ne pourraient entraver ouvertement cette action ni menacer son existence que si la Serbie était tout à fait indépendante et abandonnée à elle seule. Aujourd'hui, au contraire, l'existence même de la Porte couvre la Serbie dans chaque circonstance. Une fois son organisation achevée et son action sur les Slaves ses voisines amenée au but désiré, elle pourra, prête à tous les événements, les attendre ou même les devancer, si les nécessités lui en font une loi. Cet avantage de pouvoir travailler avec sécurité, et à son aise, sous la domination de la Turquie doit faire apprécier aux Serbes combien ils sont intéressés à rester en bonne intelligence avec la Porte et même, jusqu'au temps

marqué par la Providence, à soutenir l'existence politique de l'empire ottoman. La nationalité de la Serbie ne court pas à beaucoup près—en restant sous la suzeraineté du gouvernement de la Turquie—des dangers aussi grands que se elle laissait prendre force et racine dans le pays à l'influence d'un gouvernement fort, despotique et pervers comme celui de la Russie. Le gouvernement ottoman ayant le sentiment de sa faiblesse craint de se brouiller avec ses sujets, se méfie de toute puissance qui voudrait se mêler de leurs affaires et par cette raison les protège de son mieux toutes les fois qu'ils ont recours à lui.

L'influence de la Russie tend, au contraire, à jeter la méfiance et le désaccord entre le Suzerain et les vassaux pour amener la discorde, le trouble, et l'impuissance et puis venir rétablir l'ordre comme cela a été fait en Pologne et en Géorgie, comme cela se fait en Valachie et comme la Serbie elle-même l'a déjà éprouvé et l'éprouvera peut-être plus distinctement encore. Ainsi l'intérêt de la Serbie lui dicte par-dessus tout : d'éviter l'influence de la Russie et de profiter de la suzeraineté de la Turquie.

Cependant, malgré la nécessité de bonnes relations entre la Serbie et la Turquie, il ne faut pas que la Serbie, pour complaire à la Cour Suzeraine, sacrifié ses propres intérêts. Bien au contraire, elle ne doit rien céder de ce qu'elle a gagné, mais plutôt tendre à regagner encore davantage en avançant peu à peu et ne reculant jamais.

La Serbie doit obtenir de la Porte, sans avoir recours à la Russie ni à aucune autre puissance, un pouvoir héréditaire pour la famille du Prince qu'elle s'est choisi de la même manière et par les mêmes procédés que le Prince Milosch [Miloš Obrenović] l'avait obtenu pour sa famille. La Serbie pourrait négocier auprès de la Porte l'autorisation de rallier à elle les tribus des montagnes de Karadah, les tribus Piperi, Wassovitchi, Bielopouliki et Kutchi qui sont jusqu'ici indépendants et très souvent hostiles à la Turquie. La Serbie pourrait obtenir cette autorisation en offrant à la Turquie l'avantage d'une pleine tranquillité pour ses sujets voisins ou même plus éloignés et d'une augmentation du tribut que paye la Serbie. La Serbie, de même race que les Montagnards indépendants [les Monténégrins], pourrait peut-être opérer cette réunion, mais avant d'en parler à la Porte, elle devrait s'assurer du libre consentement de ces tribus. Cette réunion une fois faite, la Serbie peut demander à la Porte la cession d'un territoire ou du moins d'une route libre pour son commerce.

La Serbie doit aussi tâcher d'obtenir de la Porte même par quelque sacrifice, s'il le faut, que la citadelle de Belgrade soit évacuée par les troupes turques et rendue aux Serbes.

La garnison turque à Belgrade gêne beaucoup l'action du gouvernement national dès qu'il commence à ce consolider. Dans beaucoup de cas elle peut servir d'appui aux mécontents du pays et quelquefois même servir les intrigues de l'extérieur. Cette négociation doit être suivie avec beaucoup d'adresse et de circonspection ; il ne faut ni la brusquer, ni jamais l'abandonner.

E l'égard de la Russie puissance protectrice, il faut certainement garder des ménagements, mais il faut que ces ménagements soient analogues à la position politique de la Russie. La Cour protectrice n' a droit d'intervenir, c'est-à-dire de protéger que lorsque la Cour suzeraine méconnaît ses devoirs à l'égard du vassal et veut faire peser sur lui l'oppression ou lorsque la Cour suzeraine est si faible qu'elle ne peut venir en aide à ses vassaux envahis ou menacés par l'ennemi extérieur. Dans le premier cas les vassaux ayant protesté contre la tyrannie du Suzerain sollicitent la protection de la protectrice ; dans le second c' est de concert avec la Cour suzeraine que les vassaux demandent des secours à la cour protectrice.

Sans protester inutilement, sans provoquer la malveillance de la Russie, il faut se défendre par des arguments clairs et irréfragables tout en assurant qu'on respecte et apprécie sa protection, mais qu'on ne se trouve pas dans le cas de l'invoquer. Si ce cas arrivait, c'est-à-dire si la Turquie attaquait les libertés de la Serbie et que les Serbes ne fussent pas en état de lui résister, alors ils pourraient avoir recours à la protection de la Russie. Mais tant qu'on peut s'en passer, la sagesse ordonne de ne pas appeler chez soi un protecteur de mauvaise foi, qui bientôt deviendrait un maître. Il faut que la Serbie s'émancipe moralement de toute crainte de la Russie.

Cette puissance ne peut pas y envoyer aujourd'hui ses troupes et ne peut y faire jouer que ses intrigues ; il faut donc raisonnablement, sans bruit, s'appuyant sur ses droits, se contenter à chaque fois de déjouer ses intrigues ; et par une conduite sage et ferme montrer au monde sans avoir besoin de la dire la fausseté des assertions par lesquelles la diplomatie russe cherche à convaincre et à effrayer les cabinets de l'Europe en leur disant :

“ Que venez-vous faire dans ces Pays. Ce sont nos coreligionnaires, nos frères de race, leurs sympathies sont pour nous. Il est tout naturel, qu'ils veuillent s'unir à nous et qu'ils regardent, dès à présent même, l'empereur

comme leur véritable chef ; c'est là un fait accompli, ce serait en vain qu'on prétendrait à agir en sens contraire. »

Une fois que la Serbie aura par ses actions et sa conduite donné le démenti à cette formule diplomatique, une fois que elle commencera à jouer aux yeux des cabinets de l'Europe un rôle contraire à ses assertions, les cabinets l'appuieront et pourront même l'aider le cas échéant.

La Serbie ne serait plus à leur yeux l'instrument de la politique russe, mais au contraire une barrière de plus contre les envahissements de la Russie. Tout ceci doit être mené avec la plus grande prudence et modération et de manière que, déjouant et repoussant les intrigues du cabinet de Saint Pétersbourg, on n'offense nullement les Russes qui sont frères de race et qui un jour peuvent devenir alliés de tous les Slaves contre leur propre despotisme.

E l'égard de l'Autriche il faut employer beaucoup de circonspection et de dissimulation, ce dont elle donne elle-même l'exemple. Il ne faut pas la provoquer ni l'offenser avant le temps, mais il faut être sur ses gardes et ne pas se laisser endormir par ses cajoleries. Il ne faut pas se méprendre sur les intentions de l'Autriche, elle est intéressée à agir contre les nationalités slaves ; car une fois ces nationalités en jeu, l'échafaudage de l'empire d'Autriche risque de s'écrouler. Il est donc naturel que le cabinet de Vienne voie avec mécontentement et méfiance de la Serbie et qu'il lui suscite tous les embarras possibles.

L'Autriche, depuis longtemps a formé le plan de s'appropriier à la première occasion la Serbie et les autres pays slaves à sa convenance ; tant que ce plan ne pourra s'exécuter elle préférera voir les Serbes retomber sous le joug ottoman tel qu'il était précédemment et si quelquefois il lui arrive de montrer quelque faveur à la nationalité des Serbes, c'est pour les détourner de servir aux menées de la Russie parmi les Slaves soumis à l'Autriche.

Il faut accepter ses dons, mais comme ceux d'un faux ami contre lequel on sera obligé de lutter un jour. Pour aujourd'hui, l'Autriche ne peut légalement défendre que les droits de son commerce en Serbie, il faut donc que la Serbie se borne à n'avoir avec l'Autriche que des relations commerciales et s'abstienne de toute autre.

La France n'a maintient aucun droit diplomatique pour agir officiellement en Serbie. Mais elle peut et voudra agir semi-officiellement par des conseils et en se servant des Polonais. Elle ne refusera pas d'appuyer la Serbie auprès de la Porte et auprès des autres cabinets, si l'occasion se pré-

sente. Mais il faut que les Serbes offrent par leurs actes et leurs tendances des garanties d'ordre et de stabilité, qu'ils montrent de la fermeté à résister aux intrigues de la Russie, du penchant à se rapprocher de l'Occident ; en envoyant leurs jeunes gens faire leur éducation à Paris et acceptant chez eux des hommes qui leur viennent de la part de la France directement ou indirectement. Ils doivent entrer en relations commerciales avec des négociants français, leur offrir au commencement des bénéfices, qui par la suite apporteront des bénéfices beaucoup plus grands pour la Serbie. Il faut que les Serbes soient convaincus que l'intérêt politique de la France est de voir s'opérer l'émancipation nationale de tous les Slaves et d'aider au progrès de leur civilisation. l'intérêt de la France est de pouvoir mettre à la place de l'empire ottoman, lorsque son heure aura sonné, un Etat qui peut devenir son allié, or pour la formation de cet Etat elle préférerait à toute autre combinaison celle de la nationalité slave. Il n'y a pas de doute, qu'elle travaillera dans ce sens ; mais la Serbie doit d'abord gagner sa confiance par une conduite prudente chez elle, tandis qu'à l'extérieur, elle se conformera aux conseils qui précèdent.

Il serait bon qu'un établissement quelconque catholique pût surgir en Serbie ; celle donnerait un certain droit politique à la France, vu qu'elle est reconnue Protectrice légale du Catholicisme dans l'empire ottoman. Cet établissement pourrait être une église à Belgrade sous la direction d'un missionnaire français. L'église nationale n'aurait pas à s'effrayer de la propagande catholique, qui aurait soin de se tenir dans les bornes voulues par le gouvernement serbe ; Cet établissement serait motivé sur la résidence à Belgrade du consul de France. Une fois que l'on aurait en Serbie des missionnaires français ils pourraient être poussés en Bosnie, où, s'appuyant sur la protection de la France, ils y remplaceraient peu à peu les prêtres catholiques de l'Autriche. Ces missionnaires français, on ceux qui agiraient sous leur direction recommanderaient, sous le point de vue national, les Catholiques de la Bosnie à leurs frères de l'Eglise grecque [orthodoxe] ; au lieu qu'aujourd'hui les prêtres autrichiens excitent et favorisent leur discorde.

L'Angleterre est ainsi que la France sans droits diplomatiques en Serbie. Il ne faut pas douter de son bon vouloir pour la Serbie, si celle-ci résiste aux intrigues russes et si son organisation annonce la force et l'ordre. Seulement, comme malgré toute inactivité et toute la timidité du Cabinet français, il y a plus de sympathie et d'idées généreuses dans sa politique, que dans celle de l'Angleterre, toujours absorbé par l'intérêt pratique du

commerce, il ne faut pas s'attendre de la part de celle-ci à des secours qu'on a droit d'espérer de la France. Il faudrait intéresser vivement le commerce de l'Angleterre pour obtenir l'appui efficace de son gouvernement. Mais si la Serbie réussit à se procurer une route jusqu'à l'Adriatique et un point sur cette mer, la proximité des îles Ioniennes et de la Malte rendront ce pays important pour l'Angleterre et lui assureront de grands avantages politiques et financiers.

La Prusse semble, depuis quelque temps, prendre intérêt aux nationalités slaves. Agit-elle ainsi pour affaiblir et contrecarrer ses deux puissants voisins, peut-être pour porter le coup le plus sensible à l'Autriche et par là arriver à la réussite de ses projets sur l'Allemagne, ce qui est assez probable ; ou bien agit-elle de connivence avec la Russie, ce qui est aujourd'hui peu vraisemblable ; toujours est-il qu'il faut profiter de son action et ménager son concours pour le moment surtout où l'on serait dans le cas d'en venir aux mains avec l'Autriche.

E la politique extérieure appartient aussi l'action sur les peuples slaves voisins. Il faut que la Serbie se forme un plan pour l'avenir. Elle doit tendre à s'agrandir, si elle ne veut pas perdre son existence au milieu des événements dont l'empire turc est menacé. Ses regards doivent à cet effet se porter sans cesse sur les peuples slaves qu'elle devra réunir à elle dans l'avenir et sur ceux à l'émancipation desquels elle doit contribuer. La Serbie est entouré de peuples frères, dont les uns sont soumis comme elle à la Turquie, les autres à l'Autriche. Son influence paraît pouvoir s'exercer sur les premiers par une civilisation et des lumières qu'ils cherchent à propager ; sur les seconds par des preuves de force et de sagesse qu'elle leur donnera, mais surtout par le sentiment d'une nationalité commune, d'un intérêt réciproque et paternel. Et pendant que dans l'attente des changements que la Providence semble préparer la Serbie travaillera au grand oeuvre développement des nationalités slaves, elle doit faire ses efforts pour attirer et réunir à elle le plus tôt possible les tribus indépendantes de Kara-dah [Monténégro] et même ; s'il se peut, les Monténégrins, à la réunion desquels elle peut travailler sous les auspices même de la Turquie. L'action peut-être la plus importante de la Serbie et même la plus délicate et la plus difficile sera celle qu'elle aura à exercer sur les Serbes encavés dans la Hongrie et sous la domination autrichienne.

Il est possible que la cour de Vienne emploie quelques-uns de ses sujets serbes pour se faire un parti dans le sein du gouvernement natio-

nal serbe. C'est un inconvénient à éviter ; il faut au contraire que ce soit l'influence serbe qui prédomine ; les Slaves autrichiens doivent la ressentir sans cesse ; le Gouvernement serbe doit trouver parmi eux des instruments habiles et précieux ; mais il doit veiller à ce qu'ils ne soient jamais les instruments d'une influence étrangère ; il faut s'attacher cette population de compatriotes, s'assurer de sa sympathie et en tirer tout le parti possible. Les Serbes doivent tâcher aussi d'avoir des relations amicales avec les autres Slaves : Illyriens, Dalmates, Croates et avec les dix-sept régiments slaves colonisés sur la frontière de l'empire d'Autriche (les Grenz Regimenter), afin de pouvoir compter sur eux à tout événement. (Ces 17 régiments sont les cadres d'une population armée et exercée de 80 à 100.000 soldats). La Serbie doit même s'efforcer de trouver le moyen de se concilier les Hongrois pour ôter à l'Autriche ce formidable appui. Il se peut que la chose soit impossible, mais assurément elle est très désirable. Si non, il faut s'habituer et se préparer à voir dans les Hongrois l'ennemi le plus dangereux, qu'on aura à combattre tôt au tard ; mais il faut ne renoncer à l'espoir d'une conciliation possible qu'à la dernière extrémité et surtout le dire et le répéter sans cesse en se couvrant d'une commune hostilité pour l'Autriche et la Russie. Il est des choses qu'il ne faut pas s'avouer en quelque sorte, à soi-même avant le moment où la force des choses oblige à les accomplir. Les Bulgares, les Bosniaques et les Herzégoviens doivent être l'objet des soins les plus suivis et les plus conciliants de la part de la Serbie. Tels paraissent être les principaux devoirs de la Serbie dans sa politique extérieure.

Quant à la politique intérieure : en tout premier lieu constituer une dynastie régnant par droit héréditaire ; sans cela l'existence politique d'une nation n'a ni force ni consistance ; le système de la monarchie élective est le plus vicieux de tous ; il forme les troubles et la discorde dans le pays ; le livre en proie aux intrigues et aux menées des étrangers ; il discrédite complètement la nation aux yeux de toutes les puissances. Sans aller chercher d'autres exemples, la Pologne est là pour attester que l'élection des souverains perd les nations et les livre à leurs ennemis. Rendre l'administration du pays équitable, combattre les abus des employés, empêcher qu'ils ne se permettent soit des rapines à la turque, soit la vénalité comme en Russie. Punir sévèrement les capitaines de cercle et les juges qui se laisseraient aller à ces abus. Introduire l'ordre et l'uniformité dans l'administration. Par beaucoup de justice et beaucoup de modération faire disparaître les haines et les dissensions qui règnent entre les hommes des différents partis

et entre les partis eux-mêmes. Les ramener à un seul foyer, l'intérêt public représenté par le gouvernement actuel. C'est un devoir auquel on ne saurait donner trop de soin et qu'on doit poursuivre avant toute autre chose, avoir beaucoup d'indulgence pour le passé et n'être sévère qu'à l'égard de ceux qui troubleraient ou voudraient troubler de nouveau l'ordre public ; Répandre l'instruction publique en établissant dans les communes des écoles primaires, dans les villes des écoles supérieures et dans deux ou trois villes des lycées.

Aider la Société littéraire—établie depuis quelques temps à propager les écrits qui tendent à réveiller la nationalité slave et opérer la centralisation intellectuelle de tous les Serbes, se trouvant n'importe sous quel gouvernement. Des journaux littéraires avec une tendance politique bien dirigé seraient d'une immense utilité. Organiser autant que possible le pays militairement, prenant pour exemple la Landwehr de la Prusse, ou une organisation qui serait plus adaptée au pays et qui pourrait tenir le milieu entre la garde nationale de la France et la Landwehr de la Prusse. Ne pourrait-on pas soumettre les Heyducks—et les autres hommes non établis à une certaine organisation, leur diviser en détachement ; chaque chef de détachement leur fournirait les vêtements ; on les obligerait à consacrer tant de jour par semaine à l'exercice militaire, tant pour les travaux publics de la commune, et tant pour travailler comme laboureurs et manoeuvres chez les habitants contre une rétribution. On leur permettrait peu à peu de se marier et de s'établir. Tout cela semble faisable, devrait s'exécuter sans bruit à peu de frais et donnerait à la Serbie un milieu excellent et mobile au premier appel. Fonder dans le pays des fabriques d'armes, une fonderie de canons, des fabriques de poudres établies et dirigées par des Polonais formés en France et en Belgique, qui se rendraient en Serbie avec des passeports et sous la protection de la France. L'emploi des individus appartenant aux autres nations pourrait être dangereux et ne serait pas efficace. Il est évident que les nations constituées ont de quoi occuper chez elles les individus capables et d'antécédents purs ; ce qui ne laisse aux entreprises extérieures que des hommes ordinairement peu recommandables. Au contraire les Polonais ont intérêt à appuyer le mouvement de la Serbie. Ceux qui se trouvent à l'étranger, faisant parti de l'élite de la nation polonaise, travailleront avec conscience et dévouement aux intérêts de la Serbie ; ils ne feront pas ordre de leur chef ; ils regarderont ce service comme fait à leur patrie même. Les difficultés que pourraient faire

la Russie et l'Autriche peuvent être étudiées en s'assurant de l'appui de la Turquie pour des hommes munis de passeports français ; et d'ailleurs tout doit se faire avec la plus grande prudence et sans ostentation. Etablir une école militaire pour l'instruction des officiers. l'établir plutôt à Kragouévatz_ qu'à Belgrade et leur donner le nom d'école polytechnique pour ne pas éveiller l'attention jalouse de la Russie et de l'Autriche. Les Polonais pourraient aussi être employées au professorat de cette école. La Serbie verrait ainsi ses jeunes gens se rendre propres à devenir de bons officiers ; sa milice et ses gardes nationaux devenir bonne soldats et en peu de temps et sans grande dépense on pourrait mettre sur pied une armée régulière, nationale et commandée par des officiers nationaux. protéger le progrès de l'industrie en faisant venir des ingénieurs civils, des mineurs, des chimistes, toujours de préférence les Polonais aux Allemands et aux autres nations. Etablir une police pour la sûreté des voyageurs ; rendre les routes meilleures ; dans les villes protéger l'établissement des auberges, en un mot rendre le pays accessible aux étrangers, afin qu'ils y puissent exercer la commerce. intéresser les riches négociants de l'angle terre et de la France et avec leur concours former une banque nationale. Il faut éviter dans cette opération les négociants autrichiens et ceux qui auraient des relations d'intérêt ou de protection avec le gouvernement de l'Autriche. Le Gouvernement de la Serbie ne peut donner trop d'attention au clergé. Un clergé national et éclairé serait une grande garantie pour le présent et l'avenir de la Serbie. Le Gouvernement doit donc aider à l'instruction du clergé, choisir pour les postes éminents des hommes d'une capacité distinguée et d'une piété sincère. Le haut clergé aidé par le Gouvernement doit porter la même attention à l'égard du bas clergé, c'est-à-dire des curés et des moines. Tout en fortifiant ainsi et protégeant son Eglise nationale le Gouvernement saura observer la plus grande tolérance à l'égard des autres religions et gagner ainsi l'approbation et les coeurs de tout le monde.

Toutes ces choses ne peuvent s'exécuter que peu à peu, sans précipitation, mais avec beaucoup de persévérance et avec la conviction qu'en travaillant ainsi on arrive à tout ce qui est juste et légal, car la Providence protège un pareil travail. Cette esquisse rapide demanderait de longs développements et une étude approfondie des localités pour être complète. Elle contient quelques conseils, mais surtout des vœux dictés par une sincère sollicitude. Une observation mérite d'être ajoutée, c'est que la Serbie ne peut pas demeurer stationnaire dans une condition actuelle. Elle doit son-

ger à améliorer rapidement cette condition en se préparant à la prompt dissolution d'une existence éphémère. L'esprit serbe, s'il ne rayonnait en dehors des limites qui lui sont assignées aujourd'hui...

- [Les tribus monténégrins de Brda en Herzégovine, a savoir Piperi, Vasojevići, Bjelopavlići, Kući]
- [les troupes des Confins Militaires - de Vojna Krajina]
- [Društvo srbske slovesnosti, formé en Belgrade 1843]
- [brigands, rebelles contre les Turcs]
- [Kragujevac, en Serbie centrale, le capital à l'époque du Prince Miloš]



Hôtel Lambert, Paris

ZACH'S REPORT 1843

I have learnt from Mr. M. Czajkowski that you are willing to receive this report on the mission of a diplomatic agent in Serbia. I am writing it the same day without consulting a single work, without seeking advice from anyone. The honour you confer on me requires of me to be open with you because “national mask” would not hide me enough in front of a statesman with such a long, and often dangerous, experience. I wish not to appear to you too small with my ideas and combinations, and as for the rest, I believe I will be able to serve you devotedly with all my heart.

Poland and Serbia. Their interests are compatible, especially on account of their geographical position. I see no state reasons for them to become rivals and enemies. Therefore, an alliance between these two states holds promise of stability, and its efficacy cannot be doubted for both of them suffer the same hostile influences of Russia and they could only benefit from mutual assistance provided at difficult times. Serbia should trust your well-meant intentions which have already been proven, and I think she will remember them fondly.

France and Serbia. France should want to maintain its substantial influence on matters of the East and to counterbalance Russia's influence. Therefore, it could protect Christians, particularly concerning the improvements [in their status] to which the Turks themselves have consented. The Serbs would thus do well to maintain good relations with France and even to treat them as more important than relations with England because the latter is prone to follow Austria in all [things] pertaining to Slav matters in Turkey. France offers more prospects than England.

Austria and Serbia. Their interests are opposite to each other. Austria cannot allow the formation of an independent Slav state at her borders

on the part of a nation that will sooner or later attract to itself Slavonia, southern Hungary, the Croats and Dalmatia. For that reason, Austria will always endeavour to weaken Serbia preventing by all means the broad development of the Serb nationality in Turkey. France, on the contrary, would receive the creation of a Slav state with the satisfaction that would be a guarantee of its independence. The fragmentation of Turkish Slavs is a precondition for peace in Austria. As for France, the unification of the Turkish Slavs does not affect its internal affairs in the slightest, but rather constitutes one more guarantee for the maintenance of external peace.

However, nowadays Serbia should avoid as far as possible a break with Austria because that would ruin nearly all of her trade and the Danube, her great outlet, would be closed [to her]. In view of Serbia, Austria is the only country that would rely in case of war on a base of great operation. For Austria, the Danube is a great artery; Zemun and Petrovaradin are two close fortresses, the former being a butress to Belgrade, and Austria has a fleet on the Danube and Sava carrying 123 cannons and 8 howitzers with the equipment of one Tschalkisten battalion. The benefits of using steam-boats [for the Serbs] cannot be stressed enough. They [steam-boats] are increasingly necessary to the Serbs. All this requires the utmost caution in dealing with Austria.

If the greatest danger comes from that side, should not the ways be prepared with the utmost precaution to diminish it, if not entirely remove? There is a lot to be done. Friendly relations between the Turkish Slavs and South Slavs in Austria have already been established; these should be broadened without resorting to revolutionary means. The strengthening of national feeling should suffice for that purpose. In this way, 17 regiments of the Military Frontier, the best Austrian infantry, would be gained of which 17 battalions could be formed at least.

Russia and Serbia. Russia has slowed down the fall of the Ottoman Empire in order to acquire its provinces one after another. She seeks for a base on the continent to capture Constantinople for her own maritime routes are not sufficient to do so.

Therefore, Russia directly interferes with the internal affairs of the Slav people in Turkey, just like Austria, and prepares them a dismal fate. It is thus in the interest of Serbs to resist Russia together with the Turks. For that purpose, it is necessary to seek for support in France, England and, if possible, in Austria.

The more Serbia resists Russian influence, the more confidence in her the latter countries would have. The support that Russia could provide to the Serbs is exhausted. The Serbs have nothing more to expect from the Russians; they should only fear [them]. The Serbian government is doing well when it suppresses Russian influence in its quarrels with the Turks. Other Slav provinces should now follow the example of Serbia which can provide them support.

England and Serbia. England will side with Austria with regard to solving Slav matters in Turkey. England, just like Austria and France, wants freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and on the Danube. Therefore, she should be lured by means of a trade agreement which would make it easier for her to buy raw materials, if not to sell her industrial products.

Serbia in relation to Turks and Slavs in Turkey. The fall of the Ottoman Empire can be remedied only by the creation of an independent Slav state to replace it. In that case, the Moldowallachians and Greeks would stop being shifty, the cause of the [Balkan] Peninsula would be strengthened, and Russia would not advance from that side any more. However, that does not mean that the Ottoman Empire should be crashed all at once. It should not fall down without rebuilding, and only that should be detached from it which can be used for new construction.

To stir up the Slavs just for the sake of expelling the Turks would mean to work for the Russian goals.

The Turks are not enough any more for the defence of the right bank of the Danube, the inhabitants of those lands, their national defenders, should be called up. But since the Slav nations are divided and carved up, they above all and as soon as possible should be persuaded that they would be conquered one after another by either Russia or Austria unless they unite. If they stand together, that is a sufficient guarantee that they will maintain their national independence which Europe will soon recognise.

In order to carry out that rapprochement and then unification, a basis needs to be established the main elements of which are as follows:

1. *Unity in the head of state.* There is already the prop or the core, Serbia, the beginning of civil and military organisation. All other Slavs should strive to place themselves in a similar situation, and therefore they should seek for her [Serbia's] friendship and follow her example. The fact that Serbia has taken an initiative gives hope that she will remain at the

head of her sisters: Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia must want to accomplish that deed because she cannot fight against her own greatness. The part is too beautiful not to be desired. There is a lot to be gained compared to the risks involved.

2. *Unity in the church.* Nearly all Slavs in Turkey belong to the Orthodox church, but its head is subservient to Muslims and he resides in Constantinople. Therefore, a way should be found to transfer the spiritual and religious centre and attach it to a laic or civil centre. I see only one way of achieving that: to elevate the Bishop of Montenegrins to this new dignity. That is a position that he is bound to like and which would perfectly suit the interests of the Orthodox Slavs in Turkey. The state would thus have its own church independent of the Russian church. The present Bishop is an enlightened and wise man, eager to achieve great things; he knows that a head of the Montenegrins will never have much weight on the Slav pan of the scales in Turkey. Public opinion, particularly laic, will not oppose [him] because he is highly regarded, the prestige of the centuries-long national independence belongs to his tribe, and his rule is glorious on account of many improvements. The Montenegrins will always obey him and they will unite with the Serbs [from the Principality of Serbia] much easier if they see him at the head of a common church. The territorial gap between Serbia and Montenegro does not seem to me so great as not to allow to be filled. That is one of those questions that could be solved on the spot alone.

3. *National unity.* If two basic conditions existed, the third one would remain, an addendum to the previous [two]: a racial community for Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. There is a great similarity in national character and almost complete unity of language there. Unfortunately, Bulgaria differs too much to be classified in the same category. Still, I believe that the force of things will bring the Bulgarians in as well.

Besides, the unification of Slavs in Turkey cannot be carried out like the unification of French by one of the most despotic revolutions. Internal (provincial) patriotism is too deep-rooted there and thus it will be necessary to take into account the institutions and customs which have been in existence for ages. I think it could be started with alliance agreements which would promise mutual assistance in case of war or aggression. This first step would be followed by others. Little by little the road would wi-

den. Agreements on the improvement of trade routes would come to pass and there would be a lot of opportunities for the neighbouring nations with the same interests to do favours to each other.

On internal administration of Serbia. I cannot speak in detail about the government in Serbia because one should be on the spot and see people and things in order to estimate their value. Nevertheless, even now one can speak in favour of the necessity of maintaining unity in Serbian government, its stability and hereditary principle and also in favour of a civil and military organisation, increasingly uniform and centralised, which would make the government strong and worthy of respect in view of its subjects and foreigners. The more orderly her affairs, the more Serbia would rise in the eyes of her neighbours. In military respect, general armament of the people should be maintained since many a case of war might still emerge. The government should pay the greatest attention to organisation of the cadres capable of keeping the peasants armed and obedient. The introduction of the French law code suggested by certain Dr. Barašin seems to me absurd. Let the Serbs have their national customs which are more valuable than all written laws that change with every government and become one of the most difficult affairs for a state. The second thing is [the creation of] an honest and efficient administration which particularly protects the people who manage the affairs. This primarily concerns: a fair collection of taxes and the building of trading and strategic roads. Education should be under the clergy which would turn it into national upbringing. A priest is a natural teacher of the people who would use the religion to make his people good and virtuous.

This short survey will allow you to judge, if you find my frame of mind suitable, whether there are sufficient basis and reasons for starting working in this sense. I humbly deliver it to you looking forward to receiving your instructions. Please, trust me, my Lord, that I will attach the greatest importance and strictly adhere to them. I have not discussed the Czech land because its interests completely accord to those of Poland which are yours as well. I can confirm that my many conversations with South Slavs have completely convinced me on that score. From that I conclude that the Serbs will receive me all the more favourably. But the entire success of this mission depends on you since they have confidence in you, and not in me. If you do not make me your diplomatic agent, I will simply be no more than an individual to whom no one would listen. If you

instruct me, my path will be determined and made an integral part of a network created by your wisdom. Without your instructions I will be isolated and thus powerless.



Београд, Миливој Ненадовић, литографија, 1849.

Belgrade, Milivoj Nenadović, lithograph, 1849

ZACH'S SERBIA'S SLAVIC PLAN

Introduction

Serbia needs to align herself with other European nations also in terms of creating a *plan for her future* or, as it were, of laying out a sort of a *domestic policy* upon the basic principles of which she should act over several centuries and manage all her affairs unswervingly; in about the same way as Austria since the Emperor Rudolph I, England since Elizabeth, Russia since the Emperor Peter the Great, have been consistently guided by the same political principles.

Movement and agitation among the Slavs has already begun and, indeed, it will go on for centuries. Therefore, Serbia should properly understand this movement as well as the role or task she is going to have in it.

Should Serbia, then, think carefully about what she now is, what her position is, and what are the peoples that she is surrounded with, she will certainly find out that she is still small, that she must not stay that way and that it is only in alliance with other South Slavs in this world that she can have and indeed has a future and a task to fulfil.

What emerges from this understanding as the main feature and cornerstone of Serbia's policy is that it must be *South Slavic*.

Should Serbia not stick to and pursue this policy energetically, should she not give a good thought to this task and make a careful plan, she will, like a small boat, be thrown to and fro by foreign storms, and eventually crash into some huge rock and break into pieces.

To contribute a little to and make some preparations for this plan of Serbia's South Slavic policy is what we wish and try to do here. But in all this we supplicate that this proposal of ours might be judged benevolently inasmuch as it has been composed with good and honest intentions: it is this confidence that has encouraged us to take a look at the future boldly and to speak up frankly for Serbia's glory and happiness.

Serbia's Slavic policy

A few remarks on the disintegration of the Empire

If the Ottoman Empire as it is stands to disintegrate, it can only come about in two ways:

- 1) either the Empire will be partitioned;
- 2) or it will be built anew by its Christian populations.

We shall not elaborate on this subject, it should only be noted that Russia and Austria [Habsburg Empire], being neighbouring and contiguous powers, should play leading roles in that event.

These two powers could easily reach a deal as to which should take which lands and regions, Austria being only able to hope to control the western provinces, and Russia to seize the eastern ones; a straight line drawn from Vidin [today's Western Bulgaria] to Salonika [Thessalonica] would indeed settle the question to the satisfaction of both sides.

In the event of a partition, then, all Serbs might fall into the Austrian portion. Austria wishes even more for this to happen as she already has got a good share of the Serbian people.

Austria and Russia know only too well that the Ottoman Empire as it is has no future ahead and cannot last for much longer. Both states will not fail to seize such an opportunity to extend their borders. Both are working towards that in every way possible in order to forestall the emergence and rise of a Christian Slavic state in place of the Ottoman state; for, in that case, Russia would lose her dearest hope and pleasant prospect of taking and holding Constantinople, which has been her most cherished plan ever since Peter the Great, —and Austria would face the terrifying danger of losing her South Slavs. Therefore, Austria must, under all cir-

cumstances, remain hostile to a South-Slavic state; therefore agreement and accord with Austria is not a political option for the Serbs, for it would give them rope enough to hang themselves.

How to build a Slavic empire from the Ottoman Empire

Solely Austria and Russia are able to work towards the collapse and partitioning of the Turkish Empire; Russia has been moulding the situation and preparing such an outcome systematically for years. So now Austria cannot do otherwise than to lend a hand and make sure she gets a share, as she did at the partitioning of Poland. All other European powers, led by France and England, are necessarily opposed to such an expansion and augmentation of Russia and Austria, and they may find that the best way to forestall this partitioning would be to transform the Ottoman Empire into a free and independent Christian state. In that way, the space vacated by the collapse of [Ottoman] Turkey would be filled up and it is only in that way that the European balance of power could and must be fully preserved. There is no other way than that.

The Serbian state, which has already seen a fortunate start, but which needs to expand and to grow stronger, has its roots and firm foundations in the Serbian empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and in its rich and glorious past. It is then that the Serbian emperors began to encroach on the Greek Empire, almost bringing it to an end, and so in place of the ruined Eastern Roman Empire [Byzantium] a Serbian Slavic empire might have risen. Emperor Dušan the Mighty even adopted the coat-of-arms of the Greek empire.¹ The Turkish invasion put a stop to this change and interrupted the endeavour for a long while, but now that Turkish power is broken and destroyed, the spirit of yore is rekindled, it claims its rights once more and resumes its endeavour; like a powerful river, for a long time held back from its natural course by an artificial dam, and now, having broken and overcome the obstacles, resuming its original course.

These foundations and cornerstones of the Serbian empire's edifice should be now progressively cleared of rubble and debris and brought to

¹ This is a reference to the Emperor Stefan Dušan (1345–1355), crowned in Skoplje as the "Emperor of Serbs and Greeks".

light and, then, on these solid and stable historical foundations, construction can be resumed. This will confer immeasurable importance and great prestige on this whole endeavour in the eyes of all nations, and their governments too; for you, Serbs, will appear before the world as true heirs of a glorious past, as sons simply continuing the work of their great forefathers. —Your present will not be unconnected with the past, but the two will make one interdependent, integrated and structured whole, and in that way the Serbs, their nationality and nationhood, are protected by the sacred historical right. This striving of yours cannot be objected to as being altogether new and groundless, a revolution and overthrow, but all must recognize that it is politically needed, that it is grounded in ancient times, and that it has its roots in the past life of the Serbian state and people, roots that simply send forth new shoots and begin to blossom anew.

If the rebirth of the Serbian empire is seen from this standpoint, then other South Slavs will understand this idea without difficulty and embrace it joyfully, for it seems that in no other European land is the memory of the historical past so vibrant as it is among the Turkish Slavs, who, till this day, remember nearly all illustrious men and events vividly and truthfully. So it is only to be expected that the people will readily say yes to this endeavour, and that it will not take decades of working with them to make them understand the benefits and advantages of independent government.

Of all the Slavs in Turkey, the Serbs have been the first to start to fight for freedom relying on their own resources and strength; consequently, they have every right to leadership in this endeavour. In many places and in some cabinets it is felt and expected that the Serbs have a great future lying ahead, and this is exactly what has drawn attention of all Europe to the Serbs. If the Serbs did not think beyond the Principality that they now have, and if the germ of a future South Slavic empire were not contained in this Principality, then the world would concern itself with Serbia no more or longer than it has with the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, where there is no principle of independence and which are seen as mere Russian satellites.

It seems that divine providence ordained that Serbia's struggle for freedom was led by such a Hero, on whose glory a dynasty or a ruling house can be founded and around whose offspring all South Slavs will readily come together. And this is one of the main requirements for a new

constitutional monarchy to be founded. Thank God, then, that this has been accomplished and the son of the celebrated Hero Kara George brought to the throne.

A new South-Slavic, Serbian state would give Europe every guarantee that it will be a virtuous and vital state, capable of holding up between Austria and Russia; its geographical position, its area, its natural resources and its population's fighting spirit, as well as their refined and ardent national feeling, their common origin and language—all this promises its stability and a great future.

On the means of achieving union of all South Slavs

If you are determined about what you want, and want it staunchly and steadfastly, then the means of achieving the goal can, for such a capable people as the Serbian is, be found easily and quickly.

1. *The initial means*

In order to be able to decide what can be done and how to proceed, the government ought to know: what the situation is of each South-Slavic branch; this is the main prerequisite for the right decision about the means. To that end, sharp-witted, unbiased men, loyal to the government, should be dispatched to those lands to explore and survey, and, on their return, they should submit accurate written reports on the state of affairs. The men should be dispatched as follows:

- One to Bulgaria;
- One to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and north Albania; and
- One to Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia.

Each of them should be specifically instructed as to how to travel these lands, and which particular places and persons to get to know, but without further specifying their itineraries. In addition to this specific instruction, they should be provided with a general one containing the following necessary assignments:

1) They are to assess the political situation in a land, especially its political parties; to gather observations useful for understanding its people and their sentiments and, hence, their unspoken desires; but most of all they are to identify what should be considered as an already recognized and publicly expressed popular need.

2) Special attention should be paid to the state of military affairs in a land and its people, such as the people's fighting spirit and armament; then the size and disposition of the regular army; the locations of military warehouses and arsenals; the location of wartime armaments and food production units, or where such supplies are imported from, etc.

3) They are to make a list and an account or assessment of the most important and influential men, including those who are our adversaries.

4) What is the attitude towards Serbia in a given land, what its people expect from Serbia, what they want from her and what their fears of her are.

These instructions should also specify what each of the agents is allowed to say about Serbian policies at this point; what hopes they are allowed to raise and to which particular things they are to draw the attention and thinking of Serbia's friends there. It does not seem to be my place to speak about these things in detail, but only of those who have the honour of holding state offices and running Serbia's affairs.

II. On Serbia's attitude towards Bulgaria

Of all Slavic lands Bulgaria is the nearest to the glorious capital of the Turkish Empire; her largest portion is easily accessible; the most important strongholds of the Turks are situated there and more than half of their army; in no other part of Europe does the Turk feel so safe and such a master as there; moreover, almost all Bulgarians are disarmed, and have become so accustomed to obeying and working that submission and labour have become their second nature. —However, this observation shall not mislead me about the true worth of Bulgarians or into despising them. It is exactly because the Bulgarians are more hard-working and sparing than any other, and very adept at all civilian trades, that they will become increasingly aware of the imminent fall of these lazy, outward splendour-loving Turks engrossed in luxury and pleasures. —It is true, unfortunately,

that the Bulgarians, although they are the largest Slavic group in Turkey, lack self-confidence and that it is only if spurred from the outside, from a foreign country, that they will dare venture into liberating themselves. — They still see Russia as the power that can do most for their salvation and liberation. But it has already become obvious that Russia dares not take the risk involved with a direct military intervention in Bulgaria, because Europe has known the true nature of the purportedly generous Russian intentions with regard to Turkey; and, indeed, should Russia think of crossing the Danube once more, it will be a European war. For this reason, Russia needs to seek to act through others in order to accomplish what she cannot do on her own. Thus Prince Michael was her unwilling and blind instrument in this business. So, she is really keen on returning to her original plan which she has already begun to carry out through Prince Michael.

But, since the present government of Serbia is not at all trusted by Russia, and since this government will not let itself be used as a blind tool by Russia, Russia needs to work towards its overthrow in order to reinstate her exiled friend, Prince Michael.

Any attempt to mislead Russia into believing that the present government is willing to succumb to her influence and ready to act against the Porte in the same way as Prince Michael did will end in failure; for knowing only too well that a sense of national independence has been revived in Serbia, Russia will never put trust in such proposals even if the present government were to make them, and she will see a trap behind them, but she is much too clever and cautious to fall into it. — We also believe that if Russia finds out about Serbia's efforts to establish a closer alliance and agreement with other Turkish Slavs, she will use the knowledge to betray the leaders of such an undertaking to the Turks, to Austria and to other governments so as to convince Europe that it is not Russia but rebellious and disobedient Serbia that supports these rebellious efforts. — But, in spite of it all, Russia would love to be notified about such agreements in order to be able to keep an eye on their course and, little by little, to gain control of them for her own purposes.

The more independent the present government becomes in its actions, the less trusted it will be by Russia, and if Russia eventually fails to topple the present government, she will put much effort in turning all Turkish Slavs away from Serbia, in playing them off against one another and nurturing these divisions, while establishing relations and making agree-

ments with each of the branches separately. —If Serbia does not prove more active and dynamic than Russia, Russia will overtake her and win.

In this endeavour we must guard against deluding ourselves. Russia will never demean herself before Serbia, and if she sees that Serbia is not willing to serve her devotedly and unconditionally, she will reject any condition with pride and scorn. Indeed, she has strongly rejected wise advice extended by her own diplomats, such as a [baron] Lieven, exactly because he suggested a temporary *détente*; can she be expected, then, to be more yielding to foreigners than she is to her own faithful servants?—Moreover, if Russia did not find in Serbia anyone to yield to her unconditionally, and if she were compelled to work with those who are ready to serve under certain conditions, she would not hesitate to ally and work with them, but Serbs ready to obey Russia unconditionally can be found, and they will always be her first choice. —Russia would never not allow such a small state as Serbia to set conditions; she demands that her advice be acted upon unconditionally like orders, and those who want to serve to her must submit completely: or else, she does accept their services, it is true, but she never trusts them with anything, because she has no confidence in them, and whereby she removes any possibility of being deceived.

It is Serbia's desire to overcome her present subordinate position and become a true state. On her way to independence, she has to destroy and appropriate, little by little, the political authority of the Turks. Here lies the point of conflict between the policies of Serbia and Russia, because Russia also works on weakening the political power of the Turkish Empire. —But from this congruence the same goals and intentions or congruent policies do not necessarily follow. Russia has relentlessly sought to undermine and weaken the Turkish state in order to turn it into an unprecedented and self-willed (anarchic) wreck, from the ruins of which she then would be able to pick the best pieces to expand herself. For that reason Russia has been instigating the Christian *rayah* to rebellion and revolt, betraying them shamelessly and deviously whenever they tried to found a free and independent country for themselves. —Serbia, by contrast, needs to dismantle the edifice of the Turkish state stone by stone in order to use this good material to build a new great Slavic state upon the solid foundations of the ancient Serbian empire. —Even though she is still under Turkish rule, Serbia needs to make preparations for this construction, for that is not the kind of work that can be undertaken and completed at the last

moment. —Consequently, the policies of Russia and Serbia are mutually opposed and antagonistic in their intentions and goals.

We have elaborated on the nature of Russian and Serbian policies for it is in Bulgaria that encounters between Serbian and Russian influences are to be the most frequent.

If we have understood well the popular sentiments in Bulgaria, and if we have not underestimated her patriotic capacities, then we must say that a greater liberation effort is nowhere near. And yet, it is in that direction that Russia's efforts there are aimed, because this a land that lies before the very gates of Constantinople and in her way to it; but Bulgaria has exactly the same position and significance for Serbia too. If Russia goes on working like this for no more than a few years, without Serbia's working in the same way, Russia will achieve such a success in Bulgaria that any Serbian influence will become utterly useless. —Let this be a warning to Serbia never to forget that political friendships can be expected only where the love for a friend has already been shown and proven. So Serbia must do something for Bulgaria or, otherwise, Bulgaria will do nothing for her, for love and help need to be mutual.

Having briefly outlined our attitude towards present-day Bulgaria and her great significance for Serbia, and having sketched the Russian influence there, we shall proceed to outline some preliminary ways of establishing a Serbian influence in Bulgaria.

1) The Bulgarians have no educational institutions, so Serbia should open her schools to Bulgarians, and, in particular, grant scholarships to young Bulgarians currently pursuing their studies in Serbia.

2) The Bulgarian clergy are for the most part Greek, rather than of Bulgarian origin; therefore, it would be very advantageous and useful to train a certain number of young Bulgarians at the theological seminary in Serbia, who would then return as priests to their fatherland and their people.

3) Bulgarian prayer books and other church books and Bulgarian writings should be printed in Serbia; Russia has been employing this important instrument for a long time now, and Serbia must seek to outdo her in that respect.

4) It is necessary to dispatch reliable and capable men to Bulgaria in order to draw the Bulgarian people's attention to Serbia, to arouse their

sympathies for Serbia and Serbia's government, and to rekindle their hopes that Serbia will indeed come to their aid again and look after their wellbeing.

III. On Serbia's policy with respect to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Northern Albania

When we look more closely at the areas and geographic positions of these lands, the fighting spirit of their populations and the attitudes and ways of thinking of these Serbs, we necessarily come to the conclusion that it is in that portion of the Turkish Empire that Serbia could exert the most powerful influence. To exert this influence constantly and methodically appears to be the main task of Serbia's policy in Turkey for the time being (1844).

Let us, without much ado, suggest some effective means to this end:

1) If two neighbouring peoples seek to establish a closer and more intimate alliance, their borders need to be opened as much as possible in order to facilitate and intensify communication. But it seems that Serbia has been shutting herself off by a Great Wall of China from her Slavic neighbours in Turkey, allowing so little communication that there are buildings in Vienna or Paris that have more doors to get in or out than the Serbian Principality has; therefore, it is our suggestion not to reduce the number of border guards but to increase the number of the points of meeting, entry and exit along the Serbian border with Bosnia.

This system of isolation introduced under Prince Miloš might have been meaningful and useful in its time; but to maintain this system any longer would be as good as keeping Serbia lonely and shut off, which is utterly against her whole future and prosperity.

2) It is not until the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Bosnians reach an understanding and agreement on their national policy that this policy may become successful and effective.

It is Serbia's duty to propose the fundamentals of this policy to both parties, for she has the capacity to act in this matter, and she is fully entitled to due to her diplomatically recognized existence and years of experience. —One of the fundamentals is: the principle of full religious free-

dom, —this principle will satisfy and please all Christians and, possibly, some Muslim Bosnians as well. —But, as the first and foremost law of the state to be established and put forward is: that the dignity of a prince must be hereditary within the Karadjordjević family. Without the principle of unity being embodied in this highest state dignity, no enduring and stable state union between Serbia and other South Slavs can even be imagined.

Should the Bosnians not accept it, that will certainly lead to a fragmentation of the South Slavs into small provincial principalities under different ruling families, which then will certainly yield up to foreign influences; for there would arise rivalries and jealousies between them. These families could never be led to sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of another, not even if the happiness and prosperity of all South Slavs were to depend on it.

Who is truly concerned about the wellbeing of the South Slavs must not suggest a hereditary principedom to the Bosnians, but only that the best men be chosen from among the people and by the people to form some sort of a council, and not for life, but for a term. With this highest state body or authority, even if separate and provincial, a way to progress will remain open, that is, it will be easier for Serbia to establish a closer connection and alliance with Bosnia and for this closer alliance to remain possible and likely.

The third fundamental principle of this policy is that of national unity, the diplomatic representative of which should be the government of the Principality of Serbia. It is the latter, then, that the Bosnians and other South Slavs should turn to and get protection and all assistance from whenever the exercise of this principle is brought into question. —In this respect, Serbia needs to become aware that she is the natural protector of all South Slavs and that the other Slavs will not admit her the right to act and speak on their behalf until she takes that responsibility upon herself. Should Serbia set to her neighbours the short-sighted and vicious example of thinking only of herself and being indifferent to rather than concerned about the difficulties or prosperity of others, then the others will simply follow her example and instead of concord and unity, envy and misfortune will set in.

3) We also suggest that not only should all fundamental laws, the constitution and all institutions of the Principality of Serbia be promulgated among the people of Bosnia—but also that a number of young Bos-

nians should be timely employed in Serbian state administration in order to be professionally trained in political and financial management, in law and public education, and thus become public servants capable of putting into practice in their fatherland the knowledge they have acquired in Serbia.

4) As a particular and highly important means likely to achieve great results in arousing and strengthening the national feeling of all Bosnians—we recommend that a printing shop is started in Bosnia, which has already been planned and prepared for. —In the hands of the enlightened and ardently patriotic Bosnian Franciscans this printing shop will, obviously, first print a Catholic prayer book and religious poetry; after that, if not a prayer book for Eastern Christians, at least a collection of folk poems in both Latin and Cyrillic scripts could be printed; and after that, as a third step, a short and general history of Bosnia, where the glory and names of some of the Bosnian converts to the Muslim faith must not be omitted. It goes without saying that this history should be written in a Slavic national spirit and quite in the spirit of the national unity of Serbs and Bosnians. —Through printing this and other patriotic works Bosnia would be liberated (emancipated) from the Austrian influence and inclined more to Serbia. In that way the Dalmatians and Croatians too would be given works that is impossible to print in Austria, which would then lead to a closer connection of these lands with Serbia and Bosnia. —Through such books the Bosnian Muslims could indeed be influenced as well, for they understand the language, so the books could at least be read to them. Who knows, perhaps this means might win some Bosnian Muslim families back to their fatherland and Christian faith.

But in order to be able to speak credibly and resolutely through this printing shop, Serbia herself should support its establishing. —We believe that the best way to proceed would be as follows: Serbia should have works printed there at her expense, which will then be distributed among the people in Bosnia, or she should support financially the procurement of the material needed by the printing shop.

5) The entire foreign trade of Serbia is in the hands of Austria. Direct trading with foreign countries via Belgrade and Zemun [Zemlin] will always be a difficult and distressing affair. Serbia should therefore see to ensure a new trade route to connect her with the sea and provide her with a port [in Adriatic coast]. The shortest possible route now is only

the one leading to Dulcigno [Ulcinj] via Scutari. There the Serbian trader with his natural products would find in Dalmatian seamen and traders not only his co-nationals but also very apt and capable people who could lend him a hand, truly and honestly, with purchasing foreign goods. —In no place other than the Adriatic could Serbia find trading agents to sell her natural products to and to buy the necessary foreign goods from. —It is there, then, that a Serbian trading agency should be established to defend and protect the sale of Serbian products and the purchase of French and English goods.

The first step that the government should take in this matter is to appoint a trading agent at Dulcigno in order to show the Serbian trader the way, as if pointing it with a finger. Should this not suffice, should people fail to understand the significance of this step, the general public could be advised on this matter just as easily as it is being done daily in France and England, namely, the government's public paper would discuss the value and importance of new ports and trading routes and thus open the eyes of the public to them. —With even few traders managing to make some good and lucrative business deals there and find a new market for their goods, others will soon follow their example. —A general commercial gain for Serbia to be noted here is that owing to the new export route for Serbian products in the south, the prices of the same products in the north would necessarily rise, because their offer on the Austrian markets would decrease, which naturally would cause the prices of these goods to rise. At the same time, this new trade route would certainly cause the prices to fall of those goods that Serbia imports from foreign countries; because that would give rise to competition or contest. The Serb will then sell dearer and buy cheaper.

This measure is no less important in political terms, because this new Serbian agent will find himself in a Serbian environment, and the government should by no means miss this opportunity to exert an influence on the north Albanians and nearby Montenegro, the peoples who hold the key to the gates of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even to the Adriatic Sea. —We are confident that the establishing of a Serbian agency in that region, to judge from what people there think, will right away be seen by them as an extraordinarily important political act and that in this way a closer alliance of these populations with Serbia will be easy to make.

France and England will not only approve of, they will support this; for they stand to gain from it; —nor should the Porte object; for owing to this one of its ports could flourish again.

6) A stronger influence on Eastern Christian Bosnians [i.e. Christian Orthodox Serbs] will not be a difficult task for Serbia to fulfil. On the other hand, winning over Catholic Bosnians requires more caution and attention. They are led by Franciscan friars. Fortunately, Croatia, not without some self-sacrifice, has inspired this almost popular religious order with an outlook that makes them sympathetic to Serbia. All that Serbia needs to do now is add a bit and they will be entirely won over for her cause. In addition to her support to the establishing of the aforementioned printing shop, it would be very good and advisable to appoint one of these Bosnian friars as professor of Latin and classical history at the Lyceum of Belgrade. In this way the Serbs would make some sort of alliance with the Catholic Bosnians, give them a clear proof of tolerance or brotherly confessional concord, and have an intermediary at their disposal. Being a Catholic priest, he could see to establishing a Catholic chapel for the local Catholic merchants, turning in this matter to the French consul in the first place. This would give the French government a reason and opportunity to get this affair done if not to the exclusion to than in advance of Austria, and through this the Serbian government, although only acting as a support, would establish closer relations with France.

7. Karageorge was a naturally gifted and very experienced military leader; therefore he could not have overlooked the great military importance of Montenegro for Serbia whenever the issue should arise of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina off from the Porte. This hero's campaigns against Novi Bazar and Sjenica are still vividly remembered by all the Serbs, so there is no need for extensive argumentation to back up our proposal. Serbia should follow the example of Russia in Montenegro and support the Bishop with regular annual subsidies. —In this way Serbia will have, for a small price, the friendship of a country capable of mustering no less than 10,000 mountain troops.

It is to be noted that to leave such a support to the last moment cannot produce the desired success and effect, for Russia will be justifiably able to refer to her years-long and regular support, and she will be able to besmirch and cast doubt on the new Serbian proposal and support as being forced by necessity; the Montenegrins would then say: the Serbs

did not help us when we were in need, which proves that they are not our friends, but only want to make a one-time use of us.

IV. Serbia's attitude towards Croatia

Bosnia is the middle member of an alliance to which Serbia and Croatia [i.e. province of Croatia-Slavonia within Habsburg Empire] naturally belong. Bosnia shields the backs of both the Serb and the Croat in case they have to turn against Vienna and Constantinople. Through the Catholic Christians Bosnia is in a close alliance with Croatia, and through the Eastern Christians, with Serbia. Consequently, there are in Bosnia a Croatian and a Serbian population, and there Serbian and Croatian influences should always be kept in harmony and particularly aimed at encouraging Catholic and Eastern Christian Bosnians to trust each other, but also to be in accord with Serbia and, with time, to come to wish to join in with Serbia.

In this matter an agreement with the most prominent Croatian patriots ought to be reached, not in the sense that they should be persuaded into accepting such a policy, because they have it already, but in order to encourage this fine striving of theirs and to be given by Serbia a proof that she approves of and wants the policy they have favoured so far.

Unfortunately, the Austrian Serbs of Srem, the Banat and Bačka [present-day Vojvodina] are not such political friends of Serbia's that she can rely and count on promptly and at all times, should, for example, Serbia need to be defended against Austria; conversely, the Croats much better understand the political future of Serbia, and know very well what role with respect to Austria they should play in it; so they run ahead and the Austrian Serbs should be very much ashamed because of that. For this reason the Illyrian party has never wanted to support the Obrenović family, not even when the latter, under Miloš, were yielded to Austria, or when they were thinking in Russian terms under Michael; for this same reason, following the fall of the Obrenovićs, the entire Illyrian party promptly accepted the new state of affairs, and began, and in a very extensive way, to support the Serbian prince Alexander's new government, without having been persuaded into it by the Serbs and without Serbia's having spent a penny for it. —It is the patriotic spirit of Croats that inclines the whole Military Frontier to the Serbs and turns it against Austria; —and this situa-

tion is so important that it will hinder any armed intervention of Austria in Serbian affairs if Serbia knows how to use it aptly. –And if the Military Frontier ever makes a decisive step against Austria in Serbia's favour, is it not likely to expect that Italy, which is so near Croatia, will exploit that event to try to liberate herself?

And therefore the Illyrian name of the movement upsets only those uninformed, those who do not know that it stands for the unification of all South Slavs into one state. It is because he seeks to bring around and unify all the South-Slavic subjects of Austria that the illustrious man who has done most for the spread of this idea in Austria has had to take so many things into account; he has not been allowed to fly the flag of the Serbian empire and name on his house, but he has had to use a name that is legal to use Austria. His intention is not an Illyrian kingdom, but a Serbian empire under the Karadjordjević family, and all his efforts are aimed at that. We also know that the Croats, seeing that the Serbs and Serbia find the Illyrian name upsetting, have dropped and abandoned that name in relation to the Serbs and Serbia, for what they really care for is the cause, not the name; but, for important reasons, they still have to defend this name in relation to Austria.

So the Illyrians and their leaders seek:

1) To spread the image of Prince Alexander portrayed in the Serbian national costume rather than in a foreign uniform; and with a title in Cyrillic and Croatian Latin scripts, while a French one may be added beneath them. A heroic portrait of Prince Alexander will leave a particularly strong impression on the Frontier men. In order to spread this image as much as possible its price for Croatia should be as low as possible; even a price of two silver forints is too high for a vast majority of people, so it should be sold at a price of one forint.

2) Croats and their closest Slavic neighbours use the Latin script, but Serbian is progressively becoming their literary language day by day. Serbia should increasingly take this literature into account, and facilitate its reading through introducing instruction in this Croatian Latin script into schools and its inclusion in readers for public schools. So the children from an early age will be instilled with the idea that Serbs and Croats are one and the same people speaking one and the same language and simply

using two scripts. Even if seen only as a literary measure at first, it will nevertheless foster the idea of oneness and unity.

3) The Croats have established a national matrix [*matica*] in Zagreb, that is, a foundation for publishing Serbian books. Many Czech patriots have contributed to it and their names have been recorded and made public in the Zagreb press; from Prague alone 700 silver forints have come as a donation. This project has been given permission by the Austrian government. The Serbian government should instruct the dean of the Lyceum of Belgrade to donate fifty silver forints on behalf of this establishment, to acquire its books for the library of the Lyceum, so that the educated and learned South Slavs in Austria might see that the professors of the Lyceum of Belgrade want to have books from Zagreb in the Lyceum library, especially books published by the centre. At any rate, this step would lead to a literary friendship between Serbs and Croats.

4) Doctor [Ljudevit] Gaj makes significant financial sacrifices for a cause that is not exclusively Croatian. Who is familiar with his situation and means knows that these sacrifices take a disproportionately large amount of his earnings. To support financially this man, who is as educated as he is clever, through some confidential channel, would indeed be a most rewarding and highly beneficial sacrifice for Serbia and for all South Slavs. —This is a measure which would greatly help Dr. Gaj to encourage and raise the Serbian nationality and Serbian national pride among the Frontier men; and it is the Frontier that the main effort in Croatia should be aimed at: for in the last instance it is the Frontier that confers political significance on Croatian patriotism. With the Frontier come seventeen regiments of best troops. I cannot think of any other more effective means against Austria. —But Serbia can do little for this cause in a straightforward manner; Mr Gaj, by contrast, his name being widely known and highly respected, can do a lot through his many friends. Should any of this become known to the Austrian authorities and they find out about the Frontier's hostile sentiments, their investigation will lead to Mr Gaj and stop there, because Serbia's direct involvement will be impossible to prove.

V. Srem, Bačka and the Banat

It may seem at first sight that Serbia is on most friendly terms with these areas; given that they are one and the same with Serbia in origin, language,

mentality and customs. —If this is not the case, then at least part of the blame falls upon Serbia herself, because she has not tried hard enough to win the friendship of these Serbs. But we hope that all the adversary influence of Austria notwithstanding this wrong attitude will eventually improve, and proportionately to the Principality of Serbia's increasingly becoming a well-organized, just, educated and vital country.

In this respect, the following seems advisable:

1. To have Serbia constantly in the Serbian newspaper in Pest so that with time it may be shaped into a true organ of Serbian interests.

2. To gain control, if and in the way possible, of the management of the Serbian national centre [*matrix*] in Pest so as to make this important establishment better suited to its aims instead of leaving it to decay. Perhaps this can be best accomplished through Mr [Jovan] Hadžić.

VI. On an alliance with the Czech Slavs

All that I have said so far concerns Serbia's South-Slavic policy, and it appears that I am only intent on action as regards the countries that are neighbouring and nearest to Serbia. However, we should not lose sight of the Czech Slavs, who are at a somewhat greater distance, it is true, but who have particularly friendly feelings for Serbia, a way of thinking, then, which is highly important to us. For that reason, we shall outline the attitude of the Serbs towards those Slavs whose future is more closely linked with the future destiny of the Serbs.

The Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks in Austria are increasingly coming together and the idea is emerging, and filling their hearts with joy, of a joint Czech Slavic life in a national state. Therefore the political aspirations of the Czech Slavs are quite kindred to and obviously of the same nature as those of the Serbs. There is hope, then, that the hearts sharing the same feeling will understand one another easily, and this seems even likelier as the matter involves two brotherly peoples who have never persecuted or envied or harmed one another and who can only benefit from an enduring and friendly alliance. The same goes for the Poles. The Czech Slavs and Poles are indeed natural friends of the Serbs.

The Czech Slavs are able and willing to do many and significant favours to the Serbs. We shall only give a hint of the possible nature of such favours.

If it ever happens that Serbia has to confront Austria, the Czechs, Moravians and Poles too might make an attempt at liberating themselves from foreign oppression; this attempt, even if failed, will be to the advantage and benefit of Serbia: for it will have the effect of a diversion behind the Austrian army's back.

This observation does not become fully meaningful until we understand that Bohemia and Moravia have twelve infantry regiments, five chasseur battalions, ten cavalry regiments and three artillery regiments (Austria has no more than five artillery regiments). The Kingdom of Hungary [within Habsburg Monarchy] has thirteen infantry and twelve hussar regiments; it is true, but not a single chasseur battalion and no artillery whatsoever. Polish Galicia has thirteen infantry and eight cavalry regiments.

But let us leave these military calculations aside, as they belong more to the future, and pay attention to Serbia's present situation.

Serbia lags far behind many European states in sciences and arts, trade and crafts; therefore, men skilled and trained in these professions will be needed for quite some time, and if she is not to invite foreigners, she has to send her own sons to be educated abroad. In this, Serbia must not be indifferent to who is invited or where her young men are sent to; —for it is not enough to have able and skilled persons in important state offices, —if they are not at once dedicated and loyal to the Serbian state and its government, if they are not to be relied on in all circumstances, their personal aptitude will be wasted and eventually completely ruined for the lack of civil virtue and worth.

Therefore it would be to Serbia's benefit not to bring educated people to Serbia without rigorous checks, but to look for such persons only among the Slavs that are friendly and sympathetic to Serbia, and to look for and select them in a proper way, —in particular only those known as Slavic patriots and honest workers among the Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks should be invited as physicians, surgeons, engineers, miners etc.; and not, without taking any precautions, Germans or Hungarians, who deep down may be adversaries to the Serbs and Serbia.

Also, we recommend Prague as the best place for young Serbs to be sent to for training and education. Who is familiar with how the Slavic life has been developing since the end of the last century and what the national aspirations of the Czech Slavs are, and who has travelled lately in Bohemia and Moravia, will clearly and perfectly understand why we recommend these parts so strongly.

As a matter of fact, we believe that the Serbian government has seen for itself that the young Serbs it sent inadequately prepared to Vienna returned ill-educated and that most, with noteworthy exceptions, accepted only a surface social polish. —Had they been in Prague, things would probably have been different; for there they would have been in contact with many patriotic professors and learned men and with numerous Slavic patriotic youths.

But even to those who care little for the edification of the heart and character and seek only for material gains Bohemia and Moravia can offer benefits comparable with those offered by England and France. We should mention but crafts and agriculture; both countries surpass not only the other provinces of the Austrian Monarchy but also most German states.

We dare make only two suggestions in this respect:

1) To establish an institute in the interior of the country providing theoretical and practical instruction in farming, vine, fruit and forest growing and livestock breeding;

2) To establish an industrial chemistry department in Belgrade. This science is the foundation of all industry, there is no trade or craft where chemical knowledge is not useful.

At first sight, these two suggestions do not seem to belong here, but if seen as a means of drawing Czech Slavs closer to Serbs, they acquire a political significance too. To invite many Czechs to Serbia and send young Serbs to Bohemia will necessarily intensify contacts between the two peoples and lead to their agreement. —Such steps will not be opposed to by the Viennese government, because, by the looks of it, they draw Serbia closer to Austria.

For the realization of the two aforesaid suggestions, we take the liberty of recommending Professor [Pavle] Šafarik, a learned and honest Slav, devotedly loyal to Serbia and its present government. He may be instructed to explore, while travelling for the school holidays, the frame of

mind and current opinion of the Slavs in Hungary, Moravia and Bohemia, to draw the attention of their leading patriots to Serbia's future, and to consult with them on the two aforementioned men, that is the chemistry professor and the director of the economic institute.

It is our belief that we have said enough for the time being about the ways in which a closer alliance between Serbs and Czech Slavs may begin to be established; further and more detailed considerations should be left for a later date, when this should prove to be a successful beginning.

VII. On Serbia's domestic policy as harmonized with the outlined foreign policy

If Serbia is to pursue her foreign South-Slavic policy successfully, her domestic policy needs to be harmonized with it; for Serbia needs to change internally for her foreign mission.

1) To that, in our view, belongs the founding and setting up of a chair or *professorship in South-Slavic history and literature at the Lyceum of the Principality of Serbia in Belgrade*, for the history of all South Slavs, Serbs, Bosnians, Dalmatians, Croats and Bulgarians, and their literature, to be taught as one natural whole. And then this science, of utmost importance for uplifting and guiding the young minds, should become a regular course for some classes of students.

Professorships in Common Slavic history and literature have already been established in Paris, Berlin, Breslau, Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov etc. —The Serbian government should follow their example even more so as its subjects are *all Slavs*; so, it should by no means be an indifferent observer of what role is assigned to and planned for the Slavs in the future, or of how Serbian is spoken in the world and in the Serbian people.

The duty of the professor of the history and literature of the South-Slavic branch would, then, be not only not to fail to demonstrate the bond of the South Slavs with the other branches, but to demonstrate *clearly* to every Serb that the striving of the Serbs forms an important part of all Slavdom, *a striving which no other Slavic branch should annihilate or is able to fulfil.*

2) A special map should be drawn of all South-Slav-inhabited lands, and annotated in the Serbian script, and distributed to all Serbian schools to be *hung on the wall*, so that by looking at the map even the thic-

kest could clearly see that they inhabit a vast expanse. Without requiring further explanation, such an image shows the position of the South Slavs clearly enough, and speaks loudly enough to be able to arouse in every Serb the desire for a state that would bring all South Slavs together in one whole.

3) Eventually, the South-Slavic question can be resolved in no other way than by using arms and war, and the Serbs should become familiar with this idea in good time, although *such a war should by no means be started prematurely and only in the last resort.*

Governments do not respect Serbia because her citizens are honest people, but because they are armed and brave people; this fighting spirit needs to be carefully upheld and nurtured, and by properly organizing the Serbian people militarily, a military character should be conferred on the whole state; and to do that means to give the Serbian state the *firmest* guarantee of her future independence and freedom.

Nevertheless a proper military organization requires *military education of commissioned and non-commissioned army officers.* And for that reason we believe it pertinent to set up a military establishment under the name *Polytechnic school*, which should be in the interior of the country. The students would have the opportunity to be trained in arms construction in a factory set up in the same place.

That is, a small *arms and cannon factory* should be set up in the interior of the country not only for the purpose of producing a supply of arms needed for further progress, but also in order that, in time, the nearby Slavic lands could be supplied with arms from Serbia.

A particular proposal to be made here is that the *bayonet* should be introduced widely; at first, they could be fastened to the rifles of all public policemen. —In Karageorge's times the bayonet was not used even by the Turks and so Serbs and Turks fought with the same weapons; but the bayonet has since assumed a much greater military importance. It has become a common and empirically confirmed fact that a good infantry cannot be driven out of its stronghold by gunfire only; —and today almost all infantry clashes are resolved by bayoneted assaults. The enemy will be so self-confident as to launch an assault, but the Serb will find it much more difficult, given that he is armed much more poorly.

Concluding remarks

Far from being exhaustive, this composition should explicate the plan, outlined in page one, of Serbia's South-Slavic policy only as far as actions to be taken in the near future or a proposal for the initial stage of this policy are concerned. —To elaborate any further on the subject would seem impertinent and inappropriate to the propriety required by our subordinate position. —But we are fully confident that we have proposed or advised nothing incongruous with the spirit of the Serbian people, or surpassing the strength of the Serbian state.

1844

Principality of Serbia



THE NAČERTANIJE (DRAFT):
“THE PROGRAMME OF SERBIAN FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL POLICY AT THE END OF 1844”

Serbia must place herself in the ranks of other European states, creating a *plan for her future* or composing, so to speak, a long-term domestic policy to the principles of which she should firmly adhere, and according to which she should conduct herself and decide steadily all her affairs.

Movement and agitation among the Slavs has already begun and will, indeed, never cease. Serbia must well understand this movement along with the role or the assignment which she will have in it.

If Serbia ponders well enough what she is, and what her position is, and what are the peoples that surround her, she will realize that she is still very small, that she must not remain in such position, and that only through alliance with other neighbouring peoples can she fulfil the tasks for her future.

From this knowledge the plan and the foundation originate of Serbia's policy /which does not limit Serbia to her present borders, but endeavours to attach to her all the neighbouring Serbian peoples./

If Serbia does not vividly pursue this policy /and, worse still, if she rejects it/ failing to prepare a well-made plan fit for this assignment, she will be buffeted to and fro like a small vessel by the alien tempests until finally she will be broken into pieces on some huge reef.

What we wish and attempt to do here is to contribute somewhat and prepare the plan of Serbian policy abiding by its natural demands.

THE POLICY OF SERBIA

The Ottoman Empire /must/ disintegrate and this disintegration can only occur in two possible ways:

1. either it will be partitioned, or
2. it will be rebuilt anew by its Christian inhabitants.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PARTITION OF THE (OTTOMAN) EMPIRE

We do not wish to comment extensively on this subject, but shall limit ourselves merely to

observe that Austria and Russia must play the principal roles in this event since they are neighbouring and contiguous powers.

These two powers could easily agree and decide who is to receive certain lands and regions and where their borders shall lie. Austria can only aspire to rule over the western provinces, while Russia can only aspire to conquer the eastern ones. /Therefore, if/ a straight line were to be drawn from Vidin to Salonika, this question might be solved to the satisfaction of both parties.

Thus, in the event of a partition all the Serbs would fall into the Austrian portion.

Austria and Russia know well enough that the Ottoman Empire as such will not enjoy a long future. Therefore, both states are making use of this opportunity to extend their borders as quickly as possible. Both also work in every way to forestall and prevent the emergence of another Christian empire in place of the Ottoman Empire; for then, the fond hope and pleasant prospect would disappear for Russia of seizing and holding Constantinople, which has been her most cherished plan since Peter the Great; and Austria would then be in terrifying danger of losing her South Slavs.

Thus, Austria must, under all circumstances, keep being the enemy of a Serbian state. For the Serbs, then, agreement and understanding with Austria is a political impossibility; for thus she would tight the rope around her neck herself.

Only Austria and Russia are able to foster the collapse and partition of the Ottoman Empire. They are seeing to that. For many years,

Russia has been preparing the ground for that situation. Austria cannot now do otherwise than to assist her and seek something for herself, as she did at the partition of Poland. Naturally, all the other powers, under the leadership of France and England, are opposed to the expansion and enlargement of Russia and Austria. They would probably consider as the most suitable means for forestalling such partition, the conversion of the Ottoman Empire into a new and independent /Christian/ state which would occupy the vacuum left by the Turkish collapse, offering the sole means to maintain the balance of Europe in its entirety. Other way out cannot be expected.

The Serbian state which has already seen its good start, but must strive to expand and become stronger, has its roots and firm foundation in the Serbian Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and in the glorious and rich Serbian history. /It is known from this history/ that the Serbian rulers began to assume the position held by the Greek [Byzantine] Empire and almost succeeded in making an end of it in order to replace the collapsed Eastern Roman Empire with a Serbian-Slavic Empire. Emperor Dusan the Mighty had even adopted the coat-of-arms of the Greek Empire. The arrival of the Turks in the Balkans interrupted this enterprise, and prevented it from taking place for a long time; but now, since the Turkish power is broken and almost destroyed, the same spirit should act again, claim its rights anew, and continue the enterprise interrupted.

These foundations and walls of the Serbian Empire, therefore, must be cleared of all ruins and debris, and brought to light, so that a new edifice may be constructed on this solid and durable historical foundation. Such an enterprise will be endowed with inestimable importance and great prestige among all the nations and their cabinets; for then we Serbs shall appear before the world as the true heirs of our illustrious forefathers, doing nothing new but restoring their legacy. Hence, our present will not be without a link to the past, but they will make an interdependent, integrated, and well-ordered whole; thus, the Serbdom, its nationality and the life of its state stand under the protection of the sacred historical right. Our aspirations cannot be reproached as something novel and unfounded, as revolution and coup; but all must acknowledge that they are politically necessary, grounded in ancient ages, and embedded in the state and national life of the Serbian people whose roots continually send forth branches to blossom anew.

If we consider the revival of the Serbian Empire from this standpoint, then other South Slavs will easily understand this idea and accept it with joy; for probably in no European country is the memory of the historical past so vivid as among the Slavs of [European] Turkey, for whom the recollection is intense and faithful of the celebrated figures and events of their history. Therefore, it may be counted as certain that this enterprise will be readily accepted among the people, making unnecessary decades of activity among them, just in order to prepare them to understand utility and value of an independent administration.

The Serbs were the first, of all the Slavs of Turkey, to struggle for their freedom with their own resources and strength; therefore, they have the first and foremost right to further direct this endeavour. Even now in many places, and in certain cabinets, it is anticipated and expected that a great future is imminent for the Serbs, and it is this fact which has attracted the attention of entire Europe. If we thought of Serbia as merely a principality, which she is now, and if this principality were not the nucleus of a future Serbian Empire, then the world would concern itself no more with Serbia than it did with the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities where there is no principle of independent life and which it considers only as Russian pendants.

A new Serbian state in the south could give Europe every guarantee that it would be distinguished and vital, capable of maintaining itself between Austria and Russia. The geographic position of the country, its topography, abundance of natural resources, the combative spirit of its inhabitants, their sublime and ardent national feeling, their common origin and the same language—all indicates its stability and promising future.

ON THE MEANS BY WHICH SERBIAN GOAL MAY BE ATTAINED

When the goal is firmly determined, and steadfastly and vividly pursued, then /a capable government/ can easily and quickly find the means necessary for its attainment, /for the Serbian people are so good that with them everything may be reasonably achieved./

1. Initial means

In order to determine what can be accomplished, and how to proceed, the government must know the conditions and circumstances /of the peoples residing in the surrounding provinces./ This is the first prerequisite for exactly determining the means. Accordingly, it will be necessary, above all, to send sharp and unprejudiced people, loyal to the government, as investigators of the conditions of those lands and peoples, and the former /would be required/ to give exact written reports upon their return. /It is especially necessary to be informed/ on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Albania. /At the same time the exact situation in Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia must be learned and, of course, this includes the peoples in Srem, Banat, and the Backa as well./

These agents must be provided with instructions on how to circulate and pass through these lands. They must be informed, /among other things,/ which places and persons they should pay particular attention to. Besides these factual instructions, they should be given a general instruction that would contain the following points which they will be required to carry out:

1. They should judge the political situation of the designated country, especially its political currents; gather data which will enable better acquaintance with the people, their feelings and their innermost desires; but above all, they should indicate what must be considered as an already recognized and publicly expressed popular demand.
2. Special scrutiny must be attached to the military condition of the country and people, such as its martial spirit, armament, the size and disposition of the regular army; the location of military stores and arsenals; the location of industries for wartime demands, such as food and armament; or where they come from and enter the country etc.
3. They should compose description or evaluation, and the list of the most important and influential men in the country, not excluding potential opponents /of Serbia/.
4. The attitude of people in every province toward Serbia and their expectations from her must be observed, along with what they want from her or fear of.

These instructions, naturally, must seek to learn what every agent has to say so far about the ongoing Serbian policy, as well as what hopes

may be awoken and how the attention and regard, particularly of Serbia's friends, should be centered.

FIRST OF ALL TO DEFINE OUR RELATION TO BULGARIA

Bulgaria is the closest of all the Slavic countries to the glorious capital of the Ottoman Empire [Constantinople], and the greatest part of this country is easily accessible; most of the important military positions of the Turks, and more than half of their army are located here. In no other European country does the Turk feel so secure and more a master than in this one; the Bulgarians are deprived of all weapons; they have learned to submit and work—submissiveness and diligence have become their second nature. However, this observation must not prevent us from recognizing their true value, or lead us, which is worse still, to become contemptuous of them. It is an unfortunate fact that the Bulgarians, though they are the largest branch of the Slavic peoples living in Turkey, possess almost no confidence in their own strength, but it is only upon the stimulus coming from foreign countries [Russia] that they would dare attempt to liberate themselves. It is Russia that they look upon as the power which wishes and can do the most for their liberation. (Apart from the fact that Russia would only act in her own interests and would certainly replace the Turkish yoke with an even more oppressive one of her own), she would not venture, as we have already seen, on direct military aid of the Bulgarians, because Europe is aware of the true purpose of these allegedly benevolent Russian intentions toward Turkey; indeed, a general European war would ensue if Russia would want to cross the Danube once more. For this reason, Russia acts through others to accomplish what she is unable to attain directly. Prince Michael was, in this respect, her involuntary instrument, and she will, beyond any doubt, wish to return to her former plan which she has already started to effect through Prince Michael.

Since the government of Prince Alexander [Karadjordjevic] does not possess the confidence of Russia, for it does not permit itself to be used as a blind tool, Russia is forced to work for the overthrow of the present government in order to establish another government which would enable her to achieve her goals.

All attempts to deceive Russia and to convince her that the present government will follow her plan, would be foredoomed to failure. /Once Russia sees for herself/ that in Serbia an independent national spirit is awakening, she will not believe any proposals, because /Russia is much too clever to allow herself into a trap which is opposed to her designs/. Furthermore, it may well be thought that any attempts by Serbia to establish a close alliance and agreement with the other Slavs in Turkey, would be betrayed by Russia, if she only learnt about them, to Turkey, Austria and others, with the sole purpose to convince Europe that it is not Russia but rebellious and opposing Serbia who is encouraging such revolts. But, in spite of it all, Russia would be glad to receive information about these agreements in order to learn their trace and evolvment, and little by little, to gain control of them for her own aims.

The more independent Serbia becomes the less confidence Russia will have in her, and if Russia is not able /to change the situation in Serbia and destroy her independent policy/, then she will certainly endeavour to turn all the Slavs of Turkey away from Serbia, to divide them and keep them in disagreement so that she may deal with and enter into agreement with each (Slavic) branch separately. If, then, Serbia does not prove to be more active and enterprising than Russia, she will be defeated and left behind by the latter.

In this enterprise we must guard against illusion. Russia will never demean herself before Serbia, and if she sees that Serbia will not serve her devotedly and unconditionally, then she will reject every condition proudly and contemptuously. Even the sage advice of her own diplomats—men such as (Russian envoyé baron) Lieven—has been fiercely rejected precisely because they suggested only temporary concessions; is it feasible, then, to believe that she will appear to be more yielding to foreigners than to her own faithful servants? —Finally, if Russia does not find in Serbia anyone who would unconditionally serve her wishes, then, she will not hesitate to ally and work with those who would be willing to serve her only under certain conditions /for, after all, she could never give up Serbia completely/; but as long as she can find people in Serbia that would obey and serve her unconditionally, she will prefer such Serbs to true patriots.

Russia will not allow such a small state like Serbia to set conditions; she demands her advice to be obeyed unconditionally as commands, and those who wish to carry out her will must submit to her completely. It is

true that sometimes she appears to accept all who agree to serve her, but she does not employ them in anything, as some of them do not possess her confidence, so that such conduct of hers removes any possibility of deceiving her.

If Serbia wishes to come out from her present subordinate position and become a true state, she must endeavour, on her way towards independence, to take over the political power of Turkey by destroying it little by little; for this is the point upon which Serbian and Russian policies clash, because Russia also seeks to weaken the political power of the Ottoman Empire. However, despite this correspondence between the two policies, it does not necessarily follow that the aims and intentions of both are the same, or that their policies must be in harmony.

/In brief/: Serbia must endeavour to break down, but only stone by stone, the edifice of the Ottoman state, preserving its good material in order to erect, upon the solid foundation of the old Serbian Empire, a great new Serbian state. Even now while Serbia is yet under the Ottoman rule, the work of preparation and modification can be carried out, because such enterprise cannot be undertaken and finished at the last moment.

We have spoken here in detail about the nature of Russian and Serbian policies, precisely because Bulgaria is the country in which Serbian and Russian influences primarily and largely are to come into contact.

We have discussed and demonstrated here why Serbian policy is not able to agree with Russian; however, it must be said that with no other could Serbia attain her aim easier than through an agreement with Russia; but this can occur only when Russia would agree to accept completely and absolutely the conditions of Serbia through which the aforementioned intention, that is, her future in a broad sense, would be assured. An alliance between Serbia and Russia would, indeed, be the most natural one, but its conclusion would depend upon Russia herself, while Serbia should accept it with open arms, but only when it has been clearly established that Russia's proposals are sincere and open-hearted; this can only come about when Russia abandons her present policy, that is, when she decides that an alliance with Serbia, no matter how small she may be, is more natural than the one with Austria for whose sake she keeps the Western Slavs. Although I do not hope that Russia will ever be sincerely inclined towards Serbia, it is, nevertheless, necessary to mention here of what benefit such an occurrence might be for Serbia, who should immediately make use of

it, for whatever has been said against Russia, it was not out of hate, but out of necessity into which Russia herself has forced us by so many of her actions.

/A few more words about Bulgaria and then we will proceed further./ If we have learnt well the disposition of people's spirit in Bulgaria, and if our respect for her patriotic means is not too low, then we must conclude that a greater effort for its liberation from Turkish yoke is still far away. And again, that is where Russia's primary aspirations are directed to, because this country lies directly before the gates of Constantinople and in her road toward it; but Bulgaria has the same location and importance for Serbia that it has for Russia. If Russia keeps acting in Bulgaria for only a few years more the way she has been acting lately, and if Serbia let her act without doing anything herself, then Russia will indeed achieve such success that Serbian influence in Bulgaria will become useless. Let this be a warning and sign for Serbia, and never let her forget that a political friendship may be expected only if we have already showed and proved our love for the friends. Serbia must do something for Bulgaria because love and help need to be mutual.

After we have briefly indicated our attitude towards present Bulgaria and her great importance for Serbia, and after few words about the Russian influence that dominates there, we shall proceed to give an outline of some initial means for establishing the Serbian influence.

1) The Bulgarians do not possess educational and pedagogical institutions, therefore, Serbia should open her schools to the Bulgarians and grant scholarships to some of young Bulgarians who are studying in Serbia.

2) The Bulgarian clergy is mainly Greek, and not of Bulgarian nationality; therefore, it would be desirable and useful if a certain number of young Bulgars were trained in theology in Serbia and then returned as priests to their people and homeland.

3) Bulgarian liturgic and other religious books, together with other Bulgarian works, should be printed in Serbia; this important means has long been used by Russia, and Serbia must see to surpass her in that respect.

4) Reliable and capable people must be sent to travel through Bulgaria, who would draw the attention of the Bulgarian people to Serbia, awakening in them the feelings of friendship toward Serbia and the Ser-

bian government, as well as hopes that Serbia will truly aid their liberation and provide for their welfare.

ON THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS BOSNIA, HERZEGOVINA, MONTENEGRO AND NORTHERN ALBANIA

When we take into closer consideration the topography and geographical position of these lands, together with the military traditions of their inhabitants, their mentality and ways of thinking, we will easily come to the conclusion that this is the part of Turkey upon which Serbia can exert the greatest influence. The continuous determination and organization of this influence seems to us to be the main task of Serbian policy in Turkey for the moment [1844].

1) When two neighbouring peoples wish to conclude a close and intimate alliance their borders must be opened as much as possible so that continuous communication is most facilitated and stimulated. But Serbia seems to be separating herself from her co-nationals in Turkey as if by a Chinese wall, opening communications points in so few places that there are houses in bigger towns that have more doors for entry than the entire Principality of Serbia. Therefore, without reducing the border guard, we are to increase the number of points of contact, entry, and departure along the Serbian border with Bosnia. /And why not with Bulgaria as well ?/

The established system of separation might have been purposeful at the time; but to further maintain it, would be the same as shutting Serbia in and isolating her, which is in utter opposition to her future and prosperity.

2) We should act in such a manner that the two peoples, the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic, could reach mutual understanding and an agreement about their national policy, for only then can this policy be successfully brought into effect.

It is the duty of Serbia to propose the basic points of this policy to both parts of the people residing there, because she is able to act in this enterprise, and obliged to, owing to the years of experience and the diplomatically recognized rights. — One of the main points is: the principle of complete freedom of religion. This principle will satisfy all Christians, and

who knows, in time it may become acceptable to some Muslims as well. But the most important and fundamental law of the state must be determined as follows: that the principedom must be instituted as hereditary. Without this principle which is the very embodiment of state unity, an enduring and permanent state union between Serbia and her neighbours is unthinkable.

If the Bosnians do not accept this solution the unavoidable consequence would be the fragmentation of Serbdom into small provincial principalities under separate ruling families who would doubtless soon fall under the sway of foreign influences, because there would arise rivalry and envy between them. These families could never be led to sacrifice their personal interests for another family, even when the advancement of all these peoples would depend upon such a sacrifice.

(From these basic points it follows that if an attempt were made to effect any change in Bosnia prior to this general unification of Serbdom, such a change should be effected only in such a manner as to serve as a preparation for the general unification of all Serbs and their provinces into one whole; and this would be the only way in which the aims and interests common to all Serbs may be realized. —Therefore, I here emphasize Serbia merely because she alone is able to prepare that change, and being obliged to constantly work on it until the time will come to bring this plan to completion, Serbia will keep trying to make that time come.) —Thus, whoever is solicitous for the welfare of this people must not propose a hereditary principedom to the Bosnians. (In that case), the most important figures should be elected among all the people, and not for life, but only for a certain time during which they would function as a sort of council. Even with such a separate and provincial authority the road would be open for advancement; it would then be an easy matter for Serbia eventually to bring about a closer union with Bosnia, which would be both possible and likely.

The third basic principle of this policy is that of unity of nationalities, whose diplomatic representative is to be the government of the Principality of Serbia. Whenever the validity of this principle is in question, it is to the government that the Bosnians and other Slavs should turn to for protection and every assistance. Serbia, in this respect, must realize that she is the natural protector of all the Slavs living in Turkey, and that other Slavs will only concede her that right when she takes upon herself the duty

of doing and saying something in their name. If Serbia sets to her neighbours bad and unfortunate example that she thinks only of herself without caring about the troubles or advancement of others, but being indifferent to them, then they would certainly follow such an example, and would not listen to her; thus, harmony and unity would be replaced by distrust, envy and misfortune.

3) Not only that all fundamental laws, the Constitution and all major institutions of the Principality of Serbia should be promoted among the people in Bosnia /and Herzegovina/, but a number of young Bosnians should be accepted into the Serbian officialdom to be operatively trained for political and financial profession, for law and public education, so that later these officials could apply in their own homeland what they have learned in Serbia. */Here it must be particularly observed that these young people should be specially supervised and educated in such a manner that their work becomes completely imbued by the redeeming idea of a general unification and great advancement. This obligation cannot be sufficiently emphasized./*

4) /Special attention must be paid to diverting the peoples of the Roman Catholic faith from Austria and her influence, and their greater inclination towards Serbia should be fostered. This goal could be best achieved through the Franciscans there; the most important among them must be won over to the idea of the union of Bosnia and Serbia. To this end/, publishing of some prayer books and hymnals in the printing office of Belgrade should be ordered; also, liturgical books for Orthodox Christians and anthologies of popular poems which would be paralelly printed in Latin and Cyrillic alphabets; as a third step, a short and comprehensive history of Bosnia could be printed, in which the names and glory must not be omitted of several Bosnians who had converted to Muslim faith. It goes without saying that this history should be written in the spirit of the Slavic nationality and entirely in the spirit of the national unity of Serbs and Bosnians. Through the printing of these and similar patriotic works, /as well as through other necessary actions which should be reasonably determined and supervised/ Bosnia would be liberated from the influence of Austria and incline more to Serbia. In this way Croatia and Dalmatia would also procure books which cannot be printed in Austria, and this would naturally result in a closer relationship of these lands with Bosnia and Serbia. /Special attention should be given to this enterprise by en-

trusting the writing of the aforementioned history to a capable and deeply discerning person./

5) The entire foreign trade of Serbia is in the hands of Austria. / This is a misfortune whose exact consequences I shall leave the financial experts to determine, while I shall merely cite those facts that add to the importance of this plan./

Direct trade contact with foreign states through Zemun [Semlin] will always be a distressing affair. Consequently, Serbia must secure a new trade route which will connect her with the sea and provide her with a port. For the present, the only route possible is the one which leads through Skadar [Scutari] to Ulcinj. Here the Serbian merchant with his natural products would recognize natural Dalmatian seamen and traders as his nationals, but also as clever and capable people who would give him a hand honestly and efficiently when purchasing foreign wares. It is necessary therefore to establish a Serbian trade agency there to protect the selling of Serbian products and the buying of French and English goods.

For this work the government would have to take the first step providing for and appointing a commercial agent to Ulcinj who would instruct the Serbian merchant, as if pointing with his forefinger, where he should direct his attention. /This agent, entering into contact with our country's traders, would have to thoroughly explore a way to direct our trade towards favorable avenues abroad, and once the government makes certain of their benefit, it may publish such information through the newspapers, indicating to our traders the areas with lucrative prospects./ Even if only a few traders succeed in conducting good business at the outset, others would quickly follow their example, and /little by little this avenue of trade would be opened without the government having to forever concern itself about the matter; for merchants would themselves open routes of business, leaving the government's agents with their only concern to keep our merchants safe from any kind of oppression/. —From the foregoing it would follow that the price of Serbian products exported to the south would rise in the north, while the price of the products introduced into Serbia from the north would fall because of the competition with the products from the south. In a word, the Serb would in this way sell high and buy cheap.

This measure would be of no less importance in a political sense, since the new Serbian agent would find himself among a Serbian popula-

tion, which situation would result in a stronger influence of Serbia upon the northern Albanians and Montenegro, and these are the peoples who actually hold the keys to the gates of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Adriatic Sea. We are assured that the institution and establishment of such Serbian agency there would be understood by these peoples as a political act of inestimable importance on the part of Serbia, so that a closer union of the people of those provinces with Serbia would be an easy matter.

Not only that France and England would not be opposed to this, but they would even support it, whereas the Porte also would not be opposed to it because its only harbour would prosper as a result.

6) Gaining a greater influence over the Eastern Orthodox Bosnians will not be a difficult task for Serbia. However, more caution and attention must be exercised if the Bosnian Catholics are to be won over. At their head are the Franciscans.—Therefore, would it not be advisable if, in addition to the printing of books hitherto mentioned, one of these Bosnian friars were to be appointed to the Belgrade Lycée as professor of Latin or some other science. This professor could serve as an intermediary between Serbia and the Catholics of Bosnia, because such a step would be our first reassuring gesture and a proof of tolerance. Could not this same Franciscan establish a Catholic chapel for Catholics residing here, /thereby Austrian influence upon the erection of such a chapel, which will have to be built sooner or later, would be obviated. The chapel could be placed under the protection of the French consul residing here/.

This would give the French government reason and occasion to participate actively in this affair, and would at the same time free Serbia from the danger of having in Belgrade a Catholic church which would be under the influence of Austria.

7) Karageorge was a naturally gifted military leader of very great experience; he was not able to foresee the predominant military importance which Montenegro has for Serbia, and which it will always have whenever the issue arises of Bosnia and Herzegovina breaking away from Turkey and joining Serbia. The campaign of this vojvoda at Sjenica and Novi Bazar is still well remembered by all Serbs, hence, it is not necessary that we marshal new arguments to support the following proposal: Let Serbia follow the example of Russia in Montenegro, and give the Metropolitan of Montenegro [Petar II Petrović-Njegoš] regular annual financial subsidies—in this way, for a small price, Serbia will have the friendship of

a country which can, at the very least, raise an army of 10,000 mountain soldiers.

Finally we must observe that the deferment of this subsidy until the last minute will not produce the desired successful result, since Russia will justifiably be able to point to its own many annual subsidies, and in this way besmirch and arouse suspicion of Serbia's new proposal as the one made out of bare necessity; and the Montenegrins would then say : the Serbs did not help us when we were in need, which is proof to us that they are not our friends, but only wish to make a one-time use of us.

SREM, BAČKA AND BANAT

At first glance it may be thought that Serbia must be on most friendly terms with those areas, since in origin, language, religion, law, and custom they are one and the same with the Serbs of Serbia. If this is not the case then the blame falls, in part at least, upon Serbia herself, because she has not tried enough to win the friendship of these Serbs. But it is to be hoped that despite all hostile influence of Austria this improper attitude will be changed in time and improved insomuch as the Principality of Serbia shall keep proving itself to be well organized, strong, just and enlightened state.—For the present, if nothing else, at least an effort should be made to become acquainted with the most important figures in these provinces, and to establish one important newspaper there which could, abiding by the Hungarian Constitution, act usefully in the interest of the Serbian cause and which should be edited by a very sincere man such as, for example, Mr. [Jovan] Hadžić or someone of the same calibre.

ON AN ALLIANCE WITH THE CZECH SLAVS

/Concerning these Slavs we will not say very much at this time not only because they do not fall within the scope of this plan but also because to the many it would seem at first to be impractical. Therefore, passing over this briefly and leaving the benefits of such an alliance to be derived from the very realization of this plan, we limit ourselves only to make the

recommendation that we must begin making Serbia aware of the Slavs of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, and do this very cautiously and sagely so as not to arouse Austria's suspicions./

A FEW WORDS ABOUT RUSSO-AUSTRIAN INTRIGUES IN EARLY 1845

When a general has to fight against a formidable invading enemy, he will summon all his forces and take the position he expects to be able to hold until the promised help arrives.

Without having an independent policy, Serbia cannot have any future and will necessarily be absorbed by another state sooner or later. And the only independent policy is the one that sets the state a goal to achieve, and then the state, relying on the strength of its people and exploiting foreign [external] circumstances, strives to achieve it.

It is therefore necessary to:

1. Have a goal to achieve;
2. Assess the resources and capacities for achieving the goal;
3. Understand the interests of the European cabinets and peoples and, with that understanding and the available resources, pursue the goal step by step.

The current Serbian government has proved that it pursues the goal of full national triumph and that it has no doubts about what the interests of the European cabinets as regards Serbia are; or at least, the persons still stirring the wheel of the Serbian government and people have already shown twice, in 1839 and 1842, how proficiently they can exploit these interests.

Two cabinets have never since forgotten that Serbia outdid them both in terms of gain, and both have perfectly understood that their interests require the fall of the current government: Austria wants to forestall

the threat, and Russia to restore her former importance and influence on the Christian Slavic peoples of Turkey-in-Europe.

So far Serbia has fought successfully against the double attack of Austria and Russia, given that she, relying on the Porte, has won France for her cause and caused England [Great Britain] to become so distanced from Austria that she has reason to hope that this stubborn England might change her neutral position and become friendly towards Serbia. Still doubtful, however, England will not take this final step until she is positive that Serbia intends to remain Serbian instead of becoming Russian, i.e. that she will not let herself be used as a tool against the Porte.

So now the enemy attacks are directed against the weakest Friend of Serbia, and therefore Serbia must seek to avoid all that might make this still weak friend of hers, "England", hesitant or even push her into the enemy camp.

France and the Porte trust Serbia and seek to inspire such trust in England: thus, three European powers are for Serbia and two are against Serbia. But, should the latter, Austria and Russia, succeed in winning England over to their side against Serbia, the ratio will be exactly opposite: three against Serbia and two for Serbia.

In order to be able to produce so unfavourable a ratio for Serbia, Austria and Russia have agreed on which is to use what means.

Russia has already asserted overtly that she is in the process of regaining her former influence and control over Serbia; indeed, she has already demonstrated the implications of this stronger influence; e.g., that Serbia's appeal to the Porte in favour of the Bulgarians has been made at their—Russian—command.

Conversely, Austria makes plans to protest against this growing and multiplying Russian influence, but not in order to side with the adversaries of this influence, but merely to drive the enemies of the Russian influence, who are friends of Serbia's, away from Serbia; in that way Austria seeks to destroy all confidence in Serbia, to shatter all hopes France and England have ever placed in Serbia, to cause them to lose any further interest in Serbia.

So should Serbia be abandoned, and should she appear to be Russian once again, then no one will take pity on Serbia in case Austria should operate another overthrow there, for that is how European public opinion is disposed. They will give up on her and turn a blind eye as they did in

Michael's times.¹ Russia, however, will not act as she did in Michael's reign, but will secretly help Austria to effect the overthrow as quickly as possible and, at worst, Europe will rather see Serbia enthusiastic about Austria than about Russia. And this takes us back to the principles set above:—this extreme situation might come about if Serbia does not pursue her independent national policy and if she fails to exploit foreign circumstances as proficiently as she did in 1839 and 1842. So far Serbia has been victorious against Austria and Russia in pursuing this policy and will remain so if she continues to follow this course of action; so Michael was deposed; so Mr Avram [Petronijević] and Mr Vučić [Perišić] have returned to the fatherland; therefore Cvetko has been sentenced to life; so Bogičević was executed, and, still, Russia has not been able to raise any accusations against Serbia, although she certainly is disgruntled at the present Serbian government.

A unanimous, strong, enlightened and patriotic domestic policy is the best and most effective defence against foreign intrigues.

N. B. But no one can say that he is exploiting the external state of affairs who succumbs to them and overcome by them changes his course every so often; that kind of policy leads nowhere; —that kind of policy requires little knowledge and experience in state building—and even less patriotism—whoever, like [Prince] Miloš, first carries out his purse to dry land can be expected to let the state ship go aground at any moment, for he has taken care of what is his own.²

¹ This is a reference to the first reign of Prince Michael (Mihailo) Obrenović (1839–1842). After his father, Prince Miloš Obrenović, abdicated in 1839, defeated in the power struggle with the oligarchy of elders from the *Sovjet* (The Council) who enjoyed the support of Russia, his young and inexperienced son Michael soon gave in to the pressure by the same political group and went into exile as well. In 1842 he was succeeded by Alexander Karadjordjević, elected as Prince by the oligarchy which subsequently came to be known as Constitutionalists.

² A copy of these “few words” is in Ilija Garašanin's archive; another copy was submitted to Prince Alexander Karadjordjević and forms part of his personal archive.

**THE COMPOSITION GARAŠANIN SUBMITTED
TO PRINCE ALEXANDER IN 1845**

Serbia's current situation requires that her politics embraces as a ground rule: with respect to foreign affairs, "To be cautious in her relations with other powers and allow them not to gain any influence on the Serbian Nation or to interfere in the country's domestic affairs". With respect to domestic affairs, "to organize and firm up the energy of the nation, to pacify the parties by acting in moderation, and to see that the past is done and over with and that the present government becomes appreciated and respected." — On these bases, the course of action with respect to individual powers may be as follows:

1) Turkey, being the suzerain, should be shown respect, good will and loyalty—but not of a fearful or crawling kind. One should think to oneself: the Ottoman Empire is weakened and its definitive disintegration is obviously imminent, sooner or later. Under such feeble rule, Serbia has a most comfortable opportunity to organize herself the way she sees fit and to encourage the enlightening of her Slavic neighbours without giving other powers the reason and grounds to thwart her in such activities or to threaten her, which they would do if Serbia were independent and left to herself. Today, Serbia can always hide behind the *aegis* of the Ottoman Empire.

And once she organizes herself suitably and boost her influence on the neighbouring Slavs to the desired degree, then, if need be, she will be prepared for all manner of events, i.e. she will not be taken by surprise, but will have her own ways and means in case of any *change*. This advantage, to have under this half-rule of Turkey a safe and comfortable opportunity to work on her own organization, shows how useful it is for Serbia to have good relations with Turkey and that it is in Serbia's interest to keep supporting the Porte's political course until the moment marked by Providence.

Under the Porte's weak and non-interfering suzerainty the Serbian people are in no danger at all, as they would be if the influence of a powerful and despotic and sly Government such as Russian were to take root. Aware of its weakness, the Ottoman government is anxious not have any misunderstandings with its vassals and is suspicious about any power li-

kely to interfere in their affairs, so it tends to protect them whenever they turn to it with a complaint.

Russia's influence seeks to undermine the mutual trust between the suzerain and the vassals and even to divide the latter so that, when disorder, confusion and weakness come out of it, she might be able to intervene under the pretext of *restoring the order*, as was done in Poland and Georgia, as is now being done in Wallachia, and as Serbia herself experienced and will experience again. Serbia's interests require, then, *to steer clear of Russia's influence and to take advantage of Ottoman suzerainty*.

But the fact that it is desirable for Serbia to have good relations with Turkey does not mean that she has to sacrifice her foremost interests to the Porte, or the interests of the neighbouring Slavs, which she ought to regard as being her own. Not only that Serbia should not concede any of what she has already gained, indeed she must seek to regain what she has lost; and so, gradually seeking for ever-greater gains, to advance steadily without ever giving in.

Serbia should, without any other power as an intermediary, procure from the [Sublime] Porte the right of hereditary succession for the prince she has chosen for herself, and she should do it in the same way and using the same means as Prince Miloš did when he secured this right for his family. Serbia might request from the Porte the authorization to incorporate the Karadag [Montenegrin] tribes of Piperi, Vasojevići, Bjelopavlići and Kući, who have remained independent and have often expressed hostility towards the Porte. She might obtain that authorization in return for her promise that, following the recognition of these lands, the neighbouring [Ottoman] subjects should be able to live in peace. And besides, Serbia should give the Porte a larger tribute than the one presently given. Given their racial kinship, Serbia may be able to incorporate these highlanders, with their previous consent, and then she should take further steps. Once this unification is operated, Serbia may request from the Porte to concede either a piece of territory or at least one free route to the Adriatic coast, which would be of great benefit to trade.

Serbia should also seek, even at the cost of great sacrifices, to persuade the Porte into moving the Ottoman garrison out of the fortress of Belgrade and into handing the fortress over to the Serbs.

The Ottoman garrison in Belgrade is a great obstacle to the Serbian government's free action, and in many cases it might serve as a point of

support for the discontented in the country and provide backing for intrigues. The realization of this goal requires much skill and prudence, and it should be neither pursued too vigorously nor ever given up entirely.

2) Russia should be shown every respect, and she should be respected in proportion to her political rights. A *protecting power* is only entitled to mediate or intervene in defence and protection if the suzerain fails to fulfil his obligations towards the vassal and tends to use oppression, or if the vassal is attacked by an enemy and the suzerain is so weak as to be unable to defend him. In the first case, the vassal protests against the suzerain's tyranny and asks protection from the protecting power, and in the second case, the suzerain and the vassal concertedly solicit the protecting power for help.

Therefore, one should take care not to excite Russia's dissatisfaction, while at all times professing great appreciation for her protection; the only thing is there has been no reason for soliciting it so far. Only if [Ottoman] Turkey tries to wipe out Serbia's liberties and the Serbs are not strong enough to defend themselves might they resort to soliciting Russia for protection. But, so long as they can manage without it, it is wise not to invite a protector of unreliable integrity over; for he would become a master before long.

Serbia should emancipate herself morally, i.e. free herself from any fear of Russia, for presently this power is not entitled to send her troops to Serbia and thus seeks to use intrigues there. This should be counteracted silently, obstructing all such attempts of hers, and this prudent and consistent course of action will show the world, for actions speak louder than words, the falsity of all arguments Russian diplomacy uses in order to intimidate and sway the European cabinets by saying:

"What are you going to do in that country? Its inhabitants are of the same religion and race as we are, their sympathies lie with us, and they want, as is only natural, to unite with us; they already regard our emperor as their sovereign. This is an accomplished fact, and it would be a vain effort to try to counter it!"

Once Serbia's actions disprove such a discourse of Russian diplomacy and once she begins to play an obviously contrary role to what Russia asserts, then the cabinets will begin to support her.

Then Serbia will be seen no more as an instrument of Russian policy but as an obstacle and barrier to a Russian invasion. All this should be

operated so wisely and unassumingly that, while silently obstructing all Russian attempts, no public offence is inflicted to the Russians, who are our Slavic kin and may one day become allies of all Slavs against their own despotism.

3) As regards Austria, one should be cautious and feign ignorance, following the example she herself has set. Austria should not be offended or provoked ahead of time, but one should not be lulled by her flattery and sweet-talk. One must not be deluded as to Austria's true intentions; it is in her best interest to work against the Slavic nationality; for if all these people come together and start agitation, the edifice of the Austrian monarchy will be at risk of collapsing. And so naturally, the Viennese cabinet looks at the Serbian nationality with mistrust and disgruntlement and seeks to contain it in every way possible.

Austria has long had a plan to appropriate Serbia and the surrounding countries at an opportune moment, and until she is able, or if she is unable, to carry out this plan, she would rather see Serbia fall under the Turkish yoke again. If Austria happens to show an occasional sign of her ostensible sympathy for the Serbian nationality, it is only in order to prevent the Serbs from being swayed by Russian influence and to impede their influence on the fellow Serbs living under Austrian rule.

Austrian gifts should be accepted, but as gifts from a false and deceitful friend against whom one will have to fight one of these days. For the time being, Austria cannot do anything legally in Serbia other than to feed the interests of her trade; for that reason, Serbia should only enter into commercial relations with Austria, abstaining from any other.

4) For the time being France has no political right to take any official action in Serbia, but she can and will act through extending advice and using her agents. France will not deny support to the Serbs before the Porte and other cabinets if their actions prove their strong determination to maintain order and to counteract Russian intrigues, if she further demonstrates her wish for a rapprochement to the west, for example by sending her youths to Paris to study, and by accepting all direct or indirect counsel from or on behalf of France. The Serbs should establish relations with French traders, at first making lucrative proposals, which, in due time, will make it possible for Serbia to reap much greater profits. The Serbs need to be assured that it is in French political interest to see all Slavic tribes free and educated. The interest of France is to have in place of the Ottoman

Empire, once its time comes, a state which could become a French ally, and in this respect France prefers the Slavic nationality to any other combination and intention. No doubt France will work towards this, but first Serbia needs to earn her trust by pursuing a reasonable domestic policy and by following French advice.

5) England, similarly to France, has no diplomatic entitlement in Serbia. Her good will as regards Serbia should not be doubted provided that Serbia counteracts Russian intrigues and that her organization is demonstrably strong and ordered. But, support is more likely to be expected from the French cabinet than from the English; for France's policy has always been showing more indications of generosity than England, the latter being forever busy making profits from her trade, and therefore it is through a prospect of some profit that the English commercial world should be brought around with the view to gaining England's effective support. If Serbia succeeds in procuring free passage to the Adriatic Sea, the proximity of the Ionian islands and Malta would make her important to England and ensure her financial and political benefits.

6) Prussia seems to be interested in the Slavic nationality for some time now. Her goal is to strike a strong blow to Austria, and thus become able to realize her plans in Germany (which is quite probable). Her involvement should absolutely be tolerated until the time comes to fight against Austria.

Serbia's foreign policy also involves her influence on the neighbouring Slavs. Serbia should make a plan for her future. She needs to augment her size lest she perish in the turmoil threatening the Turkish [i.e. Ottoman] Empire. To that end, Serbia ought to watch over the Slavs she ought to unite with in the future, and therefore she needs to contribute to their liberation. Serbia is surrounded by kindred peoples, some under Turkish, and others under Austrian rule. Her influence on the former may be exerted in furthering education, and on the latter in offering them examples of strength and wisdom; but most of all through inspiring the sense of a single nationality and reciprocal brotherly interests. And so, while working on the development of Slavic Nationality and awaiting changes designed by Providence, Serbia should also seek to draw to herself the tribes of Karadag [Old Serbia] and, if possible the Montenegrins too, the incorporation of whom she might secure even under Ottoman rule. Serbia's

influence on the Serbs in Hungary [present-day Vojvodina], a northern province of Serbia], however, may prove to be her most difficult task.

The Austrian cabinet may use some of her Serbian subjects to win over a party at the heart of the Serbian government. Caution is needed here, and Serbia's influence should be made stronger so that all the Austrian Serbs should be aware of it. The Serbian government can find resourceful and diligent supporters among them; but she should take care that they do not become an instrument of some hostile influence. For that reason, she should bind them to herself, be assured of their sympathy and make use of it in every way possible. It would be advantageous to establish friendly relations with the Slavs of Illyria, Dalmatia, Croatia and the Military Frontier in order to be able to count on them in any event.

Moreover, the Serbs should make every effort to establish good relations with the Hungarians, for that would leave Austria without a major point of support. That may be a very difficult thing to do, but desirable nonetheless. If that fails, one should get accustomed to seeing the Hungarians as the most dangerous enemy, one that will have to be fought sooner or later, but, nonetheless, without ever giving up hope of being able to fight together against Austria and Russia. There are things one should not even confess to oneself until the force of circumstance and the things themselves compel one to action. Finally, the Bulgarians, Bosnians and Herzegovinians must be the objects of Serbian concern. And this should be the direction of Serbia's foreign policy.

As regards domestic policy, foremost is to constitute a dynasty ruling by hereditary right, without which the political existence of a people has neither strength nor stability. The system of elective monarchy is the least suitable of all; it causes tensions and discord within the country, makes it vulnerable to foreign intrigues, swindles and greed, and discredits the people before other powers. One example will suffice: Poland is the best proof that elective rulers ruin nations and hand them in to the enemy. To govern justly, to eradicate the misuse of authority, making it impossible for civil servants to grab "after the Turkish" or to indulge in bribery after the "Russian fashion", to punish severely the county prefects and judges misusing their authority, to introduce order and equity in government, these are the most urgent tasks in domestic affairs. The love of justice and moderation should remove ill feelings and discord, and arouse sympathies of the parties for the present government; these duties are foremost and no

effort put into fulfilling them is too much. To be forgiving about the past and exercise severity only in case attempts at rioting are made again. Education should be promulgated, and municipal schools established and, in two or three major towns, lyceums as well.

The learned society should be supported and the books propagated which rouse the national feeling of all Slavs no matter who rules over them. Literary magazines edited in conformity with the political direction would be very helpful. The country should be organized militarily on the model of the Prussian *Landwehr*, but in a way that better suits the country and thus comes somewhere between the National Guard of France and the Prussian *Landwehr*.


Serbia should, without too much noise and expense, establish a readily mobile military force. Also, to be set up are: arms factories, a cannon foundry, gunpowder factories, and these could be run by experienced Slavs. It would be dangerous to hire members of other nations, because well-organized states have enough domestic tasks to employ their own capable and respectable men to deal with, and so less credible men would be left to come to Serbia. On the other hand, it is in the interest of the Slavs to support the development of Serbia. These men would be supervised by their superiors, and would work as if it were for their own fatherland. Possible opposition on the part of Russia and Austria could be sidestepped through procuring Ottoman consent to hiring men furnished with safe passports; anyway, the entire matter should be pursued silently. It would also be necessary to establish an officers' training school. Its location should be at Kragujevac rather than at Belgrade, and it should be named "Polytechnical School" so as not to draw the envious attention of Russia and Austria. Professorships in such schools might also be entrusted to Slavs and thus Serbia would obtain good officers and good soldiers and would be able to set up within little time and with little expense a regular national army commanded by national officers.

To revive the economy requires civil engineers, chemists etc, and here too Slavs should be given priority over other nationalities. The safety of foreign travellers requires that police be organized, roads repaired, inns opened in towns, briefly, the country should be made accessible to foreigners so that they might be able to exercise commerce across it. The attention of wealthy French and English traders should be drawn and a

National Bank established with their participation. In this matter, capitalists and traders who are subjects of Austria should be avoided.

Clergy requires the government's particular care, for an educated and patriotic clergy is a major guarantee of the country's present and future. Learned and good-natured men should be appointed to senior ecclesiastical posts, and they in turn will oversee parish priests and monks. With the established clergy of its own, the government will be able to exercise religious tolerance, which would bring it approval and win all hearts.

These matters, of course, call for a dignified and consistent rather than precipitous action, and the government will see that all this which is just and proper is feasible and that Providence protects such endeavours. This brief draft requires further elaboration and its implementation depends on the full knowledge of the local situation. It contains some suggestions but, most of all, the wish originating from sincere solicitude. One more observation deserves to be added here: Serbia cannot remain in her present condition much longer; she must endeavour to improve her position or else she will face the imminent end of her present existence. Serbia's spirit would be soon extinguished if it failed to send its rays out across the limits assigned to it presently.



The fortress of Belgrade



The residence of the Prince in Topčider near Belgrade

THE PROGRAMME
OF YUGOSLAV POLICY PROPOSED TO STROSSMAYER
BY ILIJA GARAŠANIN IN (MARCH) 1867

Further to our previous agreements, ~~we shall reduce these to a few basic points so that they may be a sort of a programme of our Yugoslav policy, a programme we all shall abide by faithfully and steadfastly.~~

Our previous agreements have granted us the authority to draw up an outline, a sort of a programme of our work, which we shall follow faithfully and steadfastly.

The objective remains unchanged and abiding; the means, by their nature, change with changing political circumstances, but always in a way that would be the most beneficial to the cause.

~~+ Our objective is a state union of all Yugoslav tribes. The Yugoslav state, as soon as it has been created, will have to be independent and to establish a defensive alliance with the Greeks and the Bulgarians.~~

~~That state will be internally organized on purely Slavic bases; that is, on the basis of the administrative autonomy of župas [districts], with a central political government in which the most select persons of all tribes will participate equally.~~

+ Our objective is the liberation of the Christians groaning under the Turkish yoke, to create room for the unification of all Yugoslav tribes into one federal state.

The organization of the federal state is left to time and the participant tribes until after liberation.

We shall be in constant pursuit of unification and independence, while moving step by step, insofar as circumstances permit; but we shall be alert to every, even the slightest opportunity, and we shall not fail to exploit it to the greatest extent possible.

Belgrade and Zagreb stand at the head of the whole movement. They are the two pivots round which the whole Yugoslav cause will revolve. Between Belgrade and Zagreb there has to be agreement at all times.

~~Belgrade will be winning over the Bulgarians for the common cause; and Zagreb, the Slovenes. Belgrade will refer all Austrian Yugoslavs to Zagreb, and Zagreb will refer all Turkish Yugoslavs to Belgrade. This will be done orally and through the press.~~

A special eye will have to be kept on the domestic press. Even the slightest misunderstanding between two Yugoslav centres, if it ever arises, must not spill into the public through the press. Croat and Serb nationalities are one, **Yugoslav** (Slav); religion has no place in national affairs whatsoever; nationality is the only basis for the state; religion divides us in three and separates us, so it can never be our principle for uniting into one state, but rather nationality, because we are of one; and, in the state, all churches are equal ~~(or Orthodox and Catholic). Nothing will be done either in Belgrade or in Zagreb without previous agreement; but that which is decided in the end needs to be carried through exactly and steadfastly.~~

Having its independent government and all military resources at its disposal, Belgrade is the natural centre for diplomatic and military activity. All that activity will be managed from there, / ~~but always in agreement with Zagreb. / in which Zagreb will be assisting it.~~

The liberation of all Yugoslavdom needs to be the work of all Yugoslav tribes equally. Every tribe needs to bear its share of sacrifice, both in blood and in money.

The Yugoslav movement will be kicked off in Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as this summer, through the effort of Serbia and Croatia. But at first neither Serbia nor Croatia will get involved publicly lest they provoke intervention of the great powers \neg *notably of Austria, which is looking for a pretext for it.* That should be avoided most of all; for the intervention would ruin *might postpone* Yugoslav unification *for a long time.*

The **Bosnian** movement of *v Christians* in Turkey should bear a strictly local mark so that it may be deemed to be a purely internal Turkish dissension. This is why it will be done by Bosnian-Herzegovinian *v Bul-*

garian and Albanian people, and Serbia and Croatia will set it off underhand with units, well organized and equipped, which will stealthily and simultaneously enter Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, to stir up all the people there according to a prepared plan.

Once the uprising becomes well spread an interim government will be formed there, the heart and soul of which will be a few Serbs and Croats mixed with Bošnjaks [Bosnian Muslims]. They will be chosen from all the three religions that there are there. *That* *At the very beginning of the uprising an interim government will be proclaimed which, as things stand now, will be composed of persons from among the local population; but as long as the fighting lasts, there will remain dictatorship which under the name of the interim government will be exercised by the chief commander of the local army, for the uprising would not be able to hold out without firm management in the transitional period. But once the uprising comes to control a considerable space, the interim government will establish an interim order and then it will convene a popular assembly. The assembly will state that the insurgents acknowledge the principle of integrity of the Turkish Empire, but demand to stand **together with Serbia** in the same relationship to the empire as she does. This is the only way not to give a reason, or a pretext, to the neighbouring great powers to intervene; on the contrary, should the uprising weaken, Serbia will have scores of convenient opportunities to find an excuse to uphold it, publicly if need be, and even then without violating the integrity of Turkey.*

This principle should by all means be respected for the time being, until we gain strength, because then diplomacy, once it realizes that Turkey is unable to quell the uprising in the said provinces, will, fearing that protracted fighting might entail general complications over the East, press the Porte into granting the insurgents' wishes. The national cause would then obtain a substantial and firm foundation in Turkey from which it would shortly be able to take a safe leap towards achieving the ultimate common objective.

However, the Triune Kingdom, while assisting here to secure this general foundation, will also work at home to equip itself as quickly and as well as possible for this leap; that is, it will avoid union with Hungary and Vienna in order to have its hands free for the future; or, should this be impossible, it will agree only to the kind of union with Hungary which

would leave it the freedom to run its home affairs. It is preferable that it either rejects union decisively, in the way it should find fit, or to put it together in the way stated in its last communication. Should neither be possible, then it had better succumb to temporary coercion from the Viennese government.

Let us proceed from general ideas to details concerning the means.

The units that will start the uprising must *to an extent* be organized outside in Turkey, because *but since* there are not *enough* necessary elements for that in Turkey *there*, no civil liberty whatsoever, which is why it is demanded, the units they will *v largely* be organized in Serbia, Montenegro, Slavonia and Dalmatia. They will take on courageous men, who served in the army or who belong to the intelligentsia, so that these cross-border units may become the cadre (Cadres) for the popular army in Bosnia and Herzegovina that will be created of local inhabitants.

We, therefore, need to have, out of the reach of enemy authorities, a certain number of units equipped with all that is necessary and kept ready to make simultaneous incursions into Bosnia on the set date and at convenient points, and to start fighting in a way that will be prescribed later.

~~These units, each of which will have 150=200 men and be capable of subsequently becoming the cadre of a battalion, we need to organize 15 to 20 for the size of Bosnia and Herzegovina.~~

These units whose assignment is to prepare a general uprising, start the fighting and keep it up for some time, need to have some support for their own upkeep and for being able to sustain the fighting, i.e. a certain base from which to start and procure all resources.

Initially, such a base can only be the lands surrounding Bosnia as the only convenient place where to procure and keep ready all the resources necessary for starting, sustaining and conducting the fighting.

~~What fortifications and magazines are for regular warfare, secret depots have to be for secret rebellious attacks, and instead of public state-appointed managing committees we have to set up secret committees. At the very beginning, these committees should be along the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that the units referred to and dependent on them may act on the given instructions and be supplied with all that they need. Later on, when the uprising gains spread and strength, there will be set up in Bosnia a rebel, that is, insurgent interim government which then will~~

appoint provincial and county committees as political authorities in the liberated provinces and counties (nahiyes):

These border committees, composed of 3 to 4 noble persons each, should be 12 to 15 in number along the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

In addition to Serbia and Montenegro, where border authorities themselves will act as these committees, one will also need to set up, if possible, committees in the following places:

In Slavonia:

1. At Županj or Rajovoselo or Drenovac.
2. At Brod or Paka in Provincijal [area outside the Military Frontier].
3. At Stara Gradiška or Cernik in Provincijal.

In Croatia:

1. At Dubica or Jasenovac.
2. At Trgova or Bešlinac.
3. At Maljevac or Vagišelo.
4. At Zavalje, Donja Korenica or Bilopolje (Otočac region).
- # 5. At Srb or Dobroselo (Lika).

Should it be impossible to set up subcommittees in these places, then instead of Nos. 1 and 2 let one be set up at Sisak, and instead of 3, 4 and 5, one at Karlovac. =

In Dalmatia:

1. At Vilića or Knin.
2. At Imota or Vrgorac.
3. At Dubrovnik. =

Since concentration is a necessary and important strength of every endeavour, all such committees will be subordinate to three main committees set up at Osijek for Slavonia—at Zagreb for Croatia—at Makarska for Dalmatia.

Apart from that, it would be a good thing to set up a committee at Ljubljana in Kranjska, which would be under the care of the Zagreb committee:

The main committee will be in Belgrade. It will be composed of the most intelligent persons from all Yugoslav provinces who will be divided into sections: military, literary, administrative, financial, and chaired by a government member.

These border [committees] or subcommittees will not know of one another until the time comes for the uprising to begin. Until then they will only be in contact with their superiors, that is, with regional committees: —The latter, in their turn, will be receiving orders and instructions from the central committee in Belgrade. *⊥ It would be your place to set up a main committee in Zagreb, which would enter into direct correspondence with Belgrade and, upon receiving instructions, develop its work in accordance with the laid-down rules. This committee will seek v if possible, to raise funds from some patriots, in addition to those that the Central committee will give be sent from Belgrade.* Committee members will not be paid, only low-ranking persons employed as couriers and caterers for various needs will. For a patriotic cause, whoever claims the name of a patriot must work out of pure patriotism; only after liberation will the state award these noble men the titles of distinction and all manner of honours. He who shall not work under these fair terms is not needed at all.

Money, then, will mostly be spent for procuring ammunition, weapons and for soldiers' pays as of the day they set out on the uprising.

The central committee will take care of all such procurements, and regional committees will too as much as they can. Other important details will be specified later.

It remains now:

1. That you finally agree to this basic plan and promise firmly to follow it strictly.
2. That you confide our thoughts and intentions only with utmost caution to the most important and, at the same time, most reliable persons.
3. That you proceed immediately to setting up regional committees in Zagreb, Osijek, Makarska and Ljubljana, which will then see to setting up the said provincial committees.

As soon as we receive the statement from Your party that You agree to the whole thing as presented herein and that You have already set up regional committees at Zagreb, Osijek and Makarska, notifying us about the names of the members, we shall immediately proceed to further action to prepare the uprising itself.

Also, let us know if You should wish or deem it appropriate to make some amendments to this outline plan.

– Besides, our agent who will notify You of this outline plan will be given necessary instructions as to how such changes can be made immediately, on the spot, in Zagreb, and will orally explain the whole thing to You.

Archives of Serbia, Fond Ilije Garašanina (Papers of Ilija Garašanin) Concept. —The text was handwritten by Antonije Orešković and contains Garašanin's additions, alterations (*in italics*) and deletions. It is undated (probably March 1867).



The map of the Principality of Serbia (northern areas)

Title of chapter	Total number of words in <i>Načertanije</i>	Number of words taken from <i>The Plan</i>	%	Number of words that have been added or changed	%	The share of particular chapter in the text
Introduction	219	192	87,7	27	12,3	4,1
Policy of Serbia	945	924	97,8	21	2,2	17,5
On means by which Serbian aims could be achieved	60	41	68,3	19	31,7	1,1
Introductory means	361	317	87,8	44	12,2	6,7
Relations to Bulgaria	1.581	1.316	83,2	265	16,8	29,4
On policy of Serbia towards Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Albania	1.964	1.599	81,4	365	18,6	36,5
Srem, Banat and Bačka	156	156	100,0	0	0	2,9
On alliance with Czech Slavs	96	0	0	96	100,0	1,8
OVERALL:	5.382	4.545	84,4	837	15,6	100 ¹

¹ Slobodan G. Marković, "Poreklo i dometi Saveta kneza Čarotiskog, Plana Františka Zaha i Zah-Garašaninovog Načertanija", in: Č. Popov, D. Živojinović and S. G. Marković (eds.), *Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije [Bicentenary of Modern Serbian Diplomacy]* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2013), p. 115.

Name of the document	Author	Completion date
<i>Conseils sur la conduite a suivre par la Serbie</i>	Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski	End of December 1842/January 1843
Slavic Policy of Serbia: Zach's Plan	František Alexander Zach	End of February 1844
<i>Načertanije</i> or <i>Few Words</i> [the text has not been preserved. V. Žáček assumed that such a text had existed]	František Alexander Zach	Last months of 1844, or the beginning of 1845
<i>Policy of Serbia</i> also known as (<i>Garashanin's Načertanije</i>)	The abbreviated version of <i>The Plan</i> under editorship of Zach and Garašanin (with possible assistance of Garašanin's associates)	At the end of 1844
<i>Few Words</i> on Russian-Austrian Intrigues at the beginning of 1845	František Alexander Zach	January or February 1845 ²

² Slobodan G. Marković, "Poreklo i dometi *Saveta* kneza Čartorskog, *Plana* Františka Zaha i Zah-Garašaninovog *Načertanija*", in Č. Popov, D. Živojinović and S. G. Marković (eds.), *Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije [Bicentenary of Modern Serbian Diplomacy]* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2013), pp. 118–119.

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DUŠAN T. BATAKOVIĆ
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SERBIA (1844–1867)
ILIJA GARAŠANIN'S NAČERTANIJE

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