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СТВАРАЊЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ

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MIHAILO VOJVODIĆ

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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE HUNGARIAN-YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD WAR I

ARPAD HORNYAK

A b s t r a c t. – After the war the attitude of Hungary was defined to a very great extent, almost predestined by its territorial losses. However, the amputated territories were important for Hungary just at the first glance. Most of them were the Croatian and Slavonian parts of the Hungarian Kingdom towards which neither the Hungarian politics, nor the Hungarian society in general had deep emotional feelings unlike they had towards those territories that gained Rumania and Czechoslovakia. This made possible to Hungarian governments to pay special attention and give high importance to the new south Slavic state in its plans. This attention, however, was not mutual.

Key words: Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, Count Mihály Károlyi, customs union, Fiume

The World War I. did not finish yet when the new European borders had been already outlined. Empires disappeared and their place was taken over by medium sized „national states” which had, without exemption, significant proportion of different minorities within their borders. So had Yugoslavia too, who gained quite large territories from the former dual monarchy, especially from its Hungarian part. After the war the attitude of Hungary was defined to a very great extent, almost predestined by this circumstances. However, the amputated territories were important for Hungary just at the first glance. Most of them were the Croatian and Slavonian parts of the Hungarian Kingdom towards which neither the Hungarian politics, nor the Hungarian society in general had deep emotional feelings unlike they had towards those territories that gained Rumania and Czechoslovakia. This made possible to Hungarian governments to pay special attention and importance to the new south Slavic state. Of course, Hungary found her borders towards Yugoslavia unfair too, and wholeheartedly worked in the whole periode to change them. Nevertheless we have to be aware that Hungary indeed was dissatisfied 'only' with her borders along the Muravidék (Mura region, Prekomurje) Muraköz (Medjumurje, or Mura land) and the line East from the Danube while every single Hungarian goverment from the Károlyi government till the Bardossy government accepted Drava as a frontier river that means acknowledged the detachment of Croatian and Slavonian territories.

The Government in Budapest and the Hungarian public opinion as well regarded Yugoslavia as an artificial, unnatural state and believed that it was just matter of time to collapse. Nevertheless until then it was necessary to deal with it, to take into consideration in foreign policy planning.

The diplomatic relations between two countries, such as the Hungarian-Yugoslav relations can be understood only in the context of a wider international perspective. This is particularly true for 1919–1920 when the conditions in the area were not fully settled by the Great Powers. Because the political situation was still flexible the affected countries generally followed in the footsteps of the Great Powers. They endeavored to respond to them directly or indirectly but were reluctant to engage in independent political activities. This was also true for the Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. This relationship was determined primarily by Italy and then by France and, indirectly by the United States, or more accurately, by the foreign policy of President Wilson. It was the Paris Peace Conference which gave it its final form. Hungarian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations initially evolved along two lines. We can speak of a Croatian line because on November 9, 1918, Aladár Balla, the former prefect of County Bácska, was sent as an envoy to the National Council in Zagreb and a representative of this Council, Marko Petrović was sent to Budapest. We can consider the beginning of the Serb line to have taken place with the appointment of the Major Mihajlo Bodi to Budapest as the Serb member of the Vix mission. The major arrived as the representative of the Serb military high command to supervise the compliance with the Belgrade Military Convention.¹ Unofficially he was also the representative of the Serb Royal Government. After the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) was proclaimed he became the representative of the SCS Royal Army.² Naturally neither the Croat nor the Serb lines could be viewed as official ones. This did not mean, however, that Bodi was not in contact with several members of the Hungarian government in addition of being in touch with Lieutenant Colonel Géza Dormándy, who had been appointed to maintain the liaison with the Allied military mission.³ Even though according to some views Károlyi's foreign policy was limited to complaints about the neighbors who violated the decisions of the Belgrade Military Convention,⁴ in the unfavorable foreign policy situation of the

¹ Bodi made official contact with the Hungarian authorities on November 26, 1918. Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933* [Yugoslavia and Hungary 1918–1933] (Belgrade, 1971), 32. Because the Allies did not recognize Hungary, Yugoslavia also did not establish diplomatic relations with it.

² Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918–1984. Zbirka dokumenata* [Yugoslavia 1918–1984. A Collection of Documents] (Belgrade, 1985), 135.

³ Even though Bodi was a member of the Vix Mission he did not report many of his activities to the head of the mission and was in touch with him only if cooperation was required in some matter. Ádám, ed., *Document diplomatiques français sur l'histoire du Bassin des Carpates 1918–1932*, vol. 1, Octobre 1918–Août 1919 (Budapest, 1993), 1: 522

⁴ Vuk Vinaver, "Jugoszlávia és Magyarország a Tanácsköztárság idején" [Yugoslavia and Hungary at the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic], *Századok* 105, no. 6 (1971): 1222.

country Károlyi cannot be accused of a completely passive foreign policy, only of a lack of consistency. His government was not recognized internationally and Hungary, the successor of the Dual Monarchy, was internationally isolated. It did not have the adequate connections with the Entente like the Successor States and it did not have an independent diplomatic service. Yet the basic problem was not the amount of activity but the lack of a consistent foreign policy and, under the prevailing circumstances this was not surprising. It was due to this lack of consistency that Károlyi relied, in a four and one half month period, first on Wilson, then on France, and later on Italy, and then on Serbia, and eventually on Soviet Russia. By the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 Károlyi abandoned his monomania about the possibility of converting "Wilsonism" into reality which had reflected his political naiveté and lack of adequate understanding.⁵ Instead, he was looking for another political solution. About this time in Hungary, beside the traditional orientation toward France and Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, toward Germany, and under the pressure of circumstances, two totally new foreign policy directions evolved. One was the orientation of the large land owners and of the right wing opposition to the government toward Italy. This trend was even willing to find an arrangement with Romania in order to secure Italy's support at the Peace Conference.⁶ The other direction was represented by a group, including Márton Lovászi and Count Tivadar Batthyány, which believed that the resolution of the country's desperate political situation was possible by finding an agreement with the Yugoslavs. The thinking of the supporters of the group favoring an orientation toward Italy included the necessity of a collaboration of the non-Slavic peoples and the need for Hungary to rely on only one Great Power because this was the only way to preserve the country's integrity.⁷ Their hopes were based on the peculiar foreign and domestic policy situation of Italy. They figured that Italy, having won the war but being kept from cashing in on the victory, was sufficiently offended to support Hungary, a loser in the war. Their calculations were not without some basis. The Dalmatian territories, promised to Italy by the 1915 Secret Treaty of London, were threatened by the Yugoslav claims. Consequently Italy did everything to make the newly developing country's situation impossible. Italy also resented the French plan to create a strong anti-Soviet Russia and anti-German bloc from the Successor States in order to pursue a pro-French policy. In this France counted on Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia to

⁵ In his speech on the foreign policy trends of Hungary, delivered by Károlyi on December 30, 1918, at the Electoral Committee meeting of the Independent and '48 Party, he said that Hungary's foreign policy had to be based on the Wilsonian principles, "We have one principle, Wilson, Wilson and again Wilson." See Mrs. Sándor Gábor, ed., *A Magyar Munkásmozgalom Története Válogatott Dokumentumai* [Selected Documents from the History of the Hungarian Workers' Movement] (Budapest, 1956), 5:413.

⁶ The Yugoslavs saw Gyula Andrassy and Lajos Windischgrätz as the most prominent members of this trend. See 336-15-IV/9, confidential, no. 271, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁷ In this question, namely that Hungary had to get the support of one of the Great Powers, every political trend was in agreement. They differed only in which Great Power it should be.

create a structure being under its exclusive control. Because beside Wilson it was France which acted most positively in favor of the development of Yugoslavia which, in turn, threatened Italy's interests in the area and curtailed its territorial gains, Rome consistently supported those who could harm the new country and indirectly damage the French interests. In this Italy could be helped by the fact that France, counting on both victorious countries in the area, Romania and Yugoslavia, to accomplish its goals, could not side fully with either country in the matter of occupying the Bánát. In order to please both countries France had to divide its support between them. In the Bánát question it supported Romania while in the Fiume (Rijeka) question it sided with Yugoslavia against Italy. In the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia Fiume played an important role. Its acquisition was an essential condition for making the Adriatic Sea truly a "Mare Nostrum." At the same time Yugoslavia could not afford to relinquish it primarily in consideration of Croatia but also for economic reasons. The relationship between the two victorious countries had reached a critical point and Italy now, in order to acquire Fiume and the other territories promised to it, started the so-called Badoglio Plan in November, 1918. It included the encirclement of Yugoslavia, fostering the internal tensions within that country promoting its dissolution from within.⁸ Thus in the debate about the Bánát Italy sided with Romania and promoted the Austrian and Albanian endeavors. Hungary, Yugoslavia's northern neighbor, fit well into this plan and Rome was looking toward Hungary's assistance in the Fiume question.⁹ If the plan could have been fully implemented Yugoslavia would have been completely encircled. Yugoslavia was well aware of the perils of the situation and therefore, in order to halt the Italian-Hungarian cooperation, it was prepared to start discussions with the Károlyi government. Hungary was not in the position where it could ignore any offer of negotiation which could offer an opportunity to break its international isolation. Therefore Károlyi did not reject either policy options and by sending Lajos Fülep as government commissioner to the contested Hungarian port city of Fiume in December 1918, he semi-officially established relations with Italy.¹⁰ At the same time he wished to start negotiations with the Yugoslavs. While the Italians rather rapidly reached an agreement in principle and, according to Fülep, were willing to take on formal relations with Hungary,¹¹ the Yugoslavs were willing to undertake only unofficial negotiations. In fact Belgrade pretended to have a friendly political orientation toward Hungary

⁸ For a detailed discussion of the Badoglio Plan, see Ivo Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference* (New Haven, 1963), 71–75.

⁹ Legally Fiume was still a part of Hungary at that time.

¹⁰ Fülep was a young college instructor and had lived in Italy for a number of years. He was sent to Fiume as a government emissary. See Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Az olasz érdekek és Magyarország 1918–1919-ben" [Italian interests and Hungary in 1918–1919], *Történelmi Szemle* 8, nos. 2–3 (1965): 259.

¹¹ Telegram from Mihály Fülep to Mihály Károlyi, January 12, 1919, in. *Károlyi Mihály levelezése* [Correspondence of Mihály Károlyi], vol. 1, 1905–1920, ed. György Litván (Budapest, 1978), 1:380.

only in order to neutralize the Italian actions. The reason for reaching an agreement with Hungary was to fracture the Italian plan of encirclement. These endeavors were complemented at the turn of 1918–1919 by a desire to have the two countries agree to a border between them prior to the Peace Conference and with the exclusion of the Great Powers. For this reason Colonel Kalafatović, the deputy chief of staff, representing Prime Minister Stojan Protić, negotiated with Károlyi at the beginning of January 1919 in Budapest. The colonel recommended that a Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement be signed about the territories which then would be submitted to the Paris Peace Conference thus avoiding the danger of the Great Powers meddling in this matter. Károlyi categorically rejected the yielding of any formerly Hungarian territory. Instead he wanted to have the Paris conference and a plebiscite decide the future fate of the Hungarian territories.¹² The reason for rejecting the Serb proposal was not so much due to political foresight and awareness of Serb ulterior motives but rather to Károlyi's still lingering hope to translate the Wilsonian message of self-determination into reality. With this he hoped to preserve the integrity of Hungary, excluding Croatia. Because of this unsuccessful attempt the Yugoslavs gave up the idea of an agreement for a long while,¹³ even though in order to neutralize the Italian efforts, they continued to maintain good relations with the Hungarian government but strictly on an unofficial level. In the mean time Hungary gave up its hopes in the president of the United States and, first through Fülep and then through the former attorney of the Károlyi family, the minister in Vienna, Oszkár Charmant, experimented with the Italian line. The Yugoslav line also became increasingly prominent. The Yugoslavs naturally suspected the nature of the Hungarian endeavors and the goals of the two foreign policy lines. The Hungarians felt the same way about the Yugoslavs. In Belgrade the line indicating an attempt to reach an agreement with them appeared to be the more powerful one and they clearly saw its purpose. According to an assessment by Milutin Jovanovic, the Yugoslav minister in Bern, the readiness of the Hungarians to find an agreement with them was stimulated by the correct and just behavior of the Serb occupying forces (true, at least until January-February of 1919) and by Hungary viewing Yugoslavia as a natural ally against its arch enemy Romania. It was also due to the fact that the Yugoslav "amputation" had less serious consequences on Hungarian political and economic interests than the territorial acquisitions of the Romanians and the Czechoslovaks. The minister also considered an important factor in the Hungarian attempts toward a rapprochement: Hungarian exports were dependent on Yugoslavia because the only way for them to reach the world markets led through that country. Considering all these factors Jovanovic believed that it would be prudent to engage in unofficial discussions with the group favoring such an agreement and discuss with them all the problems of mutual interest. He considered this to be very important because if the negotiations with the Romanians about the Bánát were unsuccessful, being

¹² Telegram from Károlyi to Gyula Szilassy, March 3, 1919, in *ibid.*, 1:437.

¹³ Vinaver, "Jugoszlávia és Magyarország," 1221–1222.

on good terms with the Hungarians might become very useful.¹⁴ He believed that the weaker Italian line was supported only by the landowning aristocracy and by the representatives of the earlier troublemakers in Budapest. He also believed that the Italians wanted to use the Hungarians primarily in the Fiume question and wanted the Hungarians to declare that they would prefer, from an export perspective, to have Rijeka in Italian hands rather than in Yugoslav ones.¹⁵ The minister tried to convince the Hungarians engaged in propaganda activities in Bern that this was contrary to their interests and that it would be the best for them if Fiume and the entire Adriatic littoral were in Yugoslav hands because Yugoslavia was the only country that could guarantee the safe passage of Hungarian goods to all of the harbors.¹⁶ He drew the Hungarians' attention to the fact that goods to Fiume had to pass through Yugoslav territory. Referring to the old saying that being bad neighbors was a Turkish curse he explained that having good neighbors was worth more than the apparent friendship of a distant land even if that land was one of the Great Powers. The words of the Yugoslav minister were not without effect. The head of the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Count István Csáky, said the same things to Marchese Arrigo Tacoli who came to Budapest and declared that in exchange for Hungarian support for Italy in the Fiume matter, Italy should establish a separate Hungarian free port and perhaps also recognize the use of the Hungarian flag on the high seas.¹⁷ The Hungarian rejection of this proposal was due to the warning from Yugoslavia and to a change in the Hungarian-Italian negotiations. At the beginning of February the Hungarian government revoked the instructions to Lajos Fülep, who never had an official mandate, and entrusted the minister in Vienna, Oszkár Charmant with an offer to Italy. The Hungarian proposal contained a recommendation for a Hungarian-Romanian fusion in alliance with Italy.¹⁸ The Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino immediately endorsed the proposal and sent his representative, Marchese Tacoli to Budapest. The hostile attitude of the Romanian government, however, made any success of this proposal very unlikely.

The Károlyi group now believed that any Hungarian-Italian rapprochement would serve the purposes of Italy while endorsement by Italy would have only theoretical advantages for Hungary.¹⁹ On this basis they did not wish to link

¹⁴ In the spring of 1920 they raised the possibility again of ignoring the Paris Peace Conference and exchange certain cities and areas between the two countries.

¹⁵ Report of Jovanović from Bern to Pašić on February 19, 1919, 336–15 IV/9, confidential, no. 271, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The members of the propaganda group in Bern were, Pál Kéri, Ignotus, György Bölöni, Ottó Ernst, and Miklós Vadász. They were sent on Károlyi's initiative and were charged to start international propaganda on Hungary's behalf, gather information and provide it. Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:316.

¹⁸ L. Nagy, "Az olasz érdekek," 262.

¹⁹ Ignác Romsics, "Olaszország és a román-magyar megegyezés tervei 1918–1938" [Italy and the plans for a Hungarian-Romanian rapprochement, 1918–1938], *Valóság* 36, no. 6 (1993): 63.

themselves entirely to Italy and give up on the possibility of reaching an agreement with Yugoslavia.²⁰ By the end of February 1919 Károlyi, after lengthy hesitation and a careful assessment of the international situation, began to support the Yugoslav line. He fully appreciated the fact that France would be dominant power in this area. If, then, Hungary wanted to find a way toward the Entente this could be best achieved, if it seemed reasonable to achieve, via Yugoslavia the protégé of France.²¹ Recognition of this fact was only one of his reasons. Just as the Yugoslav minister in Bern had stated it was in Yugoslavia's favor that the Yugoslav troops behaved correctly in the occupied territories. The fact that the southern member of the Successor States demanded the least Hungarian territory and had an access to the sea, a vital condition for the survival of the mutilated country, justified all the efforts to gain the friendship of Yugoslavia. Regardless of how many arguments favored an arrangement with the southern neighbor, so far the Hungarian government had been unable to establish official contacts with Yugoslavia. Belgrade consistently refused to start formal negotiations with a country that was not yet recognized by anybody and that even for Yugoslavia it was important only in the Italian context. Therefore the negotiations through intermediaries were conducted in Bern between the members of the Hungarian propaganda group, Ottó Ernst and Miklós Vadász, and the head of the Yugoslav Press Bureau in Geneva, Nikola Stojanovic.²²

In addition to the reasons mentioned above there were two other perspectives that made an agreement with the Yugoslavs advantageous for Hungary. To begin with, the assumption that the Secret Treaty of Bucharest was no longer valid due to the Romanians' separate peace agreement, the promise of the Great Powers to award the Bánát to Romania had become null and void. Károlyi believed that by taking advantage of the Romanian-Yugoslav antagonism and by offering assistance to Yugoslavia Hungary could get, or rather keep, some of the Bánát. He further believed that territorial concessions could be forced from the southern neighbor and that by yielding the sovereignty over Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia and by offering support it would be possible to maintain the integrity of Hungary in that region.²³ In reality both

²⁰ Károlyi's telegram to Gyula Szilassy, March 3, 1919, in Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:436–438.

²¹ Yet, the generally malleable and indecisive Hungarian foreign policy did not discard the Italian card. This is suggested by the fact that after the end of February Charmant continued his negotiations in Rome, as a minister plenipotentiary, on the authority of Károlyi. See Romsics, "Olaszország és a román-magyar megegyezés," 64.

²² France will have a greater role in the organization of the Danube Basin than Italy and therefore Hungary can gain France's support by being Paris's protégé. See L. Nagy, "Az olasz érdekek," 260–265.

²³ Later on Tibor Podmaniczky, Counselor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was authorized to negotiate very cautiously with Pogacnik, the Yugoslav minister in Vienna but these talks never reached official standing. Telegram from Podmaniczky to Károlyi on February 27, 1919, in Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:433–435.

of these assumptions proved to be based on false expectations. The opinion that Hungary could retain part of the Bánát with Yugoslav help and do this at the cost of Romania was erroneous from the start. While it came close to an armed conflict between Romania and Yugoslavia over the Bánát, both countries agreed that this was a matter for them to settle and neither wanted to deal with a defeated country about the fate of this area. They would also not tolerate having the Bánát be made into an independent area as it had been suggested by Hungary and thus both lose their share of it.²⁴ The belief that the integrity of Hungary could be maintained in the southern area revealed even greater naiveté. In Budapest the value of Hungary's role in the Italian plans and Yugoslavia's fears of encirclement were greatly overestimated. In fact, after an initial scare, Yugoslavia was no longer frightened by the Italians knowing that it was backed by France (other than in the Bánát question) and was hoping also to get American support. It did not care sufficiently about the Italian intrigues to give up any part of the territory it had already occupied. Particularly not from those of which the occupation from a defeated country could be argued before the Paris Peace Conference. It was much more concerned about Romania in the Bánát question because it wanted to acquire this at the cost of another victorious country. It was a sign of the relief felt by Yugoslavia that Belgrade refused to engage in formal negotiations and the largely self-serving suggestion that the talks be limited to an agreement with Hungary about Fiume. The proposal that Stojanović made to Vadász in February 1919, presumably on Pašić's instructions, offered to give Hungary extensive economic advantages in Fiume in exchange for Hungary's help in arranging for Fiume to belong to Yugoslavia.²⁵ In his response, containing four items, Károlyi stated that he was willing to agree that Fiume, become a part of Yugoslavia. Under certain conditions he was prepared to establish a customs union with Yugoslavia. He also offered to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia to guarantee a full national autonomy to the Serb minority. He would recognize the special position of the areas retained by Hungary which had a large Serb population, just like he had done already in the areas with large German or Ruthenian minorities. In exchange he asked for the return of all of the area on the Hungarian side of the Danube and the Dráva making the customs union dependent upon it. He also wanted separate port arrangements in Fiume and a guaranteed rail connection to the port.²⁶ The Hungarian response was far from realistic. In contrast to items one and four which gave a concrete answer to the Yugoslav offer, items two and three suggested that, with the exception of Croatia, Károlyi was still living in the dream world of territorial integrity. On the basis of the report the Hungarian minister in Bern, Baron Gyula Szilassy, sent to Károlyi in which he outlined the advice and instructions he had given to Vadász prior to negotiations with Stojanovic, it

²⁴ Ibid., 1:436–439.

²⁵ Because there was neither a Romanian nor a Slav majority in the Bánát, Pašić concluded that it should belong to Yugoslavia.

²⁶ Károlyi's letter to Gyula Szilassy, February 28, 1919, in Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:436.

becomes quite clear that some of the men involved in Hungarian foreign policy were unable to rise above their preconceptions. According to Szilassy's report he had asked Vadász to explain to Stojanović that a Hungarian-Serb agreement which included territorial losses for Hungary would not only be meaningless from the Hungarian perspective but would be clearly harmful to its cause because it would make negotiations with Romania and Czechoslovakia much more difficult.²⁷ Obviously the Yugoslavs could do nothing with such a response. All it did was to strengthen the Yugoslav suspicions that negotiations between Hungary and Italy had progressed much further and these suspicions were further strengthened by the increasingly frequent attacks against Yugoslavia in the Hungarian press.²⁸ By the beginning of 1919 Károlyi's foreign policy concepts had undergone a major change. He appeared to have sobered up from his previously unshakable "Wilsonianism" and in his letter to Count Gyula Andrassy he compared the Paris Peace Conference to the 1913 London Conference where the Great Powers "will be compelled to chase after the events" because nobody would listen to them.²⁹ In his speech on March 2, he declared that if the world rejected Wilson's principles, Hungary would have to confront its enemies with weapons in hands.³⁰ Trusting in the Yugoslavs against the Romanians and, subsequent to the resolution of the Polish-Ukrainian differences, in the Poles against the Czechs, Károlyi believed that with the 70,000 men strong Hungarian army, established by the middle of April, the situation could be changed, but only after the Paris "verdict" when they would "fully understand their neighbors."³¹ These statements were not without effect. They concerned Romania particularly and to the extent that at the March 13 session of the Romanian Council of Ministers, it was decided to send the Romanian minister of war to Paris to advise the Allies about the situation and ask for assistance against the threats of the Hungarians.³² This action of Romania proved particularly advantageous for that country when Hungary's situation changed following the rejection of further territorial concessions demanded by Paris in the Vix Ultimatum.

The Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Budapest on March 21, 1919 that certainly had important impact on the budding Hungarian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations setting back them for a while.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Telegram from Szilassy to Károlyi on March 6, 1919, in Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:439.

²⁹ An official of the Yugoslav press center in Bern, who was charged to watch Hungary, reported to Pašić that the hitherto favorable tone of the Hungarian press had changed and the *Népszava* had joined the *Pester Lloyd* in the campaign against Yugoslavia. See March 3, 1919, 336–15–IV/9, confidential, no. 378, Arhiv Jugoslavije. In his opinion, the change in the tone was due to Italian intrigues or to the Hungarians again trying to prove that the occupied areas did not want to remain under Yugoslav administration.

³⁰ Károlyi's letter to Gyula Andrassy, March 16, 1919, Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:444.

³¹ *Az Est*, March 4, 1919

³² Litván, ed., *Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, 1:444.

Арпад Хорњак

ПОЧЕЦИ МАЂАРСКО-ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКИХ ДИПЛОМАТСКИХ ОДНОСА ПО ЗАВРШЕТКУ ПРВОГ СВЕТСКОГ РАТА

Резиме

Дипломатски односи између две земље, као што су мађарско-југословенски односи, могу се разумети само у контексту шире међународне перспективе. Ово се нарочито односи на период 1919–1920 када услови у овој области нису били у потпуности уређени од стране Великих сила. Пошто је политичка ситуација још увек била нестабилна, државе на које је она утицала су углавном следиле кораке Великих сила. То је било и за мађарско-југословенске односе који су били одређивани преважно од стране Италије, па затим Француске, а индиректно и од стране САД, или, прецизније, спољне политике председника Вилсона. Свој коначни облик они су добили на Париској мировној конференцији. Мађарско-југословенски дипломатски односи су се у почетку одвијали по две линије. Можемо говорити о хрватској линији, јер је 9. новембра 1918. године Аладар Бала, бивши управник Бачке жупаније, послат као изасланик у Народном вијећу у Загребу, а представник Вијећа, Марко Петровић, је послат у Будимпешту. Можемо сматрати да је српска линија почела слањем мајора Михаила Бодија у Будимпешту као српског члана Виксове мисије.

Београд се претварао да има пријатељски оријентисану политику према Мађарској само да би неутралисао италијанске активности. Разлог за постизање споразума са Мађарском је било осујећење италијанског плана за окружење. Уз ова настојања ишла је и жеља да се на преласку из 1918. у 1919. годину две државе договоре око међусобне границе пре Мировне конференције и без укључивања Великих сила. Због тога је пуковник Калафатовић, помоћник начелника Главног генералштаба, у својству изасланика председника владе Стојана Протића, преговарао са Карољијем почетком јануара 1919. године у Будимпешти. Пуковник је предлагао потписивање мађарско-југословенског споразума о територијама који би био поднет на Париској мировној конференцији, чиме би се избегло мешање Великих сила у ово питање. Карољи је категорички одбио давање било којих територија које су претходно припадале Мађарској. Уместо тога, желео је да судбину мађарских територија одлуче Париска конференција и плебисцит. Разлог за одбијање српског предлога није био толико у политичком предвиђању и у свести о томе шта су скривени мотиви Срба, колико у Карољијевој још увек тињајућој нади да Вилсонове поруке о самоопредељењу претвори у стварност. Надао се да ће на тај начин очувати целовитост Мађарске, без Хрват-

ске. Због овог неуспелог покушаја, Југославија је на дуже време одустала од идеје о постизању споразума,³³ иако је, да би неутралисала италијанске тежње, наставила да одржава добре односе са мађарском владом, али строго на незваничном нивоу. Преговори преко посредника су одржани у Берну између чланова мађарске групе за пропаганду, Ота Ернста и Миклоша Вадаса, и шефа југословенског прес-бироа у Женеви, Николе Стојановића. Међутим, захтеви обе стране су били далеко од реалности, па преговори нису донели резултате. А када је 21. марта 1919. проглашена Мађарска Социјетска Република, ионако слаби дипломатски односи две државе доживели су озбиљан ударац.

³³ Vinaver, "Jugoslávia és Magyarország", 1221–1222.