

MUSIC HISTORY AND THE HISTORICIST IMAGINATION: REVISITING CARL DAHLHAUS AND LEO TREITLER

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ABSTRACT

This text offers a discussion and reappraisal of the historical impact of the Prussian historical school in general and of historicism in particular, epitomised in the works of Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen, on the historiography of music, as diagnosed by Carl Dahlhaus and Leo Treitler in *Foundations of Music History* and *Music and Historical Imagination*, with special focus on the distinction between historicism and Treitler's "neopositivism", its role and those of narrativity, aesthetics, and the work concept in music historiography.

KEYWORDS: music history & historiography, historicism, Leopold von Ranke, Gustav Droysen, Leo Treitler, Carl Dahlhaus

This year, 2019, marks the 30th anniversary of two important events in the history of musicology: the publication of Leo Treitler's *Music and the Historical Imagination* and the untimely passing of Carl Dahlhaus, the author of *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte* (1977) and a doyen of German and European musicology. The purpose of this text is to commemorate these two important figures in the history of our discipline and their contributions to the historiography of music, that is, in this context, the scholarly examination of the doing of music history, with special focus on the two seminal texts mentioned above. In my mind, their contributions to our discipline are still invaluable, inasmuch as they address some of the central – and most challenging – issues in the historiography of music, that is, in the production of music history. In a few words, these comprise the paradigms of narrativity in music history – positivistic, historicist, and so on – and the role of aesthetics in music historiography. I will take them in order, with special attention to the heritage of Prussian/German histo-

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ricism in music historiography, epitomised in the works of Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen, who both feature prominently in the discussions of both Treitler and Dahlhaus.

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“What Kind of Story Is History?”, asks the title of Chapter Six in Treitler’s *Music and the Historical Imagination*, his collection of groundbreaking essays in the historiography of music written during the 1960s and 70s. That history is indeed a kind of story almost goes without saying. Almost, because history is no ordinary kind of story, one that faithfully relates its subject matter without affecting it in any way. These days, most of us would agree that telling such an objective and neutral story remains a utopian ideal. But the historiography of music that Treitler attacked rested on a different premise – that of the pleasure of narration, a pleasure that allows one to forget that narration not only relays but also constructs, forms its subject matter: “There is a satisfaction in narrative, a sheer narrative pleasure. [...] To narrate is to depict, and to evoke a sense of what happened. [...] Nothing is more satisfying than the formation of a pattern in one’s mind through which once disjunct items from the distant become recognizably connected past. [...] an important component of the satisfaction of history is the belief that one is depicting some real world of the past as it was [...]” (Treitler 1989: 167–168).

In other words, it is an archaeological kind of pleasure: real events, real people, excavated from the past and inserted into coherent stories, themselves supposedly recovered from that past, so that the seemingly chaotic morass of the past may be ordered, rationalised, and faithfully represented in meaningful narratives. History is a story and in most languages this is incontrovertible at least as far as etymology goes. Or, rather, it is a vast collection of stories that are waiting for the historian to unearth them from the historical data and faithfully retell them to her audience.

This historiographic outlook, the belief in the existence of coherent narratives in the past that are accessible to the historian, Treitler alternately labels “neopositivism” and “historicism”. In his understanding, both terms denote roughly the same conception of history: that events occur along the lines of causal narratives and that the historian’s job is to *uncover* and retell those narratives. In other words, events do not merely occur – they occur because they *have* to occur, having been caused by preceding events; therefore, understanding an event comes down not to understanding it in its own right, but to *discovering* its causes. “Historians fire on moving targets”, Treitler writes; “they cannot take aim without plotting their course [...] The historicist can answer the recurring question, ‘Who are we, and what do we stand for?’ only with reference to the past and the future” (Treitler 1989: 98).

And, as far as much of music historiography goes, Treitler is probably right. To support his point, he offers a number of examples from some venerable sources, such as Guido Adler’s *Methode der Musikgeschichte* (1919), for whom “[t]he task of music history is the investigation and the setting forth of the development paths of music” (Ibid.: 85). I might add that Raphael Georg Kiesewetter, writing his *History of*

the Modern Music of Western Europe almost a century earlier, likewise saw as his task to relate the “gradually progressive development of the art of sound to the present” (Kiesewetter 1973: 29–30).

But returning to Treitler and his critique of positivist musicology, which, in Gary Tomlinson’s phrase, “had taken the measure of the positivist approach to history” (Tomlinson 2007: 4), “(neo-)positivism” does not equal “historicism” and the story is a little more complex than the pleasure of the narrative, at least when it comes to the historiography of music. In fact, positivism and historicism (sometimes also referred to as “historism”) constituted in European and especially German historiography two fiercely opposed conceptual outlooks for much of the 19th century, with historicism finally winning the day after 1848, at least in German-speaking areas.² And this is particularly important for the historiography of music, because on either side of the Atlantic, Treitler’s “neopositivism” in our discipline was not only motivated by Cold War concerns. Rather, its roots reach much deeper into the history of general historiography, back to the pioneers of historiography in the United States, including Andrew D. White, John Fiske, and Henry and Brooks Adams. These scholars combined aspects of both historical positivism, foremost represented by Auguste Comte and Henry Thomas Buckle, and Prussian or later German historicism, defined by Ernst Troeltsch as “the fundamental historicisation of all our thinking about man, his culture and his values” (Beiser 2011: 2), foreshadowed by Wilhelm von Humboldt and championed by Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen. And as Treitler asserts, the influence and reverence of the Prussian School of historiography, led by Ranke, is chiefly to blame for the imposition of positivism and later “neopositivism” on the historiography of music, as its normative conception of history (Treitler 1989: 97).

To be sure, already in his lifetime, Ranke, “a groundbreaking figure in the history of historiography” (Braw 2007: 46), virtually hegemonised Germanic historiography; in Frederick Beiser’s assessment, he was “crucial in raising the scientific status of history in nineteenth-century Germany” with his pioneering critical method (Beiser 2011: 254–255). After him, the supreme prestige of the Prussian School, as the conceptual paradigm of the discipline, was only enhanced by his heirs, most notably Droysen. In Donald Kelly’s assessment, Ranke was “the doyen and leader of [the Prussian] school for two generations and more, as well as the source and symbol of an extraordinary posthumous legend, positive and negative, in Anglo- and Francophone as well as German and East European areas, and a large professional progeny. [...] Ranke was the father – the *Doktor-vater* – of a great extended family of scholars, of disciples, grand-disciples and great-grand-disciples over at least five academic generations” (Kelly 2003: 175).

Perhaps owing as much to his scholarly prestige as to the complicated and scholarly nepotistic institutional setup of German universities in the 19th century, through his pupils Ranke was able to hegemonise virtually all of Prussian and German history departments: “This credentialed elite came to monopolize chairs of history in more

² A good survey of the hostility to positivism prevailing among Germany’s leading historians for much of the 19th century is found in Phillips 2018.

than fifty German universities and to establish a scholarly community that was broken only (and even then only occasionally) by the upheavals of the Third Reich. Despite debates and revisionist moves this scholarly community preserved social and intellectual coherence over space and time and imposed a certain methodological and ideological orthodoxy on the interpretation of European as well as German history” (Kelly 2003: 175). Soon after 1850, through the works of Lord Acton, Edward Pusey, Goldwin Smith, and the aforementioned White and Fiske, the teaching of Ranke, whom Helmut Berding counts “among the greatest of historians” (Berding 2005: 41), achieved paradigmatic status in British and US historiography as well (Iggers 1968: 63–64). Therefore, by the time the new discipline of music historiography came into being, in the latter half of the 19th century, the conception of history championed by Ranke and the Prussian School had been accepted as normative both within and without the newly unified Germany’s borders. Thus it is only inevitable that Ranke should loom large in any account of the historiography of music in its nascent stages, as he does in the analyses of both Treitler and Dahlhaus.

But *pace* Treitler, Ranke would have never accepted the label of positivism. In fact, his entire project was motivated by his dissatisfaction with the rule of positivism in 18th- and 19th-century historiography. A late offspring of the Enlightenment, the historiographical positivism of Comte and Buckle was predicated on a dogmatic belief in the presence of scientific causality in the subject matter of history, as well as, concomitantly, in the applicability of causal deduction in the writing of history and the “discovery” of causal narratives in the past. Comte, Buckle, and other positivists modelled their methodologies after those of the natural sciences, which were at the time enjoying unprecedented cultural prestige (much as they do in our time as well, we might add). Briefly, positivist historiography sought to explain its subject matter – historical events and other historical phenomena – not directly but by “discovering” their causes and consequences; thus for instance, the French Revolution was “explained” by the deteriorating economic conditions of most of France’s population under Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI, the economic rise of the third estate, the arrogance and incompetence of Louis XVI and the nobility, and so on. Ultimately, the goal was to demonstrate the operation of universal natural laws in the history of humanity, and thus to order and rationalise the past.³

For Ranke, who considered every generation “equally immediate to God”, this amounted to no less than the violation of that same past. Positivism’s cardinal sin, Ranke believed, was the imposition of preconceived narratives on the past, to which preconceptions the past was then forced to conform and was therefore at once distorted. To facilitate a faithful representation of the past, Ranke and Droysen after him advocated instead a strictly historical contextualisation of every historical event and phenomenon and separate historiographical consideration of every historical period. “[E]very generation is immediate to God”, Ranke asserted, “and its worth is not at all based on what derives from it but rests in its own existence, in its own self” (Ranke 1973: 53).

3 For more on the reception of positivism in Germany, see, for instance, Fuchs 2000.

From the same standpoint, Ranke rejected Hegel's philosophical conception of history as the unstoppable unfolding of the Spirit and man's gradual progress to freedom (which both Ranke and Hegel and later Droysen, too, rather conveniently understood as the subject's "freely" chosen existence inside the existing political order). "To many", Beiser writes, "Ranke was the gallant knight of history who slayed the monster of Hegelianism" (Beiser 2011: 254). Thus "the gallant knight" asserted in his first lecture to King Maximilian II of Bavaria, given in 1854, that "[t]he doctrine according to which the world spirit produces things and uses human passions to achieve its goals is based on an utterly unworthy idea of God and mankind. Pursued to its logical conclusion consistently, this view can lead only to pantheism" (Ranke 1973: 55). Likewise Droysen, once a regular in Hegel's lectures at the University of Berlin, parted ideological company with the philosopher in his later years, sharing much of Ranke's motivation for his own anti-Hegelianism.⁴

But none of this is to say that there was no common ground between historicism and Hegel's philosophy of history or, for that matter, between historicism and historical positivism. For, just like the positivists and the idealists, Ranke, Droysen, and the historicists believed in history as a coherent, causal, teleological, and meaningful narrative waiting to be uncovered and retold by the historian. Thus Humboldt, one of historicism's early prophets, in 1821 lectured his audience at the University of Berlin on the task of the historian: "The fabric of events is spread out before him in seeming confusion, merely divided up chronologically and geographically. He must separate the necessary from the accidental, uncover its inner structure, and make visible the truly activating forces in order to give his presentation the form on which depends, not some imaginary or dispensable philosophical value or some poetical charm, but its truth and accuracy, its first and most essential requisite. For events are only half understood or are distorted, if one stops with their superficial appearance" (quoted in Ranke 1973: 10). In an 1830s manuscript Ranke likewise tells us that "[e]vents which are simultaneous[,] touch and affect each other; what precedes determines what follows; there is an inner connection of cause and effect. Although this causal nexus is not designated by dates, it exists nevertheless. It exists, and because it exists we must try to recognize it" (Ranke 1973: 40). The conclusion of a much later manuscript, dating from the 1860s, suggests that his basic convictions remained substantially the same until the end of his career: "we must work in two directions: the investigation of the effective forces behind events and the perception of their general connection" (Ibid.: 59).

While Droysen and his generation certainly cherished similar convictions, their conception of history was much more explicitly teleological than Ranke's.⁵ For the nationalist Droysen, who played an active role on Germany's political stage, the *telos* of all German and even world history was something much less lofty than Hegel's unfolding of the Spirit: it was the political unification of Germany under the domi-

4 On Droysen's complicated relationship with Hegel, see Southard 1995: 4–13.

5 For a detailed discussion of Droysen's *Historik* – his conceptions of historiography – see Assis 2014.

nation of Hohenzollern Prussia. For much of his career, Droysen was an active player on the German political scene. While still in Schleswig-Holstein, where he taught at the University of Kiel, he helped energise the Duchy's resistance to continued Danish rule and was very much the spokesman of German nationalism there. Later on, he stepped onto the national stage, as member of the Frankfurt *Volksparlament* for Schleswig-Holstein in 1848 and 1849. When in the final months of 1849 things went awry and the somewhat naive Frankfurt parliamentarians finally realised that their nationalist political agenda was not yet going to materialise, Droysen and many of his colleagues were forced to rethink their conceptions of history. In Droysen's case, this entailed a substantially more pragmatic outlook, with distinctly Darwinian overtones: whatever happened in past and present political struggles (for international politics always monopolised the scholarly attention of all the historians associated with the Prussian School) Droysen now legitimised as the logical outcome of invisible political forces, simply guided by the invisible hand of political power. While Droysen now realised that it still lay in the future, the unification of Germany remained for him the ultimate *telos* of history, and whatever happened in the meantime, even seemingly regressive developments such as Friedrich Wilhelm IV's refusal of the German crown, Droysen sought to legitimise as steps that had to be taken on the path to that *telos*. "All development and growth is movement toward an end, which is to be fulfilled by the movement, thus coming to its realization", he wrote in his influential *Historik*; "[i]n the moral world end links itself to end in an infinite chain" (Droysen 1893: 46–47).

One of the difficulties in Droysen's (and by extension Prussian) *Historik* or conception of history is that it implicitly appears to advocate political conservatism, or even passivism. For, if the invisible hand of history will take care of everything, why bother to do anything? In other words, what might be the purpose of human agency then? In fact, this was a major point of contention between Droysen and the much more cosmopolitan (and conservative) Ranke, who considered man's free will, understood theologically according to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, equally responsible for the progress of history as the invisible hand of God. Indeed, the preservation of free will was Ranke's main motive for rejecting both the positivist and Hegelian conceptions of history, which, according to the historian, threatened "to do away with human freedom and makes men into tools without a will of their own" (Ranke 1973: 51).

From an ethical point of view, however, a still greater difficulty in Droysen's understanding of history lies in his relativisation of all value, historical, ethical, political, and other. For, if all historical events are indispensable links in a vast teleological chain, then none of them can be deemed undesirable, no matter how appalling or atrocious they might be. This problem, implicit in all historicism, has been raised with varying degrees of concern in most studies of Germanic 19th-century historiography. Thus Paul Hamilton, for instance, acknowledges that historicism "progressively relativized all historical truth, making it a function of the particular culture or group to which it belonged". He then attempts to mitigate "the fear that this amounts to an uncontrolled relativism on the part of the historian or critic" by pointing out that "changeability in our view of the past is a condition of getting our present into proper perspective"

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(Hamilton 2003: 16). By contrast, Georg Iggers offers a damning and, in my mind, fair critique of historicism's ethical relativism, going so far as to accuse it of proto-fascism: "The classical national tradition of German historicism undoubtedly contributed to the atmosphere that facilitated the rise of an authoritarian regime and many of the historians in this tradition, but by no means all found it easy to come to terms with the Nazis" (Iggers 1968: xi). To do justice to Droysen, perhaps he would have rethought some of his core beliefs, had he lived to see the horrors of 1930s and 1940s Europe. By then, many in Germany and beyond had been forced to view historical "progress", like Walter Benjamin's angel of history, as "a single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage" (Benjamin 1969).

When it comes to the historiography of music, one need not look for too long to find traces of the historicist conception of history. To be sure, there is much historicist heritage in general as well as in music historiography that we should be thankful for. Crucially, historicism helped historiography attain the status of a modern scientific discipline, shedding much of its pre-Enlightenment metaphysical baggage along the way. Its agenda was "simple but ambitious: to legitimize history as a science", "to justify the scientific status of history" (Beiser 2011: 6–7). While the Neapolitan early 18th-century philosopher and historian Giambattista Vico has sometimes been hailed as a precursor of historicism, it was really the Prussian historians Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen who forcefully and irreversibly broke with both scholastic traditionalism on the one hand, and the *Diktat* of positivism and the natural-law conception of history on the other. In addition, as Peter Koslowski notes, historicism emancipated the human sciences "from the metaphysics of German Idealism" (Koslowski 2005: 4), at a time when Hegel's lectures at the University of Berlin were still thronged by the city's students, the young Droysen included. Ranke and Droysen's generations of Prussian and German historians are to be credited with the imposition on historiography of a scholarly respect for the past as its subject matter, which conditioned their thoroughness and care in dealing with historical sources. Without these basic tenets of the Prussian School, neither general nor music historiography would be conceivable as modern scholarly disciplines. Toward 1900 and beyond, the then nascent historiography of music benefited the most from the historicist treatment of the historical sources, which facilitated the discovery of vast repertoires of "early music", which had previously been all but forgotten. Only thanks to the historicist respect of history could the founding texts of music historiography be written, such as the large histories of Brendel, Ambros, Adler, and Riemann, to name but a few. The works of these figures unearthed a wealth of historical data without which our discipline would have been bereft of its subject matter.

However, musicology bears not only traces, but also scars from its historicist heritage. These are most conspicuous in the kinds of narratives that have, until recently, been normative in the historiography of music. In so many 19th- and 20th-century histories of music the "inconsequential", the "peripheral", the "backward" are winnowed from, to borrow Donald Francis Tovey's coinage, "the mainstream of history". Owing to its interest in the biographies of "great composers", which it adopted from general historiography's interest in "great men", the historiography of music has erected a

pantheon of masters, using as its foundation the remains of those “peripheral” ones who were not admitted into the core canon: most typically Schubert, Chopin, Mendelssohn, Tchaikovsky, Mahler, among others. In this way, the historicist conception of history as an amorally teleological narrative has served more often than not to uphold thinly veiled chauvinist prejudices. On a still larger scale, it has also legitimised the euro-centrism from which our discipline has not yet fully recovered and, when it comes to the historiography of European music, the focus on the “central” and the concomitant neglect of all the “peripheral” nations. Franz Brendel’s 1867 *Geschichte der Musik in Italien, Deutschland und Frankreich* is an early and quite explicit document of this valorisation.

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Of course, the present text is hardly the first complaint about the undesirable effects of the heritage of Prussian/German historicism in the historiography of music. For instance, in one of the essays assembled in *Music and the Historical Imagination*, Treitler concludes that “[i]n our quest for the sources of art we neglect its quality. We do so to the disadvantage of our faculty for judging artworks, for our standards of judgement have little to do with the ways in which we apprehend works” (Treitler 1989: 93–94). But the rest of Treitler’s conclusion suggests that his concerns rest elsewhere, away from the problems I have been discussing so far: “Then we are left with a history in which aesthetics and hermeneutics play no significant part” (Ibid.). Two concepts from these quotations are of utmost importance here: aesthetics and the work, the indispensable category of all music aesthetics since at least the late 18th century. Surprisingly, elsewhere in the same article Treitler blames the “essentialist” interpretation and usage of the work concept in the historiography of music for enabling the construction of distorting, “positivist” narratives: “at the core of each process of development [...] there must be something that is recognizably the same even while it changes with respect to its outer form. We affirm this in our willingness to name what it is that is undergoing development [...]” (Ibid.: 90). Treitler then goes on to outline the defining characteristics of the developmental-essentialist historiography of music: 1) it is predicated on a fixed, closed, and abstract conception of the (musical) work, of which essence individual instances are viewed as particular embodiments; 2) they are understood in terms of their antecedents and consequences; and 3) the history of music is presented as a teleological narrative of progressive (artistic) perfection.

By contrast, Dahlhaus shared few of Treitler’s concerns. In his view, not only are musical works “historical facts” with which a conscientious music historian must reckon, but they also define the “special nature” of music historiography and delineate it from general historiography: “Music historiography has a different legitimation from political historiography. It differs from its political counterpart in that the essential relics that it investigates from the past – the musical works – are primarily aesthetic objects and as such also represent an element of the present. [...] The concept ‘work’, and not ‘event’, is the cornerstone of music history” (Dahlhaus 1983: 4). Of course, a necessary ingredient of any such work-based historiography of music

is aesthetic autonomy – “a primary category for Dahlhaus” (Zagorski 2015: 252) but today a concept that is extremely difficult to sustain. On the left, some, most notably Adorno (in the guise of his “relative” aesthetic autonomy of music), have used it as the foundation of their music criticism. But on the whole, aesthetic autonomy has been attacked more often than not, which has rendered any notion of a music historiography predicated upon it increasingly precarious. For instance, Terry Eagleton offered a particularly compelling Marxian critique in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, as a phantasmatic sanctuary from the exigencies of advanced capitalism (Eagleton 1990). While aesthetic autonomy could perhaps be salvaged as one historiographic-interpretative paradigm among many, Dahlhaus subscribed to it in the strong sense, as a *reality* in the history of music: “aesthetic autonomy is not merely a methodological principle an historian is free to take or leave, but an historical fact that he has to accept” (Dahlhaus 1983: 28). And despite his declarative openness to the possibility of music historiographies based on different conceptual grounds, in a few instances Dahlhaus issues some quite surprising verdicts: “The aesthetic premise behind the history of reception – the thesis as to what music ‘really’ is – does not make good historiographical tender” (Ibid.: 39). This is, Dahlhaus tells us, because the historiography of music ought to be about music *qua poiesis* not *praxis*; in other words, the subject matter of music historiography should comprise not music itself as a cultural practice, but only the products of music inasmuch as they constitute musical works in Dahlhaus’s fixed understanding of the concept.

This strict adherence to aesthetic autonomy on Dahlhaus’s part was motivated by the sheer immensity of the repertory that music historiography must address and the necessity to reduce and organise that vast body of music into more manageable chunks. The aesthetic of music and music analysis as its main tool are meant to help us winnow the influential from the inconsequential, the great from the not-so-great, the canonical from the ephemeral. That is why, in Dahlhaus’s judgement, the canon “is at one and the same time a bothersome impediment to, and an indispensable mainstay of, historical criticism” (Ibid.: 97). While of course one cannot possibly discuss all the composers who ever lived, Dahlhaus’s assertion that the concept of greatness in music has only served us beneficently, that “[n]o-one had a burden to bear because Beethoven wielded authority in music”, (Ibid.: 6) will strike anyone at least vaguely familiar with the reception of, say, Schubert or Chopin in music scholarship as factually incorrect, if not also ethically bewildering.⁶

Although the difficulties entangled with the concepts of musical greatness, the work, and aesthetic autonomy are indeed challenging, one need not dismiss them altogether and thus throw out the baby with the bathwater. For, while we should no longer labour under its tyranny, we must accept that the aesthetic autonomy of music was at least a reality in the minds of such figures as Beethoven, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Walter Pater, and Adorno, and that ought to count for something in our dealings with music history. Aesthetic autonomy and its concomitant concepts have certainly regulated the production and reception of “art music” (for want of a better term) in much

6 For more on the (ab)use of Beethoven in the early reception of Chopin, see Cvejić 2016: 254–261.

of Europe at least since 1800, a historical fact we cannot afford to ignore. Few would deny that the final decades of the 18th century saw a paradigm shift in the conception of music in the West, whereby the disavowal of all social function became the *sine qua non* of all “great” music and especially instrumental, which was elevated from Johann Sulzer’s “pleasant nonsense” to the paradigm of all art, precisely on account of its non-referentiality that had marginalised it in the first place.

In this context, it might be worthwhile to remember Lydia Goehr’s theorisation of the work as a “regulative open” concept. Briefly, an open concept is determined by the different tasks it performs within a given cultural practice and only receives its meaning by functioning within that practice. A regulative open concept serves to determine, stabilise, and order the structure of a practice, by means of determining the normative content of its subsidiary concepts (for instance, in the case of 19th-century European “art music”, concepts such as “composer” or “score”) and associated ideals (for instance, perfect compliance with the score in performance). The regulation proceeds not by *Diktat* but by setting ideals, which can, by definition, only ever be approximated but never reached: “Recognizing something to be an ideal means that it is rarely if ever perfectly realized, this does not undermine its existence and force in any way” (Goehr 1992: 100). In this way – and this in my view constitutes Goehr’s greatest potential contribution to the historiography of music – we get to have our cake and eat it, too: we are forced neither to essentialise the work concept nor to ignore its regulative operation.

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In lieu of concluding, a few caveats: of course the construction of causal narratives will always have a role to play in the writing/doing/making of history; as both Dahlhaus and Treitler rightly observed, historiography would scarcely be conceivable without them. Also, it would be equally inadvisable to dismiss aesthetic autonomy and its satellite concepts. While we might agree with Eagleton and many others that aesthetic autonomy was always-already an ideological concept, it has nonetheless shaped the production and reception of European music for a long time and this should not be ignored. For instance, the collusion between German cultural nationalism on the one hand and so-called absolute music and aesthetic autonomy on the other is a complex and fascinating topic that has not yet received enough attention in music scholarship. The same can be said about similar ideological uses of historicism in music historiography. These are some of the areas that historical musicology, mindful of the heritage bequeathed to it by major figures such as Dahlhaus and Treitler, would do well to pursue.

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ЖАРКО ЦВЕЈИЋ

ИСТОРИЈА МУЗИКЕ И ПРОМИШЉАЊЕ ИСТОРИЗМА: СЕЋАЊЕ НА КАРЛА ДАЛХАУСА И ЛИЈА ТРАЈТЛЕРА

(РЕЗИМЕ)

Ове године, 2019, обележавамо 30. годишњицу преране смрти Карла Далхауса, као и 30 година од објављивања збирке написа под насловом *Music and the Historical Imagination* (Музика и промишљање историје) Лија Трајтлера, двојице великана музичке историографије у њеном изворном смислу – у смислу бављења историјом музике. Док су Трајтлерови пионирски радови у овој области, писани шездесетих и седамдесетих година прошлог века, већином сакупљени у овој књизи, Далхаус се овом проблематиком највише позабавио у књизи под насловом *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte* (Основи историје музике) из 1977. године. Обојица су исправно дијагностификовала дубински историјски утицај пруске школе историографије уопште а посебно историзма (*Historismus*), с Леополдом фон Ранкеом и Густавом Дројзенем на челу, на историографију музике као научну дисциплину (укључујући историјску музикологију) – нарочито Трајтлер, који је, додуше, мешао историзам с „неопозитивизмом“, што би Ранкеу, Дројзену и већини немачких историчара из XIX века било неприхватљиво. У погледу наслеђа историзма и позитивизма у историографији музике, главни проблеми тичу се сложених улога наративности и естетике, тачније појма (музичког) дела у писању историје музике, чији је утицај био и користан и штетан – користан јер је историчарима музике омогућавао научно утемељено бављење разним канонизованим репертоарима, али и штетан, јер је наметао и оправдавао занемаривање свих других.

Кључне речи: историја музике и историографија, историцизам, Леополд фон Ранке, Густав Дројзен, Лио Трајтлер, Карл Далхаус