

eventual persecution and mass expulsion during the wars of Yugoslav succession (1991–1995).

Katrin Boeckh analyses the compromises in the minority policies of communist Yugoslavia in 1945–1980. She claims that, as the experiment of *Yugoslavism* failed to consolidate the fragile political system of the first Yugoslavia, the communist elites in 1945 adopted the Marxist-Leninist solution, namely, the Soviet federal model. And from then on, if national feelings arose in Yugoslavia, it was necessarily due to the remnants of civil society and its ideological products, such as alleged Serbian unitarism and nationalism. Grave compromises that were made, such as granting collective without political rights, resulted in the appalling disintegration of Yugoslavia after the death of the communist dictator J. B. Tito, the last factor of ideological cohesion.

Finally, Vojislav Stanovčić offers an elaborate text on democracy in multi-ethnic societies. He underlines the importance of the rule of law, separation of powers, dispersion of power, pluralistic civil society and democratic political culture as prerequisites for truly democratic rule in multiethnic societies. Furthermore, he concludes that in multinational political entities, simple majority rule has to be

reshaped and strengthened with institutions of consociational democracy.

Overall, national questions, or minority questions, still continue to burden relations among the neighbouring states of the Balkan region. Even though some of these have already become full members of the European Union, the standards of promotion and protection of minority rights are far from being thoroughly implemented. Besides, various legacies of the past and many unresolved (even unaddressed) issues will continue to set the minority questions on the top of the Balkan political agenda. It is a fact that mono-ethnic nation-states in the Balkans are non-existent. Contemporaries are, therefore, facing a dilemma: should they search for institutional arrangements that can enable and enhance peaceful and progressive coexistence or should they continue promoting models of domination over minority groups, which often involve outbursts of ethnic or religious hatred, pogroms, or forced assimilation? The *Minorities in the Balkans* not only assesses the failure of former Balkan minority policies, but expresses a clear message that what is needed is a sustained commitment to nurturing tolerance and diversity as fundamental democratic principles and widely held social values.

ROBERT M. HAYDEN, *FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO THE WESTERN BALKANS: STUDIES OF A EUROPEAN DISUNION, 1991–2011*. LEIDEN: BRILL, 2013, pp. 406.

Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević*

The new book by Robert M. Hayden, professor of anthropology, law and international affairs, and director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, makes a significant contribution to the knowledge and unbiased understanding of the Yugoslav crisis and its various aspects. Its particular

merit is that the research into phenomena is done across disciplinary perspectives (law, political science, anthropology, philosophy and ethics, psychology, sociology). Based on fact, Hayden's well-argued discussion largely explains the causes of the

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war among the once “brotherly peoples” in the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only Yugoslav entity with no single majority ethnic group. In dignified contrast to widespread prejudices and constructs of the Balkans, so amply present in current academic and popular writing, Professor Hayden’s balanced, convincing and unpretentious conclusions demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the history and culture of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and provide the groundwork for a more objective approach to the study of the Balkans in the West.

The first part of the book analyses the causes of the collapse of the principles on which the life of South Slavs under one state roof was premised, notably in the course of the 1980s. One of the focuses is the “brotherhood and unity” principle on which the Titoist system of post-Second World War Yugoslavia was predicated. Contrary to the widespread stereotype of the Balkans as a region of dissent and hatred which has little in common with European culture, Hayden suggests that the peoples of Yugoslavia were accustomed to living together and aware of potential threats to such a way of life, and that, therefore, it took much effort to make them start shooting at each other: “Before beginning the analysis, however, a few comments on the similarities among and distinctions between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims are in order. [...] suffice it to say that there are as many ‘objective’ differences (e.g., of language [dialect], religion, food, economy) between Bavarians and Prussians than between Serbs and Croats, and not many more between these peoples and the Bosnian Muslims.” Hayden also finds that the breaking of the union of the Yugoslav peoples was a process unfolding in stages, initially manifest in the introduction in public discourse of hatred-inducing “negative stereotypes” dating from the Second World War. These

efforts, aided by many intellectuals, were successful because they were complementary. Thus, many Croat intellectuals and politicians began to subsume, unjustifiably, all Serbs under the “chetnik” category, and some Serbs adopted the emblems and slogans of the chetnik movement. On the other hand, many Serbian intellectuals and politicians subsumed, unjustifiably again, all Croats under the term “ustasha”, and leading Croatian politicians and intellectuals adopted ustasha emblems and slogans. Speaking of a later phase, when hostilities already began, Hayden says: “While the war included a large array of political actors and their military and paramilitary groups, the Četniks and Ustaša came to symbolize the worst elements of murderous extreme nationalists among Serbs and Croats [...] The personal styles of Četniks and Ustaša marked the members of the two groups more than did their uniforms. [...] In part, the Ustaša resembled their mentors, the Nazis, while the Četniks invoked images of the hajduks, hill bandits famed for their opposition to the Ottoman rulers. More importantly, though, the grooming styles of Četniks and Ustaša reflected the difference between Orthodox and Catholic clergy. Since the confessional difference had become the defining characteristic distinguishing Serbs from Croats, the immediate reflection of this in the physical appearance of the two groups of fighters was part of an overriding symbolic structure of distinction.” The ultimate result was the demonised image of one group in the eyes of the other, which led to further tensions and, eventually, to bloodshed between the two numerically strongest ethnic communities, Serbs and Croats, which naturally affected all other interethnic relations. Socialist Yugoslavia had constructed a negative image of both chetniks and ustashes, and their public promotion was prohibited by law. In the 1980s, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

criticised this as infringement of freedom of speech. It now is obvious that the reaffirmation of the two terms and of what they stood for eventually took a heavy toll in human lives, and Hayden rightly draws attention to the fact that today these same organisations might well support such a ban as controlling “hate speech”. As the conflict escalated, the discrepancy grew between their policy of human rights protection of the 1980s, when they had criticised Yugoslav authorities for repressing nationalistic attitudes and statements, and their policy since the 1990s, when they began to criminalise nationalistic public discourse.

The second part of the book sheds light on the emergence of all particular, mostly economic, programmes which gave a further impetus to nationalisms, undermining the Yugoslav state idea and creating the atmosphere in which all troubles were blamed on “others”. Hayden gives the examples of the Slovenian National Programme and the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy: “Thus at the same time that the ‘group of intellectuals’ at the Serbian Academy was writing the Memorandum, a conceptually similar Slovenian National Program was being written by a group of Slovenian intellectuals. It should be noted that this expression of Slovenian nationalism, which revealed a strong bias against Yugoslavs from all other republics, arose before Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia, and he was able to build some of his earliest appeal in Serbia by seeming to counter Slovenian attacks on Serbia.” As for the similar developments in Croatia, Hayden draws attention to the book (*Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti*) of the future president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, published in 1990. The book justifies genocide in general and the genocide against the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45) in particular, by claiming that “throughout history there have always been attempts at a ‘fi-

nal solution’ for foreign and undesirable racial-ethnic or religious groups through expulsion, extermination, and conversion to the ‘true religion’. [...] It is a vain task to attempt to ascertain the rise of all or some forms of genocidal activity in only some historical period. Since time immemorial, they [genocidal practices] have always existed in one or another form, with similar consequences in regard to their own place and time, regardless of their differences in proportion or origin.

The Yugoslav union-breaking endeavour was supported by many prominent “national” intellectuals of the 1980s, paving the way for the disintegration of the common state and the surge of mass violence in the wars of 1991–95. These bloody conflicts introduced into international communication the term “ethnic cleansing” to denote forced and permanent expulsion of members of one ethnic, national or religious group from the regions in which they are living in order to group these regions into a national territory of the group that carries out the expulsion. Over time, this process became part of a broader set of genocide accusations, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly through a well-run campaign of Bosnian Muslims (later renamed Bosniaks). In Hayden’s view, the horrible crimes committed in Bosnia were in fact misused to draw analogy with the Holocaust, with which they were not comparable. Arguing that accusations for genocide were not a new thing in Yugoslavia, that they were used to foment conflict in the first place, Hayden analyses the politicised use of the terms “ethnic cleansing”, “genocide” and “population transfer” in order to remove all vagueness and to highlight subtle differences between them. He argues that the political use of these terms depended on the political response the user expected to produce: if the goal was to incite action against one of the parties in conflict, the latter was accused for genocide; if the

goal was only to denounce and demonise one side without calling for action against it, then the term of choice was “ethnic cleansing”. The term “population transfer” was also used in negative connotations, being unfortunate and inhumane, but an unavoidable or, at a given moment, only solution. In conclusion to his in-depth discussion on this delicate and intricate topic, Hayden expresses his own view on genocide and ethnic cleansing using the example of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “So let me be blunt: ‘genocide’ draws its moral force, and conceptual horror, precisely because of the exceptional nature of the Holocaust. Hitler wanted the Jews utterly exterminated, not simply driven from particular places. Ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, involves precisely such removals rather than extermination, and is not exceptional, but rather common in particular circumstances. Further, ethnic cleansing may be sponsored by the very powers that profess horror at genocide. In other words, ethnic cleansing may lead to international rewards. The rhetorical device of labeling some ethnic cleansing ‘genocide,’ and other ethnic cleansing a ‘population transfer,’ constitutes the legitimization in the second case of what, to the victims, is surely a process of horror.” Finally, Hayden looks into the phenomenon of mass rape during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making estimates of the intensity, frequency and spatial and temporal distribution of such assaults, and comparing the data with similar occurrences in South Asia.

The third part of the book enters the field of ethics. It deals with that which had to be protected during the war and mass violence in the former Yugoslavia – human rights, and with all international actions whose goal was human rights protection. Hayden finds that war developments in the former Yugoslavia led to boundaries of some principles, hitherto standard in international relations, being

moved: the principle of state sovereignty withdrew before the universally accepted demand for mandatory protection of human rights, which involves the obligation of the international community to intervene anywhere in the world in the event of organised and mass violence, even against the will of the government in whose territory the violence is taking place. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, a special international tribunal (ICTY) has been set up for prosecuting persons responsible for crimes committed during the wars of 1991–95 and 1999. Hayden analyses the policy of the international community towards the warring parties, stressing that only a small amount of money was set aside for those who needed it the most, while most of it went to the Tribunal, its staff and experts, with expectedly unsatisfactory results. He criticises the flawed proceedings of the Tribunal in many cases, which has been eroding its authority and its professed role as an aid in achieving reconciliation.

The fourth and last part of the book is devoted to the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1995 Dayton-Paris agreement which ended the war. Carefully analysing the political structure of, and relations within, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hayden argues that the international community has been carrying out a sort of a constitutional experiment, creating a democracy without a “demos”, given that there has never been a single population as a political unit, as a basis for democracy, but three political electorates with their particular political demands. Hayden also suggests that there have been attempts, usually through external pressure, to constitute a single political community using various unfounded myths and ideological premises (such as a myth of a single Bosnian people divided into Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics), most of them ending in failure and producing further

polarisations in society: “The lack of use of the general term ‘Bosnian’ as a noun to describe the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is symptomatic of the absence of a self-defined Bosnian nation that includes all of the peoples living there. Overwhelmingly, the Serbs and Croats classify themselves apart from the Muslims and from the idea of a Bosnian state, preferring to describe themselves as Serbs and Croats and to accede to Serbia and Croatia, respectively. Many Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina are as likely now to identify themselves as ‘Bosnians’ as the Muslims of Pakistan are to identify themselves as Indians. The Muslim utilization of ‘Bosniak’ to describe themselves stresses their own connection to Bosnia, but thereby implies a Muslim identity for the population of the country. Thus the terminologies of description used since 1991 by the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to describe themselves indicate the lack of a shared concept of a Bosnian nation.”

Hayden analyses the attempt of the USA to impose a constitutional order that would ensure domination of one people (Muslims/Bosniaks) over the other two (Serbs and Croats), which also ended in failure, for each of the three peoples has its own programme and vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina ever since the first multiparty elections held in 1991. On the surface, each of the three ethnic groups elects its representation. Their powers, however, are limited by the broad powers of an international authority, including the power to impose laws and recall the elected organs if they are “found” to be in violation of the constitution, something already seen both under socialist Yugoslavia and, earlier, under Austria-Hungary.

In conclusion, the author points out that Yugoslavia was a multiethnic state which disintegrated in blood under the pressure of a number of factors, and that its experience may prove to be invaluable to a similar multiethnic community, the European Union.

KNJIŽEVNA ŽIVOTINJA. KULTURNI BESTIJRAJ II. DIO

[THE LITERARY ANIMAL. A CULTURAL BESTIARY. PART 2].

ED. BY SUZANA MARJANIĆ AND ANTONIJA ZARADIJA KIŠ. ZAGREB: CROATIAN UNIVERSITY PRESS AND INSTITUTE OF ETHNOLOGY AND FOLKLORE RESEARCH, 2012, pp. 1144.

Reviewed by Ljubica Djurić*

The thematic volume *Književna životinja. Kulturni bestijraj II. dio*. [Literary Animal. A Cultural Bestiary, Part 2] was published in 2012 by Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada [Croatian University Press] and Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, as part of the research project “Cultural animal studies: literary, folkloristic, ethnological and anthropological contributions” directed by Antonija Zaradija Kiš. While the first volume (published in 2007; see review by Smiljana Djordjević in *Balca-*

nica XXXVIII) explored the ethnological, anthropological and folkloristic aspects of the animal, this second volume views the animal as a literary fact, from the earliest literary works until today. However, not all of the articles focus exclusively on the animal in the light of literary interpretation: some include a very strong zooethical dimension. By analyzing literary works, the

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