Формално сазнање и садржински доживљај: дистинкција епистемичких форми у логичком позитивизму

Abstract

The philosophy of logical positivism has recognized the tendencies of zeitgeist and the need to restate the aim and task of philosophizing in their light. The logical respectively linguistic turn is taken as the pivot of changes within the contemporary philosophy. A small-minded and hasty interpretation of the positivistic way of thinking may recognize it only as a reductionism which presupposes that all propositions must be refuted or qualified as meaningless if they cannot be empirically verified (in the case of metaphysical statements). Although it is true that logical positivists lay claim to the postulate of empirical verifiability and the primacy of scientific methodology, their metaphilosophical reflections should not be ignored, i. e. their attempt to meaningfully define philosophy as a potential form of knowledge in relation to sciences (especially natural ones). The differentiation of epistemic forms in the philosophy of logical positivism – especially in Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap – should be pointed out in the article, that is, the distinction between purely formal and content-related momentum, discursive and intuitive aspect of our relation to the world, which is the basis of the above-mentioned differentiation. It will be turned out that our knowledge about the world and our subjective experience [Erlebnis] are two completely different ways how we cognitively refer to objects and events in the world – the former isrelated to the form, the latter to the content of cognition. Members of the Vienna Circle have elaborated their theories ranging from scientific realism to moderate versions of constructivism. While Schlick elaborates the use of the “method of coincidences” in General Theory of Knowledge (1918/1925), in his main work, The Logical Structure of the World (1928), Carnap formulates a “constitutional system” in which special terms and propositions are derived from basic ones. If logical positivists recognize the essence of scientific knowledge in its formal and symbolic component, then the importance of philosophical thought maybe should be seen in the elaboration of the qualitative moment. The task of this consideration lies both in the presentation of different epistemic forms in logical positivists as well as in showing the benefits this presentation would imply for the very definition of philosophy according to which philosophy would not have to risk a fruitless competition with science (that was the case with traditional metaphysics). Moreover, philosophy could finally recognize its true purpose and find out whether it is a special kind of gaining knowledge and thus something more than “metaphysical poetry” [Begriffsdichtung].

Филозофија логичког позитивизма препознала је тенденције времена и потребу да се под њиховим утицајем изнова формулишу циљеви и задаци филозофије. Иако је тачно да се у њему заступа постулат емпиријске проверљивости и примат научне методологије, не треба из вида изгубити метафилозофске рефлексије логичког позитивизма, његов појмовни напор да се филозофија смислено одреди као могућа форма сазнања спрам свог односа према наукама (пре свега: оним природним). У прилогу треба да се укаже на диференцијацију епистемичких форми у филозофији логичког позитивизма – посебно код Морица Шлика и Рудолфа Карнапа – одн. на разликовање чисто формалног и садржинског момента, дискурзивне и интуитивне стране когнитивног односа према свету као њено полазиште. Ако се суштина научног сазнања види у његовом формално-симболичком моменту, онда би допринос филозофске мисли можда требало тражити у разради квалитативног момента. Захваљујући њему, она не би морала да ступа у непотребну конкуренцију с наукама, како је то био случај с традиционалном метафизиком, већ би коначно могла да препозна у чему лежи њен смисао и шта су њени реални домети.